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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background of the Research 
A clean and healthy environment is part of a prosperous society. Yet, continued economic growth, both in 
industrialised and developing countries, has put pressure on the environment. At times, industrial or other 
activities cause considerable damage to the environment with, for example, contaminated soil or 
contaminated groundwater as a result. Therefore, protection and restoration of the environment has 
become a growing global governmental concern. Yet, developing an environmental policy that best 
prevents pollution and ensures restoration of the environment after damage has occurred, is a highly 
complex matter. 
Firstly, governments face different choices when deciding upon the policy instruments to use to 
protect their environment. Generally, governments have introduced a framework of public law and 
regulations in order to reduce pollution and to protect their environment from further damage. This public 
law framework has frequently been complemented with liability rules for environmentally harmful 
discharges. Environmental liability rules belong to the private law domain and have become often-used 
provisions in national law as well as in international conventions. In the 1970’s, environmental economists 
moreover introduced the idea of using incentive instruments like marketable permits or licences and 
emission charges to reduce pollution. However, these incentive instruments still only play a minor role in 
the protection of the environment. 
Secondly, besides deciding upon the policy instruments to protect the environment, governments also 
face the choice of how to organise their environmental policy. Federal states must especially make a choice 
between a uniform, harmonised policy for all regions, a differentiated policy for each state, depending upon 
the specific problems of the region, or a solution of mixed competences. Federal systems, for example like 
the European Union1 or the United States, both composed of various states, therefore have to decide not 
only on the choice of instruments but also on the decision-making level for environmental policy. 
Scholars became interested in the complex question of what environmental policy to choose and at 
which level that policy should be designed in a federal system. Harmonisation of environmental regulation 
became a frequently debated issue in political as well as in academic circles from the late 1960’s and 1970’s 
in the United States and from in the 1980’s in the European Union. Indeed, with the adoption of the 
European Single Act in 1986, the European Union obtained the explicit competence to regulate the 
environment. 
Environmental federalism scholars studied at which level environmental policy could best be set, 
given specific circumstances and developed frameworks for the assessment of the `optimal policy level’ of 
environmental policy instruments in general.2 Besides general analyses, attention was also given to 
environmental policy instruments in particular, such as environmental liability rules. The contribution of 
liability rules to the prevention and restoration of environmental damage and the optimal level of these 
rules has become a frequently discussed issue in academic as well as in political debates. Consequently, 
some scholars have examined the `optimal policy level’ for environmental liability rules in a federal 
system.3 
Yet, in the European Union, the debate did not remain merely theoretical. Indeed, the desire to 
harmonise environmental liability rules in the European Union already existed at a European level for 
about 20 years. On 21 April 2004, Directive 2004/35/CE on Environmental Liability with Regard to the 
                                                             
1  Lawyers may disagree that the European Union is a federal system, and would rather qualify the European Union as a 
multi-level governance system. Yet, in the Law and Economics literature, on which this research is based, the term 
`federal system’ is commonly used to indicate a multi-level regulatory structure. Therefore, the use of the term `federal 
system’ in this research should not have a legal interpretation, but rather be interpreted as a system in which there is 
regulation at different levels of government. 
2  See for example Esty 1996, 570-653 or Revesz 2001a, 3-29. 
3  See for example Faure 2003a, 31-82. 
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Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage was finally adopted. The Member States have until 
31 April 2007 to transpose the Directive into national law. 
The development process of the Environmental Liability Directive gave rise to much controversy and 
conflict and resulted in animated academic debates on the role of liability rules for environmental damage 
and on the question whether a harmonisation of liability rules in the European Union would better protect 
the environment from damage to occur and ensure restoration in case of an accident. 
In this doctoral research I will examine whether the harmonisation of environmental liability rules in 
the European Union corresponds with the optimal policy level of environmental liability rules as 
propounded by the economic theory on federalism and, if not, how harmonisation of environmental 
liability rules can be explained in the European Union. In particular, this research will examine the 
existence of the Environmental Liability Directive from a public interest approach as well as a private 
interest approach. As the analysis of the optimal level of liability rules for environmental damage in general 
is a very broad subject, I will use liability rules for soil pollution as a case-study throughout this research. 
The choice to use liability rules for soil pollution as an illustration is not arbitrary. The optimal policy level 
of liability rules for soil pollution has not been examined in much detail up to now. Moreover, soil 
(pollution) can be seen as a — predominantly local — public good, on which federalism-theories can be 
perfectly applied. 
By this comparison of theory and actual situation in the European Union, this PhD research aims to 
refine the existing scholarly debate on the optimal decision-making level of environmental regulation. 
Refinements to the existing theory will be added in two ways. Firstly, the `optimal policy level’ of 
liability rules in a federal system will be examined not only from a public interest approach but also from a 
private interest approach. Accordingly, a theoretical framework on the optimal decision-making level for 
liability rules for environmental damage in a federal system will be developed. Secondly, the theoretical 
framework will be applied to the harmonisation of environmental liability through Directive 2004/35/CE 
in the European Union in order to unravel all factors that played a role in the harmonisation of 
environmental liability in the European Union. As a case-study, the harmonisation of liability for soil 
pollution by means of the Directive will be studied. This case-study will again refine the existing scholarly 
debate. As such, this doctoral research might provide a better understanding of all factors that have to be 
taken into account when deciding upon the optimal decision-making level of liability rules for 
environmental damage. This understanding may provide a useful guidance for other kinds of 
environmental policies. Furthermore, the research would not only provide a contribution to the theory on 
environmental federalism, but would also have practical relevance, with respect to environmental policy in 
the European Union. 
1.2. Problem Definition 
The diverse arguments pro and contra harmonisation of environmental regulation and the sometimes 
fierce debates on harmonisation at an academic as well as at a political level incite the research question of 
this PhD: was harmonisation of environmental liability rules in the European Union, including liability rules for soil 
pollution, desirable from an economic point of view and for what reasons did harmonisation take place? Yet, the 
harmonisation debate is a very complex one, and therefore, in order to answer this research question, 
subquestions will have to be formulated. 
In order to point out the relevance of this research, the first of these questions is: what is the contribution 
of environmental liability rules in the prevention and restoration of environmental damage and which type of liability 
rule would be best to prevent and restore environmental damage? Indeed, prior to the question at which level 
liability rules for environmental damage can be best decided, the question what liability rule would be most 
efficient from an economic point of view to prevent and restore this damage must be answered. To answer 
this question, the economic analysis of tort law will be applied to liability for environmental damage. As 
soil pollution is the case-study throughout this research, the economic analysis will also be applied to 
liability for soil pollution. 
Next, the optimal decision-making level at which liability rules for environmental damage might be 
decided in a federal system as the European Union can be examined. Therefore, the second question is: what 
is the optimal decision-making level of liability rules for environmental damage in a federal system from a theoretical 
perspective? In order to answer this question, the arguments of the so-called public interest approach and the 
private interest approach on harmonisation will have to be examined. The former approach looks at 
regulation as a correction for market failure and assumes that governments and other public agencies are 
able to correct market failures; the latter approach stresses the role of interest groups in the law-making 
process and emphasises the danger of government failure as a result of lobbying by interest groups. Again, 
the optimal level of liability rules for soil pollution will be taken as an example. 
  Chapter 1 
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The answers to the above two questions would allow the development of a theoretical framework on 
the optimal decision-making level of liability rules for environmental damage, including liability for soil 
pollution. This framework can accordingly be tested to the harmonisation of environmental liability rules, 
including liability rules for soil pollution, through Directive 2004/35/CE in the European Union. 
Turning to the European situation, first, an insight in the development process and the provisions of 
Directive 2004/35/EC would seem to be appropriate. A third sub-question will therefore be: for what reasons 
did the Community consider harmonisation of environmental liability rules necessary and what are the scope and the 
provisions of Directive 2004/35/CE on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of 
Environmental Damage, known as the Environmental Liability Directive, also with respect to soil pollution? In order 
to answer this question, in a first step, the competence of the European Union to harmonise environmental 
liability rules will have to be clarified. Next, the development process of Directive 2004/35/CE — or the 
Environmental Liability Directive — and the reasons provided for by the Community for the harmonisation 
of environmental liability rules at European level will be discussed. Then, the Directive’s provisions and its 
application to soil pollution can be studied. 
Finally, whether the harmonisation of environmental liability rules, including liability rules for soil 
pollution, through the Environmental Liability Directive, corresponds with the predictions of the theoretical 
framework presented above can be examined. The fourth and last subquestion would therefore be: does the 
Environmental Liability Directive correspond with the theoretical framework, with respect to economic efficiency as 
well as to the decision-making level of liability rules for environmental damage and, if not, why was harmonisation of 
environmental liability rules, including liability rules for soil pollution, considered necessary in the European Union? 
As for the theoretical analysis, again, it would be appropriate to examine first whether the liability regime 
as proposed by the Directive could be considered as efficient. This is independent from the question on the 
optimal decision-making level of liability rules for environmental damage. Secondly, the optimal decision-
making level of liability rules for environmental damage, including soil pollution, can be examined for the 
particular case of the European Union. The arguments that where provided by the Community to justify the 
Directive will be examined both from a public interest approach and a private interest approach. In this 
way, the examination of the Environmental Liability Directive complements the theoretical framework and 
might offer a better understanding of all factors that play a role in a harmonisation debate. 
On the basis of these four questions an answer to the main research question can be formulated. By 
answering this question, this doctoral research might provide a better understanding of all factors that can 
be taken into account when deciding upon the harmonisation of environmental rules in a federal system. 
1.3. Research Methodology 
Academic research is usually pursued from a specific background. In order to answer the research 
questions raised above the economic analysis of law, also known as `Law and Economics’ methodology, 
will be used in this PhD. Law and Economics research can be understood as the application of economic 
theory, primarily micro-economic efficiency analysis and basic concepts of welfare economics, to examine 
the formation, structure and economic impact of law, in this case tort law.4 
Recognition of the impact of legal rules on economic behaviour has existed for almost a century, at 
least, and can even be traced back to the work of Adam Smith. However, law and economics research only 
came of age as a separate research discipline in the 1960’s and 1970’s. The dominant school of thought 
within Law and Economics research methodology became the Chicago approach to law and economics. The 
Chicago school primarily emphasises an efficiency analysis of legal rules. The works of scholars like Coase 
and Posner are considered as the core of the Chicago approach to law and economics.5 
As soon as the 1970’s, the Chicago approach, which focuses on economic efficiency6 to explain existing 
law and to prescribe efficient rules, was criticised. The growing awareness of the role of institutions, the 
importance of social norms and other social science theories in the formation of law, resulted in the 
emergence of distinct schools or complements to the Chicago law and economics approach. Nowadays, the 
Institutional law and economics school (Goldberg, Samuels), the Neoinstitutional school (North, 
                                                             
4  Mercuro & Medema 2006. For other introductions to law and economics methodology, see also Bouckaert & De Geest 
2000 and Faure & Van den Bergh 1989. 
5  See Coase 1960, 1-44 and Posner 1998 (first edition 1973), e.a. 
6  The term `economic efficiency’ merits a short explanation. Efficiency in the standard definition of the Chicago approach is 
mostly based on the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion. This efficiency criterion can be understood as stating that a change 
in legal rules is efficient if the gainers gain more than the losers lose, so that the gainers of this change in law could 
compensate the losers and still have profit from it. However, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not require that the losers 
are effectively compensated, this is hypothetical and therefore this criterion has been critiqued. Put differently, the 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion states that the wealth of society as a whole must be increased by a change in law. 
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Williamson), the Austrian school (Hayek, Rizzo) and the Public Choice approach (Buchanan, Tullock, 
Olson), focusing on rent seeking behaviour to explain the formation of legal rules, can be placed beside the 
Chicago approach. The Yale School (Rose-Ackerman, Calabresi, Schwarz) is not usually seen as a distinct 
school, but as an enrichment of the Chicago approach. The Yale School approach adopts the methodology 
of the Chicago School but believes in a larger need for government intervention and pleads for recognition 
of allocative and distributional impacts of legal rules and a concern for justice and fairness.7 
The first part of this research aims at developing a framework for decision-making that would offer 
criteria to determine an optimal or efficient level of liability rules for environmental damage in a federal 
system and can be seen as a positive economic analysis of tort law. 
In a first step, the economic analysis of tort law will be used to examine which type of liability rule 
would most efficiently prevent and restore environmental damage, including soil pollution, from an 
economic point of view. 
Next, the optimal decision-making level of liability rules for environmental damage will be examined. 
Yet, in a federal system, the debate on the harmonisation of liability rules for environmental damage, 
including soil pollution, is a very complex matter with a lot of factors that have to be taken into account and 
that need to be unravelled. Therefore, a deeper understanding of this complex matter in the real world can 
only be gained by studying the problem from different angels. This research will therefore look at the 
problem from two different theoretical perspectives within Law and Economics methodology that can both 
bring useful contributions to the underlying problem. Both perspectives will be brought together in order to 
provide an overall assessment. 
The first perspective, called public interest approach, is based on Chicago School of Law and 
Economics, complemented with components of Yale School of Law and Economics. Economic efficiency 
criteria will be used to examine the appropriate federal structure for environmental liability rules, a method 
that is usually called the theory of federalism.8 This involves careful weighing of all arguments in favour or 
against assigning responsibility to a certain level of government, which can be the central or national 
government or a more local level of government. Besides the purely economic arguments, non-economic 
arguments will also be taken into account. However, the level of regulation may appear inefficient 
according to the theory on federalism, or the content of the regulation may be inexplicable on the basis of 
the public interest approach. Therefore, a second perspective, that provides insights in the actual division of 
power between the central level and the local level in a federal system, is needed. 
This second perspective, called private interest approach, is based on Public Choice theory. Obviously, 
environmental rules can have important economic implications. Therefore, rent seeking behaviour and 
lobbying of different interest groups in the law making process should not be ignored. Public Choice theory 
looks critically at the belief that government officials would only develop regulations in the public interest. 
Moreover, Public Choice theory critically examines the role of the people that have to be regulated, and 
how pressure groups might try to steer the law making process. Politicians may develop regulation that 
does not (only) serve the public interest, but which is in fact for the benefit of one or another pressure 
group, this in return for votes at an election and other forms of support.9 Hence, the use of Public Choice 
theory might help to unveil reasons for the harmonisation of environmental liability rules in the European 
Union that cannot be explained by the economic theory of federalism. 
Indeed, although the public interest approach, based on welfare and efficiency criteria, and the private 
interest approach, based on Public Choice theory, use different conceptual starting points, the approaches 
complement each other. The reasons for a certain policy can sometimes be best understood if not only the 
public interest, but also the behaviour of the government officials and pressure groups is taken into 
account. Hence, the combined use of both approaches might be the best way to develop a framework for 
decision-making on the optimal level of liability rules for environmental damage, including soil pollution, 
in a federal system. 
The second part of this research consists of a presentation and examination of Directive 2004/35/CE 
on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, by 
which the Community intends to harmonise environmental liability rules in the European Union. After 
providing an insight into the development process and contents of the Directive, the theoretical framework 
can be tested. 
In a first step, an efficiency analysis of the Directive, based on the economic analysis of tort law, will 
be provided. The efficiency of a liability regime in preventing and restoring environmental damage is 
independent of the level of regulation. At each decision-making level inefficiencies may arise. However, it 
                                                             
7  See Teijl & Holzhauer 1990 617-631 and Mackaay 2000, 402-415. 
8  Inman & Rubinfeld 2000. 
9  See for instance De Geest 1990, 666-673 and Faure & Van den Bergh 1989, 148-152. 
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is interesting to study whether the Environmental Liability Directive will be able to achieve the aims of 
prevention and restoration of environmental damage, and of soil pollution as an illustration, before 
studying whether the harmonisation of environmental liability rules in the European Union would be 
justified from an economic perspective. 
Next, the public interest approach and the private interest approach will be applied to the 
harmonisation of environmental liability rules in the European Union by means of the Directive. Whether 
the justifications for the harmonisation of environmental liability rules, including liability for soil pollution, 
in the European Union correspond with the economic theory of federalism, will be examined. As a 
complement to this public interest approach, a private interest approach, based on public choice theory, will 
be used to examine whether rent seeking behaviour has played a role in the harmonisation of 
environmental liability rules in the European Union, and to what extent rent seeking behaviour has 
influenced the content of the Directive itself. This part of the research can also be seen as a positive analysis 
of tort law. However, those who wish to do so can of course use the results at the policy level to capture 
competences for environmental law making in a federal system on the basis of economic efficiency criteria. 
1.4. Structure 
The structure of this doctoral research follows directly from the research questions defined above. The 
theoretical framework for deciding on the optimal level of liability rules for environmental damage in a 
federal system, with the example of soil pollution, will be developed in chapters 2 and 3. 
Chapter 2 will provide an introduction into the economic analysis of tort law, and will apply this 
theory to environmental liability. The contribution of environmental liability rules to prevention and 
restoration of environmental damage will be shown by means of an assessment of other instruments for the 
prevention of environmental damage, in general, and soil pollution, in particular, such as regulation, 
marketable permits and pollution taxes. Moreover, interdependencies between liability rules and regulation 
will be made clear. Finally, the contribution of liability rules to the prevention and restoration of 
environmental damage, and of soil pollution as an example thereof, will be clarified. Readers familiar with 
this analysis might skip chapter 2 and immediately go to chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 will examine the optimal decision-making level for environmental damage liability rules in 
a federal system from two different theoretical perspectives, a public interest approach and a private 
interest approach. Firstly, the problem will be studied from a public interest perspective. Based on the 
theory of federalism, economic efficiency criteria will be used to examine the appropriate federal structure 
for environmental liability rules. This involves careful consideration of all arguments in favour or against 
assigning responsibility to a certain level of government. Besides economic arguments, non-economic 
arguments will also be taken into account, like the right to high environmental quality for all citizens. 
Secondly, a private interest approach, using public choice theory, will be applied to liability rules for 
environmental damage. 
The framework that will accordingly be developed, aims at providing guidance on the optimal policy 
level of environmental damage liability rules in a federal system. Soil pollution will be used as an example. 
Next, the framework can be applied to Directive 2004/35/CE on Environmental Liability with Regard to 
the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, adopted on 21 April 2004. 
Chapter 4 will first outline European environmental policy as far as the division of competences for 
environmental matters is concerned. Then, the background and provisions of the Environmental Liability 
Directive and its application to soil pollution will be studied critically. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, the theoretical framework developed in chapters 2 and 3, will be applied to the 
Environmental Liability Directive. Chapter 5 will examine the extent to which the provisions of the 
Directive correspond with the economic analysis of tort law as provided in Chapter 2 and whether the ELD 
can efficiently achieve the prevention and restoration of environmental damage and of soil pollution. 
Chapter 6 will then examine whether the justifications provided by the European Commission for a 
harmonised European environmental liability regime, including liability rules for soil pollution, correspond 
with the predictions of the theoretical framework for harmonisation of environmental liability rules. In a 
first step, the justifications of the Commission will be compared with the public interest approach. 
Additional explanations for the harmonisation of environmental liability rules in the European Union will 
then be sought on the basis of the private interest approach. The findings of this case-study may then be 
used to refine the framework developed in the theoretical part, in order to refine the existing scholarly 
debate on the optimal decision-making level for environmental liability rules, and specifically for soil 
pollution. 
Finally, the main results will be summarised, a few conclusions will be formulated and an answer to 
the main research question will be provided: was harmonisation of environmental liability rules in the 
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European Union, including liability rules for soil pollution, desirable from an economic point of view and 
for what reasons did harmonisation take place? By answering this question, this research tries to contribute 
to the existing academic debate on the optimal policy level for environmental policy and, in particular, for 
liability rules for environmental damage. 
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AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 
This chapter will introduce the reader in the economic analysis of tort law and its application to 
environmental damage and soil pollution as an example thereof. This research tries to reach readers of 
various disciplines, economists as well as lawyers or even scholars of other sciences, who are interested in 
environmental law and policy. This chapter is therefore meant as an introductory chapter. The chapter will 
explain the contribution of liability rules in the prevention and restoration of environmental damage, and of 
soil pollution, before examining the optimal division of competences between the central and the local level 
for environmental liability rules in a federal system. Yet, readers that are familiar with this analysis might 
continue immediately with chapter 3. 
Tort law is the field of law that defines the applicable liability rules in an accident setting. The chapter 
will gradually build up an economic theory of environmental liability and will consist of three parts. 
Paragraph 1 will explain the starting points of the economic analysis of law, whereby some basic 
economic notions, such as externalities and the Coase theorem, will be clarified. 
Paragraph 2 will then define an economic theory of liability for environmental damage. This will be 
done in four stages. Firstly, the economic theory of tort law in general will be explained. The functions of 
tort law from an economic perspective will be clarified and an analysis of optimal liability rules for accident 
prevention will be presented. Secondly, the economic theory of tort law will be applied to environmental 
damage. Optimal liability rules for environmental damage will be studied and a few refinements to the 
general theory will be indicated. Thirdly, liability rules will be compared with other instruments for 
controlling pollution. By providing a brief assessment of other instruments that can be used to protect the 
environment, such as regulation, marketable permits and pollution taxes, the contribution of liability rules 
for the prevention and restoration of environmental damage will be clarified. Moreover, interdependencies 
between tort law and regulation, and the complementary function of liability rules, will be demonstrated. 
Fourth, the value added by liability rules for environmental damage will be demonstrated. 
Paragraph 3 will apply this economic theory of liability for environmental damage to soil pollution. 
This paragraph will clarify the contribution of liability rules in the prevention and restoration of soil 
pollution and the interdependencies between liability rules for soil pollution and regulation of soil quality 
standards. 
Once the contribution of liability rules in the prevention and restoration of environmental damage, 
including soil pollution, has been clarified, the optimal division of competences between the central and the 
local level for environmental liability rules in a federal system can be examined in Chapter 3. 
1. An Economic Perspective on Environmental Damage 
This paragraph will first clarify some basic principles of the economic analysis of law. Next, the role of 
environmental damage within this economic perspective, and how the role of tort law, or liability rules, can 
be explained within this framework, will be described. 
1.1. Basic Principles of the Economic Analysis of Law 
The economic analysis of law is primarily based on neo-classical micro-economics, and in particular welfare 
economics.10 This might merit a short explanation. Welfare economics starts from the principle that 
individuals seek to maximise their own welfare, usually referred to as utility or wealth maximising 
behaviour. Economics presumes that the market system allows individuals — who are only concerned with 
maximising their own welfare — to realise efficiency and hence to maximise social welfare, through 
                                                             
10  See Posner 1998, Shavell 1987 and Cooter & Ulen 2003, 9-44. 
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bargaining with one another. However, when the market does not work perfectly, as we will see in the case 
of environmental damage, individual welfare-maximising behaviour might fail to maximise social welfare. 
In such circumstances, legal rules can become necessary to steer individual welfare-maximisation 
behaviour so that an efficient allocation of resources can be achieved.11 Fundamentally, the economic 
analysis of law tries to examine how individuals would respond to changes in law and, hence, under which 
circumstances a particular rule would maximise social welfare. 
1.2. Environmental Damage as an Externality 
Traditionally, the starting point of the economic analysis of environmental law is that an industrial activity, 
which may be beneficial for society on its own, may have negative effects on the environment or citizens, 
called external effects or externalities.12 These negative effects of industrial activity are called externalities 
since the polluting firm is not affected itself by the external effects of its production. Indeed, as the use of 
the environment has no clear price, the polluter will not take the environmental damage that he caused into 
account in other costs in his decision-making process. The fact that the polluter does not take these negative 
effects of production into account might reduce social welfare. 
Environmental economics therefore suggests ‘pricing’ the environment by legal or economic tools in 
order to force the polluter to take the pollution that he causes into account in his business decisions, like his 
activity level. This is what economists call the internalisation of negative effects. The traditional economic 
solution would consist of imposing a tax on the polluting activity. This solution is based on the work of 
Pigou; the tax is usually referred to as a Pigouvian tax.13 In the 1970’s environmental economists introduced 
the further idea of using incentive instruments like marketable permits and emission charges to reduce 
pollution. These incentive instruments still play a minor role in the protection of the environment. In 
practice, governments have generally introduced a framework of command and control regulation, which 
defines the standards a company has to meet. This public law framework has frequently been 
complemented by liability rules for environmental harmful discharges. Environmental liability rules belong 
to the private law domain, and have become often-used provisions, in national law as well as in 
international conventions. The Coase Theorem is commonly used to explain the role of governmental 
intervention through regulation or tort law. 
1.3. The Coase Theorem as an Explanation for the Role of Tort Law 
The role of tort law, or liability rules, in internalising externalities is usually explained by the Coase 
theorem.14 However, before the Coase theorem can be explained, a clarification of the notion of property 
rights is meritted. Economics deals with the use of scarce resources, whereby individuals will seek to 
maximise their own welfare. Property rights provide the framework for the allocation of scarce resources to 
individuals. Property rights define what individuals may or may not do with the property they own, and to 
what extent they may use, transform or even deplete their property.15 
Coase’s theorem can be clarified using the well-known example of the cattle rancher and the farmer.16 
Suppose that a cattle rancher lives besides a farmer. Although the boundary is clear, there is no fencing 
between the two properties. Yet, once in a while, the cattle wander onto the farmer’s property and damage 
the corn. The damage to the farmer could be prevented by building a fence. If the law requires the rancher 
to install the fence, the rancher would have to bear the cost of the fence. In the assumption however, that 
the law does not require the rancher to build the fence, it would pay for the farmer to start bargaining with 
the rancher and to offer compensation in order to build the fence, as long as the cost of the fence is lower 
than the farmer’s damage.17 Under these circumstances, the fence will be built, irrespective of the provision 
on the property right in the law. 
                                                             
11  As stated in the introduction, Law and Economics usually uses the Kaldor-Hicks criterion to define efficiency, stating that 
a change in legal rules is said to be efficient if the winners gain more than the losers lose, so that the winners of this 
change in law could compensate the losers and still have profit from it. The criterion does not require actual 
compensation though. See Landes & Posner 1987, 16. 
12  Endres & Staiger 1996, 80, and Faure 2001, 127. 
13  Faure 2000, 445. 
14  Coase 1960, 1-44. 
15  Coase 1960, 2-6. 
16  Cooter & Ulen 2003, 74. The latest version of this book has been published in September 2007. 
17  Note that if the cost of the fence is higher than the farmer’s damage, the farmer will not bargain. 
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Coase’s conclusion was that, in the absence of transaction costs,18 it does not matter whether an 
entitlement or right is given to the polluter, or to the person who suffers damage. If the initial allocation 
would not be efficient, parties will start bargaining —called Coasian bargaining — by which the parties 
involved can reach maximum individual and social welfare. In this case, there would be no need for 
intervention; the economic efficient solution would be reached through bargaining. 
The Coase theorem raised various criticisms, some of which merit some brief explanation.19 First, it 
should be mentioned that Coase did not consider distributional effects, only efficiency. The Coase theorem 
therefore does not take social norms of fairness considerations into account. Second, property rights have to 
be clear and strategic behaviour of both parties in bargaining should be excluded. Furthermore, the Coase 
theorem does not take the effect of endowment into account. An ‘endowment’ is an initial assignment of 
property rights. Experiments revealed that people might demand a higher price to ‘sell’ a right to, for 
instance, clean air, then they would pay to buy the same right. The discrepancy between the buying and 
selling price is called the ‘endowment effect’, because the price varies depending upon the initial 
assignment of ownership, which may influence the outcome of the Coasian bargaining. The demand for 
environmental regulation might, therefore, be importantly affected by the initial allocation.20 
Still, the most problematic assumption with respect to environmental damage is that the Coase 
theorem is based on a zero transaction cost assumption. In reality, transaction costs might be prohibitive in 
allowing Coasian bargaining. With respect to environmental harm, it might be extremely difficult to 
identify who exactly are the victims of environmental harm. In fact, everybody can suffer from 
environmental harm. Therefore, ex ante Coasian bargaining between the polluter and the potential victims is 
mostly not a workable solution for coping with the problem of environmental harm. Governmental 
intervention through command — and control regulation or liability rules, but also by taxes and pollution 
permits, may therefore be needed to induce the potential polluter to internalise the negative effect of his 
activity.21 
Despite the criticism, the Coase theorem provides a useful starting point in explaining the role of tort 
law and governmental intervention to prevent environmental damage. The usefulness of the Coase theorem 
lies in the fact that it might help the legislator to search for that law that would ‘mimic’ the spontaneous 
economic efficient result if there had been no transaction costs. Therefore, the Coase theorem might prevent 
excessive or inefficient regulation. 
Taking the Coase theorem as a starting point for the explanation of the role of tort law in preventing 
environmental damage, the relevant question that has to be answered next is which type of liability rule 
would then best guarantee the prevention and restoration of environmental damage. Paragraph 2 will turn 
to this question and will develop an economic theory of liability for environmental damage. 
2. Defining an Economic Theory of Environmental Liability 
2.1.  Economic Theory of Tort Law: General Approach 
In this paragraph, the contribution of liability rules in the prevention and restoration of environmental 
damage will be clarified and an economic theory of liability for environmental damage will be developed. 
This theory will be unfolded in four stages. First, a general economic analysis of tort law will be presented. 
Tort law defines the applicable liability rules when damage has been caused. The economic analysis of tort 
law evaluates liability rules on their efficiency in accident prevention. Second, this general framework and 
the analysis of optimal liability rules will be applied to environmental damage and a few refinements to the 
general theory will be added. Third, liability rules will be compared with other instruments to control 
pollution. By providing a brief assessment of other instruments that can be used to protect the environment 
— like regulation, marketable permits and pollution taxes — the contribution of liability rules for the 
prevention and restoration of environmental damage will be illustrated. Moreover, interdependencies 
between tort law and regulation and the complementarity of liability rules will be shown. Finally, the value 
added by liability rules for environmental damage will be demonstrated. 
                                                             
18  Coase did not provide an exact definition of these transaction costs. Hence, a rich literature emerged on the definition of 
transaction costs. It falls out of the scope of this research to discuss this literature in detail. Therefore, transaction costs 
will be understood as including, at the most basic level, the costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contractual 
agreements. See Mercuro & Medema 2006. For other introductions to law and economics methodology, see also Allen 
2000, 893-926. 
19  See Faure & Van den Bergh 1989, 66 and Cooter & Ulen 2003, 86-87. 
20  See Sunstein 1993, 217-254, Cooter & Ulen 2003, 87. 
21  Faure 2000, 446-447. 
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2.1.1. Economic Function of Tort Law 
2.1.1.1. Development of the Economic Analysis of Tort Law 
Excellent analyses on the economic function of tort law emerged in the 1960’s, with the pioneering works of 
Calabresi, Coase, Brown, Shavell and Posner.22 
The lawyer Guido Calabresi was one of the first scholars to examine the effect of tort law on individual 
behaviour thoroughly from the perspective of law and economics.23 In his famous book ‘The Costs of 
Accidents’ Calabresi showed that tort law has the ability of reducing three different types of costs: primary, 
secondary and tertiary costs. Primary accident costs are, on the one hand, the costs of accident avoidance, 
which are the costs of taking precautions, and, on the other hand, the damage that eventually occurs if an 
accident does happen. Secondary costs refer to the costs of loss spreading. Secondary costs of accidents 
arise, for example, if those who bear the primary accident costs are risk-averse and take insurance coverage. 
Tertiary costs are the costs of administrating the legal system in the case of a trial. According to Calabresi, 
an efficient tort law should give incentives to individuals to achieve a reduction of the total social accident 
costs, which is the sum of the three types of accident costs. 
The Calabresi’s ideas were formalised by economists. Posner and Shavell examined the most 
important liability rules with respect to their effect on a society’s wealth. Brown provided a now classical 
analysis of the economic effects of liability rules. 
2.1.1.2. Deterrence and Compensation Function of Tort Law 
The economic analysis of tort law starts from the idea that liability rules will give incentives to potential 
parties of an accident for careful behaviour. As the emphasis is on steering the behaviour of individuals, the 
law and economics approach examines the prevention or deterrence function of tort law especially. 
However, liability rules have a second function. Namely, compensation of the victims after damage has 
occurred, which touches upon fairness notions in society. This compensation function gets most attention 
from lawyers.24 Incorporation of such fairness notions in the economic analysis of liability for 
environmental damage will be discussed below. 
Several authors25 refer to this difference in accents between both approaches as an ex ante versus ex 
post vision. They state that, in general, lawyers tend to be more interested in the accident problem ex post, 
when a victim needs to be compensated. Economists study the accident problem in an ex ante way by 
asking how ex post liability for damage will influence ex ante the behaviour of potential parties to an 
accident, notably by taking precautions in order to prevent the accident. 
In any case, the fact that the deterrent function and compensation functions are carefully 
distinguished as the ex ante and ex post functions of legal instruments has a clear advantage. This distinction 
notably allows the effect of the various legal mechanisms that one would choose to prevent damage to be 
evaluated with respect to both the prevention and the compensation function. In this chapter, attention will 
go to both functions of environmental liability rules to prevent environmental damage. By doing so, the 
added value of environmental liability rules can be shown. 
2.1.2. Analysis of Optimal Liability Rules 
2.1.2.1. Basic Notions of Tort Liability 
The first goal of tort law would be to minimise the costs of accident avoidance and the expected damage in 
case of an accident, defined by Calabresi as the primary accident costs. Indeed, accidents do not only cause 
costs from the moment an accident occurs and harm is suffered. Potential parties in an accident make 
investments in care (precautions) to avoid the occurrence of an accident. This paragraph will discuss the 
major liability rules and will examine under which circumstances what type of liability rule would 
minimise the primary accident costs. A distinction will be made between two types of accident risk, 
nomely, unilateral and bilateral accidents.26 
In a unilateral accident situation the behaviour of one person (the injurer) can influence the chance 
that an accident will happen, and the gravity of the accident. In a bilateral accident case, both the injurer as 
                                                             
22  Calabresi 1970, Coase 1960, Brown 1973, Shavell 1987, Posner 1998. For an overview see Schaefer 2000. 
23  Calabresi 1970. 
24  Faure & Grimeaud 2003, 19. 
25  Faure & Grimeaud 2003, 19 and Heyes 1994. 
26  Shavell 1987, 5-32. See also Brown 1973; Landes & Posner 1987; Faure 2003b, 20. 
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the person who is harmed (the victim) can influence the occurrence and gravity of the accident. The 
accident risk is not, however, influenced solely by the level of precaution taken by the parties in the 
accident but also by the level of activity, which are the times that the parties engage in the activity.27 
A liability rule defines whether the injurer is liable for the accident and whether he should pay 
compensation to the victim. Strict liability and negligence are the major rules of liability used in tort law to 
deal with situations where one person (the injurer) causes harm to another (the victim). Occasionally these 
rules are completed with some defence possibility, such as contributory negligence and comparative 
negligence.28 
Under a strict liability rule, the injurer has to compensate the victim no matter what care he took in 
attempting to prevent the accident. He will always have to bear the costs of the accident. Under a 
negligence rule, on the other hand, the injurer will only be held liable if he did not take appropriate care. 
The appropriate care level is usually determined by the law and/or the court. This level is called reasonable 
care or due care. The due care standard specifies a level of care and defines parties who take less care to be 
at fault.29 The question, however, is how this ‘due care’ level can be determined. 
In order to determine what level of precaution will minimise the social costs of an accident, 
economists use a classic cost-benefit analysis. From an economic point of view, minimisation of costs can be 
found at the level where the marginal (i.e. one more unit) costs of care taking equals the marginal benefit in 
accident reduction. The economic logic is that taking precautions also has a price. Therefore, a liability rule 
should not give incentives to avoid every accident that could occur, but only those accidents that could be 
avoided by taking precautions of which the marginal costs are lower than or equal to the marginal benefits 
in accident reduction.30 It is possible that more precaution could induce an additional reduction of the 
accident risk but the marginal costs of these precautions might be much higher than the additional benefit 
of accident reduction. Investment in precaution when it costs more than the benefits received is clearly 
economically inefficient and scarce resources would be spoiled.31 The level of precautions where the 
marginal costs of these precautions are equal to the marginal benefits in accident reduction is referred to in 
the economic literature as optimal or efficient precaution (or care) levels.32 A liability rule should therefore 
give an incentive to potential parties in the accident setting to adopt this optimal care level. Once the due 
care standard has been set, negligence under a negligence rule can be determined. 
Interestingly enough, the first person to describe a formula for negligence was not an economist but a 
judge. Judge Learned Hand developed the Learned-Hand formula in 1947 in the case called United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co.33: The case concerned the loss of a barge and its cargo after it broke loose from its 
mooring line in New York Harbour. Judge Learned Hand decided that the accident could have been 
prevented if the owner had taken precautionary measures. According to him, such preventive measures 
would have cost less than the expected damage in case of an accident. Consequently, Judge Learned Hand 
defined three variables that determined negligence: (1) the probability that the accident will occur, (2), the 
seriousness of the resulting injury, and (3) the costs of adequate precautions. A person is negligent, and 
hence liable for the accident, if the costs of precautions (B) were less than the probability of harm (P) times 
the seriousness of the injury (L), which becomes in formula B<PL. In different words, the Hand rule 
provides a due care level that defines a party to be negligent if the expected accident losses are greater than 
the prevention costs that the party has undertaken.34 Though mathematical in form the Judge Hand 
formula does not yield precise results as the variables cannot all be quantified. The Hand rule was further 
refined by economists by considering the marginal costs instead of total costs.35 Nevertheless, the formula is 
a valuable aid to clear thinking about the factors that are relevant to a judgement of negligence and about 
the relationship between those factors. 
A strict liability rule and a negligence rule have different consequences and effects. As the focus of this 
chapter is to search for the liability rule that is ‘optimal’ or efficient, in the sense that it would minimise 
social costs of accidents, the remainder of this paragraph will concentrate on the general analysis of optimal 
liability rules, which is mainly based on the analysis of Shavell.36 The effects of a negligence rule on taking 
                                                             
27  Shavell 1987, 6-10. 
28  Shavell 1987, 4. See also Schaefer 2000, 569-577. 
29  Shavell 1987, 4-8. See also Schaefer 2000, 569-577. 
30  Faure & Grimeaud 2003, 21. 
31  This finding is only valid in a risk neutral setting. In case of risk aversion higher levels of care taking might be efficient 
since a reduction of accident risk can remove the disutility of risk from the risk averse person, in Faure 2003b, 21. 
32  See for example Landes & Posner 1987, 58 and Cooter & Ulen 2003, 301. 
33  United States versus Carroll Towing Co., 159 F 2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
34  Cooter & Ulen 2003, 313-315, Schaefer 2000, 597-618. 
35  Brown 1973, 332-335. Brown was the first scholar to refine the formula, all authors after him take marginal costs into 
account. 
36  Shavell 1987, 5-32. 
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precautions to avoid an accident can be compared with the precautions that will be taken in case of a strict 
liability rule. This general analysis will then be used to consider the effects of negligence versus strict 
liability for environmental damage. This research will only deal with unilateral accidents, as environmental 
accidents, which are the subject of this study, are mostly unilateral cases. 
 
2.1.2.2. Negligence versus Strict Liability in Unilateral Accidents 
In the unilateral case, Shavell distinguishes between two legal rules, which will give the injurer the 
incentive to take optimal care in order to prevent an accident, namely, the negligence rule and strict 
liability.37 
Negligence Rule: 
In case of a negligence rule, the injurer will only be held liable if he did not take appropriate precautions to 
avoid the accident. This basically means that the injurer took less precautions than the legal standard of due 
care. Shavell proves that the injurer will take optimal care (which is the level where total social costs are 
minimised), provided that the due care standard defined in the legal system is equal to the economically 
optimal care level.38 The reasoning behind this result is that the injurer will try to avoid the accident by 
taking precautions. Taking precautions involves a cost. However, by doing so, he can avoid paying the 
damage in the case of an accident happening. The injurer could, of course, take more precautions than 
required by the legal system under a negligence rule, but it would be to no advantage, since he can already 
avoid liability by following the due care standard. The injurer might also take less care than the legal 
system requires him to do. He would then have fewer costs of precaution, but he would be exposed to the 
risk of being liable to pay the damages in the case of an accident occuring. Since the optimal level of 
precaution was defined as the level of precaution where the marginal costs of care equal the marginal 
benefits in accident reduction, taking less precaution than the due care standard would be to no advantage 
either, as it would increase his total expected costs. Therefore, a negligence rule will lead to an optimal 
result as long as the legal system sets the due care standard equal to the optimal care level.39 
Strict Liability 
Under a strict liability rule, the courts do not have to define any level of due care because the injurer will 
have to pay the costs of the accident regardless of the magnitude of his precaution.40 
In the unilateral case, this means that the injurer has to bear his own costs of precaution as well as the 
expected damage if an accident occurs. Rationally, the injurer will take that level of precaution that 
minimises his total expected accident costs. Shavell shows that this minimisation of costs is reached at the 
optimal care level, as with negligence. The reasoning is that taking more precautions than the optimal level, 
would increase his costs of precautions inefficiently. Indeed, the costs of precaution would be higher than 
the benefit from it. On the other hand, spending less on precaution than the optimal level would increase 
the accident risk, and hence the accident costs. By taking slightly more precaution the potential injurer 
would reduce accident costs by more than the extra cost of more precaution. Therefore, the injurer will 
choose the optimal precaution level spontaneously. 
Balance 
From the above it can be concluded that in case of unilateral accidents both a negligence rule and a strict 
liability rule will lead to a minimisation of the primary costs of accidents. 
However, it cannot be concluded there are no differences between a negligence rule or a strict liability 
rule. Indeed, both liability rules have consequences that should not be overlooked. With regard to the three 
                                                             
37  The case in which there is no liability (no rule), cannot be efficient, as the injurer would have no incentive for care-taking. 
He will not ‘internalise’ the cost of an accident and an inefficient outcome will follow. See Shavell 1987, 8. 
38  Obviously it is very difficult for courts or authorities to define the efficient level of care, in order to set the legal standard 
of due care. Due care is therefore usually defined by comparing the precaution level of the injurer with what a reasonable 
person would do under similar circumstances: Schaefer & Schoenenberger 2000, 602. 
39  Faure & Grimeaud 2003, 21-22. 
40  Shavell 1987, 8, Schaefer & and Schoenenberger 2000, 597-618. 
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types of costs defined by Calabresi, there are differences between the two liability rules in as far as the 
secondary and tertiary costs are concerned.41 
Regarding the secondary costs (concerning loss spreading), it is clear that under the negligence rule, 
the injurer will not be liable for any damage as long as he complies with the due care standard. If this is the 
case, there will be no compensation for the victim, who will have to bear the costs of any accident himself. 
On the other hand, under a strict liability rule, victims will always be entitled to compensation. A drawback 
however, of a strict liability rule is that the injurer might be insolvent, so that the victim cannot be 
compensated. Therefore, whether the victim will actually receive compensation depends on the funds the 
injurer has, or whether he took insurance. The insurance issue will be dealt with below, with an application 
to environmental damage. 
Also, the administrative and information costs, which are Calabresi’s tertiary costs, will differ for both 
rules. Under strict liability the number of claims before the court is likely to be higher since the injurer will 
always be liable, regardless of the care he took. Court costs can therefore be expected to be higher than 
under a negligence rule. On the other hand, if it comes to a court case under the negligence rule, high 
information costs might result since the judge will have to determine in a particular case whether the 
injurer took optimal level of care, i.e. the level where marginal costs and benefits are equal.42 
Besides differences in secondary and tertiary costs, negligence and strict liability also have a different 
influence on the activity level of the potential injurer. Shavell has paid special attention to the influence of 
the activity level as he states that not only the level of precaution influences the accident risk. The activity 
level proves also to be an important factor that influences the accident risk. The chance of being involved in 
an accident will not only be influenced by the precaution which is taken when exercising the activity, but 
also by the number of times the potential parties engage in the activity.43 
Shavell stresses that the objective of a liability rule should not only be to provide incentives for 
optimal care taking, but also to provide incentives for adopting an optimal activity level. This influence on 
the activity level is an important factor in the choice between strict liability and negligence. If accidents are 
unilateral, and hence only the injurer’s activity can influence the accident risk, it can be proven that 
negligence will not lead to optimal results. Shavell states that negligence only provides incentives to the 
injurer to take optimal care, but not to adopt an optimal activity level. The reasoning is that when a judge 
has to define the due care level required by the legal system, he can not take the activity level exercised by 
the injurer into account. The judge will not be able to identify what an optimal activity level is and will not 
hold an injurer liable because of negligence since he engaged too often in a certain activity.44 
Only a strict liability rule will provide incentives for the injurer to adopt an optimal activity level. The 
reason is that the injurer can minimise his total expected costs by adopting an optimal activity level. Under 
a strict liability rule the injurer will have to compensate the total accident costs. He therefore knows ex ante 
that he will have to bear his own costs of precaution and the expected damage. Therefore, he will not only 
consider his costs of care, but also the number of times he engages in the activity against the resulting 
expected loss. From the above it follows that when the victim can not influence the accident risk, neither 
through taking care, nor by adopting an optimal activity level, which is the case in a unilateral accident, 
only strict liability will lead to an optimal activity level.45 
Another advantage of the strict liability rule is that it is the injurer who has to search for the optimal 
level of care. Indeed, in many cases, the injurer is better at deciding which precautions to take and to what 
extent. He is likely to be familiar with the activity in which he engages that can cause an accident.46 
In sum, both a negligence rule as a strict liability rule result in an optimal level of precautions in a 
unilateral accident setting. There are differences though, with respect to the secondary and tertiary costs 
and the activity level. If the aim of the liability rule is also to reduce the activity level, a strict liability rule 
might be preferred. 
2.2. The Economic Theory of Tort Law Applied to Environmental Damage 
This paragraph will apply the general economic analysis of optimal liability rules in a unilateral accident 
setting to environmental damage. Analogue to the economic analysis of tort law in general, liability rules 
can be seen as a possible solution for internalisation of the negative effect of the polluter’s activities on the 
environment. Environmental liability rules can be considered as a means of providing incentives for the 
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43  Shavell 1987, 5-32. 
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polluter involved to take precautions in prevention of environmental damage ex ante and to act ‘efficiently’ 
after environmental damage has been caused, notably in engaging in clean up. Heyes classifies these two 
objectives of liability rules as ex ante and ex post efficiency.47 
As for liability rules in general, on the one hand, liability for environmental damage48 fulfils a 
deterrence function ex ante, as it will incite the polluter to take the efficient level of precaution in order to 
escape liability. On the other hand, liability has a compensation or restoration function ex post, to ensure a 
‘fair’ compensation of damage.49 
In the following, again only the unilateral case will be discussed. It is assumed that only the potential 
polluter has the means to influence the damage by taking precautions. Bilateral cases, whereby both injurer 
and victim can influence the risk by their behaviour are not that common in environmental liability and will 
therefore not be examined here.50 
2.2.1. Negligence versus Strict Liability in Preventing Environmental Damage 
There are several authors that discuss the use of strict liability versus a negligence rule in the case of 
environmental damage.51 Their results and reasoning are essencially the same. As a starting point, Polinky 
and Shavell consider a firm in which production has a risk of causing environmental damage. If 
environmentally harmful discharges would occur clean-up efforts by the responsible firm can reduce the 
level of damage. Social welfare is economically defined as the utility of the firm’s production (for 
consumption), less the total cost of production, which include the costs of prevention and clean-up efforts.52 
Departing from this situation, it can be examined whether a negligence rule or a strict liability rule will be 
more efficient in giving incentives to prevent environmental damage, and in clean up if environmentally 
harmful discharges occurred. 
Negligence 
Under the negligence rule, courts will define a due care standard of precaution. In the ideal situation that 
courts dispose of all relevant information, they will be able to set this due care standard at the economically 
optimal level, as discussed in the general case. Under the negligence rule, the potential polluter will only be 
held liable if it can be proven that he did not adopt the due care standard of precaution. Therefore, he only 
has to internalise clean-up costs in the case where he took less precaution, otherwise he merely has to bear 
the optimal level of prevention costs.53 Assuming rational cost-minimising behaviour, the potential polluter 
will take the optimal level of precaution, in order to avoid liability. Hence, an optimal level of precaution is 
achieved under the negligence rule. 
Strict Liability 
Under the strict liability rule, the courts do not have to define any level of due care because the injurer will 
have to pay the costs of the damage regardless the precaution he took. A firm that is strictly liable will 
therefore, besides his precaution costs, also internalise expected damage costs. If the firm causes 
environmental damage, it will be responsible for clean up and remain strictly liable for any harm that 
remains after the clean-up, as Polinsky and Shavell state. Economic rational behaviour is assumed, 
therefore the firm will try to minimise its total costs, prevention and expected damage costs. It is clear that 
the more precaution the firm takes, the smaller the expected damage costs will be. The firm will increase 
precautions up to the level where precaution costs are equal to the expected damage. Beyond that level 
precaution costs will be higher than the reduction in expected damage. Hence the firm would select the 
economically optimal level of precaution that will minimise total costs for the society. 
                                                             
47  Heyes 1994, 294. 
48  For the purpose of this section all kinds of environmental damage are considered. However, it is assumed that liability is 
limited to environmental damages of which it can be proven that the polluter did indeed cause the accident. It is also 
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Hence, under a strict liability rule, firms will take the socially optimal precautions to prevent 
environmentally harmful discharges and realise the optimal amount of clean up if pollution occurs, as they 
will be liable for any remaing harm.54 
Balance 
Under the idealistic assumptions of the models presented by the various authors, it can be concluded that, 
as far as economic efficiency is concerned, both liability regimes induce firms to take the optimal level of 
precaution. However, this result does not take compensation into account. Both liability regimes differ 
considerably from this point of view. Under strict liability, the victims will be compensated in any case. 
With negligence, the victims will have to bear the costs of clean-up themselves, as long as the injurer 
complied with the legal standard. If the aim of installing a liability regime is to internalise the costs for the 
environment caused by production, the negligence rule will not reach this aim fully, as part of the damage 
will not be bourne by the injurer.55 Therefore, there might be a preference to opt for a strict liability rule for 
environmental damage. However, besides a difference in compensation, there are, as in the general case, 
other important differences between the negligence rule and the strict liability rule that should not be 
neglected by governments when deciding upon their environmental policy. These differences merit some 
special attention, and will be dealt with in the next paragraph. 
2.2.2. Refinements 
A closer look at some refinements will facilitate the understanding of the different consequences of a 
negligence rule versus a strict liability rule. 
2.2.2.1. Activity Level 
As Shavell pointed out, a liability rule should not only provide incentives for optimal care taking, but 
should also provide incentives for adopting an optimal activity level.56 These are the times when the 
polluter would engage in the polluting activity, to produce the socially optimal amount of the good. The 
analysis of environmental liability is similar to the analysis of torts in general. 
Under negligence, if the firm complies with the due care standard of precaution, it will not be held 
liable for harm. This means that the firm will not have to take the costs for clean-up into account in its cost 
calculation, if it fulfilled the due care standard. As these costs will not be internalised in the firm’s costs, the 
firms will produce too much or, in other words, engage in the polluting activity too often. In addition, these 
clean up costs will not be reflected in the sales price of the product. Consequently, consumers will purchase 
too much of the good, the production of which might give rise to environmental harm. This result will 
reinforce the excessive level of activity and eventually a socially excessive number of discharges causing 
environmental harm might occur.57 
Under a strict liability rule, the polluter will always be liable for the damage. The firm will therefore 
internalise both the cost of prevention and the clean up costs in its cost calculations. This will also be 
reflected in the sales price of the product. Consumers will thereby purchase the socially optimal amount of 
the good whose production might give rise to environmental damage. 
From the above, one could conclude that a strict liability rule could be favoured in cases of 
environmental harm. This liability rule would give the injurer optimal incentives for precaution and result 
in an optimal activity level. This result should, however, be balanced.58 It might be possible that goods, the 
production of which may give rise to environmental damage, are beneficial for society, like medicines. It 
would not be desirable to reduce the production of those goods. Therefore, the consequences of the 
introduction of either liability rule should always be assessed carefully. 
2.2.2.2. Information Differences 
A negligence rule and strict liability rule also differ with respect to the information that a judge will need in 
case of a trial.59 It was mentioned above that a negligence rule requires high information costs for the judge. 
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The information that is necessary for a judge to determine in a particular case what the due care standard 
would be and whether the injurer took optimal precautions may not be readily available to the judge.60 
Under a strict liability rule it will be the injurer, who will bear the costs of defining the optimal care level. 
Furthermore, it was advanced that the information on the optimal precaution level is better available with 
firms who perform the activity, than with the judges. Reasonably, it can be assumed that this also holds for 
firms that engage in production that might cause environmental harm. Hence, information advantages 
provide another argument in favour of strict liability for environmental harm.61 
Some remarks should be made, however. In the above it was implicitly assumed that the judge can 
determine the amount of damage. If courts cannot assess the damages, strict liability might lead to 
underdeterrence.62 One should also note that the various authors start from the economic assumption of 
risk neutrality. If this assumption is relaxed and risk aversion introduced, then, if the potential polluter is 
risk averse, he might be reluctant to engage in the activity, which would not be socially beneficial either. It 
is therefore correctly argued that in such cases strict liability will only induce optimal behaviour if the risk 
can, to a certain level, be removed from the risk averse polluter, through insurance for example.63 
2.2.2.3. Insolvency and Financial Caps: Strict Liability versus Negligence 
Even if the scale of operations of the firm that engages in potential polluting production is small, it may 
cause substantial harm to the environment. In such cases, the damage costs can be higher than the assets of 
the firm, which results in the fact that they cannot pay for the harm.64 It might also be possible that a 
limitation of the compensation that is due to the victim is included in the liability legislation, which is called 
a ‘financial cap’. 
In such circumstances, the advantage of the strict liability rule for environmental damage should be 
reconsidered.65 Until now, it was implicitly assumed that the polluter would have the money to compensate 
the victim or to engage in clean up. However, if the damage costs exceed the firm’s assets or if there is a 
financial cap, this might result in underdeterrence in the case of strict liability. 
The explanation is that liability is limited to the amount of the assets of the firm which causes the 
damage or to the financial cap, if this is a provision in the liability rule. Hence the polluter will only take 
precautions up to the value of his assets or up to the financial cap. Thus, he will only take the precautions 
necessary to avoid an accident that results in damage costs equal to his assets. He will not increase his 
precaution for accidents that may cause higher damage costs than the value of his assets or the cap. In the 
first case, he will be insolvent, and will not be able to pay for the damage. In the second case, he will not 
have to pay more than the statutory limit. A problem of underdeterrence will thus arise and a full 
internalisation of the potential pollution costs will not be achieved. 
Under the negligence rule, the insolvency problem is not that pronounced. Under this liability scheme 
the polluter will still have an incentive to adopt the due care standard required by the legal system as long 
as the costs of these precautions are less than the value of his assets. Indeed, by complying with the due 
care standard the potential polluter can avoid liability and hence will not have to pay compensation to the 
victim, or to engage in clean up activities. Therefore, if a polluter could cause damage to the environment 
with costs that are higher than his assets (which can often be the case in polluting activities), and when no 
insurance or other solutions are available (see below), there is an argument in favour of the negligence 
rule.66 
Indeed, under negligence, the potential polluter shall still have an incentive to comply with the legal 
standard of care in order to escape liability. The imposition of strict liability might lead to underdeterrence 
when the value of the assets is lower than the potential damage. Hence the damage costs will not be fully 
internalised. 
As this last refinement has serious consequences for environmental damage compensation in the case 
of a strict liability rule the attachment of some remarks on the remedies for insolvency is merited. 
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2.2.3. Remedies to Compensate for Environmental Damage in Case of Insolvency 
The previous paragraph showed that strict liability gives optimal prevention incentives and guarantees full 
internalisation of environmental damage costs. Insolvency might, however, distort this compensatory 
function — or restoration function in the case of environmental damage — of liability. 
Several scholars have examined the insolvency problem of strict liability, and provided for diverse 
remedies. Remedies that are advanced are ex ante safety regulation, extended liability — referred to as 
‘lender liability’ — to the financiers of the firm that caused the environmental damage;67 insurance for 
environmental damages and a public fund for compensation of losses resulting from environmental 
damage, funded through the tax system. It falls beyond the scope of this research to examine each remedy 
in detail. Therefore, only a brief explanation of the remedies for insolvency will be provided. 
Safety Regulations 
Safety regulations, which are set ex ante by the government, can contribute to solving the problem of 
underdeterrence. In this case, the potential polluter will have to comply with the regulatory standard, 
which in the ideal case would be the optimal precautionary level. However, as Faure indicates, there may 
still be a problem of underdeterrence if the regulation is enforced by monetary sanctions that are higher 
than the polluter’s assets.68 This problem might be solved by enforcing the regulation through non-
monetary sanctions.69 Nevertheless, regulation and liability can and should be complemented. This 
complementary relationship will be the main focus of paragraph 2.3, liability rules versus other instruments 
in pollution control. 
Extended Liability 
Extended liability as a solution for underdeterrence has been a heavily debated issue, in academic as well as 
political debates. Indeed, Boyer and Laffont point out that extending liability to lenders can have a 
substantial impact on the decision process and financial structure of the firms that engage in potentially 
polluting activities. 
If only the owners or shareholders of the firm are held strictly liable for accidents, then they are 
usually held liable by an amount corresponding to the capital provided to the firm and its profits. They will 
rationally tend to obtain a full external (bank) loan, so that only the firm’s profit is exposed to liability 
claims. The consequence might be that environmental damage may not be fully compensated. The 
introduction of lender liability may result in incentives for lenders to control the activities of their clients in 
order to prevent environmental harm. However, extended liability may result in lenders increasing the cost 
of financing by charging a premium for firms that engage in potentially polluting activities, in order to 
incorporate the risk of being held liable in case of damage. This may have negative consequences on loan 
availability and may even discourage the funding of high-risk, but socially beneficial activities.70 
Besides the disputed possibility of lender liability, insurance for environmental damage might be a 
relatively new solution for the lacunas in the liability system. It therefore merits some explanation.71 
Insurance for Environmental Damage 
The traditional insurance system is based on the assumption that risk is quantifiable, in order to define the 
right premium that the insured will have to pay to the insurer for transferring the risk. The traditional 
system therefore works on a four phases basis: risk assessment, risk transferring, risk pooling and risk 
allocation.72 
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However, insurance for environmental risks represents many difficulties for the insurance market. 
Insurance is only able to perform its function correctly if a certain amount of information on the probability 
and possible extent of the damage of a certain risk is available. Precisely this information concerning 
environmental risk includes several factors of uncertainty, both factual and legal. The so-called gradual 
pollution poses a special difficulty. This kind of pollution develops slowly over a long period of time and its 
damaging effects are only apparent in the long run. In the case of gradual pollution it is very difficult to 
determine when pollution began and how long it continued. Moreover, it is far from easy to identify single 
polluters. 
Furthermore, asymmetrical information, which means that one party has access to information the 
other party does not have — due to the complexity of modern production technologies —, may give rise to 
problems of adverse selection for environmental insurance. This means that the insurer cannot accurately 
differentiate between high risk and low risk clients. Hence, when the insurer bases the insurance premium 
on the average risk across all firms, the high risk companies will purchase a more than proportionate share 
of insurance and the insurer will suffer losses, because he could not rightly assess the probability of the 
risk.73 
Moral hazard or careless behaviour of the insured, as accidents will be covered by insurance, might 
pose another serious problem for insurance of environmental accidents, as the insured will take less than 
optimal precautions.74 Ironically, in such a case the insurance coverage and the insurance premium could 
be understood as a licence to pollute. 
There would also be a difference between strict liability and a negligence rule. If the legislator choses a 
strict liability standard as the applicable rule, this would not constitute a problem in terms of insurability. 
Insurance of strict liability could, on the other hand, work as a kind of reinsurance, favouring compensation 
of the injured parties, the environment in this case. In fact, more problems would arise by a negligence 
standard, in which case liability involves a fault by the insured, by not complying with the legal standard. 
Hence, it will be even more difficult for the insurer to estimate the risk and the premium for the transfer of 
liability to the insurer. Moreover, the insurer would also face uncertainty concerning damage estimation by 
the court.75 
These particular features of environmental risk may explain why, at present, environmental risk is 
excluded from traditional liability insurance almost everywhere. As long as the damage costs of an accident 
are extremely difficult to predict ex ante, the insurance market will not be able to evaluate environmental 
risks properly and, hence, will not be willing to offer reasonably priced coverage. 
Consequently, the insurance industry has started to work out new techniques for coping with 
environmental damage. Insurance companies proposed the introduction of a new phase, referred to as ‘risk 
remodelling’, which takes place before the transfer of the risk. Professional risk-assessors would intervene 
actively on the risk by imposing technical safety standards. Insurance coverage for environmental damage 
could consequently only be provided on a site-specific basis, as it would require a careful evaluation and 
classification of the risk to be transferred.76 In this way environmental liability insurance could contribute to 
the insolvency problem of strict liability and would, moreover, enforce an extensive set of precise technical 
safety standards.77 Although this approach would provide a solution for the insolvency problem, in 
practice, modern environmental insurance is still not widespread at all. Especially gradual pollution 
coverage is still seen as too risky and most firms do not offer insurance against these environmental risks. 
Monti, who has studied the issue of insurance for environmental damage extensively, therefore 
proposes a system of compulsory pollution insurance. A compulsory insurance might provide a solution 
for the dilemmas mentioned above, for activities that are particularly polluting for example. However, it 
has to be acknowledged that environmental insurance must be tailor-made and site specific. A standard 
framework would force pollution insurance back into the traditional insurance scheme, which does not 
function properly as environmental risks cannot easily be assessed. 
Monti therefore proposes an ‘institutional model’ that takes all dilemmas and particularities into 
account. Monti emphasises the need to introduce a system of quasi-compulsory insurance for 
environmental risks and emphasises that regulation, liability, funds and insurance can be combined in an 
efficient way.78 Within this institutional model, the efficient legal system will use regulation to set minimal 
safety standards. Those standards will be combined with minimal insurability standards. As an additional 
condition for operations, the meeting of certain financial requirements shall be imposed on each firm that 
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wants to enter or remain on the market. Under such circumstances, environmental insurance will become a 
viable solution for the economic actors — given that all firms in operation will meet the minimal 
insurability standards — pollution coverage should be denied to nobody. Insurance for environmental 
damage would then complement both the liability system and the regulatory scheme. 
Compensation Funds 
In order to provide a solution for historical pollution, a fourth remedy, examined by legal and economic 
scholars, consists of a tax based Compensation Fund. Compensation funds could intervene for certain risks 
as historical pollution, were the polluter cannot be found anymore.79 Nevertheless, it seems appropriate, as 
Faure indicates, to examine the combined use of liability rules, insurance, and funds, in order to achieve 
optimal results for restoration of environmental damage.80 
To summarise, when the economic theory of tort law is applied to environmental damage it can be 
shown that both a negligence rule and a strict liability rule will result in an optimal level of precautions in 
prevention of environmental damage. However, as in the general analysis, there are substantial differences 
between these two liability rules. Only a strict liability rule will reduce the activity level. Negative 
consequences, however, like a reduction in the production of socially desirable goods as pharmaceutics, 
should be avoided. A strict liability rule, furthermore, does not have as high information costs as a 
negligence rule and from a compensation point of view, strict liability might ensure full compensation of 
damage, which would not be the case for negligence. Indeed, the polluter would not have to pay for the 
damage if he fulfilled the due care standard. Insolvency, however, might distort this compensation. 
Scholars therefore examined solutions as safety regulations, extended liability, insurance and compensation 
funds. In the next paragraph, liability rules will be compared with other instruments of pollution control in 
order to point to the complementary role of liability for environmental damage. 
2.3. Liability Rules versus Other Instruments for Controlling Environmental Damage 
This paragraph will evaluate different instruments for controlling environmental damage in order to sketch 
the contribution of environmental liability in the prevention and restoration of environmental damage. 
First, the difference between so called ex ante and ex post instruments to control pollution will be explained. 
Then, attention will go to the use of regulation in the prevention and restoration of environmental damage. 
Finally, the complementary relationship of regulation and liability rules will be explained. 
2.3.1. Ex Ante versus Ex Post Instruments for Controlling Environmental Damage 
Governments face different choices when deciding upon the instruments to use to protect their 
environment. Therefore, governments have to weigh different regulatory (legal and economic) tools. A 
common dilemma is whether to use regulations or other instruments that impose the quality standards to 
be achieved in advance — ex ante — or whether to use ex post instruments to control pollution, like liability 
rules that come into effect after damage has occurred. 
Theoretically, the goal of full internalisation of pollution externalities can be achieved through many 
different legal or economic instruments. On the one hand, there are legal and economic instruments that 
steer individual behaviour ex ante. Insofar as legal instruments are concerned regulations such as command 
– and — control rules, standards and sanctions define the environmental quality that is to be reached and 
set by the government ex ante. Economic ex ante internalising tools that can be mentioned are the attribution 
of permits to firms and the enforcement of pollution taxes. 
On the other hand, internalisation of pollution can also be ensured by ex post imposition of the costs of 
pollution on the polluter by means of liability, which is enforced by courts. The polluter will be held liable 
to pay for any damages to the environment in any case where he was strictly liable or in case of negligence, 
when he did not take due care. If cost minimising behaviour is assumed, the potential polluter will 
consequently internalise the cost of pollution, as with the ex ante instruments.81 
It is beyond the scope of this research to provide an extensive overview of the different instruments. 
However, a short elucidation of each of the internalising tools will provide a better understanding of the 
role of environmental liability. Both ex ante economic and legal instruments will be compared with ex post 
liability. 
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Ex ante economic Internalising Instruments 
The environmental economics literature proposes ex ante internalising instruments, which generally try to 
minimise the total cost of achieving a certain environmental quality.82 
One instrument that has been shown to create the appropriate incentives, at least in theory, is a 
marketable permit. Marketable permits are generally thought of as a ‘quantity’ instrument because they 
ration a fixed supply of a commodity, in this case pollution. The implementation of marketable permits 
involves several steps. First, a target level of environmental quality is established. Next, this level of 
environmental quality is defined in terms of total allowable emissions. The regulator should then grant a 
firm a number of permits, with each permit allowing the owner to emit a specified amount of pollution. If 
the firm is able to reduce its emissions, preferably through the use of newer technologies, it can sell its 
remaining emission permits to another firm that cannot meets its quota. Assuming firms minimise their 
total production costs, and the market for these permits is competitive, it can be shown that the overall cost 
of achieving the environmental standard will be minimised. 
The opposite of a quantity instrument is a ‘pricing’ instrument, such as emissions charges or pollution 
taxes. The pricing technique also starts from a predetermined set of standards for environmental quality 
and then imposes unit taxes (or subsidies) sufficient to achieve these standards. The idea underlying 
emissions charges is to charge polluters a fixed price for each unit of pollution. In this way, they are 
provided with an incentive to economise on the amount of pollution they produce. Economic 
environmental theory shows that if all firms are charged the same fixed price for each unit of pollution all 
firms will try to reduce costs. Firms might have a different state of technology though, so that some firms 
abate more than others. However, in the end, marginal costs (the cost of one more unit) of abatement will 
be equated across firms. According to economic theory, this result implies that the resulting level of 
pollution is reached in a cost minimising way. From a practical point of view, it is clear that charges are 
easier to control than marketable permits, which have not received widespread use.83 
Ex Ante Economic Instruments versus Ex Post Liability 
A fundamental remark should be made concerning the above mentioned economic internalising tools. 
Although both instruments achieve efficient results, as far as prevention and precaution behaviour is 
concerned, they do not give the signal that polluting is ‘wrong’ and that the polluted area should be 
restored. In fact, especially a permit, but also a tax when paid, gives a permission to pollute. The 
compensation function of liability, which can be seen as a restoration function for environmental damage, is 
therefore not incorporated in the economic instruments, as with a liability rule. Paragraph 2.4 will 
concentrate on this issue. For the time being, if the compensation function is considered to be important in 
environmental policy, it should be concluded that ex post liability rules should be preferred to the above 
mentioned economic ex ante internalising instruments.84 
Ex Ante Legal Internalising Instruments 
An ex ante legal instrument for ensuring internalisation of environmental pollution is a regulatory system. 
A government can use a number of ways to control environmental damage and reduce the probability of 
environmental accidents. The traditional approach is the command and control procedure of setting and 
enforcing pollution standards. The regulator might oblige firms to limit their emissions, to emit no more 
than a specified amount of a certain pollutant or to install particular abatement technology, like a filter. The 
regulator then monitors the firms’ compliance.85 More recently, voluntary standards have been proposed as 
an instrument in environmental regulation.86 
The regulatory system is characterised by a centralised structure. It is based on the assumption that 
the government has an oversight of the problems and risks of environmental pollution and is therefore well 
suited to set environmental standards and to enforce the implementation of those standards. However, a 
drawback might be that regulatory agencies may not be very flexible in adapting to changing conditions or 
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knowledge and that a centralised command structure, which relies on expert advice, may be subject to 
political pressure as well as to lobbying by the regulated firms.87 
Ex Ante Legal Instruments versus Ex Post Liability 
Governmental regulation of environmental standards can differ from a liability regime in the following 
aspects: the level of administrative costs, the responsible party to pay for the damage in case of an 
environmental accident, the information of the parties regarding accident probability and finally, the risk of 
lobbying.88 
A first element is the difference in administrative expenses incurred by both private persons and the 
regulator. The cost of a liability system includes the cost of controlling the accident risk, the legal expenses 
in case of a trial and the public expenses for the operation of legal institutions. The costs of the regulatory 
system include the public expenses for the functioning of the regulatory agencies and the private cost of 
compliance with the standards. The liability system has the advantage that a significant part of the 
administrative costs are only incurred if a trial occurs. The administrative costs of a regulatory system are 
incurred whether or not an accident happens because the process of regulation is costly by itself. Indeed, 
the regulator needs to collect information about the parties, their activities and the risks, in order to set 
pollution standards.89 
A second element that might differ is the person that bears the cost of environmental damage. In a 
regulatory system, when due care is exercised by firms according to the standards defined by the 
regulatory agency, the firm will not bear the costs of restoration. Instead, the costs are usually, directly or 
indirectly, covered publicly. In a (strict) liability system, restoration costs are imposed on the responsible 
private parties, given their capacity to pay and their limited liability. With reference to paragraph 2.3, 
where insurance for environmental damages was discussed, it may be concluded that both systems could 
profit from some form of compulsory insurance for the losses in excess of the assets of the firm. Potentially, 
the liability system could also rely on an extended liability regime for the firm’s shareholders and 
financiers. However, this may cause too much deterrence and prohibit socially desirable activities.90 
A third important difference between regulation and liability is the distribution of knowledge among 
parties with respect to the benefits of the activity, the cost of precautions and the probability and severity of 
accidents. Sometimes the nature of the activities is such that the firms have better knowledge of the 
probability of an accident and the costs of reducing the risk. In such a case a liability system has the 
advantage of making the private parties responsible for controlling their risks, while a regulation system 
might, through a lack of information, lead to the overestimation or underestimation of the costs, probability 
and severity of the risks. But it might also be the case that the regulator has better knowledge of those risks 
and costs of precaution, in particular when a better knowledge of the risk factors requires a special expertise 
or centralised information that can be applied to different activities and situations.91 
Fourthly, the possibility of lobbying should not be neglected. The government might be influenced by 
external pressure of lobby groups. In general one might argue that courts are less likely to be influenced 
than the regulating agencies.92 
Balance 
Both ex ante legal and economic instruments and ex post liability can achieve internalisation of 
environmental damage by the potential polluter. Ex ante economic instruments are less common, and 
compensation is not addressed. Therefore these instruments will not explicitly be studied further in this 
research. Attention will go to the comparison between ex ante regulation and ex post liability. In the law and 
economic literature, liability for environmental damages and safety regulations are often compared on their 
efficiency in preventing and restoring environmental damage.93 It is often stated that environmental 
regulation and liability rules can or should be complements of each other. A regulation requires a potential 
injurer to take specific measures in order to prevent the accident from happening. A liability rule also seeks 
to deter by making the potential injurer liable for the costs of the accident, should it occur, but alsoprovides 
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for a ruling on compensation.94 The next paragraph will point out the precise role of environmental liability, 
and its interdependency in relation to environmental regulation. 
2.3.2. Interaction between Environmental Regulation and Environmental Liability 
In the law and economics literature several contributions can be found that weigh liability rules against 
regulation of environmentally dangerous activities. However, the different scholars reach different 
conclusions on the exact role both instruments could play and the complementary function regulation and 
tort law could have in preventing accidents. 
Indeed, whether regulation of environmental quality standards is more efficient than liability rules 
depends on various factors. Shavell distinguishes several factors that should influence the choice between 
ex ante regulation and ex post liability.95 Various authors have discussed these criteria.96 As these criteria are 
fundamental to the assessment of regulation and liability rules, they will be discussed below, first in a 
general way, then in relation to environmental damage in particular. 
Regulation versus Liability: General Situation 
A first important factor that influences the choice between ex ante regulation and ex post liability is the 
availability of information. Shavell claims that generally private parties might have better information on 
the accident risk.97 They are the ones who undertake the potentially dangerous activities. Therefore, they 
might be in the best position to estimate the nature of the risks that they create and the costs of taking 
precautions. This information advantage would then favour a liability rule. On the other hand, if optimal 
safety standards are publicly known, or if the estimation of risk requires specialised research, an ex ante 
regulatory system might be better at ensuring optimal safety than tort law. Hence, for every activity, it must 
be examined whether the government or the private parties would have better information on the accident 
risk, in order to choose between ex ante regulation or ex post liability. 
Second, if injurers might be insolvent and hence unable to pay for the harm they cause, ex post liability 
will not effectively deter them. Indeed, if the damage exceeds the wealth of the polluter underdeterrence 
results. Regulation, that determines ex ante the efficient level of precautions, might overcome the insolvency 
problem. However, if the regulation is enforced by fines based on the expected damage then the insolvency 
problem still might persist. Shavell therefore proposes that the regulation should be enforced by non-
monetary sanctions.98 On the other hand, insurance might solve the underdeterrence of tort law, as was 
already addressed in paragraph 2.3. 
Other factors that might influence the choice between ex ante regulation and ex post can be grouped 
under the actual threat of a liability suit. There may be situations in which significant harm to the 
environment is done, but where no action will be brought against the polluter. In such a situation, ex ante 
regulation might be preferable. Firstly, governmental regulation may be desirable when harm is diffuse. In 
such a case, there may be many individuals that suffer a little bit of harm, so that they have little incentive 
to sue on their own. Due to transaction costs, they are often unable to organise cheaply in order to sue as a 
group. This situation might lead to systematic undercompensation and consequently to underdeterrence. 
Underdeterrence might also result from weak causational chains. When the relationship between a certain 
activity and harm cannot be proven, no liability suit will follow, and the polluter will have no incentive to 
take optimal precautions. Hence ex ante regulations or taxes might be preferred.99 
Finally, administrative costs are an important consideration. If the probability of harm is low, ex post 
systems may be preferable since they only need to come into play when damage occurs. 
Assessment of these criteria shows that, depending upon the situation, either regulation or liability or 
a combination of both will be best to deal with different kinds of harm. Shavell’s criteria can now be applied 
to environmental damage in particular. 
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Regulation versus Liability: Environmental Damage 
As far as the availability of information is concerned, liability rules might be preferred when private parties 
have better knowledge concerning the benefits of their activities, the cost of precautions, or the severity of 
the risks. Whereas, when the information possessed by regulators is superior to the information of private 
parties, regulation might be favoured’.100 In the specific case of environmental risks, Arcuri and Faure point 
out that regulatory bodies may have better knowledge of the risk. Notably, certain risks to the environment, 
such as oil spills, accidents at chemical or at nuclear-power plants, or the transportation of dangerous goods 
require expert knowledge in order to assess the accident risk. Regulatory bodies might perform this task 
better. Small organisations might lack the incentive or resources needed to invest in research to determine 
the optimal care level for certain dangerous activities. Moreover, they would have little incentive to carry 
out intensive research if the results would be readily available to competitors in the market, known as the 
free-rider problem. Finally, economies of scale exist in developing scientific knowledge concerning the risk 
of these activities to public health or to the environment. Therefore, regulation might be favoured.101 
The insolvency risk provides another argument for ex ante regulation. Indeed, it should be considered 
that accidents, causing damage to the environment, might be real disasters. If the amount of damage 
significantly exceeds the assets of the polluting firms, liability will not provide incentives to take 
precautions as the firms will probably be incapable of paying for the full magnitude of the damage. 
Underdeterrence will arise in the case of a liability rule. 
Finally, in cases of accidents causing damage to the environment, a long period of time may pass 
before the full extent of damage becomes apparent. The damage might also be widely spread. Hence, it may 
be difficult to prove a causal link between the damage and the polluter, which will make it hard for the — 
possibly many — individuals to bring a lawsuit against the polluter. Therefore, the risk of a liability suit 
might be very small for the polluter. In such circumstances liability rules will not work optimally as 
polluters will not face the threat of suit for harm done.102 Under such circumstances ex ante regulation could 
be preferred. 
In conclusion, based on Shavell’s criteria, it appears that there are strong arguments to prevent 
environmental damage through ex ante regulation, since liability rules may, in certain cases, provide 
insufficient incentives for firms to take optimal precautions. Furthermore, ex ante regulation might be 
preferred when harm is large, spread over many victims, when it takes a long time to become apparent, and 
when it is possible to determine and to control optimal standards or requirements.103 
The question arises, however, whether this outcome implies that prevention of environmental damage 
should depend solely upon regulation or whether liability can fulfil a complementary role. The next 
paragraph will turn to this question. 
2.3.3. Complementary Relationship between Liability and Environmental Regulation 
Various scholars have examined the complementary relationship between regulation and liability for 
environmental damage.104 It appears that liability for environmental damage can complement ex ante safety 
regulations. The complementary role of liability rules in controlling environmental risks is threefold. 
A first reason to combine ex ante regulation with ex post liability is found in the lack-of enforcement-
argument, so defined by Arcuri.105 The effectiveness of ex ante regulation depends upon the ability to 
enforce the regulation. In the case of weak enforcement, ex post liability might be an effective complement to 
regulation. If the government does not dispose of sufficient means of control, this might lead to an 
inefficient high level of risks for society. Liability rules might counterbalance this deficiency of 
environmental regulation and can act as a supplementary enforcement device. However, as Kolstad and 
others indicate, this is only possible if the liability rule is equal to or less stringent than the regulatory 
standard. Obviously, problems will arise if the liability rule, in practise, would impose standards that are 
higher than the regulatory standards. In such circumstances, firms will be reluctant to produce, as there is 
always a risk they will be sued, although they complied with the safety standards. Strict liability might, 
therefore, be inadvisable, a negligence rule could, on the other hand, be an effective complement if due care 
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is set equal or less stringent than the regulatory standard.106 Implementation or enforcement of regulation 
might also be difficult when diverging interests exist at the political level. The combination of safety 
regulations and liability rules might, to some extent, overcome the influence of lobby groups on regulation. 
Secondly, safety standards and regulation might be outdated relatively fast and might often lack 
flexibility, which favours a combination with liability rules equally. Due to better information concerning 
environmental risks, regulation appeared to be a superior tool for dealing with environmental risks, as 
compared to liability. However, regulation can not be adapted quickly to changes in reality. Indeed, before 
a new regulation can be issued, the government will have to go through the whole law-making process. On 
the other hand, technology might evolve rapidly and, as new industrial processes might be developed; new 
risks might come into existence. Consequently, there will be a gap between the time that the new risk comes 
into existence and a new regulation being issued to deal with this risk. Therefore, there will be a ‘systematic 
lack of control’107 over new risks. In such cases liability might be applied until legislation has been passed. 
Liability rules are indeed adaptable to new situations. They are not designed to deal with a particular 
situation, but are intended to deal with a wide range of different cases that are not necessarily foreseen. The 
deficiency of ex ante regulation in relation to the ‘systematic—lack—of–control’ over new risks, would thus 
be minimised by the existence of a complementary liability regime.108 
Finally, liability rules do not only provide incentives to steer individual behaviour towards an 
internalisation of environmental damage. A liability system might also function as a compensation system, 
by obliging the polluter to compensate those who suffered damage or to oblige the restoration of the 
damage. Therefore, if compensation is not addressed in the regulation, either a compensation fund could 
fill up this gap, if damage is widely spread over many victims, or, if there are few victims, the law could 
permit private tort actions under liability principles in order to achieve compensation.109 
Summarising, this paragraph evaluated different instruments for controlling pollution in order to 
sketch the contribution of environmental liability in the prevention and restoration of environmental 
damage. It was shown that ex ante legal and economic instruments as well as ex post liability can achieve 
internalisation of environmental damage by the potential polluter. As ex ante economic instruments are not 
that common, the focus was on the comparison between ex ante regulation and ex post liability. It can be 
concluded that for environmental damage, ex ante safety regulation will be needed as in some cases ex post 
liability might not provide sufficient incentives to take optimal precautionary measures towards accident 
prevention. However, it was shown that liability rules may play an important complementary role to 
regulation, not only in the prevention of environmental damage, but also in restoration after pollution. 
Indeed, the growing attention for environmental liability rules on national and international levels may 
reflect an increased concern for the compensation and restoration function of environmental liability. 
A possible explanation of this concern for compensation of environmental damage will be given in the 
next paragraph. 
2.4. The Added Value of Liability Rules for Environmental Damage 
Recently, several authors have paid attention to the consequences of different environmental policies on 
human behaviour and the need to take justice and fairness considerations into account in the analysis of 
optimal environmental policies. This paragraph is not intended to be exhaustive, as the subject falls outside 
the scope of the research. However, two important views will be presented. 
2.4.1. Recognition of a Crowding-out Effect 
In his book ‘Not just for the Money’,110 Bruno Frey emphasises that human behaviour is not solely guided 
by monetary incentives and proves the importance of intrinsic motivation. 
As was mentioned before, governments face different choices when determining their environmental 
policy. Governments mainly introduced laws and regulations to reduce pollution and to protect the 
environment. However, environmental economics introduced the idea of the use of incentive instruments 
like marketable permits or licences and emission charges to reduce pollution. These policy instruments put 
a price on the use of the environment, and from an economic point of view, they are economically efficient 
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policy instruments.111 In that sense, environmental incentive instruments can be seen as successful 
applications of economic theory, but in the real world they are not often used. 
Frey provides an explanation for the rare use of incentive instruments, based on intrinsic motivation. 
Frey states that human motivation is not restricted to monetary incentives, intrinsic motivation is also 
crucially important. Worse, external interventions such as permits and licences might under certain 
circumstances drive out people’s intrinsic motivation, a result that Frey calls the ‘Crowding–Out Effect’.112 
Frey indicates that individuals are prepared to behave in an environmental friendly way, if their 
behaviour costs them little. The more costly it gets the lower the attention for moral concerns. When the 
cost is very high, only ecological extremists would still behave in an environmental friendly way, while 
most people would find a lot of reasons why they should not do so. Yet, a firm facing perfect competition 
will incur high costs if it adopts high environmental standards and other firms do not. On the other hand, 
environmentally friendly production methods may pay for a firm if it can thereby increase its sales or 
prevent a boycott from environmental action groups or other stakeholders. Such behaviour might also help 
to be on good terms with the government for future orders. There are thus various reasons for which 
individuals and firms might pursue environmentally friendly behaviour. According to Frey, this behaviour 
shows intrinsic motivation.113 
When incentive instruments would be introduced to prevent environmental harm, and individuals 
initially behave in an environmental friendly manner, a crowding-out effect might come into existence. The 
explanation is that licence permits allow a specific amount of emissions and as long as the firm stays within 
the emission limits, damage to the environment is not condemned. From this point of view, once a licence 
has been obtained, the firm has a ‘licence to pollute’. Furthermore, in case of a pollution tax, if the tax fails 
to distinguish between firms that do care for the environment and firms that do not, all firms will get the 
same average tax. Hence, a firm’s environmental conscious behaviour is not recognised, and it is possible 
that those firms simply adjust their emission level to the sector’s average level. Consequently, incentive 
instruments might fail to acknowledge intrinsically motivated concerns to protect the environment and a 
Crowding-Out Effect might come into existence.114 
Frey’s theoretical analysis therefore suggests that instruments entailing a moral condemnation of 
pollution might be preferred. Frey does not exclude incentive instruments, though: they could be modified 
or used in areas where environmental concern is weak. Regulations, liability and subsidies are, on the other 
hand, instruments that reward environmentally conscious behaviour.115 
The fact that liability for environmental damage gives a clear signal that polluting is wrong, and that 
the polluter should restore the damage is an extra argument for the use of liability as a complement to 
regulation. 
Kaplow and Shavell present another argument for the combination of regulation and liability. 
2.4.2. Fairness and Justice Considerations in the Economic Analysis of Law 
Kaplow and Shavell examined the desirability of incorporating fairness into the economic analysis of law.116 
They argued that taking notions of fairness into account can, and sometimes will, make society worse off. 
As the economic analysis of law is based on welfare economics, preference should go to that policy under 
which everyone is better off than under each of the alternatives. Therefore, any deviation from this optimal 
state will make everybody worse off. This result does not depend on the particular interpretation of 
fairness. Any notion of fairness would be subject to their criticism. They argue that if notions of fairness are 
used as independent evaluative principles in assessing governmental policy and a different legal rule 
would be chosen than the one which would be optimal according to welfare economics, society as a whole 
could be made worse off.117 
Therefore, their analysis suggests that notions of fairness should not be given any weight as 
independent evaluative principles in assessing governmental policy. Nevertheless, they agree that notions 
of fairness undoubtedly have appeal both to legal analysts and philosophers, as well as to society more 
generally.118 Therefore, according to Kaplow and Shavell, even though notions of fairness should not be 
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used as independent evaluative principles, the existence of social norms can have relevance when assessing 
legal rules within the framework of welfare economics.119 
Indeed, the importance that individuals attach to social norms may translate into a preference for a 
policy that treats injurers and victims in a manner that is consistent with related notions of fairness. That is, 
just as individuals will be upset, when an injurer does not compensate a victim when the injurer is wrong in 
an informal setting, they may be upset if the chosen policy does not require an injurer to compensate a 
victim when the injurer is wrong. 
If citizens have such feelings, this will be relevant under welfare economics, just like any other tastes, 
whether for material goods or ‘moral beliefs’, because welfare economics takes all components of an 
individual’s well-being into account. Therefore, if fairness enters into their preferences, it should be 
included in the welfare analysis of a particular policy.120 
Thus, the real question is not so much whether social norms or fairness notions have to play a role in 
policy considerations, but much more what weight these social norms, justice or fairness considerations 
should get in the welfare economic analysis.  
The attention for fairness notions in the choice of an optimal environmental policy, might present 
another argument for the use of liability as a complement to regulation. Indeed, a liability rule incorporates 
notions of fairness. The first notion of fairness is concerned with making the injurer pay for the harm he has 
brought about. The second notion of fairness concerns compensation. A fairness principle might demand 
both that the injurer pay and that this payment be received by the victim. 
Summarising, this paragraph has shown by means of welfare economic analysis that imposing 
liability for environmental damage — when combined with safety regulation — fulfils economic efficiency 
and, moreover, gives a clear indication that polluting is wrong. This indication meets the socially accepted 
idea that the polluter should pay for the damage caused, thereby fulfilling fairness notions in society and 
preserving intrinsic motivation. It can therefore be concluded that liability rules for environmental damage 
do indeed provide an added value to environmental policy. The next paragraph will therefore concentrate 
on the contribution of liability rules in the prevention and restoration of soil pollution, which will be the 
focus in the remainder of this research. 
3. Liability Rules for Soil Pollution 
3.1. Defining Soil Pollution 
3.1.1. Complexity of Soil Pollution 
It falls beyond the scope of this research to go into the details of chemical reactions between hazardous 
substances and soil, but, as soil pollution will be used as an example throughout this research, a brief idea 
of what is meant by soil pollution might help to understand the contribution of liability rules in the 
prevention and restorion of soil pollution. 
Soil is the upper layer of the Earth’s crust composed of mineral particles, organic matter, water, air 
and organisms and is the product of climate, geology, vegetation and biological activity.121 The exact 
proportions of these different components determine the physical, chemical and biological properties of a 
certain soil type. In Europe 320 different soil types have been identified.122 
Soil has many important functions. By providing nutrients, water and air, soil serves a habitat for 
numerous organisms and plant life. Agricultural production is soil related and soil is a source of raw 
materials, used for constructions and buildings. Moreover, soil has a filtering, buffering and transformation 
function of substances entering the soil. Finally it serves as an archive of natural history.123 
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Soil pollution is a very complex and challenging environmental problem. Soil pollution did not get 
attention until the late 1970’s and was even then not considered to be of major concern.124 Nowadays, it is a 
widespread problem faced by many countries.125 
At present, there exists no harmonised definition for ‘contaminated soil’. At national level, various 
definitions of soil pollution are used. Some countries have introduced a definition with a quantitative 
character; other countries use a more qualitative definition in their legislation. At the international level, the 
ISO Technical Committee TC 190 on Soil Quality has not as yet been able to agree on a definition for 
‘pollution’ and ‘contamination’.126 The European Environmental Agency has proposed a definition for the 
term ‘contaminated site’, whereby a distinction is made between ‘potential contaminated sites’ and 
‘contaminated sites’. For both types of sites, a qualitative and a quantitative definition are presented, 
whereby the quantitative definition is more detailed. There a potentially contaminated site is understood — 
when slightly simplified — as `a location where, as a result of human activity, waste or harmful discharges, 
suspected to be dangerous to human health or the environment, are present in, on or under the soil and/or 
in nearby controlled groundwaters and surface water resources’. A contaminated site is `a location in which 
the quantities or concentrations of waste or harmful discharges are such that, on the basis of the result of 
risk assessment, they constitute a danger to human health or the environment’.127 
Soil pollution is closely related to industrialisation and can have multiple causes. A distinction can be 
made between local and diffuse soil pollution. Diffuse soil pollution is due to emissions from industry, 
traffic or agriculture, and isvery difficult to track. The focus of this research, however, will be on local soil 
contamination. One source of local soil pollution is the inadequate disposal of waste containing hazardous 
substances in past decades. A second source of local soil pollution is the use of potentially hazardous 
substances in industrial production processes. These include heavy metals like lead, inorganics (sulphate, 
asbestos) or organics (oils, dioxins). As the use of chemicals or other potentially hazardous substances is 
wide-spread in industrial processes, there is hardly any industrial sector where the risk of soil pollution in 
the course of operation can be excluded. Other sources might be mining activities or former military sites.128  
As soil serves various functions, soil pollution can have different impacts on the environment and on 
human health. First, an important hazard that can occur is the contamination of the groundwater. How 
quickly and severely the groundwater might be contaminated does not only depend on the substance that 
has been spilled, but also depends on the soil structure itself, as there is a highly variable degree of soil 
reactivity to a single substance. In the case of permeable soil, substances might more easily contaminate the 
groundwater, which might have particularly dangerous consequences, whereas clay land might hinder 
dangerous substances from contaminating the groundwater for a longer period.129 Next, direct contact (for 
example, a children’s playground at a former industrial site) with polluted soil might cause irritations and 
building on former landfill sites showed the risk of explosions of landfill gasses in closed rooms. 
Furthermore, the risk exists that plants and vegetables absorb the hazardous substances in the soil, thereby 
entering the food chain. However, depending on the hazardous substance and the soil condition, not all of 
these possible hazards will arise. It is also important to note that contaminants, present in any form and 
particularly gases or liquids, can be mobile. How quickly they might migrate beyond the boundaries of the 
contaminated site depends on the soil structure. It is therefore possible that pollution can spread to 
surrounding land. In many cases, however, contaminants remain close to the places where they were or are 
used.130 
As both the type of hazardous substance as the features of the soil influence the way in which and 
when a hazard might arise, a simple cause and effect relationship might sometimes be hard to prove.131 The 
difficulty in proving that soil pollution might cause hazards, does not, however, mean that these hazards 
are negligible, but merely that soil pollution might be difficult to detect and sometimes very slow to 
appear.132 
These particular characteristics of soil pollution have to be kept in mind with respect to soil protection 
policies, the ‘optimal’ liability rule for preventing and restoring soil pollution and the ‘optimal level of 
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decision-making’ of liability rules for soil pollution, which will be used as a case-study throughout this 
research. 
In short, soil pollution is a complex problem that is widely acknowledged nowadays. Hence, 
prevention of soil pollution and decontamination seem to have become legislative concerns in most 
countries. 
3.1.2. Regulation for Preventing and Restoring Soil Pollution 
It falls beyond the scope of this introductory chapter to discuss in detail how various countries have 
regulated soil pollution. Yet, in general, most countries have established a framework of regulations to 
prevent and restore soil pollution. These regulations appear to be rather fragmentary and soil pollution is 
often addressed indirectly in different policy areas. Indeed, as soil pollution can have many sources and 
many consequences, the scope of national regulations and the approaches used, vary considerably. First, 
the main focus of legislation might differ depending on the main problems experienced due to soil 
pollution. For instance, in some countries, soil protection legislation focuses on the protection of 
groundwater quality, as a source of drinking water. In other countries, the regulations of industrial or 
agricultural activities are major concerns. In any case, the nature of soil pollution, with wide-spread 
consequences, might explain why the problem is not solved by legislation that deals uniquely with the 
prevention of soil pollution, but that it has been incorporated in other fields of regulation like land-use 
planning. Furthermore, there are different standards and different actual levels of enforcement of 
environmental legislation. Yet, the legal framework developed for the prevention of soil pollution can show 
lacunas, has to be enforced, and, in case of an accident, decontamination has to be ensured. In various 
countries, the regulatory framework is complemented with civil liability, in order to ensure the enforcement 
of their environmental legislation and to ensure the restoration in case of damage.133 
It therefore merits studying the contribution of liability rules to prevent and restore soil pollution and 
the complementary role of environmental regulation and liability rules for soil pollution. 
3.2. Liability to Prevent and Restore Soil Pollution 
3.2.1. Contribution of Liability Rules in Prevention and Restoration of Soil Pollution 
In paragraph 2, explaining the economic theory on liability for environmental damage, it was already 
demonstrated that liability rules cannot be the single regulating instrument for protecting the environment, 
due to problems of insolvency, for instance. However, it was shown that liability rules can play a useful 
complementary role besides environmental regulation by the government. The same reasoning can be 
applied to soil pollution. 
Liability rules for soil pollution may have two functions. Firstly, as prevention of soil pollution is 
concerned, civil liability for soil pollution can play a complementary role besides regulations requiring 
industry to fulfil certain standards or possess certain licences. Indeed, regulation might lag behind or norms 
might be inefficiently low, due to political pressure or because the causal link between an activity and soil 
pollution is not always easy to prove. Under these circumstances, liability can induce industry to take all 
necessary preventive measures that are possible, knowing that they can still be held liable even when they 
do not go beyond their licence. As Faure indicates, it is in this complementary role that scholars see the 
surplus value of liability.134 
Secondly, liability rules can provide compensation for the victims. However, in the case of strict 
liability, insolvency of the polluter might hinder effective compensation of the victims or restoration of the 
polluted soil. Therefore, for liability rules to work optimally, a combination with other mechanisms, like an 
environmental damage insurance, might be necessary. 
The question arises, however, what kind of liability rule, strict liability or negligence, would best 
prevent and restore soil pollution. 
3.2.2. Strict Liability versus Negligence for Preventing and Restoring Soil Pollution 
In order to answer the question: which type of liability rule would be best able to prevent soil pollution or 
restore existing pollution, a distinction has to be made between historical contamination and recent 
contamination. 
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3.2.2.1. Recent Contamination 
Regulation to protect the environment can not exclude that accidents still can happen. Furthermore, 
although nowadays most industries are subject to environmental regulation and control, the enforcement 
might be not effective enough.135 In such cases, a strict liability rule might complement safety standards set 
by the government. Polinksy and Shavell prove that making industry responsible for restoration and 
strictly liable for remaining damage would induce industry to take all necessary precautionary measures. 
Moreover, the optimal activity level will be adopted.136 However, other scholars like Bergkamp, for 
example, state that strict liability offers no additional benefits over fault liability.137 Strict liability does 
indeed have certain drawbacks. First of all, if the damage excedes the polluter’s wealth a problem of 
underdeterrence might arise. Furthermore, if risk aversion might be assumed for certain operators, a strict 
liability rule might prevent them from engaging in beneficial production. Summarising, in cases of recent 
contamination, strict liability for dangerous activities might be useful, whereas a negligence rule might be 
sufficient for non-dangerous activities. This approach is also followed by several European countries. 
3.2.2.2. Historical Contamination  
Sometimes it might take a long time before becoming clear that some substances has caused soil pollution. 
Therefore, a wide range of contaminated sites might fall under this category. In some cases, the polluter 
cannot be found anymore or, in many cases, these sites became contaminated through their use by industry 
using processes and substances which would not be allowed anymore by current environmental regulation 
in most western countries, but which were allowed at the time of contamination. Brownfields in older 
(industrial) cities might be examples of such historical contamination.138 These sites obviously also require 
clean up measures. To develop a liability rule for this damage will be difficult though. The responsible 
parties might have acted according to legislation at that time. 
Hence, for historical contamination, a fault-based liability regime might be preferred, whereby a firm 
shall be held liable in case fault, damage and causation can be proved. Furthermore, different solutions than 
liability rules might have to be provided in order to ensure restoration. Often the government itself might 
engage in clean up. The clean-up cost can either be paid by tax revenues, or by restoration funds through 
industry payments.139 
In Chapter 3 a framework for making decision regarding the optimal level of liability rules for 
environmental damage, including soil pollution, in a federal system will be developed, and hence will 
address the question of whether harmonisation of liability rules would result in better prevention and 
restoration of environmental damage, including soil pollution, whether a system of liability rules at 
national level would be preferable or whether a multi-level solution would be best. Before starting this 
discussion, the features of a liability rule that the harmonisation debate must take into consideration merit 
some attention. 
3.3. Features of a Liability Rule 
There are four main features of a liability rule that have to be taken into consideration in a harmonisation 
debate. First, the scope of the liability rule has to be discussed, as well as what type of liability will be 
chosen. In which cases does strict liability apply, when is a negligence rule appropriate, and is it useful to 
harmonise the application of either liability rule in a federal system? Second, how will causation be 
determined for negligence? Third, which scientific basis or standard will be used to decide when there is 
risk or harm? Or, is there need for a harmonised risk assessment procedure? Finally, who is going to 
implement and enforce the liability rules? Will this be a central agency or environmental control agencies of 
the different countries? An overview of the choices to be made is given below. 
3.3.1. Type and Scope of Liability Rule (Strict Liability versus Negligence) 
In the case of harmonisation, countries will have to agree on (industrial) activities that will either be subject 
to a strict liability rule (for dangerous activities for example), or to a negligence rule (non-dangerous 
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activities). Furthermore, the temporal scope of the liability rule (how long can somebody be held liable), the 
persons that can be held liable under the liability rule (operators, but also managers, authorisation holders 
or even parent corporation) or exemptions that will be added to the liability rule, are all features that will 
have to be addressed. 
3.3.2. Causation 
A feature of liability is that it requires a causal link between the damage and the activity in order to claim 
that the polluter is liable for the damage. With respect to our case-study, however, it might be very difficult 
to establish a causal link for soil pollution, as it might take a long time before soil pollution becomes 
apparent. A thorough local knowledge of the soil, its features and reactivity on the one hand and the 
industrial activities on the other hand therefore seems crucial in deciding whether there might be a causal 
link between polluted soil and a certain industry. Whether a standard approach towards causation can be 
formulated should therefore be examined carefully. 
3.3.3. Risk Assessment  
There are no international or European standards on how identification of potentially contaminated sites 
would have to be done, nor how risk management, for example clean-up measures or monitoring, should 
be effectuated.140 Nevertheless, when there is harm and when compensation or restoration is required 
under a liability rule must be defined. Therefore, in the harmonisation debate, eventual harmonisation of 
risk assessment and risk managementmust also be addressed. 
3.3.4. Implementation and Enforcement 
Finally, in the harmonisation debate, the implementation and enforcement of the liability rule will have to 
be discussed. Implementation of the liability rules and enforcement could be done by a central agency or 
environmental control agencies of the different participating countries. The (dis)advantages of both 
approaches will have to be weighted as well. 
4. Summary 
In this chapter an attempt was made towards explaining the role of environmental liability in the 
prevention and restoration of environmental damage. 
Using a law and economics approach to tort law, it was indicated in paragraph 1 that liability has a 
twofold function. On the one hand, liability fulfils a preventative function, by giving individuals incentives 
to internalise the negative effects that their activities impose on others, and hence liability guides individual 
behaviour in order to maximise social welfare. On the other hand, liability could provide compensation for 
damage in case an accident should occur. It was shown that both a negligence rule and a strict liability rule 
would result in an optimal level of precautions in a unilateral accident setting, although there are 
differences between these liability rules with respect to Calabresi’s secondary and tertiary costs and the 
activity level. If the aim of the liability rule is to reduce the activity level as well, a strict liability rule may be 
preferred. 
In paragraph 2, this general theory was applied to environmental damage. It was shown that a strict 
liability regime would provide optimal incentives for individuals to take precautions towards preventing 
environmental damage. However, as in the general analysis, there are substantial differences between these 
two liability rules. Only a strict liability rule will reduce the activity level. Negative consequences, however, 
like a reduction in the production of socially desirable goods as medicines, should be avoided. A strict 
liability rule, furthermore, does not have such high information costs as a negligence rule and, from a 
compensation point of view, strict liability might ensure full compensation of damage, which would not be 
the case for negligence. Indeed, under negligence the polluter does not have to pay for the damage if he 
fulfilled the due care standard. The weaknesses of strict liability in addressing environmental risks were 
brought to light simultaneously. Insolvency might distort the deterrence and compensation or restorative 
function of strict liability. Scholars therefore examined remedies to this problem like safety regulations, 
extended liability, insurance and compensation funds. Moreover, lack of information on the risk, and weak 
causational chains may result in neither the deterrence function nor the compensation functions of either 
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liability rule being accomplished successfully. Hence, other instruments for preventing environmental 
damage were discussed whereby attention was paid to the difference between ex ante instruments and ex 
post liability rules. It was shown that economic instruments like marketable permits and taxes could achieve 
efficient results but are less common. Regulation proved to be an efficient instrument to affect behaviour ex 
ante without waiting for harm to occur, and could solve the problems that a liability rule would pose on its 
own. On the other hand, liability could cover lacunas in regulation, such as inflexibility and compensation. 
It therefore seems that liability and regulation cannot be totally separated. Hence, liability can complement 
regulation for both the prevention and the restoration of environmental damage, thereby fulfilling fairness 
notions in society (polluting is wrong) and preserving intrinsic motivation. Consequently, it was claimed 
that the combination of ex ante regulation and ex post liability rules would achieve the most efficient 
prevention of environmental damage. 
Paragraph 3 tried to answer the question: which type of liability rule would be best to prevent soil 
pollution or restore existing pollution. Soil pollution is a very complex issue with multiple causes and 
different impacts on the environment and on human health. In order to determine the optimal liability rule 
to complement the regulatory framework, a distinction has to be made between recent contamination and 
historical contamination. For recent contamination, strict liability for dangerous activities might be useful, 
whereas a negligence rule might be chosen for non-dangerous activities. For historical contamination a 
negligence liability regime might be adopted, whereby a person shall be liable in case fault, damage and 
causation can be proved. Furthermore, different solutions than liability rules might have to be provided in 
order to ensure clean up, like clean-up measures by the state. 
Finally, a brief overview was given of the elements of a liability system that have to be taken into 
account in a harmonisation debate such as, for example, the scope of the liability rule, causation 
requirements, risk assessment and implementation. 
It is not claimed that liability is the perfect solution for all kinds of environmental damage; however, 
liability can play a valuable complementary role in preventing and restoring environmental damage. 
Hence, it merits further research into how environmental liability rules could be optimally organised within 
a federal system. 
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OPTIMAL DECISION-MAKING LEVEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY RULES IN A FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 
Chapter 3 will develop a framework for decision-making upon the optimal level of liability rules for 
environmental damage in a federal system. The harmonisation of liability rules for environmental damage 
in a federal system is a very complex matter with many factors and criteria that have to be taken into 
account and that need to be unravelled. Therefore, a deeper understanding of this complex matter can only 
be gained by studying the problem from different angles. This research will, therefore, look at the problem 
from two different theoretical perspectives within Law and Economics methodology that can both bring 
useful contributions to the underlying problem. Both perspectives will be brought together in order to 
provide an overall assessment. 
Chapter 3 will consist of three paragraphs. Paragraph 1 will examine the optimal level of liability rules 
for environmental damage in a federal system from a public interest approach. The public interest approach 
is based on Law and Economics methodology. Economic efficiency criteria will be used to examine the 
appropriate federal structure for environmental liability rules, a method that is usually called the theory of 
federalism.141 The public interest approach will start from the decentralisation principle for regulation, 
based on the Tiebout Model (1956) and the decentralisation theorem by Oates (1972). Refinements by 
Fischel and Oates and Schwab will be added. However, when applied to environmental damage, and to soil 
pollution in particular, some assumptions of the Tiebout model will not be fulfilled, which will give rise to 
grounds for centralisation. These reasons for centralisation constitute the core of the public interest 
approach and will be discussed subsequently: the transboundary character an externality (1.2.1), the risk of 
a race-to-the-bottom (1.2.2), the market access argument for centralisation (1.2.3) and, finally, besides pure 
economic arguments, non-economic arguments will also be taken into account (1.2.4). Then, these 
(de)centralisation arguments will be carefully weighted against each other and a balanced conclusion will 
be formulated, either for or against assigning responsibility to a certain level of government, based on the 
public interest approach. 
Paragraph 2 will examine the optimal decision-making level of liability rules for environmental 
damage from the second theoretical perspective, called private interest approach. Obviously, 
environmental rules can have important economic implications. Therefore when deciding upon the 
‘optimal level’ of environmental regulation, rent seeking behaviour and lobbying of different interest 
groups in the law-making process should not be ignored. The private interest approach applies economic 
models to political decision-making and tries to take rent seeking into account in the law making process. 
The contribution of this approach is that it throws light upon the conditions under which laws are made.142 
The private interest approach will first present an overview of the theories that examine the influence of 
lobbying on the law-making process (Capture Theory, Public Choice Theory, based on the work of 
Buchanan and Tullock, and Interest Group Theory, based on Stigler and Becker). Next, these theories will 
be applied to environmental federalism. The core of the private interest approach will be to examine the 
relative powers of interest groups at different levels of government, who is lobbying and for what reasons 
(with respect to the research subject these lobby groups are mainly industry and environmental lobby 
groups). Links with the public interest approach will be shown. Then, the results can be further refined to 
environmental liability, and, as an example, to soil pollution. Again, centralisation and decentralisation 
arguments for environmental damage liability will be weighted against each other, this time based on the 
private interest approach. 
The framework presented in Figure 1 sketches the structure of this research graphically. The structure 
of both public interest and private interest methodology are shown and interdependencies between the two 
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theoretical approaches are indicated by means of arrows. The cores of both approaches are represented in a 
grey box. 
Paragraph 3 will bring both perspectives together as they can both bring useful contributions to the 
harmonisation debate. An overall assessment will be provided and a proposal for a decision-making 
framework upon the optimal level of liability rules for environmental damage in a federal system will be 
presented. As an illustration, the optimal level of liability rules for soil polution in a federal system will be 
developed. 
The framework will then be tested in chapters 4, 5 and 6 by means of a case-study: the harmonisation 
of environmental liability rules, including liability for soil pollution, in the European Union. 
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1. Public Interest Approach on the Optimal Decision-making Level of Liability for 
Environmental Damage 
1.1. Decentralisation as a Traditional Starting Point 
Environmental federalism scholars generally start with a bottom-up approach towards centralisation, using 
the Tiebout Model and the Decentralisation Theorem of Oates as starting points for their analysis. However, 
certain circumstances might require the intervention of a higher government, through centralisation or even 
through harmonisation.143 In this paragraph, the Tiebout Model and the Decentralisation Theorem by Oates 
will be explained and applied to environmental damage and to soil pollution in particular. Next, the 
possible reasons for a federal intervention will be examined. 
1.1.1. The Tiebout Model 
1.1.1.1. The Model 
In 1956, Tiebout developed an ideal model of fiscal competition between independent governments.144 
Tiebout stated that, with decentralised — horizontally arranged — competitive governments, individuals 
could move along local jurisdictions to select that community with a regulatory combination that best 
satisfies his preferences for public goods. Governments would try to attract residents on the basis of 
differing tax and benefit structures. As everybody would go and live where the set of regulations would 
best suit his or her preferences for public goods, overall social welfare would be maximised and a pareto-
superior outcome would be achieved, since no individual can be made better off by moving, he would have 
done so otherwise.145 Tiebout’s idea is now commonly known as ‘voting with the feet’ by citizens. 
According to Tiebout, the greater the number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the 
better citizens could realise their preferences.146 Tiebout’s model of governmental competition is similar to a 
purely competitive market model between firms with complete information.147 
Though the Tiebout model was designed for fiscal policies, academic scholars introduced the model in 
other fields of regulation. The Tiebout model became the starting point for scholars to state that public 
policies in various fields of regulation should be decentralised, except when there are significant 
externalities from one jurisdiction to neighbouring jurisdictions. In cases of such externalities, and high 
transaction costs to overcome these externalities, the oversight of a higher governmental level might be 
appropriate. 
It is, however, important to understand the assumptions on which the Tiebout model relies. If the 
assumptions are clear, it can be examined whether those assumptions will hold for environmental liability 
rules and liability rules for soil pollution in particular. 
1.1.1.2. Assumptions 
Tiebout defines seven assumptions to build his model.148 Firstly, Tiebout assumes that households and 
firms are fully mobile. They can, therefore, move without cost to that jurisdiction which fulfils their 
preferences. 
Secondly, it is assumed that households and businesses are fully informed regarding the fiscal and 
regulatory policies of each jurisdiction. From these two assumptions together it can be concluded that 
households and business would move from one jurisdiction to another that better fits their needs, as they 
are informed about the facilities and they do not face any costs. 
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The third assumption made by Tiebout is that there is a perfectly elastic supply of governmental 
services by the competing jurisdictions. This assumption ensures that households or firms have sufficient 
alternatives between which they can choose. 
Next, restrictions due to employment are not considered. Tiebout assumes that all households live on 
dividend income. 
A fifth assumption which certainly should be noted is that Tiebout excludes interjurisdictional 
externalities or spillovers. This assumption ensures that all public regulatory activities can be provided 
within these efficient jurisdictions without distortion to other jurisdictions. Furthermore, larger 
governments or intergovernmental co-operation is unnecessary. 
Sixth, it is assumed that an optimal community size exists, for which the service or public good can be 
provided at minimum average cost. By this assumption, Tiebout also excludes purely public goods. These 
are goods where additional users of the government’s service do not reduce the consumption of other 
citizens, as with national defence. Goods to which the Tiebout model can be applied are those goods where 
more users reduce the benefit to the other users, called congested public goods, like education or parks, 
environment in general and also of soil specifically.149 Furthermore, the optimal community size must be 
sufficiently small so that each household has enough choice and can find a suitable jurisdiction in which to 
reside. 
Finally, communities below the optimum community size will seek to attract new residents to lower 
average costs, whereas communities above optimum will do the opposite, in order to achieve and keep the 
optimal size. 
If all assumptions hold then, according to Tiebout, a world with fully decentralised competing 
jurisdictions will achieve economic efficiency. Households and business would be able to consume their 
preferred levels of the public good at minimum expenditure of production and transaction costs. 
The Tiebout Model provides a useful theoretical starting point for federalism as it forces critical 
thought about the arguments for harmonisation. However, the model uses rather strong assumptions. If 
they do not hold, the optimality of a complete decentralisation must be reconsidered. 
1.1.2. Refinements of the Tiebout Model 
1.1.2.1. Refinements by Fischel 
Later scholars have tried to broaden the reach of Tiebout’s analysis by relaxing some of the assumptions or 
by applying it to a different field of research. Fischel applied the Tiebout model to environmental regulation 
with a model that addressed pollution and industrial location.150 He concluded that, under restrictive 
assumptions, environmental externalities could be internalised when polluters would compensate 
communities for environmental damage. Households would again choose that community that would fulfil 
their preferences for environmental quality. This would make interjurisdictional competition desirable and 
social welfare would be optimised. Like Tiebout, Fischel ignored any job-loss problem and based his model 
on the assumption that citizens are perfectly mobile.151 
1.1.2.2. Refinements by Oates and Schwab 
Oates and Schwab152 tried to overcome these weaknesses with a model acknowledging the existence of 
immobility of labour and wage effects. In their model, jurisdictions could compete for mobile capital 
choosing either or both of two mechanisms: low taxes or lax environmental standards. Communities would 
determine tax rates on capital and environmental standards in such a way that they would achieve an 
optimal mix of industry and pollution. Like Tiebout, Oates and Schwab assumed many jurisdictions, 
moreover, they assumed that each of them was sufficiently large for all individuals both to live and to work 
in the same jurisdiction. Furthermore, pollution generated by firms in one jurisdiction does not spill over 
into other jurisdictions. The output of a jurisdiction’s firm depends on the jurisdiction’s given stock of 
capital, labour and allowed polluting emissions. Oates and Schwab conclude that under restrictive 
conditions, interjurisdictional competition would yield welfare-maximising environmental standards. A 
rational government would set a tax rate of zero on capital and then achieve a welfare-maximising 
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environmental policy by reducing pollution until lost wage income would be equal to the gains from 
reduced pollution damage.153 
Besides the Tiebout Model, the Decentralisation Theorem by Oates can be referred to as a starting 
point for decentralisation of regulation. 
1.1.3. The Decentralisation Theorem by Oates 
The Decentralisation Theorem, as formulated by Wallace Oates in 1972, states that, for public goods, it 
would be economically more efficient if local governments would provide the amount of public goods that 
would reflect the preferences of their citizens, than if a central government would provide a uniform level 
of output of the public good across all jurisdictions.154 Put differently, with decentralisation, local 
preferences for public goods are likely to be better fulfilled, and social welfare would be maximised. 
Furthermore, the advantage of decentralisation would be greater the more the preferences for the public 
good vary among the different jurisdictions. Indeed, in such situations, the uniform central output would 
diverge most from the preferred output in the different jurisdictions. Hence, a decentralised provision of 
public goods would be ideal from the perspective of welfare maximisation. Yet, for the Decentralisation 
Theorem to hold, it is assumed that the cost of providing the public good in each jurisdiction is the same for 
the local government as for the central government. Indeed, if the central government could realise 
economies of scale in providing the public good, then centralisation might be preferred.155 However, if no 
cost savings result from centralisation, Oates’ Theorem provides a proposal for decentralisation of the 
provision of public goods. Hence, applied to the environmental realm, the Theorem would suggest a 
decentralisation of environmental regulation, such that the regulations would reflect the preferences of the 
citizens in a jurisdiction. 
1.1.4. Limitations of the Tiebout Model and the Decentralisation Theorem Applied to Environmental 
Damage 
Both the Tiebout model and the Decentralisation Theorem by Oates are useful starting points for examining 
the ‘optimal level’ of liability rules for envionmental damage in a federal system, in order to provide a 
balanced answer on the harmonisation debate from a public interest approach. Using the Tiebout Model 
and the Decentralisation Theorem as starting point limitations of the decentralisation of environmental 
regulations can be shown. Indeed, both the Tiebout model and the Decentralisation Theorem show some 
shortcomings when applied to environmental regulation, and to liability rules for environmental damage. 
These shortcomings might be illustrated by means of the example of soil pollution. 
In order to understand the shortcomings of the models when applied to the example of soil pollution, 
it might be helpful at this stage to characterise soil in this debate. Soil might be publicly or privately owned. 
However, the fact that a particular site is privately owned should not give the owner a right to pollute that 
site, thereby preventing other citizens to use that soil after closure of the firm. Therefore, soil can be 
understood as a public good, as all citizens should be able to enjoy its use. Moreover, polluting substances 
that cause soil pollution, emitted within a certain jurisdiction, will mostly have their effect solely within that 
same jurisdiction.156 Indeed, as was shown in paragraph 3.1.1 of chapter 2, although it is possible that 
pollution can spread to surrounding land, which are local spillover effects, in many cases contaminants that 
cause soil pollution remain close to the places where they were or are used.157 It is only in rare cases that 
soil pollution will migrate beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction, though it might very well be possible 
for the contamination to spread and damage the property of different owners within the same jurisdiction. 
Hence, in environmental federalism terminology, soil pollution can be understood as a local public good. 
This definition of soil pollution as a local public good is important in order to illustrate what the optimal 
policy level would be of liability rules for soil pollution in a federal system. 
The limitations of both theoretical models will be discussed below. They will give rise to reasons for a 
certain level of centralisation. 
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1.1.4.1. Lack of Mobility  
Tiebout’s first assumption was that citizens are fully mobile.158 However, stating that citizens and business 
can move between different jurisdictions without costs clearly might be problematic in a real world setting. 
Work and family might prohibit people from moving to different jurisdictions. Therefore, it seems doubtful 
that citizens can move without costs to the jurisdiction that best fulfils their preferences for environmental 
regulation in general or for soil pollution liability specifically. 
1.1.4.2. Imperfect Information 
In the case of environmental damage, and soil pollution in particular, Tiebout’s second assumption, that 
citizens and business are fully informed about the choices they face,159 is highly problematic. Although it 
must be possible to obtain information on current environmental regulations or policies of the different 
jurisdictions, in the real world it might be very difficult to obtain accurate information on existing 
environmental damage and certainly on soil pollution in a certain jurisdiction. It may very well be possible 
that some jurisdictions have not yet mapped — or might not know — the sites that are polluted. Therefore, 
it might be very difficult to assess the presence of soil pollution in certain jurisdictions. If there are no clear 
liability rules in case land is transferred, this might cause uncertainty and might have a negative effect on 
business. 
1.1.4.3. Market Failure 
In the Tiebout model, it is stipulated in its third assumption that there is a perfectly elastic supply of 
political jurisdictions.160 Hence, governments are analogous to firms in a perfectly competitive market 
setting, with free entry and exit from an industry. It will be clear that free entry of new governments, with 
their own policies on public goods, is a highly problematic assumption in a real world setting. However, if 
this assumption does not hold, this has several consequences for economic efficiency. Firstly, with a limited 
number of jurisdictions, it might well be the case that citizens have different views on the government’s 
best policy for a certain public good in the same jurisdiction, as they might not find the jurisdiction that 
perfectly fulfils their preferences. In this case, if decisions are made by majority, the outcome of the 
provision of the public good might not necessarily be economically efficient.161 Applied to environmental 
regulation and liability for environmental damage, this would mean that the environmental regulation or 
the liability rules to prevent and restore environmental damage, including soil pollution, would not fulfil 
citizens’ preferences perfectly, as opposed to what the Tiebout Model or the Decentralisation Theorem 
suggest. 
More critical is that the regulatory policies of a jurisdiction, in a world of limited jurisdictions, now 
might have effects on the other jurisdictions, which may lead to strategic behaviour. The possible 
consequences of strategic behaviour have been discussed by several scholars of environmental regulation. If 
states would relax their environmental regulation in order to attract business, this could lead to a race to the 
bottom in which environmental regulation would be undersupplied, resulting in reduced overall welfare.162 
The risk of a race to the bottom, when states would relax their liability rules for environmental damage will 
be discussed below. 
1.1.4.4. Externalities 
Besides the fact that jurisdictions cannot be compared with a perfectly competitive market, the fifth 
assumption of the Tiebout model might be violated often in the case of environmental damage. This 
assumption states that there are no externalities that might require intervention of a central government.163 
However, interstate externalities of environmental damage are a major reason for federal oversight over 
environmental matters. Oil spills or dumping of chemicals in streams for example, might contaminate land 
far over the border of a certain jurisdiction. The concern is that states will be unable, or presumably 
unwilling, to take into account the effect that their environmental regulation might have on other states.164 
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In that sense, environmental damage does not only pose a threat to social welfare maximisation, but also to 
the protection of property rights.165 
A spillover of soil pollution to a neighbouring jurisdiction, for example, raises an issue of property 
rights. As explained in chapter 2, if property rights over environmental resources would have been clearly 
defined and if transaction costs of negotiating compensation in case of damage or harm would be low, 
according to Coase, a free market for environmental resources would produce a welfare-maximising result: 
environmental harm would be internalised, and it would be a fair outcome, in the sense that property rights 
would be respected, the initial endowment is not debated here. Hence, there would be no need for 
environmental regulation. Because of the nature of soil pollution such a Coasean bargaining might not 
work though. It might sometimes take a long time for damage to become apparent and property rights to 
pollute soil are certainly not defined clearly. 
Yet, as stated in chapter 2, soil pollution will stay close to the place where the accident occured in most 
cases. Therefore, in most cases, for soil pollution, assumption five could hold. This result, however, does not 
exclude that in some cases, pollution can spread to surrounding land, thereby damaging the property of a 
neighbour, that it can spread across jurisdictions, or that psychological spillovers might result, because 
citizens of a foreign jurisdiction will not be able to visit the contaminated area anymore as tourists. 
Therefore, in case of interjurisdictional spillovers, decentralisation of environmental regulation might not 
maximise social welfare, a result which would plead for some central oversight. 
Summarising, meeting the list of requirements of the Tiebout model is clearly unlikely in the real 
world. The soil pollution example illustrates this finding clearly. People are just not perfectly mobile, 
certainly not in Europe, obtaining perfect information might prove impossible, market failures and 
externalities cannot be excluded, nor can the existence of prohibitive transaction costs for interjurisdictional 
negotiations. Nevertheless, neither the Tiebout model nor the Decentralisation Theorem should be 
dismissed too hastily, as they show how different decisions by jurisdictions, with respect to public good 
provision — like soil quality — might be explained on the basis of their citizens’ preferences. Furthermore, 
both models force us to think critically about the reasons for centralisation or even harmonisation. Indeed, 
the fact that liability rules for environmental damage do not fully fulfil the Tiebout model, does not mean 
that full harmonisation in a federal system might be needed. It merely indicates that in some circumstances 
federal or central guidance might be useful. 
1.2. Arguments for Centralisation of Liability Rules for Environmental Damage 
Decentralisation of the provision of public goods, as proposed by the Tiebout Model and Oates’ 
Decentralisation Theorem, do indeed show some limitations when applied to environmental damage, as 
was shown by the example of soil pollution. These limitations give rise to arguments for a certain level of 
centralisation of environmental regulation and of liability rules for environmental damage. These 
arguments are discussed in academic as well as political debates. For instance, the European Union’s 
proposal for an environmental liability directive166 resulted in animated political and academic debates on 
the role of liability rules for environmental damage and on the question of whether a centralisation or 
harmonisation of liability rules in the European Union would better protect the environment from future 
damage than decentralisation. The arguments that are advanced from a public interest perspective, both by 
politicians and by scholars, will now be analysed carefully, in order to provide an answer to the question on 
the optimal decision-making level of liability for environmental damage from a public interest perspective. 
It will also be examined how these arguments can be applied to soil pollution. 
Although different scholars might use a slightly different classification, the reasons for centralisation 
or harmonisation of regulation can be grouped into four main arguments: the transboundary character of 
an externality argument, the race-to-the-bottom argument, the market access argument and non-economic 
arguments for centralisation or harmonisation. In order to provide an insight into the optimal decision-
making level of liability rules for environmental damage from a public interest perspective, each argument 
for centralisation will be unfolded in two successive steps. 
First, the advanced argument will be examined for liability rules in general. A distinction will, hereby, 
be made as to whether the advanced argument pleads for centralisation or even for more far-reaching 
harmonisation. The starting point of every argument is why centralisation or even harmonisation would be 
needed. The approach followed is defined by Van den Bergh as ‘bottom-up federalisation’.167 Furthermore, 
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the question of centralisation of liability rules often cannot be separated from the debate on centralisation of 
regulation, as liability rules are frequently used as a complement to regulation. Moreover, some countries 
rely predominantly on regulation instead of liability rules. Therefore, whether the argument would plead 
for centralisation of liability rules or regulation will be examined as well. 
Second, after the argument has been examined for the general case, it will be applied to environmental 
regulation and to liability rules for environmental damage, with the illustration of soil pollution. Following 
the same reasoning as for the general case, the starting point of the examination is why centralisation or 
even harmonisation would be needed. Especially for environmental damage, the question of centralisation 
of liability rules often cannot be separated from the question of centralisation of regulation for 
environmental damage, as liability rules are often used as a complement to environmental regulation. 
Therefore, a distinction will be made as to whether the argument pleads for centralisation/harmonisation 
of regulation for environmental damage or liability rules for environmental damage, with soil pollution as 
an example. 
After a careful analysis of the four arguments, decentralisation and centralisation arguments will be 
weighted in order to provide a balanced answer on the harmonisation debate of liability for environmental 
damage, from a public interest approach. Then, the harmonisation problem can be examined from a second 
perspective, the private interest approach. 
1.2.1. Transboundary Character of an Externality Argument 
The Tiebout Model, favouring decentralisation of the provision of public goods, only holds if decisions of 
one jurisdiction have no external (negative) effects on other jurisdictions. When policies of a certain 
jurisdiction have a transboundary effect on a neighbouring jurisdiction, there is an argument for 
centralisation. The reasoning is twofold. Firstly, internalisation of transboundary externalities could be 
ensured by shifting powers to a higher governmental level. Secondly, economies of scale could be reached 
by — a certain level of — centralisation.168 
Both strands of the transboundary externality argument will now be studied in detail. Each strand will 
first be examined in general. Next, the reasoning will be applied to environmental damage and to soil 
pollution in particular. Finally, the results of both strands will then be merged in order to provide some 
understanding on the optimal level of liability rules for environmental damage according to the 
transboundary externality argument. 
1.2.1.1. Internalisation of Transboundary Environmental Damage Through Centralisation 
General Case 
The problem of interstate externalities or spillovers arises when the effects of a particular activity accrue 
beyond the boundaries of a jurisdiction to a certain extent.169 For example, a jurisdiction might benefit from 
an (economic) activity, whilst not bearing the full costs of the activity, as part of the costs are endured by 
neighbouring jurisdictions. The classic example of externality is a physical externality, like pollution caused 
by an economic activity that spills over to a neighbouring jurisdiction. Externalities may also be of an 
economic nature. Certain regulations, for example antitrust rules, might have a negative impact on the 
profits of foreign-based producers and distort competition.170 This competition distortion might eventually 
trigger a so-called race-to-the-bottom, a second argument for centralisation, which will be discussed below. 
Finally, some authors argue that psychic spillovers might exist. Psychic spillovers would arise when 
citizens of another jurisdiction are deprived of the enjoyment of certain goods, a natural park, for example, 
or a coast line within the first jurisdiction, because of pollution.171 Psychic spillovers are related to the non-
economic arguments for centralisation, which will be discussed in detail later. 
The presence of interstate externalities — physical, economic or psychic — provides a tenable 
argument for shifting regulatory power to an overarching governmental level. The reasoning is that 
jurisdictions will not internalise the consequences of their actions that might accrue across their borders. 
Hence, jurisdictions will have no incentive to impose stringent regulation on their own industry and 
consequently will underregulate the harmful activity.172 This argument in favour of centralisation may hold 
for both regulation and liability rules. Indeed, the argument could also be advanced in cases of 
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transboundary torts. Often, accidents as a result of product deficiencies might have transboundary effects 
which are not internalised in a jurisdiction’s regulation or rules.173 
The logic behind the need to correct externalities by collaboration at an overarching governmental 
level is not much debated in the academic realm. Even firm advocates of decentralisation do not deny the 
need to internalise externalities.174 However, as Van den Bergh indicates, the need to internalise 
transboundary externalities should not lead a priori to centralisation or harmonisation of regulation or 
liability rules. In first instance, Coasean bargaining between jurisdictions could be considered.175 Indeed, as 
explained in Chapter 2, if property rights are clearly defined and if transaction costs of negotiating 
compensation for damage are low, then, according to economic theory, Coasean bargaining between 
jurisdictions would lead to a welfare-maximising result. 
In cases of transboundary torts, damage costs could be internalised by the responsible jurisdiction 
through Coasean bargaining, there would then be no under-regulation and compensation could be 
provided. Hence, there would be no need for centralised liability rules. However, Coasean bargaining may 
not always be feasible when property rights are not clearly defined. Nonetheless, the basic insight is that the 
presence of transboundary torts should not automatically justify centralisation of liability rules. Indeed, 
centralised tort law might be overinclusive, in the sense that it might regulate more than transboundary 
torts, thus also torts that only have in-state consequences. In such cases, the cure might be worse than the 
disease.176 Therefore, less comprehensive measures than complete harmonisation might be considered for 
curing interstate externalities. This finding will be important when weighing all arguments for or against 
centralisation and when alternative solutions can be studied. 
In conclusion, transboundary externalities may be an argument for shifting decision-making power to 
a higher governmental level in cases where decentralised law-making would be unable to remedy the 
transboundary externalities. However, centralisation should be limited to transboundary externalities 
preferably. Indeed, in the case of torts, if the effects of a tort are merely local, domestic legal remedies could 
solve the problem.177 
Environmental Liability 
Although externalities may arise in many fields of regulation, certain regulatory domains are admitted to 
frequently cause externalities, like the environmental domain.178 As in the general case, three different types 
of externalities might exist. First of all, environmental damage might cause physical transboundary 
externalities. Indeed, water pollution might, for example, cross the borders of a jurisdiction. Furthermore, 
as in the general case, some authors indicate that, besides physical spillovers, psychic spillovers might exist. 
It is claimed that, if plant life, animal species or a special area are endangered in a jurisdiction because of 
water or soil pollution, citizens of other jurisdictions might experience harm, as they cannot enjoy the 
availability of that area anymore.179 Other authors are rather critical about the existence of psychic 
spillovers as a justification for centralisation. Faure, for example, indicates that this would open the scope of 
centralisation tremendously, which might be against citizens’ preferences.180 The psychic spillovers 
reasoning will be examined in detail in the paragraph on non-economic arguments for centralisation. 
Finally, these transboundary externalities can be economic in nature, if a neighbouring country’s crop has 
been destroyed because of the externality.181 
Yet, if property rights were clearly defined and if transaction costs of negotiating compensation for 
damage would be low, then, as for the general case, according to economic theory, Coasean bargaining 
between jurisdictions could lead to a welfare-maximising result. Transboundary environmental damage 
would be internalised by the responsible jurisdiction, there would be no under-regulation and 
compensation might be provided. Hence, in cases of transboundary accidents, there would be no need for 
centralised liability rules for transboundary pollution. However, because of the nature of environmental 
damage, Coasean bargaining might not always be feasible. It might take a long time for damage to become 
apparent sometimes, the causal link might be difficult to prove and the damage actually caused might be 
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very difficult to assess. Furthermore, property rights over environmental resources certainly might not be 
defined clearly. Finally, if pollution goes one-way, transaction costs might be high.182 
Some transaction costs associated with environmental damage result from technical uncertainty, 
defined by Esty as technical transaction costs.183 Even when property rights over environmental resources 
are clearly defined, the value of the environmental resource is not easily expressed in monetary terms. 
Individuals cannot easily judge the risks to their health or what ecological damage might have been caused. 
Furthermore, information on how much harm an environmental problem might cause changes frequently, 
as scientists might find new links between emissions and public health or ecological injuries and new 
methods for risk reduction. An additional difficulty is that many pollutants may show threshold effects, 
such that small amounts of emissions may cause no harm whilst exposure beyond a certain level does cause 
damage.184 Esty identifies further administrative and strategic transaction costs that arise when 
bargaining.185 
Therefore, as stated in the general case, legal uncertainty, or poorly defined property rights and high 
transaction costs, that may make Coasean bargaining unfeasible, provide an argument for a certain 
interjurisdictional co-operation.186 Co-operation might reduce the administrative costs of negotiating 
property rights or the costs of suing the injurer to claim one’s rights. However, as Revesz rightly states, the 
fact that an intervention by a higher governmental level is justified to solve these transboundary 
externalities does not imply that all environmental liability rules should be centralised or harmonised.187 
Indeed, many environmental accidents are confined within the borders of a jurisdiction. As stated in the 
general case, the transboundary externality argument does not justify harmonisation of liability rules that 
deal with in-state torts. Moreover, before centralisation is considered, it should be examined whether 
national legal remedies could solve the externality problem, to prevent a cure worse than the disease.188 
The case of soil pollution might clarify this position. In order to assess whether the transboundary 
externalities argument would allow for the centralisation of regulation or liability rules for soil pollution, 
the nature of soil pollution has to be taken into account. As for environmental resources in general, 
property rights over soil might not always be clearly defined. And even if property rights over soil were 
clearly defined, the value of clean soil is not easily expressed in monetary terms. Individuals cannot easily 
judge the risks that soil pollution poses to their health. Furthermore, information on how much harm soil 
pollution causes might change, as scientists could find new links between emissions and public health. As 
for environmental damage in general, soil pollution at low levels may not be harmful, whereas exposure to 
certain substances beyond a certain level might cause damage.189 However, as was explained in chapter 2, 
in most cases soil pollution will stay close to the place where the accident happened, which implies that 
local soil pollution will be the major problem to be regulated. Therefore, physical spillovers of soil pollution 
across jurisdictions might be a minor part of the problem, though transboundary damage cannot be 
excluded for industrial activities close to the border of a jurisdiction, for example. Moreover, the causes and 
consequences of soil pollution can vary significantly between jurisdictions in a federal system and even 
within a single jurisdiction. 
Under these circumstances regulation or liability rules tailored to local needs and preferences seem 
appropriate. The fact that the major part of the problem will be in-state torts, whereby a solution adapted to 
local circumstances might be appropriate, raises the question of whether a far-reaching harmonisation or a 
centralisation of regulation or liability rules for soil pollution would be desirable. Possible alternative 
solutions for transboundary spillovers of soil pollution could be examined as well as whether an 
appropriate regulatory response could be provided that would be less far-reaching than harmonisation or 
even a more modest centralisation.190 
Summarising, as far as the internalising of externalities reasoning is concerned it can be concluded 
that although the transboundary character of environmental damage would provide an argument for 
centralisation soil pollution itself will cause mainly in-state torts. Therefore, a far-reaching harmonisation or 
even centralisation of liability rules for soil pollution might not be justified. When dealing with national 
torts, states should be able to set liability rules for soil pollution according to the preferences and needs of 
their citizens. Alternative solutions could be examined to solve transboundary spillovers of soil pollution. 
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An appropriate regulatory response might consist of co-operation between jurisdictions, instead of 
centralisation or harmonisation. 
However, besides the internalising of externalities, economies of scale might reach a centralisation of 
certain tasks. 
1.2.1.2. Economies of Scale in the Regulation of Environmental Damage 
General case 
The second strand of the transboundary externality argument concentrates on the economies of scale that 
could be reached through centralisation. The reasoning is that the decision-making power should be 
entrusted to a higher regulatory level, which has a sufficient competence to solve the externality problem 
adequately. Moreover, if an authority that has competence over a larger territory could deal with the 
externality, economies of scale could be reached in the provision of public goods.191 Indeed, when 
economies of scale are present, centralisation could be more efficient than regulatory competition.192 The 
economies of scale reasoning is closely related to the transaction costs argument, which will be discussed 
below in the paragraph on market access, as it could be argued that transaction costs will be lower if 
regulation is made at a higher level.193 
Following the second strand of the transboundary externality argument, federal intervention might be 
justified if the costs of having diversity — the presence of externalities — would outweigh the benefits of 
having different local rules.194 Centralised standards might also be preferred by industry. Indeed, firms 
selling in different jurisdictions would face a clear legal framework and economies of scale in production 
could be reached more easily if certain regulations were centralised, like, for example, consumer safety 
regulations.195 
However, the economies of scale justification for shifting decision-making to a higher governmental 
level should not be understood as a plea for total harmonisation of all standards of, for example, food safety 
or water pollution. This justification merely indicates that whether some regulatory functions would be 
more efficiently carried out at a higher governmental level, while other tasks would be more appropriately 
dealt with at the local governmental level, must be examined carefully.196 
Indeed, in areas that require highly technical information, like environmental problems that have to be 
regulated, the federal government could provide the public good with research and information. Although 
states would benefit themselves from doing research, no state might have an incentive to provide the costly 
technical information that would be needed to develop environmental regulation, for example. The reason 
is that, once the information is obtained, other states will profit from it, without bearing the costs, which 
causes a free-rider problem. Besides the free-rider problem, states might lack the technical capacity and the 
resources necessary to carry out a rigorous analysis.197 Furthermore, some elements of regulation are based 
on technical data that do not vary substantially across states, like consumer safety. Therefore, the 
shortcomings at local level could be overcome if the federal government would provide scientific research 
and information, thereby reaching economies of scale.198 
This presumption in favour of centralisation of technical and scientific research is opposed by the 
‘state-as laboratories’ reasoning. The argumentation is twofold. First, multiple approaches to address a 
problem might be better at finding the right policy than one centralised analysis. This might improve both 
the quality of the regulation and governmental efficiency through competition among decentralised 
jurisdictions.199 However, it is debatable whether state officials work more efficiently than federal officials 
because they are supposed to be in competition with other states. Furthermore, the availability of technical 
capacity and financial resources at central level should not be ignored. Second, the ‘states as laboratories’ 
reasoning addresses problems that are specifically geographically heterogeneous.200 It must be admitted 
that in such circumstances the ground knowledge is crucial and that the diversity of circumstances has to be 
taken into account. Therefore, in such cases, research at the local level might make sense, so that regulation 
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can be tailored to the specific circumstances. However, when there are common problems, centralisation of 
research might be encouraged in order to profit from economies of scale and expertise. Indeed, as Esty 
rightly states, diversity of circumstances is an argument against uniformity of standards, but not necessarily 
against centralisation of certain tasks.201 For example, a federal framework regulation on safety standards 
could be complemented with local rules, adapted to regional circumstances. Hence, a mixed policy 
structure could be created that would be centralised in part whereby regulatory functions as data gathering 
that would profit from economies of scale could be more efficiently carried out at a higher governmental 
level while other tasks that would require on the ground knowledge could be more appropriately dealt 
with at local governmental level. 
Certainly, whereas data collection and data analysis would profit from centralisation and economies 
of scale, other tasks might be more appropriately carried out at local governmental level. For example, 
because of the diversity of harms that may exist, governments have to be aware of local circumstances and 
risks. Therefore, problem identification might preferably be done at local level as the local government is 
aware of local problems.202 For the same reason, implementation, enforcement and policy evaluation might 
be carried out by the local government to ensure that local circumstances are taken into account and 
decisions are taken closer to the preferences of the citizens. Moreover, citizens might have easier access to 
the regulating government.203 However, a clear distinction between tasks that are best carried out by the 
central government and other tasks that are best accomplished at the local governmental level is often not 
so easy to make and might also depend on specific circumstances.204 
In conclusion, the economies of scale reasoning of the transboundary externality argument suggests 
that in order to solve the externality problem adequately, decision-making power should be entrusted to a 
higher regulatory level, that has a competence that is large enough to deal with the problem. Moreover, by 
centralisation of certain tasks like technical and scientific research, economies of scale could be reached. 
These findings can now be applied to regulation for environmental damage, and in particular to soil 
pollution. 
Environmental Liability 
Regulation for environmental damage is certainly a realm that requires highly technical information and 
where economies of scale could be reached by centralising scientific research and information. 
Centralisation of scientific research would benefit from economies of scale and hence would reduce the 
above mentioned technical transaction costs for victims to claim their rights. However, as in the general 
case, the promise of economies of scale in scientific research does not argue for a centralisation in an 
excessive sense. One could create a policy structure that would realise scale economies in the technical 
stage, which could be gathering data on pollution and risk assessment, without centralising other parts of 
the environmental policy. With respect to the soil pollution case, this could, for example, be reached by the 
creation of a federal institute that would gather and analyse data on soil pollution and provide scientific 
support for the different jurisdictions, whereas the jurisdictions would set their own standards and liability 
provisions.205 
It is now worthwhile to combine both strands of the transboundary externality argument in order to 
answer the question whether (a certain level of) centralisation of liability rules for environmental damage 
would be justified according to the transboundary externality argument. 
1.2.1.3. Federal Regulation for Transboundary Environmental Damage Only 
The first strand of the transboundary externality argument concentrates on the internalisation of 
transboundary spillovers through centralisation. It is not much disputed that externalities need to be 
corrected through some form of interjurisdictional collaboration.206 However, as Esty and Geradin indicate, 
the importance of transboundary spillovers may vary from one field of regulation to another. In some fields 
spillovers are rare, whereas other fields of regulation are likely to create transboundary externalities. This 
clearly has significant implications for how to deal with the existing transboundary externalities. Some 
fields of regulation might require broad interjurisdictional cooperation, whereas spillovers in other 
domains might be solved by Coasean bargaining and much more emphasis can be placed on regulatory 
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competition and decentralised decision-making.207 Yet, in any case, the presence of transboundary 
spillovers does not automatically justify a far-reaching harmonisation or even centralisation of regulation or 
liability rules. Indeed, several scholars suggest that centralisation of regulation or liability rules should be 
limited and targeted to the transboundary externalities and they certainly argue against total 
harmonisation.208 Total harmonisation might not take local circumstances into account and might even be 
counterproductive. Indeed, in the case of torts, the transboundary externality argument provides no 
justification for harmonisation of tort law that merely deals with in-state torts. 
This result might, however, be complemented by the second strand of the argument. It is suggested 
that in order to solve an externality problem adequately, it might be necessary to entrust decision-making 
power to a higher regulatory level that has a competence large enough to deal with the problem. Moreover, 
centralisation of certain tasks, like technical and scientific research, would generate economies of scale. This 
reasoning appears to be a bit more lenient towards centralisation of certain tasks, not only in solving 
transboundary spillovers but also solving problems that are common over different jurisdictions. Indeed, 
the reasoning suggests that jurisdictions might profit from the centralisation of certain tasks or from some 
guiding framework developed by the central government. It must be clear, however, that the centralisation 
of certain tasks or the development of a guiding framework does not equal, and should not justify, 
harmonisation and fixed uniform standards. The central government might set minimum standards 
ensuring that all parties meet a basic level of protection in a certain field of regulation. For some 
jurisdictions, these baseline standards may be the most appropriate endpoint for that particular policy 
given their level of available resources and other local circumstances. In other jurisdictions, a higher level of 
economic development and/or a greater public preference for a certain regulation might plead for more 
stringent standards.209 Ultimately, the fact that differing local circumstances and preferences have to be 
taken into account, does not argue for decentralised regulation without co-operation, but for flexible 
regulatory policies and strategies. Likewise, the promise of economies of scale in scientific research does not 
argue for centralisation in an excessive sense. One could create a policy structure that would realise scale 
economies in the technical stage of the regulatory process without centralising other parts of the regulatory 
policy. This could, for example, be reached by the creation of a federal institute that would gather and 
analyse technical data and provide scientific support for the different jurisdictions, but whereby these 
jurisdictions would set their own standards.210 
Hence, the transboundary externality argument would allow for a mixed system that would benefit 
from the merits/expertise of both governmental levels, but would not justify excessive centralisation or 
harmonisation. Instead, in order to take local circumstances into account, centralised regulation or liability 
rules for transboundary externalities only could be preferred. 
When both strands of the transboundary externality argument are applied to soil pollution in 
particular, the following conclusion could be made on the optimal level of liability rules for soil pollution in 
a federal system, according to the transboundary externality argument. 
Soil pollution will mostly be a local problem; moreover, the causes and consequences of this pollution 
can vary significantly within a jurisdiction and between jurisdictions. In these circumstances, regulation 
tailored to local needs and preferences seems appropriate. Harmonisation of regulation or liability rules for 
soil pollution in a federal system as a remedy for the case that soil pollution would spill over to 
neighbouring jurisdictions and is, therefore, not justifiable as differences in circumstances and preferences 
can not be taken into account. However, the choice does not have to be between fully decentralised or fully 
centralised liability rules. It is certainly possible to develop a centralised regime dealing with 
transboundary damage only, or with transboundary damage and damage to areas that are of special 
interest because of their fauna and flora. Furthermore, economies of scale in technical research might plead 
for co-operation or centralisation in that part of regulation. Moreover, depending on the willingness of the 
states, a mixed system might be considered, whereby the federal state would set minimum standards, to 
ensure that a basic environmental quality would be guaranteed to every citizen, whereby the different 
jurisdictions could go further, and whereby they would take care of the implementation and enforcement of 
the liability rules. Such a solution would optimise both the scale of standards and the scale of institutions.211 
Or one might think of special provisions for area’s of special interest, and develop a system of solidarity 
within the federal system in case of serious pollution of the area of special interest, or foresee in a special 
federal funding for these accidents. 
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Summarising, with respect to the nature of soil pollution, full centralisation or harmonisation of 
regulation or liability rules for soil pollution would not be justifiable as it would not take diverse causes, 
circumstances and preferences into account. Therefore, central regulation of liability rules for soil pollution 
might preferably go no further than a kind of transboundary – special areas only regime to remedy 
transboundary soil pollution. This might, however, be completed with centralisation of supporting 
scientific research and data analysis, as all states and citizens would benefit from it. 
This paragraph has tried to provide some understanding on the optimal level of liability rules for 
environmental damage, with soil pollution as an example, according to the transboundary externality 
argumentation. The next argument for centralisation that will be discussed is the race-to-the-bottom 
argument. 
1.2.2. Race-to-the-Bottom Argument 
The race-to-the-bottom rationale might be the most heavily debated economic argument to justify federal 
environmental liability rules. The argumentation will be explained in three steps. First, a general definition 
of the race-to-the-bottom will be provided and theoretical foundations will explained. Next, the risk of a 
race-to-the-bottom in environmental regulation can be discussed. Theoretical grounds as well as empirical 
evidence of the existence of a race-to-the-bottom in environmental regulation will be analysed. The findings 
of this analysis might then be further refined for environmental liability and liability for soil pollution in 
particular. The theoretical grounds that might exist for environmental regulation in general, can indeed be 
applied to environmental liability as well. Furthermore, it will be examined whether empirical evidence of 
relaxed liability rules, specifically for soil pollution, in order to attract industry, might be available. The risk 
of a race-to-the-bottom in environmental liability rules, and in liability rules for soil pollution in particular, 
can then be assessed, in order to answer the question whether the race-to-the-bottom argument is a valid 
argument for justifying federal intervention with respect to environmental liability rules. 
1.2.2.1. Definition of a Race-to-the-bottom 
The term race-to-the-bottom refers to an ongoing relaxation of state regulatory standards, caused by 
interstate competition to attract industry. This relaxation of regulatory standards would result in a 
reduction of social welfare below the social welfare level that would exist in absence of this race.212 If there 
is a risk that such destructive competition would arise, centralised standard setting might be advanced as a 
remedy to prevent states from engaging in this welfare-reducing race-to-the-bottom. 
The race-to-the-bottom argument is sometimes confused with the creation of a ‘level playing field’, 
especially in the European Union. Indeed, federal regulations enacted under a race-to-the-bottom rationale 
might, in reality, aim at creating a ‘level playing field’, or the harmonisation of conditions of competition 
between states.213 In such cases, the aim is much more the reduction of interstate competition and the 
significance of geographic features that would allow certain states to have lower quality standards, than to 
actually overcome a race-to-the-bottom as defined above. The prevention of lower quality standards is not 
the same though as the prevention of a race-to-the-bottom. Lower quality standards — in the sense of lower 
than average —, could be efficient more particularly when they correspond with citizens’ preferences. 
Moreover, preventing states from using their geographic and other location specific advantages might 
reduce economic efficiency as it is exactly this geographic diversity that allows gains from trade.214 A race-
to-the-bottom, on the other hand, would result in economic inefficiency, which needs to be remedied. 
Therefore, the ‘level playing field’ argumentation to justify centralised regulation is criticised by various 
scholars.215 
The ‘level playing field’ argumentation will be taken up again in the next paragraph on market access. 
This paragraph will concentrate on the race-to-the-bottom argument. 
Scholars have based the race-to-the-bottom theory upon non co-operative game theoretical models, of 
which the Prisoner’s Dilemma may be the best known example.216 The Prisoner’s Dilemma refers to a 
situation in which individual welfare maximising behaviour might lead to an outcome that is socially 
suboptimal, whereas with co-operation all parties would have been better off. A well-known illustration of 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma is the example whereby two prisoners, who committed a crime, each face the same 
two choices. They can co-operate with each other and both deny any commitment in that crime or they can 
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confess the crime. If both deny, they will get a light sentence. If both confess, they will get a sentence of 
medium severity, but if one prisoner confesses and the other did not, the one who confessed will be 
released, whereas the other prisoner will get a severe sentence. The prisoners will have to make their choice 
without knowing the other’s choice. The result is that, although both would have been better off if they 
would have denied the crime, following individual self-interest, both will confess and get a medium 
sentence instead of a light one.217 
Game theory and the Prisoners’ Dilemma were applied to public goods for the first time by Mancur 
Olson and in the Tragedy of the Commons Garrett Hardin applied the game-theoretical approach 
specifically to the environment.218 The game-theoretical approach suggests that states might behave to 
attract industry strategically, which might result in a race-to-the-bottom. Indeed, although states would be 
best off if they would co-operate and agree on optimal regulatory standards, states may, to attract industry, 
relax regulatory standards to reduce the regulatory burden they impose on industry. Hence, a prisoner’s 
dilemma might arise and this bid for industry could result in a downward pressure on regulatory 
standards.219 Therefore, centralisation is advanced to prevent states from engaging in a welfare-reducing 
race-to-the-bottom. 
Based on the neoclassical model developed by Oates and Schwab, however, opponents of the race-to-
the-bottom theory, like Revesz, argue that interstate competition would lead to efficiency and would be 
welfare-enhancing.220 It is not claimed though that states will not lower their standards, only that this 
behaviour might be welfare-enhancing.221 
This neoclassical approach stands in contrast to the game-theoretical approach, according to which the 
same behaviour would lead to the opposite result: suboptimal low regulatory standards and reduced social 
welfare. 
The different outcome can be explained by a different assumption that is made. Both approaches 
assume that individuals are rational and have ordered preferences over their needs. Additionally, both 
assume that the fulfilment of individual preferences yields ‘utility’ and that individuals try to maximise 
their utility. However, the difference that might account for the opposed result is that the neoclassical 
approach assumes that individuals cannot influence the results of the market and hence that rational 
pursuit of individuals’ self-interest would result in welfare maximisation. Game theory assumes that, under 
specific circumstances, like a small number of actors, these actors could make a difference in market results, 
behave strategically, and therefore rational pursuit of their self-interest might not result in welfare-
maximisation for society as a whole.222 
This raises the question which theoretical approach might best reflect actual behaviour of industry 
and governments where environmental regulation is concerned and hence, whether a risk of a race-to-the-
bottom could exist in environmental regulation. 
The next paragraph will, in a first step, analyse whether the game-theoretical approach or the neo-
classical approach would theoretically reflect the real world situation best where environmental regulation 
is concerned. Second, it will be examined whether empirical evidence can be found of the existence of a 
race-to-the-bottom in environmental regulation. The findings from this analysis will then be used as a basis 
for further refinement in an application to environmental liability rules. Accordingly, it can be studied 
whether differences in liability rules for soil pollution could lead to a race to the bottom, justifying federal 
intervention. 
1.2.2.2. Risk of a Race-to-the-bottom for Environmental Regulation 
Theoretical Grounds for a Race-to-the-bottom in Environmental Regulation 
If differences in environmental standards, and thus differences in environmental costs, would induce firms 
to relocate to states with the lowest environmental standards, a race-to-the-bottom, which in environmental 
cases is referred to as the ‘pollution haven’ hypothesis, might occur.223 In such circumstances, there might 
be an economic argument for centralisation. Various scholars have tried to prove the existence or the 
absence of a race-to-the-bottom in environmental regulations both theoretically and empirically. 
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Nevertheless, the results vary and the existence of a race-to-the-bottom in environmental regulations 
remains debated. 
The divergence of opinions concerning the existence of a race-to-the-bottom is owing to the different 
view of various scholars on the functioning of the environmental regulatory process. The neo-classical 
approach supposes that the environmental regulatory process resembles a market of perfect competition, 
whereas adherents of the game-theoretical approach assume that there is imperfect competition between 
regulators. Therefore, the basic question is whether the environmental regulatory process resembles a 
market of perfect competition, so that regulatory competition would be welfare-enhancing, which is 
Revesz’ opinion, or whether states might act strategically, so that regulatory competition could result in a 
race-to-the-bottom and reduce welfare, a view that is shared, for instance, by Engel and Esty.224 
Relying on the neoclassical model of perfect competition developed by Oates and Schwab,225 Revesz 
suggests that the market for environmental regulation is comparable to a perfectly competitive market. 
Hence, interjurisdictional competition would lead to maximised social welfare instead of a race-to-the-
bottom.226 In the Oates and Schwab model jurisdictions can compete for mobile capital, choosing either or 
both of two mechanisms: low taxes or lax environmental standards. It is assumed that the rate of return to 
capital in equilibrium is constant. Oates and Schwab conclude that, under the restrictions of the model, 
interjurisdictional competition would yield welfare-maximising environmental standards.227 Indeed, a 
rational government would set a tax rate of zero on capital, which would be the rate that exactly covers the 
costs of public services provided to the capital, like roads or police protection. The government would then 
achieve a welfare-maximising environmental policy by reducing pollution until the gains from reduced 
pollution damage would be equal to lost wage income.228 Hence, there would be no race-to-the-bottom in 
state environmental standard setting.229 
Based on the game-theoretical approach, however, it is possible to show that, given certain conditions 
of interstate competition, a race-to-the-bottom might enter into existence. By means of a simple game-
theoretical mathematical model Engel illustrated that an island jurisdiction will set standards so that social 
welfare is maximised. However, in a two-state world, states face the choice of whether to alter (relax) their 
environmental standards or keep them unchanged. The dilemma arises if a state can attract some industry 
from the other state by relaxing its environmental standards. If the state relaxes its environmental standards 
industry will produce more pollution but also more products and economic benefits. Both states will then 
be subject to a Prisoner’s Dilemma and choose to relax standards unless there is a mechanism, like federal 
intervention, to ensure that optimal environmental standards will be set. Hence, based on the game-
theoretical approach and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, interjurisdictional competition might result in a race-to-
the-bottom, which might be remedied by federal minimum standards.230 
Nevertheless, Revesz indicates that game-theoretical interactions might also lead to overregulation 
instead of underregulation.231 This might be the case if certain states do not want to have certain industry, 
known as the ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) phenomenon.232 In that case, federal intervention would 
require maximum standards instead of minimum standards. Hence, according to Revesz, even if there 
would be imperfect competition, there would be no clear reason for a race-to-the-bottom, and hence the 
race-to-the-bottom argument would not be a convincing justification for federal minimum environmental 
standards. 
It appears from the results of both approaches, that the theoretical existence of a race-to-the-bottom for 
environmental regulation depends crucially on the assumptions that are made concerning states’ ability to 
influence the market (which depends on the number of states that are participating), the taxes and subsidies 
that are available and what types of market imperfection might exist. Different scholars use different 
assumptions on the influence of taxes and market imperfections, or place different emphases, which might 
lead them to reach a different result. 
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The game-theoretical approach supposes that there are only a few number of states involved, while in 
the Oates and Schwab model, the number of states is unspecified, but presumably large. It is indeed the 
assumption of a large number of states that allows the rate of return to capital in equilibrium to be treated 
as constant. The importance of this assumption can be demonstrated by the following example. Consider a 
state, willing to attract foreign capital by lowering its environmental standards. In the Oates and Schwab 
model, the number of other states from which this capital comes is so large, that only a very small amount 
comes from every other state. Put differently, the loss of capital is so much spread, that no state can notice 
it. Hence a state will not be affected by any other state’s regulatory decisions and no race-to-the-bottom will 
follow. The efficient outcome of the Oates and Schwab model therefore crucially depends on this 
assumption. If the number of states is ‘small’, an efficient outcome can no longer be predicted by the Oates 
and Schwab model and it might be necessary to apply game theory. Therefore, to conclude that interstate 
competition would result in efficient environmental standards at least two sets of conditions must be 
fulfilled in the real world: the number of participants must be large and their relative market power 
small.233 
It still remains unanswered which theoretical approach now best reflects the real world for 
environmental regulation and thus whether a race-to-the-bottom for environmental regulation might come 
into existence. As appears from above, a theoretical proof that points clearly in the one or the other 
direction for a race to the bottom in environmental regulation is hard to give. 
Therefore, as it is not possible to proof the validity of the race-to-the-bottom argument in case of 
environmental regulation on theoretical grounds alone, it merits studying the surveys that were undertaken 
to find empirical evidence of pollution havens. 
Empirical Evidence of Pollution Havens 
Evidence of a race-to-the-bottom in environmental regulation cannot be found that easily. Indeed, evidence 
might be scattered and hard to discover. Nevertheless, there are different indicators that may point to the 
existence of or a risk of pollution havens. Indeed, in order to find evidence of the existence of pollution 
havens, three relevant empirical aspects might be analysed. A first indicator that might point to a risk of a 
race-to-the-bottom in environmental regulation might be the relative power of industry versus states, as 
this might indicate that there is no perfect competition and market distortions could arise. Furthermore, a 
second aspect that is important to analyse, is whether industry would respond to the lowering of 
environmental standards by industry location decisions. Finally, regardless of industry response, it is 
worthwhile to examine the willingness of states to engage in strategic interactions in order to attract 
industry and thus whether states would compete for industry by lowering their environmental 
standards.234 
A. Relative Power of Industry versus States 
First, the relative power of industry and states could be an indication that a risk of destructive competition 
could exist, as it would give information on whether the market for environmental regulation resembles 
perfect competition or whether it is distorted. Engel suggests that competition between states for industry is 
higher than the competition between firms for sites for new industrial plants. Hence, industry might have a 
bargaining advantage. Engel furthermore claims that the demand for new or relocating plants is high 
relative to supply. Moreover, the number of states competing against each other for (large) firms would be 
small. Indeed, Engel could show in her survey that government officials, competent for state environmental 
standard setting, were most familiar with the environmental regulation in neighbouring states, and much 
less with standards from countries further away. This result could indicate that, if states would compete 
with other states for industry, they would compete only against a few neighbouring states. Esty is, 
moreover, also critical of the rationality of governments and doubts that the market for locational rights 
would be undistorted, and that no prisoner’s dilemma could occur.235 These findings might suggest that the 
market for environmental regulations bears more resemblance to the game-theoretic approach, which does 
not exclude a race-to-the-bottom happening in environmental regulation, than to the neo-classical 
approach.236 
Nevertheless, an indication of the relative power of industry versus states is, of course, insufficient to 
formulate a conclusion concerning the existence of pollution havens. A second indicator that has to be 
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examined is whether environmental standards would influence industry location decisions. Indeed, a 
commonly used justification for centralised regulation to prevent a race-to-the-bottom in environmental 
regulation is that the stringency of environmental standards would be an important determinant of 
industry location.237 
B. Determinants of Industry Location Decisions 
Several scholars studied the determinants of industry location in order to find evidence that industry would 
locate in states with the lowest environmental standards. Studies that examine the influence of 
environmental regulation on firm location decisions use three different methods: (1) surveys of industry 
executives competent for deciding on plant locations; (2) aggregate studies that compare aggregate 
measures of economic activity, like economic growth, with aggregate measures of environmental regulatory 
stringency, which might be indicated by the number of environmental laws adopted. These studies try to 
link environmental regulatory stringency and a location’s overall economic performance; (3) so called 
‘establishment-level’ studies, which correlate new plant sites with economic activity indicators and 
measures of environmental stringency.238 
Despite much effort, empirical evidence of relocation of industry because of stringent environmental 
regulation is rather weak.239 Based on an extensive survey of existing location studies,240 
Jaffe/Peterson/Portney/Stavins conclude that the effect of environmental regulation on industry location 
decisions is either small or statistically insignificant.241 Nevertheless, they add to their conclusion that, 
although the stringency of environmental regulations will not induce existing firms to relocate, it might 
influence decisions for new plant locations.242 This finding can be explained by the fact that other factors 
such as tax levels, public services, proximity to markets and raw materials, availability of transportation 
networks and the unionisation of labour force are much more important determinants of competitiveness. 
Environmental regulation appears to be only a minor determinant in industry location decisions.243 The 
Jaffe/Peterson/Portney/Stavins survey, however, has been refined somewhat by the study of Xing and 
Kolstad.244 Xing and Kolstad found that lenient environmental regulations may indeed be a significant 
determinant for foreign direct investment of heavily polluting industries, using chemicals and primary 
metals. However, conforming to the Jaffe/Peterson/Portney/Stavins study, lenient environmental 
regulations are insignificant for less polluting industries. 
Although the Xing/Kolstad study seems to revise the results of Jaffe/Peterson/Portney/Stavins for 
heavily polluting industries, it does not contradict their findings that existing firms will not relocate because 
of stringent environmental regulations.245 Several authors indicate, moreover, that multinational 
corporations, doing business in various jurisdictions, might choose to meet the most stringent standards, 
because of cost efficiency reasons. Indeed, by doing so, they might use the same production process for each 
location and have a single company-wide environmental management system. Ogus further indicates that 
international firms might benefit from these stringent standards as they might induce technical innovation, 
whereby these firms would gain a comparative advantage over competitors.246 Therefore, multinational 
corporations might be insensitive to local environmental regulations.247 
Based on these studies some scholars, Revesz in particular, argue that there is no support for a race-to-
the-bottom in environmental regulation.248 However, to subscribe to the position that there is no support for 
a race-to-the-bottom seems a little premature, as the behaviour of the states themselves as a third indicator 
for a risk of a race-to-the-bottom still has to be examined. 
C. Willingness of States to Engage in Strategic Interactions 
A third indicator for the existence of, or a risk of a race-to-the-bottom, might be the willingness of states to 
engage in strategic interactions or, put differently, whether states would seek to relax their environmental 
standards to attract or retain industry. In order to study this third indicator empirically, Engel conducted a 
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survey of five separate groups of respondents who were influential in the decision-making process of a 
state’s environmental standards.249 In contrast to the studies referred to above, which concentrated mainly 
on industry behaviour and the importance of environmental standards in industry location decisions, this 
survey tried to examine state officials behaviour in environmental standards setting. It was examined 
whether officials were concerned that industry might relocate to another state and whether this had ever 
played a role in decision-making on environmental matters. Indeed, states might still believe that, besides 
lucrative packages and compensations like subsidies and low-interest loans, they can compete for industry 
through relaxed environmental standards, even if in reality industry would not relocate because of these 
lenient environmental standards. Hence, a welfare-reducing race-to-the-bottom could arise, as lax 
environmental standards would not be compensated by increased economic activity.250 
Engel suggests, on the basis of the survey, that many states are indeed concerned about industry 
relocation and that this concern could at times influence their policies towards protection of the 
environment and their policies for environmental quality standards. This does not necessarily mean that 
states would actually relax their environmental standards. Indeed, as Esty and Geradin claim, probably the 
most important risk of regulatory competition might be a ‘political drag’ or a ‘regulatory chill’.251 This 
would mean that state officials, fearing industry relocation, would — instead of lowering their standards — 
under political pressure not adopt, raise, implement or effectively enforce environmental standards. It 
might be very difficult to prove the existence of a political drag though. Indeed, it might be very hard ‘to 
hear a bell that does not ring’.252 Further research in the field might therefore be appropriate. Furthermore, 
the private interest section will hopefully shed some light on lobbying practices and the pressure that 
officials, competent for environmental standards setting, might face. 
Using a game-theoretical approach, however, Bommer tried to reveal how a situation of ‘regulatory 
chill’ might come to existence. Bommer could show that, under certain circumstances, industries might 
relocate part of their production to states with lower environmental standards for strategic reasons, rather 
than due to a real loss in competitiveness caused by stringent environmental standards. Indeed, in a 
situation in which states have incomplete information about the capability of industry to adapt to stringent 
environmental standards, under certain assumptions, industries might signal difficulties to adapt to high 
standards by relocating part of their production. This could incite states to refrain from raising their 
environmental standards or even from strict enforcement of environmental standards.253 In such 
circumstances, it might therefore be possible that state officials, responsible for environmental standards 
setting, are under political pressure not to raise or effectively enforce environmental standards. Therefore, if 
states are concerned with industry relocation, and if this concern might influence their policies towards 
environmental quality, it might be possible that destructive competition or even a race-to-the-bottom might 
arise in environmental regulation. 
However, to declare that states will lower their environmental standards as a result of interstate 
competition is premature as well. Indeed, there exists some evidence that states may actually strive for 
stringent environmental standards, even if this would put extra costs on their industries.254 This finding 
weakens somewhat the claim that states would engage in a race-to-the-bottom as far as environmental 
standards are concerned. Some countries may in fact be more involved in a race-to-the-top than a race-to-
the-bottom.255 Indeed, as Vogel explains, international competition and capital mobility might actually 
encourage states to adopt higher environmental standards than they would have done without this 
competition.256 There are two main reasons that might explain phenomenon. 
Firstly, stringent domestic environmental standards might offer market opportunities to firms that 
export pollution-control equipment and trigger innovation. For example, as a result of their own strict 
emission limits for coal burning power plants, Germany and Japan succeeded in dominating the world 
market in scrubbers. Secondly, and although disapproved by the GATT, a state could, through stringent 
environmental regulations, make it more difficult for foreign producers to sell their products, as they might 
not fulfil all environmental requirements. This would give a competitive advantage to domestic industry.257 
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Hence, for a number of environmental regulations, a phenomenon, defined by Vogel as the California-
effect, could be noticed.258 In general terms, the California-effect is used to describe the upward ratcheting 
of regulatory standards when economically powerful nations with stringent standards can force producers 
from other states with lower standards to adopt these strict standards, in order to maintain market access.259 
For environmental standards, this would mean that stringent environmental (product) standards of a 
certain state would encourage producers of other states and eventually other states themselves, to adopt 
these higher standards to be able to sell their products in this important market. The term ‘California-effect’ 
refers to the upward ratcheting of US automobile standards caused by California’s stricter standards. The 
1970 Clean Air Act Amendments gave California the permission to adopt stricter emission standards than 
the rest of the United States. Other states could choose to adopt the national standards or the stricter 
California standards. It appeared that several states adopted the stricter California standards. Hence, in the 
case of automobile emission standards, a downward pressure on emission standards did not occur, in fact 
precisely the opposite happened. The explanation is that, as California is a very important market, 
automobile producers had strong incentives to comply with the stringent emission standards, in order to be 
able to sell their cars. Hence, other states could impose these standards as well. Therefore, economic 
integration and competition might in some cases stimulate the adoption of more stringent environmental 
standards instead of resulting in a race-to-the-bottom.260 
It must be noted, however, that the California effect basically holds for product standards, which 
regulate the environmental characteristics of a product. Yet, environmental damage is often caused by the 
way a product is produced. Whereas differences in product standards mainly affect market access, process 
standards might raise competitiveness concerns as industry in countries with lenient process standards 
might produce at lower costs. Mainly lenient process standards might cause states to fear industrial 
relocation and a race-to-the-bottom, which might result in a ‘political drag’.261 Hence, in order to assess the 
risk of a race-to-the-bottom in environmental regulation, a distinction should be made between product and 
process standards. 
To recapitulate, as far as the behaviour of states is concerned, the risk of a political drag should not be 
ignored, but, on the other hand, in some cases economic integration might even stimulate the adoption of 
more stringent environmental standards. 
D. Synopsis of the Results of the Three Empirical Indicators 
Heaving examined the three empirical indicators that may point to an existence of or a risk of pollution 
havens, bringing the various results together is now merited, in order to assess the risk of a race-to-the-
bottom in environmental regulation. Indeed, on the basis of the empirical material that is available, some 
broad conclusions might be formulated. 
Firstly, empirical evidence seems to indicate that regulatory competition might not always yield 
efficient state environmental standards. As the conditions necessary for perfect competition and the real 
world, where states compete for industry, can differ to a great extent, it cannot be presumed that interstate 
competition will always lead to efficient state environmental standards. Indeed, in some circumstances, 
such as if a small number of states is engaged in interstate competition and if the relative bargaining power 
is greater for industry than for states, then non co-operative game theory might better reflect the real world 
as opposed to neo-classical economics. It cannot, therefore, be excluded that states might engage in a race 
towards more lenient environmental standards at some point in time. 
Secondly, although the market for environmental regulations might resemble the game-theoretical 
approach more than the neo-classical approach, industry location studies mostly conclude that industry 
does not respond to differences in environmental standards in a significant way, and hence no race-to-the-
bottom would result. Indeed, environmental regulation appears to be only a minor determinant in industry 
location decisions, although it must be mentioned that it might influence decisions for new plant locations 
or for foreign direct investment of heavily polluting industries. 
Thirdly, despite the fact that industry will mostly not relocate because of the stringency of 
environmental standards, state officials still might believe or might be under political pressure to believe 
that environmental standards are an important determinant in industry location. Moreover, industry might 
make use of this common belief. Indeed, industry might relocate part of their production to states with 
lower environmental standards for strategic reasons, rather than due to a real loss in competitiveness 
caused by stringent environmental standards. By doing so, they might induce states to refrain from raising 
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their environmental standards or even to neglect strict enforcement of environmental standards. A ‘political 
drag’ or ‘regulatory chill’ might then come into existence and environmental standards might be set at a 
suboptimal level. Hence, environmental damage will not be fully internalised or compensated, which might 
reduce social welfare. The situation might be different; however, in the case of environmental product 
standards, whereby a state that is economically powerful enough, can impose its standards on foreign 
producers, and eventually induce a race-to-the-top. 
When these three results are now taken together, it appears that, despite the fact that various studies 
try to shed some light on the matter, empirical evidence for a race-to-the-bottom in environmental standard 
setting still does not point into one clear direction. Indeed, there are no strong indications that prove that a 
race-to-the-bottom in environmental regulation is sure to happen, neither can it be excluded that a race-to-
the-bottom might happen in certain cases. Nevertheless, the finding that industry will mostly not respond 
to lenient environmental standards, combined with the fact that states might still believe that they can 
attract industry by lenient environmental standards, might indicate that the risk is probably not so much of 
a race-to-the-bottom but of a ‘regulatory chill’ or ‘political drag’. This is very difficult to prove though, and 
might therefore need further research. In any case, the risk of a political drag in environmental regulations 
should not be neglected. Hence, the question that might be asked is whether federal intervention would be 
appropriate to prevent or overcome such a ‘political drag’. 
Indeed, a race-to-the-bottom or a ‘political drag’ — for example the lack of enforcement of 
environmental standards — might need to be prevented or remedied. However, this would not necessarily 
plead for full centralisation of all environmental standards. As Revesz indicates, even if states would use 
lenient environmental standards to attract industry, centralised regulation or harmonisation of 
environmental standards might not necessarily solve the problem. Indeed, states might compete for 
industry on many fronts, like labour or safety standards. Therefore, Revesz warns that, as a response to 
centralised environmental standards, states might reduce standards in other regulatory fields like health 
care or taxes, to attract industry.262 
Nevertheless, some scholars suggest that, in order to prevent a race-to-the-bottom or a regulatory 
chill, a limited harmonisation of environmental standards might increase social welfare.263 Engel, for 
example, suggests that federal minimum standards have much to recommend them, as they leave the 
opportunity for a state to adopt more stringent standards or to co-operate with neighbouring states and to 
negotiate binding agreements. This co-operation could include uniform standard-setting by a small number 
of states to address specific regional environmental problems. According to Engel, such an approach would 
prevent a race-to-the-bottom, which would lower both environmental quality and overall social welfare, 
and would at the same time avoid the economic inefficiencies of centralised environmental standard setting 
that are heavily critiqued by some scholars.264 This does not mean, however, that other proposals for 
enhancing the efficiency of environmental regulation should be neglected. Indeed, Esty evaluates different 
ways of federal intervention for which further theoretical and empirical research might be 
recommendable.265 In any case, centralisation is not the only way to respond to a risk of a race-to-the-
bottom or political drag. Various responses, including different degrees of harmonisation, might reduce 
competitiveness tensions without hampering trade. 
In conclusion, contrary to common belief, the risk of a race-to-the-bottom in environmental regulation 
does not justify full centralisation of environmental regulation. Indeed, although a race-to-the-bottom, or 
more likely a ‘regulatory chill’ in environmental regulation cannot be fully excluded, this would not justify 
full centralisation of environmental standards. States might then compete by other means and centralisation 
would not leave opportunities open for more stringent standards, or co-operation between states, according 
to states’ preferences. A limited harmonisation or other proposals enhancing the efficiency of 
environmental regulation might be considered to prevent a regulatory chill. However, which response 
would be best, depends on the circumstances and the environmental problem under examination. A 
context-specific analysis might thus be required. Only then an optimal co-operation between the federal 
and state level can be found in order to prevent a race-to-the-bottom or a ‘political drag’ in environmental 
regulation. 
The findings of the analysis for environmental regulation in general can now be used as a basis for 
further refinement, notably the risk of a race-to-the-bottom in the area of environmental liability rules. It 
will now be examined whether differences in liability rules for soil pollution could lead to a race-to-the-
bottom, justifying federal intervention in liability rules. 
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1.2.2.3. Risk of a Race-to-the-bottom for Environmental Damage Liability 
Theoretical Approach 
The findings for environmental regulation in general suggested that the market for environmental 
regulations might resemble the game-theoretic approach, which does not exclude the possibility of a race-
to-the-bottom happening in environmental regulation, more than the neo-classical approach. However, 
even in this case, the risk of a race-to-the-bottom in environmental liability rules and, for example, liability 
for soil pollution depends mainly on the actual behaviour of industry and states. Their behaviour therefore 
needs to be examined in order to judge whether differences in liability rules would lead to a race-to-the-
bottom. 
Concerning industry behaviour, as in the general case, it might be doubtful that environmental 
liability rules would play a significant role in attracting or repulsing industry to or from a certain state. 
Indeed, other factors may play a far more important role in industry location decisions, like labour 
regulations and taxes.266 A stringent environmental liability regime would not create barriers to trade 
either, as it would not affect product standards. Nevertheless, it might create higher costs for producers, as 
it might interact with a state’s process safety standards, which is the way in which a product is produced. If 
a firm does not comply with the state’s process standards, and damage to the environment occurs, a 
liability claim might follow. Hence, a stringent liability regime might result in higher production costs for 
industry for which process standards matter much, for a heavily polluting industry, like the chemical 
industry, for example. Yet, it must be examined empirically, whether industry would relocate because of a 
stringent environmental liability regime, eventually interacting with high costs to comply with process 
standards. 
The same reasoning can be applied to liability rules for soil pollution. Indeed, it might be doubtful that 
liability rules for soil pollution would have a major impact on industry location decisions. However, as for 
environmental liability rules in general, stringent liability rules for soil pollution might create higher 
production costs for heavily polluting industry. Nevertheless, whether there is empirical evidence that 
industry would relocate because of stringent liability rules for soil pollution must be examined. 
As far as the behaviour of states is concerned, a state could, theoretically, try to attract industry by 
reducing the burdens that might be imposed on industry through tort law. For example, a state might 
impose a higher burden of proof on the victims of environmental damage or a state might require a clear 
cause-damage relationship. Alternatively, a state might neglect the enforcement of its environmental 
quality standards.267 This behaviour would be difficult to detect and to prove however. A kind of political 
drag would then exist. The same reasoning could apply to liability rules for soil pollution. A state might 
indeed impose a higher burden of proof on the victims of soil pollution, or neglect the enforcement of its 
soil quality standards. Nevertheless, Faure suggests that if environmental liability rules were to have an 
effect, a race-to-the-top would be more likely than a race-to-the-bottom. Indeed, a lenient environmental 
liability regulation would limit a state’s possibilities of claiming restoration for environmental damage 
caused by (foreign) industry. In the case of soil pollution, lenient liability rules for soil pollution might 
mean that industry will not have to pay for the restoration of polluted soil. Therefore, a lax liability regime 
could be counter to a state’s interests.268 It might be examined whether a race-to-the-top in liability rules is 
more likely, provided that enforcement is ensured. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that, theoretically, it seems doubtful that a race-to-the-bottom in 
environmental liability rules would occur. On the one hand, there are more important factors that influence 
industry location decisions than environmental liability rules, and on the other, states would derive no 
advantage from a lenient liability regime. Nevertheless, political pressure and risk of a political drag should 
not be ignored either in the case of environmental liability rules. 
Although it seems doubtful, theoretically, that a race-to-the-bottom in environmental liability rules 
would occur, an examination of whether there is evidence of relaxed environmental liability rules is 
merited in order to formulate an overall conclusion on the risk of a race-to-the-bottom in environmental 
liability. 
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Empirical evidence 
There are no surveys that explicitly examine the influence of a liability regime on industry location 
decisions. However, based on the reasoning above, it seems doubtful that evidence would be found that 
tort law, in casu, liability rules for soil pollution, would play a significant role in attracting or repulsing 
industry to or from a certain state. 
Indeed, other factors may play a far more important role in industry location decisions, such as labour 
regulations, taxes and the availability of raw materials. Moreover, there exists some evidence that 
multinational corporations might decide to apply even more stringent standards than local standards, 
either because of consumer pressure, called by Esty ‘green demand’ in industrialised nations, or to avoid 
potential liability. Levinson describes this as the Bhopal-effect, after the Union Carbide accident in Bhopal, 
India in 1984.269 Therefore, from industry’s side, even based on empirical evidence, it seems doubtful that 
industry, and certainly multinationals, would relocate because of lenient liability rules in other countries. 
The same reasoning might hold for soil pollution liability. 
Nor is there any evidence of relaxed regulation on the side of governments. However, it might be 
possible that state officials believe, or are under political pressure to believe, that a stringent liability 
regime, like stringent liability rules for soil pollution, might repulse industry from locating in that state. 
Hence, they might fail to adopt stringent (soil) quality standards and a stringent liability regime or neglect 
the enforcement of this regime. Further research in this area could provide more information on 
government behaviour. The private interest section will, hopefully, shed some light on lobbying practices 
and the pressure that officials, responsible for environmental liability, or liability rules for soil pollution, 
might face. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that states, European, for example, would engage in a game in 
which they would strive for a low level of environmental liability or liability for soil pollution and renounce 
restoration claims in order to attract industry. 
In conclusion, it seems doubtful, maybe even more than for environmental regulation in general, that 
a race-to-the-bottom in environmental liability regulation, including liability for soil pollution, would 
happen. The risk of a ‘regulatory chill’ might require further examination though. However, even in that 
case, this would not justify full centralisation of environmental liability regulation. Some scholars even 
doubt whether any federal intervention in environmental liability rules, like minimum requirements, 
would be necessary. Indeed, other solutions for enhancing the efficiency of environmental liability rules 
should be examined as well. 
Nevertheless, federal intervention in environmental liability rules, including liability rules for soil 
pollution, might be necessary for other purposes than the prevention of a race-to-the-bottom. Hence, even if 
the existence of a race-to-the-bottom is doubtful, federal intervention might still be justified due to other 
reasons. 
1.2.3. Market Access Argument 
Market access presents another frequently advanced argument for the harmonisation of environmental 
rules. For a long time, trade liberalisation and environmental protection policies have moved along separate 
tracks. Nowadays, trade liberalisation and environmental protection increasingly intersect. Notably, free 
trade advocates fear that environmental regulations might be used as a justification for protectionism, 
whereas environmental organisations fear that trade liberalisation might prevent governments from 
pursuing domestic environmental policy objectives. Yet, free trade and a healthy environment both 
contribute to social welfare, and therefore neither should be pursued at the expense of the other.270 Hence, 
the increasing interdependence of world economies and the intersection of free trade with environmental 
policies have become an important aspect of the debate on the optimal level of environmental regulation in 
a multi-jurisdictional system.271 
This paragraph will first examine whether harmonisation of environmental regulation would be 
justified in order to ease the tensions created by the differences in the stringency of environmental 
regulations of various jurisdictions. Whether harmonisation of environmental liability in particular be 
justified in order to avoid trade distortions and to improve access to foreign markets will then be examined. 
The argument will consist of two strands, ‘harmonisation of marketing conditions’ and ‘reduction of 
transaction costs through harmonisation of legal rules’, which will both firstly be examined for 
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environmental regulation in general, and secondly, for environmental liability rules, including liability 
rules for soil pollution. 
The ‘harmonisation of marketing conditions’ reasoning concentrates on the trade distortions that 
could arise from the differences in the stringency of environmental regulations. Therefore, the 
harmonisation of marketing conditions reasoning is closely linked to the race-to-the-bottom argument. In a 
first step, concerns of both free trade advocates and environmentalists will be described and the 
relationship between environmental regulation and international competitiveness will be clarified. Then, 
the position of the WTO on the use of unilateral trade measures against harmful environmental products or 
processes will be briefly explained. The general case of how conflicts between free trade and environmental 
protection might be alleviated will then be studied. Therefore, whether harmonisation of environmental 
regulation would indeed prevent trade distortions and improve market access will be examined. However, 
various other policy responses, that might be used to address these concerns, will also be evaluated.272 
Accordingly, the reasoning can be applied to harmonisation of environmental liability and in particular to 
liability rules for soil pollution. 
The ‘reduction of transaction costs through harmonisation of legal rules’ reasoning concentrates on the 
reduction in transaction costs that could be achieved through the harmonisation of legal rules. This would 
then improve market access. Whether transaction costs savings would indeed be a reason for harmonisation 
of legal rules will first be examined in general. In a second stage, the reasoning will be applied to 
environmental liability and in particular to liability rules for soil pollution. 
1.2.3.1. A Level Playing Field through Centralisation of Environmental Liability 
General Case: Harmonisation of Marketing Conditions 
It is sometimes argued that different levels in the stringency of safety regulations, like environmental 
regulation, might cause trade distortions and hamper access to foreign markets.273 Harmonisation of legal 
rules would create a ‘level playing field’ and ease the various competitiveness concerns arising from the 
intersection of trade liberalisation and safety regulations, such as environmental protection policies.274 
Firstly, the concerns of both free trade advocates and environmental organisations with respect to 
market access will be presented. Secondly, the position of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) concerning 
unilateral trade measures will be explained. Thirdly, the arguments for a harmonisation of marketing 
conditions will be analysed, and it will be discussed whether this would justify a harmonised 
environmental regulation. Finally, the argumentation will be applied to environmental liability. 
A. Concerns 
This paragraph will spell out the different concerns, firstly of free trade advocates, and secondly of 
environmental organisations. 
The concerns of free trade advocates are related both to environmental product standards, which 
would hamper market access, and to environmental process standards, which also touches upon 
competitiveness as well.275 
On the one hand, free trade advocates worry that environmental protection could be used as a 
justification for trade barriers. In principle, free trade regimes, like the WTO, recognise the right of 
jurisdictions to protect their citizens against harmful environmental, health or other safety effects of 
imported products, on the condition that the basic principles of national treatment, non-discrimination and 
most-favoured nation are respected. This would mean that both domestically produced products and 
imported products would be subject to the same regulatory measure. However, free trade advocates are 
concerned that some product-based measures that would nominally apply to both domestically produced 
products and imported products, in reality would impose a disproportionate burden on importers and 
protect domestic industry. In other words,, these product standards would be disguised trade barriers. 
Furthermore, there is a fear that inconsistent product regulations, for example of household equipment, like 
toasters, washing machines, etc., might hamper economies of scale in production and distribution, increase 
transaction costs and reduce trade.276 
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In addition to product standards, free trade advocates fear that countries might also introduce 
process-based trade restrictions. The considerations for introducing process-based restrictions differ from 
the introduction of product standards. Whereas product standards aim to protect a state’s citizens from the 
(environmental) harmful effects of certain products, process standards try to regulate how a product has to 
be produced, even if this product would be produced outside the jurisdiction of the importing state.277 
Competitiveness concerns are generally the ground for introducing such environmental process standards. 
Indeed, differences in the stringency of process standards may distort competition. Companies operating in 
jurisdictions with lax environmental regulation might be able to produce at lower costs than companies 
located in jurisdictions with stringent environmental regulation. If local conditions (strong wind, less dense 
population) would justify these relatively lax environmental regulations, intervention would be inefficient, 
as exactly these differences make gains from trade possible. Cost advantages, however, may be unfair in 
cases where lenient environmental rules are not based on any comparative advantage.278 Moreover, free 
trade advocates fear that differences in the stringency of process standards may induce industrial relocation 
or even a race-to-the-bottom. As discussed above, there is however, little theoretical or empirical evidence 
that such shifts toward pollution havens would occur.279 Nevertheless, proponents of such process-based 
trade restrictions argue that such measures are justified to prevent industrial relocation or a race-to-the-
bottom.280 
Yet, both product-based and process-based trade restrictions might hamper free trade. Therefore, in 
order to avoid trade barriers, claims of free trade advocates arise for international harmonisation or policy 
convergence of environmental policies.281 
Environmental organisations from their point of view fear that, through competitive pressure, trade 
liberalisation might weaken both their country’s regulatory standards and those of their trading partners, 
which might also result in the lowest common denominator or in a race-to-the-bottom. Moreover, even in 
the absence of a race-to-the-bottom, they fear that trade agreementsmight discourage governments from 
pursuing domestic environmental policy objectives or adopting (more) stringent environmental standards, 
which was defined as a regulatory chill.282 According to environmental organisations, countries might be 
allowed to use trade measures to offset differences in environmental standards. Therefore, environmental 
organisations sometimes criticize the WTO as it rejects the use of trade controls and market access by one 
member, to force other members to raise environmental standards. Environmental organisations would opt 
for the solution that the right of market access under a trade agreement like the WTO could be linked to 
commitments to raise environmental standards. Hence, environmental organisations would prefer that 
either environmental policy would be exempted from WTO obligations, or that environmental policy 
objectives would be integrated in the global trade order.283 
Summarising, although for different reasons, free trade advocates as well as environmental 
organisations plead for international harmonisation or policy convergence of various policy areas, 
including environmental policy, in order to avoid trade barriers, even if the effects are only ‘within the 
border’ of a jurisdiction. 
Before it can be examined whether the harmonisation of environmental regulation would indeed be 
justified in order to ease the tensions arising from the intersection of trade liberalisation and environmental 
regulation, it merits briefly studying the attitude of the WTO towards the use of unilateral trade measures. 
B. WTO Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures 
As far as product standards are concerned, the WTO recognises the right of jurisdictions to protect their 
citizens against harmful environmental, health or safety effects of products, as long as these countries 
respect certain key principles. Indeed, the GATT/WTO agreement is built upon a number of key principles 
that lay down the prohibitions of certain types of trade barriers and discrimination between trading 
partners. The most important principles are the Most Favoured Nation principle (GATT Article I.1), the 
National Treatment principle (GATT Art. III) and GATT article XI: 1, which deals with prohibitions on 
importations.284 WTO members should not adopt measures that violate one of these principles. For 
instance, Member States must guarantee that the measure or policy applies equally to imported and 
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domestic products. The measure therefore should not be a disguised attempt to protect domestic industry. 
In such circumstances, there is in principle no conflict between WTO law and the pursuit of a domestic 
environmental policy objective.285 Article XX, moreover, elaborates criteria that justify exemptions to these 
basic principles. A measure, that might potentially hamper free trade, could be adopted, if it is considered 
to be necessary to protect public morals, to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or necessary for 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.286 
Process-based trade restrictions present a more difficult case. As the restriction applies to production 
processes, that took place outside the jurisdiction of the importing country, the traditional GATT position 
was that all such extra-jurisdictional measures would be inconsistent with free trade and therefore invalid. 
This position has been reflected in the Tuna/Dolphin cases in 1991 and 1994.287 At that time, the United 
States enacted a legislation that prohibited the use of certain tuna fishing methods, to protect dolphins from 
being killed in a tuna catch. This legislation required foreign governments to enact a similar legislation; 
otherwise they would be prohibited to sell their tuna in the United States. In these two cases, the GATT 
panels held that the ban on tuna imports from countries that allowed less dolphin-friendly fishing 
techniques, than the U.S. techniques, violated Article XI of the GATT Agreement. The ban could not be 
justified under Article XX either. The first panel argued that Article XX could only be invoked with respect 
to environmental threats within the importing country’s own jurisdiction; the second panel decided that the 
exemptions could not be invoked if the measure intended to change the exporting country’s domestic 
policies.288 This attitude was slightly modified in the Shrimp/Turtle decisions in 1998.289 The background of 
this dispute is similar to the Tuna-Dolphin cases. The dispute involved a US ban on the importation of 
shrimps, from countries that did not take precautions to prevent the killing of sea turtles during a shrimp 
catch. Now, the WTO Reports took a more favourable approach towards the trade restriction. Indeed, the 
WTO panels in these cases did not reject the possibility that the U.S. regulation could fall under the 
exemptions of Article XX. Nevertheless, the measure was now rejected on the claim of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination. 
However, neither the Tuna-Dolphin cases nor the Shrimp-Turtle decisions provide a clear answer 
whether trade measures based on process standards could be allowed in the future by the WTO. 
Consequently, the debate on process-based trade restrictions is not finished yet. The main conclusion up to 
now might be that trade restrictions to protect extraterritorial values, based on article XX (for example for 
public morals) would not be precluded in principle. However, to date, no measure has been found 
completely WTO consistent.290 
Nevertheless, the WTO rulings might have discouraged developed countries from using trade 
restrictions and restricting imports from less developed countries in order to enforce or strengthen process 
or product standards.291 This might also explain the claims, from both free trade advocates and 
environmentalists, for harmonisation of environmental regulation, or policy convergence. The next 
paragraph will examine whether harmonisation of environmental regulation would indeed be justified to 
ease the various concerns, raised by differences in environmental standards. 
C. Harmonisation to Create a Level Playing Field 
The argument that harmonisation of legal rules would be necessary in order to avoid trade distortions and 
to guarantee market access, seems to imply that a total equality of marketing conditions, sometimes called a 
level playing field, would be a conditio sine qua non for market access. However, differences in marketing 
conditions might vary because of different local circumstances, and exactly these differences make gains 
from trade possible. Therefore, it must be possible to develop a framework of rules that would guarantee 
market access, without harmonising all rules and standards, which would eliminate gains from trade. This 
would, for instance, justify the harmonisation of certain product standards, in order to reduce barriers to 
trade. However, in the environmental realm, the fact that harmonisation of product standards sometimes 
might be justified in order to guarantee market access, is sometimes used to justify the harmonisation of 
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process standards as well. However, this aims to harmonise conditions of competition.292 It therefore merits 
making a distinction between environmental product and environmental process standards, when 
examining whether harmonisation would be justified. 
As far as environmental product standards are concerned, it could be argued that differences in 
product safety standards might indeed create barriers to entry and hamper interstate trade.293 Accordingly, 
trade liberalisation might indeed require some degree of integration in other fields, including 
environmental regulation. However it is questionable, whether this would justify a total harmonisation of 
standards. Total harmonisation of standards is certainly not the only available policy option to deal with 
market access concerns. It should be possible to achieve market integration with less comprehensive 
instruments than total harmonisation. Indeed, a variety of refined policy tools exit to respond to market 
access concerns.294 Market access can be promoted through various forms of harmonisation. A minimum or 
essential harmonisation of requirements that lays down the basic safety requirements might well be 
sufficient. Mutual recognition among trading countries would also offer a mechanism to address market 
access concerns. Harmonisation of public information might be even far-reaching. Fundamentally, the 
challenge is to find that policy that offers the advantages of co-ordinated policy and that at the same time 
reflects diversity in local circumstances.295 However, it must be noted that the reasoning above would 
justify a certain level of centralisation or harmonisation of environmental product standards, not necessarily 
of tort law. 
Process-based trade restrictions on the other hand, try to regulate the way a product is produced, even 
if outside the jurisdiction of the importing state. Market access is denied because of competitiveness 
concerns instead of the desire to protect a state’s citizens from the (environmentally) harmful effects of 
certain products. Revesz distinguishes six types of situations in order to examine whether the use of 
process-based trade restrictions would be justified.296 His analysis might help to decide in which cases a 
harmonisation of process standards would ease these competitiveness concerns. It must be noted that the 
reasoning below examines whether a certain level of centralisation or harmonisation of environmental 
process standards would be justified, or put differently, whether a certain level of harmonisation of 
environmental regulation would be justified. It does not examine whether harmonisation of environmental 
liability would be justified. This will be examined separately. 
Regrouping Revesz’ six types of situations, gives three main cases for which whether the use of 
process-based trade restrictions would be justified and whether harmonisation could overcome these 
restrictions can be examined. The three cases are the following: firstly, the case where no externalities are 
present; second, when physical externalities are present, either in the importing country, or in third 
countries; and third, when psychic externalities might exist. 
Firstly, the effect of environmental process standards might be purely domestic in the exporting 
country. Nevertheless, in order to respond to competitiveness concerns, policy makers of the importing 
country, industry and environmental interest groups, might call for the use of trade restrictions to imports 
from jurisdictions that apply lenient environmental standards.297 However, as discussed in the argument 
dealing with externalities, in such case, it would be hard to justify the introduction of trade sanctions by the 
importing country and equally hard to find a justification for harmonisation of these process standards. 
Indeed, trade restrictions, instead of equalising marketing conditions, distort trade relationships by 
eliminating the comparative advantage of countries that can set less stringent environmental standards due 
to local circumstances. Moreover, as Revesz rightly argues, as the cost of production depends on various 
factors that differ among countries (labour standards, wages), there is no reason why environmental 
regulation in particular should be harmonised.298 
However, if the environmental process standards in one jurisdiction would cause physical spillovers 
in the importing country, economic theory would consider these interstate externalities as a tenable 
argument for shifting regulatory power to an overarching governmental level. Indeed, as discussed in 
paragraph 1.2.1, the reasoning was that jurisdictions will not internalise the consequences of their actions 
that might accrue across their borders. It was argued, though, that the centralisation of regulatory power 
should be limited to transboundary externalities. In the case of torts, the transboundary externality 
argument did indeed not provide a justification for harmonisation of tort law that merely dealt with in-state 
torts. 
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Yet, when dealing with the global trade order, the interaction between environmental regulation and 
economic integration is different than in federal systems like the European Union. Indeed, the differences in 
wealth and economic development might be far more pronounced. Moreover, as will be discussed below, 
environmental conditions in some countries might be so bad that this might give rise to concerns that basic 
human rights would be violated and therefore need to be protected. Yet, in the international community the 
capacity for harmonised standard setting might be much weaker, and there might be almost no capacity for 
harmonised environmental enforcement.299 Hence, the importing country might feel that the use of trade 
restrictions is the only way to protect these citizens.300 Indeed, because environmental standards setting and 
enforcement might be unsatisfactory in developing countries, there might be a stronger tendency in the 
international community than in federal systems to impose environmentally based trade restrictions. As 
Revesz indicates, although in the case of interjurisdictional externalities, that a certain level of centralisation 
might be preferable, it is understandable that states may see state regulation coupled with trade measures 
as the best available solution if centralised regulation is not viable, or if the enforcement of this regulation is 
not feasible.301 
Nevertheless, it merits having a closer look at how a certain level of harmonisation of environmental 
regulation could solve the spillover problem and the need for trade restrictions. Indeed, by narrowing the 
gap between the environmental requirements that companies in high-standard jurisdictions have to comply 
with and the requirements that companies operating in more lenient jurisdictions face, a certain level of 
harmonisation could minimise the risk of unfair competition, a race to the bottom or a regulatory chill in 
environmental policy making. Hence, a certain level of harmonisation could eliminate the need for trade 
restrictions.302 It is not claimed that this would require a total harmonisation. There may be less trade-
distorting ways to achieve the same result. 
Indeed, although it sometimes might be difficult to achieve, countries could adopt a trade agreement, 
with provisions of enforcement commitments by the jurisdictions of their respective environmental rules. 
Such an approach, which for example was used in NAFTA, does not ensure market access. However, the 
commitment to full enforcement of national environmental rules may help to ease competitiveness tensions 
by preventing that basic environmental standards would be neglected. Hence, the risk of a race to the 
bottom in environmental policy making could be prevented and consequently there would be no need for 
trade restrictions. Moreover, enforcement commitments are a relatively non-interventionist strategy, which 
allows countries to adopt environmental standards that are tailored to their individual circumstances and 
needs.303 
In addition to enforcement commitments, a diverse set of harmonisation techniques are available. 
Indeed, possibilities like minimum standards, multi-tier agreements, convergence of standards, 
differentiated standards or goal harmonisation should not be overlooked.304 Minimum production process 
standards set a regulatory floor below which no jurisdiction may go. By narrowing the gap between the 
environmental requirements in high-standard jurisdictions and the requirements in more lenient 
jurisdictions, minimum standards limit the possibility of distortions of competition. Multi-tier regulatory 
regimes allow for differentiated standards, for different groups of states, depending on their level of 
development. By doing so, the benefits of standards adopted to local conditions can be obtained, without 
losing the advantages of uniform requirements. With a differential standards regime, countries could adopt 
a free trade agreement in which they could identify environmental targets common to all participating 
countries, but which would provide for different degrees of stringency, for example in the time limit to 
achieve the target. Hence, standards would be set centrally but not uniformly. Again, differential standards 
would be economically more efficient than total harmonisation because they would better match regulatory 
requirements to local needs. Finally, the presence of common long-term goals could ensure that wide 
variations in the stringency of environmental protection will not persist over time as countries converge on 
the jointly defined goal.305 It must be clear however, that the reasoning above would argue for a certain 
level of harmonisation of regulation, not necessarily of environmental liability rules. Environmental liability 
in particular will be discussed below. 
Up until now, it was assumed that the spillovers did arise in the importing country. If these spillovers 
would arise in third countries, but not in the importing country that introduces the trade restrictions, this 
would complicate the analysis. Indeed, if the importing country is not affected itself but if it would impose 
                                                             
299  Revesz 2001a, 20. 
300  Revesz 2001a, 22. 
301  Revesz 2001a, 20. 
302  Esty & Geradin 1997, 283. 
303  Esty & Geradin 1997, 275. 
304  Esty & Geradin 1997, 287. 
305  Esty & Geradin 1997, 287-292. 
Optimal Decision-Making Level of Environmental Liability Rules 
78 
a trade restriction to protect the environment, there might always be a risk of disguised protectionism, 
instead of purely good intentions.306 In this sense it is understandable that the WTO is reluctant to allow 
such trade measures, although the importing country’s trade restriction might increase global social 
welfare. Nevertheless, it might be important to mention at this point, that for example the U.S. tuna 
embargo against Mexico has motivated Mexico to strengthen its fishing standards, and incidental dolphin 
deaths have significantly declined. Hence, although the use of process-based trade sanctions might violate 
the WTO rules, the interest of some developing countries in obtaining or increasing their market access to 
rich industrialised markets, has at several occasions provided incentives for these developing countries to 
strengthen their environmental standards. Therefore, in some cases, a trade restriction might lead to a 
California effect. The California-effect referred to the upward ratcheting of regulatory standards when 
economically powerful nations with stringent standards can force producers from other states with lower 
standards to adopt these strict standards.307 
Further, in addition to the fact that a country may introduce trade restrictions, because of spillovers in 
third countries, a country might also introduce trade measures as the citizens of this importing country 
might suffer psychic losses, caused by the destruction of valuable natural resources or global commons, or 
because the environmental conditions in some countries might be so bad that this might violate basic 
human rights and therefore need to be protected. However, even if these psychic losses are real, it might be 
hard to justify that rich countries may take trade measures or require total harmonisation of certain 
environmental standards. Indeed, distributional aspects might arise and there might also be a risk of 
disguised protectionism. Moreover, Revesz points out that, in case of global commons, trade measures 
might be explicitly allowed by international treaties. International treaties, requiring all countries to meet 
certain public health or ecological standards, might also ease the concerns of both environmentalists as free 
trade advocates.308 However, as such treaties might take a long time to negotiate; countries may again see 
unilateral sanctions as the best option to protect the global commons.309 
In conclusion, the first line of reasoning of the market access argument focused on the need of 
‘harmonisation of marketing conditions’ in order guarantee a level playing field and market access. Indeed, 
different levels in the stringency of safety regulations, like environmental regulation, might cause trade 
distortions and hamper access to foreign markets. Therefore, proponents of harmonisation argue that 
harmonisation would create a ‘level playing field’ and ease the various concerns, arising from the 
intersection of trade liberalisation and safety regulations, such as environmental regulation. These concerns 
carried by free trade advocates and environmental organisations equally relate to both (environmental) 
product standards and (environmental) process standards. 
As far as environmental product standards are concerned, it was argued that differences in product 
safety standards indeed might create barriers to entry and hamper interstate trade.310 Therefore, it was 
concluded that trade liberalisation might indeed require some degree of integration in other regulatory 
fields, including environmental regulation. However, this would not justify a total harmonisation of 
standards. Indeed, it is possible to achieve market integration with less comprehensive instruments than 
total harmonisation as there are a variety of refined policy tools to respond to market access concerns 
caused by differing product standards.311 
In the case of differing process standards, the claim that harmonisation of marketing conditions is 
needed in order to guarantee free trade is primarily based on competitiveness concerns. Indeed, 
competitiveness concerns cannot be ignored in the context of trade liberalisation. In order to respond to 
competitiveness concerns caused by differing environmental process standards, countries may introduce 
trade restrictions to imports from jurisdictions that apply lenient environmental standards. It consequently 
was examined whether harmonisation of process standards would be justified in order to ease these 
competitiveness concerns. It was argued that if the effect of environmental process standards would be 
purely domestic in the exporting country, it would be hard to justify the introduction of trade sanctions by 
the importing country and equally hard to find a justification for harmonisation of these process standards. 
However, where externalities exist, there might be a justification for centralisation of process standards.312 
Yet, it was shown that other solutions than total harmonisation might be available in order to guarantee 
market integration. Finally, if these externalities would be psychic, it would be hard to justify that rich 
countries may take trade measures or require total harmonisation of certain environmental standards. 
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Indeed, distributional aspects might arise and there might also be a risk of disguised protectionism. 
Centralisation of basic standards through international treaties, requiring all countries to meet certain 
ecological standards might ease the concerns of both environmentalists as free trade advocates. 
This paragraph tried to examine whether – a certain level of – harmonisation could be justified in 
order to avoid trade distortions and to improve market access. The focus however was on environmental 
regulation. It merits to now examin whether and how harmonisation of environmental liability could be 
justified in order to improve marketing conditions and market access. 
A Level Playing Field Through the Harmonisation of Environmental Liability Rules 
As discussed above, realising free trade could justify the harmonisation of elementary environmental 
product or process standards, to avoid incompatibilities which would create barriers to entry and 
distortions of competition. Yet, it is questionable if the realisation of free trade would justify the 
harmonisation of civil law such as as environmental liability rules. As was shown above, it is certainly 
possible to realise free trade without the total harmonisation of all legal rules. The same reasoning holds for 
environmental liability. Moreover, equal marketing conditions would not necessarily be achieved through 
the harmonisation of environmental liability rules. Indeed, harmonisation of liability rules would not create 
a level playing field, as differences in the availability of natural resources, labour standards, etc., are far 
more important factors that determine the conditions of competition. These factors would still create 
variations in marketing conditions.313 For example in the case of product liability, experience has proven 
that harmonisation of product liability has not been able to achieve a total harmonisation of marketing 
conditions.314 Furthermore, even if there would be differences in the stringency of environmental liability 
rules, it seems doubtful that industry would relocate to ‘pollution havens’, as examined previously. It 
therefore also seems doubtful that environmental liability would act as a trade barrier or cause 
competitiveness concerns. 
Unlike regulatory measures, liability rules are not subject to restrictions under the WTO framework, 
provided that they apply only after the harm has occurred and are not used to restrict market access. 
Indeed, liability rules are not considered to be measures equivalent to quantitative import restrictions under 
the WTO framework. Hence, this might cause countries to prefer liability rules to target environmental-
unfriendly products, instead of using regulatory restrictions, or product regulations might be backed up by 
liability rules. Introduction of liability rules, however, would not hamper free trade. On the contrary, as 
Bergkamp indicates it would have a significant advantage. The use of liability rules, eventually 
complementary to regulation, would prevent disguised protectionism. Indeed, a stringent liability regime 
will not impede the import of a certain product and in case of harm; a causal link between the 
environmental harm and the product concerned must still be proven.315 Product or process standards, on 
the other hand, might in name apply as well to domestic products and imports, but in practice it might be 
more difficult for importers to comply with the standards so that in reality foreign producers might not be 
able to import their products. 
Thus, as diverging liability rules would not hamper free trade, it seems doubtful that a total 
harmonisation of environmental liability to ensure market access would be necessary. Countries could set 
their liability rules according to their preferences, and still guarantee market access, whereby disguised 
protectionism might be prevented.316 
If liability rules for soil pollution in particular are considered, the reasoning will be essentially the 
same. Indeed, it seems doubtful that stringent liability rules for soil pollution would act as a trade barrier 
for certain products. Indeed, a causal link between the soil pollution and the product concerned still must 
be proven. The advantage moreover would be that disguised protectionism could be prevented. On the 
other hand, stringent liability rules for soil pollution might influence the production process and require 
additional precautionary measures like investing in environment-friendly technology, which would make 
production costs more expensive. Nevertheless, it seems doubtful that industry would relocate to ‘pollution 
havens’, as examined previously. This also depends on the regulation in neighbouring countries. Within 
Europe – even if Eastern Europe is included – and the US, most states have liability rules for soil pollution. 
Concluding, it seems very doubtful that harmonisation of environmental liability and liability for soil 
pollution as an example would be necessary to ensure market access and fair marketing conditions. 
Nevertheless, federal intervention in environmental liability regulation might be justified for other 
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purposes. Hence, it merits to now examin the second strand of the market access argument: reduction of 
transaction costs through harmonisation of legal rules. 
1.2.3.2. Reduction of Transaction Costs Through Centralisation of Environmental Liability 
General Case 
In addition to the concern that differences in marketing conditions might hamper market access, there exists 
the concern that differences in legal rules might cause high transaction costs, and hence that this equally 
might hamper market access. Therefore, it is sometimes argued that harmonisation would be more efficient 
because of transaction costs savings that can be realised through harmonised legal rules. This assumption, 
however, might require further examination.317 
Some scholars expressed themselves critically about the need to harmonise private law, such as 
contractual liability, property rights, or family law, in order to ensure market access and free trade. It is 
claimed that it is not clear that a uniform private law would be a necessary feature to ensure free trade.318 
Again, a careful weighing of the advantages of harmonisation against the advantages of decentralisation 
must be made. Indeed, the central question to be posed is whether the eventual transaction cost savings of 
harmonisation do outweigh the benefits of differentiated legal rules, adapted to the preferences of the 
citizens.319 
Advocates of a harmonisation of legal rules argue that uniform legal rules would solve information 
problems. Citizens and firms of different jurisdictions do not have to spend any more on information costs. 
They do not have to inform themselves about the differences in the law, or the way the law is enforced. 
Indeed, these transaction cost savings might be important for companies that are active in interstate 
commerce, in order to obtain scale economies in production and distribution.320 Furthermore, it is claimed 
that uniform rules tend to bring about legal certainty and a predictable jurisprudence.321 However, 
although these arguments in the field of economic regulation might be valid, it still has to be examined 
whether harmonisation also would be desirable in the case of private law, such as tort law. 
Indeed, the assumption that a harmonised legal system will always be more efficient than 
decentralisation, because of transaction cost savings and legal certainty, might be somewhat precipitate. 
Certainly in the field of private law, this reasoning neglects the benefits of decentralisation, as legal rules 
can be adapted to the preferences and needs of the citizens of the different jurisdictions. Indeed, 
harmonisation of private law touches upon the sovereignty of states. Moreover, scholars such as Legrand322 
argue that differences between legal systems and legal cultures might be substantive, hence, the costs of 
harmonisation might be huge, and the transactions cost savings might be fairly small.323 Undeniably, 
traditions, culture and values might vary substantially across states, which will have an impact on the 
interpretation of a certain rule. Furthermore, translation problems might lead to different interpretations of 
the same ruling. Therefore, Legrand is sceptical about ‘legal transplants’ from one state to another. In such 
circumstances, Van den Bergh indicates that harmonisation might increase legal uncertainty instead of 
realising legal certainty.324 
Hence, it will have to be examined case by case whether differences in certain legal rules are indeed 
reflecting different preferences of citizens, or whether these differences merely concern ‘technicalities’, in 
order to formulate an opinion about the desirability and feasibility of harmonisation of these legal rules. 
With application to tort law, there might be cases where a same liability rule, either strict liability or a 
negligence rule, is applied to a same type of accident in different jurisdictions. It could then be argued that, 
although formulations might differ, citizens might have the same preference pattern. Hence, the liability 
rule for that specific accident type could be considered for harmonisation in order to reduce transaction 
costs. However, it still will have to be examined whether the existing differences can be bridged at low 
costs. If these differences are rooted in the legal culture of the jurisdictions, the costs of harmonisation still 
might be huge. Furthermore, it should be guaranteed that a uniform rule does not disregard differences in 
preferences.325 
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Yet, transaction costs savings do not necessarily require total harmonisation of a certain liability rule, 
which might neglect differences in citizen’s preferences. Indeed, it is very well possible that, for a certain 
tort, the applicable liability rule would be harmonised, for example a negligence rule, but that the contents 
of the due care standard is left at state level, according to the preferences and needs of the citizens. Hence, 
centralisation of a specific liability rule for certain activities might be combined with a differentiation of the 
specific contents of this rule. In that case, transaction costs could be lowered, and differing preferences 
could be still respected. Therefore, harmonisation of liability rules in order to reduce transaction costs might 
allow for a certain level of centralisation, but not for full harmonisation.326 
Nevertheless, there might be areas in tort law where citizens’ preferences are more important than a 
reduction in transaction costs. It merits therefore examining now whether there would be a scope for a 
certain level of centralisation of environmental liability, or that citizens’ preferences in that field of tort law 
might differ substantially. 
Environmental Liability 
In order to judge whether a certain level of centralisation or even harmonisation might be desirable in the 
case of environmental liability rules, the central questions that must be answered are whether centralisation 
or harmonisation would improve legal certainty and reduce transaction costs and whether this 
harmonisation would then improve market access. 
The European experience has proven that increased legal certainty and a reduction in transaction 
costs, through harmonisation of environmental liability, are not easy to realise. Indeed, most developed 
countries have certain provisions to deal with environmental damage. Moreover, environmental damage 
might be very diverse, and one single pollution case might cause different types of damage. The 
consequences of harmonisation must therefore be very carefully examined. There indeed might be a risk of 
increased legal complexity, if different rules, on federal and state level, would apply to various types of 
environmental damage, caused by a single pollution case. Increased legal uncertainty would obviously 
hamper the reduction in transaction costs.327 Besides this problem, environmental protection might have 
deep roots in a jurisdiction’s culture and hence in its legal rules. Therefore, the cost of harmonisation of 
environmental liability rules might be high and the transaction costs savings might be less than expected. 
Hence, a total harmonisation of environmental liability rules does not seem desirable. However, 
general principles of tort law to protect the environment could be defined centrally, or a specific liability 
rule for certain activities could be set centrally, combined with a differentiation of the specific contents of 
this rule. In such circumstances, transaction costs might be lowered, market access might be promoted and 
still differing preferences could be respected. 
These findings may be further refined to liability for soil pollution. Soil pollution and clean up 
requirements for contaminated soil might be locality specific and dependant on the physical and 
geographical characteristics of the region.328 Combined with the facts that environmental protection might 
be rooted in a jurisdiction’s culture and that it might be doubtful that differences in the stringency of 
liability rules for soil pollution would significantly hamper market access, total harmonisation of liability 
rules for soil pollution does not seem desirable either. Indeed, it might be questionable whether the 
eventual transaction costs savings of harmonisation would outweigh the benefits of differentiated legal 
rules. Therefore, to achieve some form of harmonisation it might seem wiser to try to harmonise some 
general principles concerning environmental liability, combined with local determination of for example, 
the specific content of a due care standard, rather than a total harmonisation of liability for soil pollution.329 
It merits now to summarise the market access argument as a whole. The argument did consist of two 
strands of reasoning, ‘harmonisation of marketing conditions’ and ‘reduction of transaction costs through 
harmonisation of legal rules’. 
With respect to the need of harmonisation to equalise marketing conditions, it was concluded that 
trade liberalisation might indeed require some degree of integration in other fields, including 
environmental regulation. A distinction was made between process and product standards. Yet, 
divergences neither in product nor in process standards did justify a total harmonisation of standards. 
Indeed, it was indicated that it must be possible to achieve market integration with less comprehensive 
instruments than total harmonisation as there exist a variety of refined policy tools to respond to market 
access concerns caused by differing product or process standards. When these findings are applied to 
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environmental liability, and to liability for soil pollution, it was concluded that the argument, that 
harmonisation of environmental liability would be necessary to ensure market access and fair marketing 
conditions is rather weak. Indeed, diverging liability rules would not hamper free trade. On the contrary, 
the use of liability rules, eventually complementary to regulation, could prevent disguised protectionism. 
Indeed, a stringent liability regime will not impede the import of a certain product and in case of harm, a 
causal link between the environmental harm and the product concerned still must be proven.330 Product or 
process standards, on the other hand, might in name also apply to domestic products and imports, but in 
practice it might be more difficult for importers to comply with the standards so that in reality foreign 
producers might not be able to import their products. 
With respect to the second line of reasoning, reduction of transaction costs to ensure market access, it 
was argued that transaction costs savings do not necessarily require total harmonisation of a certain liability 
rule, which might neglect differences in citizen’s preferences. Indeed, it is very well possible to centralise 
the use of a specific liability rule for certain activities, combined with a differentiation of the specific 
contents of this rule. In that case, transaction costs could be lowered, and still respecting differing 
preferences. Therefore, harmonisation of liability rules in order to reduce transaction costs might allow for a 
certain level of centralisation, but not necessarily for full harmonisation. The same result was achieved for 
environmental liability and liability for soil pollution. 
Hence, the market access argument would not justify a total harmonisation of environmental 
regulation, nor of environmental liability. Nevertheless, centrally defined principles might ensure market 
access and free trade and might moreover encourage more stringent environmental protection in regions 
for which environmental quality might not be the highest priority. A co-operative approach could be 
adopted, with central minimum requirements of protection, but allowing regions to implement the 
standards or to adopt more stringent measures in accordance with the objectives of free trade and 
competition, and conform to the citizen’s preferences.331 
However, again, federal intervention in liability rules for soil pollution might be necessary for other 
purposes than market access. 
1.2.4. Minimum Level of Protection Argument 
The final argument, harmonisation in order to guarantee a minimum level of protection, falls beyond the 
pure economic arguments for harmonisation of liability rules. Some authors stay within the economic 
reasoning and argue that harmonisation would be justified in order to guarantee a minimum level of 
protection as unacceptably low environmental standards in a certain jurisdiction could present negative 
psychic externalities to citizens in other jurisdictions. Other authors consider environmental protection as a 
human right, freed from economic justification. It merits studying this argument first for regulation in 
general and for environmental regulation. Second, attention will go to tort law in general. Finally, it can be 
examined whether the minimum level of protection argument would justify a harmonisation of 
environmental liability rules. 
1.2.4.1. Guarantee of a Minimum Level of Protection 
In addition to the economic reasons for harmonisation, non-economic arguments could be advanced to 
plead for harmonisation of legal rules. The main non-economic argument is that harmonisation of legal 
rules would provide a minimum level of protection to citizens. 
In order to justify the harmonisation of legal rules to ensure a minimum level of protection to citizens, 
some scholars try to incorporate this non-economic argument into the economic arguments for 
centralisation as the transboundary externalities argument and the market access argument. 
First, it is argued that low standards of for example health protection, safety standards or 
environmental quality, in a certain jurisdiction, could present negative psychic externalities to citizens in 
other jurisdictions.332 Therefore, from a welfare maximising perspective, these psychic externalities should 
be taking into account in the analysis of the optimal level of regulation. Eventually, psychic spillovers may 
justify centralisation.333 
In the environmental realm, it is claimed that psychic spillovers could arise when citizens of another 
jurisdiction are deprived of the enjoyment of a certain natural resource. It is assumed that people do care 
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about the Brazilian Rainforest, or the water quality in Alaska, even when they do not live there, and 
probably will never visit it. Hence, the health of (valuable) ecosystems, to which certain citizens might have 
no physical connection, might still enter into their utility function. Consequently, it is argued that psychic 
externalities should be taken into account when developing an environmental policy.334 Yet, if the existence 
of psychic externalities would be accepted, this would open the scope of centralisation tremendously. Faure 
rightly warns that the consequence of a ‘harmonisation for a minimum level of protection’ might be that 
citizen’s preferences in the different jurisdictions are ignored. Centralisation would then amount to 
paternalism.335 
Second, it is argued that maintaining free trade would require a core set of common norms and values 
to establish guidelines for behaviour. Centralised norms and values for trade, including safety standards, 
would make liberalised trade possible. Without centralised moral baselines for trade, countries would be 
under pressure to conduct trade in an unacceptable way.336 Moreover, according to Esty, interdependence 
between states would require, to some degree, integrated environmental protection programmes, or global 
environmental norms to guide citizen’s behaviour.337 As was already explained above, market access would 
not justify a total harmonisation of environmental regulation, nor of environmental liability. Nevertheless, 
centrally defined principles might encourage more stringent environmental protection in regions for which 
environmental quality might not be the highest priority. It was stressed however, that a co-operative 
approach could be adopted, with central minimum requirements of protection, but allowing regions to 
implement the standards or to adopt more stringent measures in accordance with the objectives of free 
trade and competition, and conform to the citizen’s preferences. 
On the other hand, some authors leave the economic debate and argue that minimum standards of 
environmental protection for all countries would be justified if it is accepted that the environment is a 
common heritage of all people.338 In that sense, environmental protection would be considered as a human 
right. Harmonisation would guarantee all citizens a similar environmental quality and moreover, the 
environmental and cultural heritage and human health would be protected. Being a human right, 
environmental protection would be freed from economic justification.339 Indeed, if this argument would be 
accepted at policy level, and environmental rules would be harmonised, it must be clear that the reason for 
harmonisation would not be based on economic efficiency, but on the desire to guarantee all citizens a basic 
level of environmental quality.340 
Yet, it is not argued that this would not be valid argument, but there is an important consequence of 
harmonisation of environmental rules, based on the human rights justification or because of the existence of 
negative psychic externalities. Indeed, in such case, it might be that a basic level of protection would be 
imposed in a certain jurisdiction, even if this would be contrary to citizens’ preferences. As Ogus explains, 
rights-based arguments might trump arguments based on economic efficiency. For example, the 
preferences of citizens in certain jurisdictions for lower standards, may sometimes be overruled it the 
general opinion is that these lower standards would infringe human rights.341 And again, it must be clear 
that, if it is accepted that harmonisation of legal rules is justified, either because of the protection of human 
rights, or because of the existence of negative psychic externalities, that this would open the scope for 
harmonisation tremendously. 
Moreover, Revesz is critical about this minimum level of protection justification for harmonisation of 
environmental regulation. As Revesz indicates, environmental risks are part of aggregate health risks. 
Hence, it is difficult to understand why environmental regulation should be harmonised in order to 
guarantee a minimum level of protection, if, for example in the European Union, there is no minimum 
social security, no provision of general health care or no harmonisation of minimum wages.342 
Yet, even if the existence of psychic externalities would be accepted or the need to protect human 
rights, the question remains whether the harmonisation of tort law is the appropriate instrument to achieve 
this minimum level of protection. 
The minimum level of protection justification for harmonisation addresses the concern to guarantee all 
citizens minimum quality standards, which refers to harmonisation of regulation. Therefore, the minimum 
level of protection argument might in some circumstances justify the harmonisation of regulation, but it is 
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more difficult to justify the harmonisation of tort law. It is indeed questionable that the harmonisation of 
tort law would be the appropriate instrument to achieve such minimum safety standards. Indeed, it might 
be more efficient to develop minimum quality standards that must be achieved, before and after an 
accident, rather than to harmonise the liability rules itself in the different jurisdictions. Moreover, the type 
of liability rule might reflect differences in preferences of citizens. As Faure argues, in the European Union, 
for instance, it is doubtful whether the different liability rules in some Member States would not provide a 
minimum level of protection for accident victims. Hence, there would be no need for harmonisation of tort 
law. Therefore, regulation or other instruments, as the European Convention on Human Rights,343 could be 
more used more appropriately to guarantee such minimum level of protection, rather than the 
harmonisation of tort law.344 Hence, although the minimum level of protection argument might in some 
circumstances justify the harmonisation of regulation, the argument seems rather weak to justify the 
harmonisation of tort law. It will be interesting, however, to apply the minimum quality argument to 
environmental liability. 
1.2.4.2. Minimum Level of Protection Through Centralisation of Liability for Environmental Damage 
As for the general case, the minimum level of protection justification for harmonisation addresses the 
concern to guarantee all citizens minimum environmental quality standards, which actually refers to 
harmonisation of regulation. Therefore, the minimum level of protection argument might in some 
circumstances justify the harmonisation of regulation, but again, it might be more difficult to justify the 
harmonisation of environmental liability rules. The question arises whether the harmonisation of liability 
rules would guarantee such minimum level of protection for environmental accidents and even if this 
might be the case, it must be examined whether total harmonisation would be necessary. 
Indeed, again, it might be more efficient to develop protection measures for certain rare habitats and 
minimum standards of environmental quality that must be achieved, before and after an accident, rather 
than to harmonise the liability rules itself in the different jurisdictions.345 Indeed, the type of liability rule 
might reflect differences in preferences of citizens and even with harmonisation, as was indicated above in 
the paragraph on reduction of transaction costs, this still might lead to different interpretations and 
treatment. 
Moreover, Bergkamp indicates that there exists a body of international law that deals with the 
protection of common natural resources, for example the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES).346 It might well be that this body of international law is insufficient, but additional treaties 
might be negotiated and enforcement possibilities might be improved, instead of the harmonisation of 
jurisdictions’ liability rules.347 
In sum, if the minimum level of protection argument would be accepted, it must be emphasised that 
the reason for harmonisation would not be based on economic efficiency, but on the desire to provide a 
minimum level of protection against environmental accidents. However, this argument would rather justify 
harmonisation of minimum standards of environmental quality that must be achieved, before and after an 
accident, instead of environmental liability rules. It is not claimed though that total harmonisation would be 
justified. Indeed, there might be other options than total harmonisation of environmental quality standards, 
like centralisation or coordination of minimum standards, but allowing states to go further, so that differing 
circumstances and preferences in different jurisdictions would be taken into account. Nevertheless, it is 
questionable why environmental quality standards should be harmonised, if a minimum level of protection 
of public health is not harmonised. 
For soil pollution in particular, the same reasoning can be followed. Starting from decentralisation, 
according to the Tiebout model, jurisdictions would be free to set their own clean-up standards and their 
own liability rules. If the minimum quality standards argument is accepted, then this minimum level of 
environmental quality could be realised through minimum quality standards that would have to be 
achieved after the clean-up of contaminated soil.348 Hence, this could justify the centralisation of minimum 
soil quality standards, but it would not be necessary to harmonise liability rules to achieve this basic 
environmental quality after clean-up. Each jurisdiction could organise this according to its preferences. 
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Moreover, again, there might be other options than total harmonisation of soil quality standards, like 
centralisation or coordination of minimum standards, but allowing states to go further, according to their 
needs and preferences. 
In sum, the minimum level of protection argument might justify in some circumstances the 
centralisation of regulation, by defining certain minimum quality standards, but not necessarily the 
harmonisation of environmental liability in general or specifically liability for soil pollution. 
1.3. Summary of the Public Interest Approach 
It merits now to recapitulate the results of the public interest approach on the optimal level of decision-
making for environmental liability rules, with the example of liability rules for soil pollution, and to 
formulate an intermediate conclusion. 
The public interest approach starts from decentralisation of regulatory policies and examines 
accordingly whether there might be reasons for federal intervention. This bottom-up approach towards 
centralisation is based upon the Tiebout model and the Decentralisation Theorem of Oates. 
The reasons for harmonisation were grouped into four main arguments: the transboundary character 
of an externality argument, the race-to-the-bottom argument, the market access argument and the 
minimum level of protection argument. 
The first argument for harmonisation was the transboundary character of an externality. The 
argument consisted of two strands. First, internalisation of transboundary externalities could be ensured by 
shifting powers to a higher governmental level. Second, economies of scale could be reached by a -certain 
level of – centralisation. 
It was argued that the transboundary externality argument does not justify centralisation and 
certainly no harmonisation of environmental liability rules to solve transboundary spillovers. Instead, in 
order to take local circumstances into account, centralised regulation for transboundary externalities only 
could be preferred. However, according to the economies of scale reasoning, it could be examined whether 
there are economies of scale and advantages of expertise that can be benefited from without having to give 
in on diversity. Hence, the transboundary externality argument would allow for a mixed system that would 
benefit from the merits/expertise of both governmental levels, but would not justify excessive centralisation 
or harmonisation. 
The example of soil pollution clarified this position: with respect to the local nature of soil pollution, 
full centralisation or harmonisation of liability rules for soil pollution would not be justifiable as it would 
not take diverse causes, circumstances and preferences into account. Therefore, federal regulation of 
liability rules for soil pollution preferably might not go further than a kind of transboundary — special 
areas only regime to remedy transboundary soil pollution. This might however be completed with 
centralisation of supporting scientific research and data analysis, as all states and citizens would benefit 
from it. 
The second argument for harmonisation was the risk of a race-to-the-bottom. The race-to-the-bottom 
rationale might be the most heavily debated economic argument to justify federal environmental liability 
regulation. Theoretical grounds as well as empirical evidence of the existence of a race-to-the-bottom in 
environmental regulation were analysed. 
It was concluded that theoretically, it seems doubtful that a race-to-the-bottom in environmental 
liability rules would occur. On the one hand, there are more important factors that influence industry 
location decisions than environmental liability regulation, and on the other hand, states would have no 
advantage of a lenient liability regime. Nevertheless, political pressure and the risk of a political drag 
should also not be ignored in the case of environmental liability regulation. 
There are no surveys that explicitly examine the influence of a liability regulation on industry location 
decisions. However, again, it seems doubtful that evidence would be found that environmental liability 
rules would play a significant role in attracting or repulsing industry to or from a certain state. 
Indeed, other factors may play a far more important role in industry location decisions like labour 
regulations, taxes and the availability of raw materials. Moreover, some evidence that multinational 
corporations might decide to apply even more stringent standards than local standards, either because of 
consumer pressure or to avoid potential liability, exists. Therefore, from the side of industry, even based on 
empirical evidence, it seems doubtful that industry, and certainly multinationals, will relocate because of 
lenient liability rules in other countries. 
The same reasoning might hold for liability for soil pollution. There is no evidence of relaxed 
regulation on the side of the governments in order to attract industry. However, it might be possible that 
state officials might believe or are under political pressure to believe that a stringent liability regime, like 
stringent liability rules for soil pollution, might repulse industry from locating in that state. Hence they 
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might fail to adopt stringent (soil) quality standards and a stringent liability regime or neglect the 
enforcement of this regime. Further research in this area could provide more information on governmental 
behaviour. The private interest part will hopefully shed a light on lobbying practices and the pressure that 
officials, competent for environmental liability, or liability rules for soil pollution, might face. 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that, for example in Europe, states would engage in a game in which they 
would strive for a low level of environmental liability and renounce on restoration claims in order to attract 
industry, and therefore, the argument would not justify full centralisation of environmental liability rules. 
Market access presented the third argument for the harmonisation of environmental liability rules. It 
is sometimes claimed that harmonisation of environmental regulation would be justified in order to ease 
the tensions created by the differences in the stringency of environmental regulations of various 
jurisdictions. The argument consisted of two strands, ‘harmonisation of marketing conditions’ and 
‘reduction of transaction costs through harmonisation of legal rules’. 
With respect to ‘harmonisation of marketing conditions’, it was concluded that although realising free 
trade could justify the harmonisation of elementary environmental product or process standards, to avoid 
incompatibilities which would create barriers to entry or distortions of competition, it is questionable that 
the realisation of free trade would justify the harmonisation of private law, such as environmental liability 
rules. Indeed, it is certainly possible to realise free trade without the total harmonisation of all legal rules. 
Moreover, equal marketing conditions would not necessarily be achieved through the harmonisation of 
(environmental) liability rules. Indeed, harmonisation of liability rules would not create a level playing 
field, as differences in the availability of natural resources or labour standards still would create variations 
in marketing conditions. Moreover, if countries would prefer liability rules to target environmental-
unfriendly products, instead of using regulatory restrictions (which might be under WTO restrictions), this 
would not hamper free trade, on the contrary, it would have a significant advantage. Indeed, the use of 
liability rules would prevent disguised protectionism, as a causal link between the environmental harm and 
the product concerned still must be proven. Hence, it seems doubtful that environmental liability rules 
would act as a trade barrier or cause competitiveness concerns and that a total harmonisation to ensure 
market access and fair marketing conditions would be necessary. Countries could set their liability rules 
according to their preferences, and still guarantee market access, whereby disguised protectionism might be 
prevented. The same reasoning would hold for soil pollution. 
The second strand of the market access argument, the ‘reduction of transaction costs through 
harmonisation of legal rules’ reasoning, concentrated on the concern that differences in legal rules might 
cause high transaction costs and hence that this equally might hamper market access. The reduction in 
transaction costs through harmonisation would improve market access. 
It was concluded that the assumption that a harmonised legal system will always be more efficient 
than decentralisation, due to transaction costs savings and legal certainty, might be somewhat precipitate. 
Increased legal certainty and a reduction in transaction costs, through harmonisation of environmental 
liability, are not easy to realise. Indeed, most developed countries have certain provisions to deal with 
environmental damage. Moreover, environmental damage might be very diverse, and one single pollution 
case might cause different types of damage. The consequences of harmonisation must therefore be very 
carefully examined. There indeed might be a risk of increased legal complexity, if different rules, on federal 
and state level, would apply to various types of environmental damage, caused by a single pollution case. 
Increased legal uncertainty would obviously hamper the reduction in transaction cost. In addition to this 
problem, environmental protection might have deep roots in a jurisdiction’s culture and hence in its legal 
rules. Therefore, the cost of harmonisation of environmental liability rules might be high and the 
transaction costs savings might be less than expected. 
These findings can be further refined to liability for soil pollution. Soil pollution and clean up 
requirements of contaminated soil might be locality specific and dependant on the physical and 
geographical characteristics of the region. Combined with the facts that environmental protection might be 
rooted in a jurisdiction’s culture and that it might be doubtful that differences in the stringency of liability 
rules for soil pollution would significantly hamper market access, total harmonisation of liability rules for 
soil pollution does not seem desirable either. Indeed, it might be questionable whether the eventual 
transaction costs savings of harmonisation would outweigh the benefits of differentiated legal rules. 
Therefore, it might seem wiser to try to harmonise some general principles concerning environmental 
liability, combined with local determination of for example, the specific content of a due care standard, 
rather than a total harmonisation of liability for soil pollution. 
In sum, the market access argument would not justify a total harmonisation of environmental liability 
rules. Nevertheless, centrally defined principles might ensure market access and free trade and reduce 
transactions costs. A co-operative approach could be adopted, with central minimum requirements of 
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protection, but allowing regions to implement the standards or to adopt more stringent measures in 
accordance with the objectives of free trade and competition, and conform to the citizen’s preferences. 
The final argument, harmonisation in order to guarantee a minimum level of protection, falls beyond 
the pure economic arguments for harmonisation of liability rules. Some authors stay within the economic 
reasoning and argue that harmonisation would be justified in order to guarantee a minimum level of 
protection as unacceptably low environmental standards in a certain jurisdiction could present negative 
psychic externalities to citizens in other jurisdictions. Other authors consider environmental protection as a 
human right, freed from economic justification. 
It was argued that if the minimum level of protection argument would be accepted, it must be 
emphasised that the reason for harmonisation would not be economic efficiency, but the desire to provide a 
minimum level of protection against environmental accidents. Furthermore, if citizens’ preferences are not 
homogeneous, harmonisation might amount to paternalism. Yet, even if the existence of psychic 
externalities would be accepted or the need to protect human rights, the minimum level of protection 
justification for harmonisation addresses the concern to guarantee all citizens minimum quality standards, 
which refers to harmonisation of regulation. Therefore, the minimum level of protection argument would 
rather justify harmonisation of minimum standards of environmental quality that must be achieved, before 
and after an accident, instead of environmental liability rules. However, it is not claimed that total 
harmonisation of standards would be justified. Indeed, there might be other options than total 
harmonisation of environmental quality standards, like centralisation or coordination of minimum 
standards, allowing states to go further, so that differing circumstances and preferences in different 
jurisdictions would be taken into account. Nevertheless, it is questionable why environmental quality 
standards should be harmonised, if a minimum level of protection of public health is not harmonised. 
For soil pollution in particular, the same reasoning can be followed. A minimum level of 
environmental quality could be ensured through minimum quality standards that would have to be 
achieved after the clean-up of contaminated soil. Hence, this could justify the centralisation of minimum 
soil quality standards, but it would not be necessary to harmonise liability rules to achieve this basic 
environmental quality after clean-up. Each jurisdiction could organise this according to its preferences. 
Moreover, again, there might be other options than total harmonisation of soil quality standards, like 
centralisation or coordination of minimum standards, but allowing states to go further, according to their 
needs and preferences. 
In short, the minimum level of protection argument might justify in some circumstances the 
centralisation of regulation, by defining certain minimum quality standards, but not necessarily the 
harmonisation of environmental liability in general or specifically liability for soil pollution. 
Hence, the intermediate conclusion from the public interest approach is: none of the arguments would 
justify a total harmonisation of environmental liability rules. Yet, there might be a supportive role for the 
federal government in the provision of information and scientific research. Besides that, a federal 
government might develop solutions for transboundary damage or for special conservation area’s. 
Furthermore, general principles of tort law to protect the environment could be defined centrally, or a 
specific liability rule for certain activities could be set centrally, combined with a differentiation of the 
specific contents of this rule. In such circumstances, transaction costs might be lowered, market access 
might be promoted, a minimum level of protection could be guaranteed and still differing preferences 
could be respected. 
The same reasoning holds for liability rules for soil pollution. Perhaps the strongest argument for 
decentralisation of liability rules for soil pollution is that local conditions, geography, economic strengths 
and concerns might vary substantially from place to place. Furthermore, local knowledge and expertise 
with specific soil conditions might prove essential to develop the proper liability rules for soil reclamation. 
Therefore, certainly in the specific case of soil pollution, a one-size-fits-all approach probably might fit 
nobody. 
Hence, based on a public interest approach, an argument could be made for a multi-level regulatory 
structure. The main power of decision-making would be with the local authorities, whereby the federal 
government could provide a supporting framework of data gathering and technical information provision. 
Moreover, the federal government could provide a solution for transboundary damage and natural 
conservation area’s and could define general principles to protect the environment. 
2. Private Interest Approach on the Optimal Decision-making Level of Liability for 
Environmental Damage 
The existence or the harmonisation of certain environmental regulations cannot always be explained on the 
basis of the public interest approach. For a full understanding of environmental policy, the influence of 
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lobbying of different interest groups in the law making process must be recognised.349 Indeed, 
environmental rules may have significant economic consequences. The costs of environmental regulations 
are generally more concentrated and borne by industries than the benefits, that are difficult to monetise and 
that accrue to the general public.350 Firms might therefore try to influence the law- making process to their 
advantage. Moreover, it would be naive to presume that legislators who enact environmental laws are 
exclusively concerned to protect the public interest. In reality, also environmental politics has a lot to do 
with the pursuit of power, privilege, and special interests. It should not be surprising that sometimes 
environmental regulations are designed to serve narrow political and economic interests, instead of the 
public interest.351 
Hence, when developing a framework for decision-making upon the optimal level of liability rules for 
environmental damage in a federal system, rent seeking behaviour and lobbying of different interest 
groups in the environmental law making process should not be ignored. The public interest approach will 
therefore have to be complemented with a so-called private interest approach. This approach applies 
economic models to political decision-making and tries to take rent seeking into account in the law making 
process. The contribution of this approach is that it throws light upon the conditions under which 
(environmental) laws are made and that it allows to explain inefficiencies in regulation. 
This chapter will first present a brief overview of the theories that examine the influence of lobbying 
on the law making process: Capture Theory, the Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Choice Theory. 
Moreover, the various stakes of industry and environmentalists, the main lobby groups in the 
environmental law making process, will be discussed. In a second step, the results will be applied to 
environmental federalism. Lobbying might take place at all levels of decision-making. Indeed, lobbying 
might not only concern the contents of the regulation, but also at what level of government the regulation 
will be issued. Interest groups, having a stake in a certain area of regulation, might prefer that level of 
government at which their strength is greatest in comparison to other interest groups with different 
concerns in the same area.352 Therefore, the influence of interest groups on the level of environmental 
decision-making will be discussed. The relative influence of the interest groups at different levels of 
government will be studied and links will be shown to the public interest approach. Finally, the potential 
influence of lobbying for environmental liability rules, and for example for liability for soil pollution, will 
be examined in order to refine the theory on the optimal decision-making level for environmental liability 
rules. Again centralisation and decentralisation arguments for liability for enviromental damage, illustrated 
by soil pollution, will be weighted against each other, this time based on the private interest approach. 
2.1. Theories of Regulation 
2.1.1. Theories 
A primary motivation for the development of theories that explicitly examine rent seeking behaviour in the 
law making process has been the observed divergence of actual environmental policy from the efficient 
policy suggested by economic theory.353 Indeed, lobbying by interest groups in the political arena might 
influence the final design of the regulation.354 As environmental measures might impose significant costs on 
polluting firms, environmental decision-making might be very susceptible to special interest distortions. 
This paragraph will briefly introduce the main theories on lobbying in the regulatory process. 
Successively Capture Theory, the Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Choice Theory will be 
discussed. In a second stage, attention will go to the various stakes of the main lobby groups in 
environmental regulation. 
2.1.1.1. Capture Theory 
The ‘Capture Theory’, that tries to explain the influence of interest groups in the law-making process, is 
developed by political scientists. Recognition of the existence of interest groups and the idea of ‘capturing’ 
can already be found in the work of Bentley in 1908 or of Truman in 1951.355 Yet, attention grew in the 
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1960’s. The starting point of the ‘Capture Theory’ is that regulatory agencies can be ‘captured’, meaning 
influenced or bribed, by the industry that has to be regulated. This ‘capturing’ is possible as the regulator is 
dependent on the industry that has to be regulated, for information on the best available techniques in 
order to set regulatory standards. The regulator might even have to recruit officials of that industry to work 
out these regulatory standards.356 For environmental regulation for example, the polluting industry will be 
best informed about technology and the best available techniques. Such a situation of asymmetric 
information might open possibilities for strategic behaviour by industry.357 In such circumstances, the 
legislator, who should pursue the public interest, might be captured by the industry that has to be regulated 
and that aims to protect its own interests. 
Yet, the Capture Theory lacked theoretical foundations. What was needed was a general theory which 
could explain how lobbying would influence the law making process. 
2.1.1.2. Economic Theory of Regulation 
In 1971, Stigler developed a positive Theory of Economic Regulation.358 This theory also became known as 
the Chicago theory of regulation. According to Stigler, the existence and the scope of regulation can be 
predicted as a response by politicians to the demands of — primarily — industry lobby groups. Hence, 
Stigler’s central proposition is that it is the industry itself that asks for regulation.359 Stigler’s theory holds 
that every branch of industry, which is powerful enough to do so, will lobby for regulatory measures that 
restrict entry, like tariffs, or reduce output, like licences. These measures can reduce competition, create 
cartel-like situations and increase industry profits so that the industry branch would get a comparative 
advantage. The demand for regulation will be high when the restrictions to competition cannot be obtained 
by the interest groups themselves, for example by the creation of a cartel.360 Falling within the Chicago 
school of reasoning, Stigler’s theory predicts that the outcome of the regulatory process would be 
economically efficient.361 Stigler’s theory was formalised and extended by Peltzman.362 Peltzman indicates 
that not only well organised industry groups can be expected to lobby, but that other interest groups and 
voters will try to influence the decision-making process as well. Politicians will then distribute favours and 
disfavours among these interest groups in order to maximise their chances of re-election.363 
A further contribution to the Chicago theory of regulation was made by Becker, who concentrated on 
the competition between interest groups. In 1983, Becker developed a model of competition among interest 
groups for political influence like taxes, subsidies or protective regulation, and combined public and private 
interest considerations.364 Becker assumes that politicians carry out the political allocations resulting from 
the competition among various pressure groups. The political equilibrium then depends on the capability 
of each pressure group in producing pressure on the government.365 The model shows that correcting 
market failures by the government would not necessarily be prevented by the involvement of interest 
groups. Indeed, according to Becker, it is not the existence of well-organised pressure groups that may be 
harmful to the economy, but the unequal distribution of political power across these groups.366 Hence, 
Becker unifies the view that governments correct market failure with the finding that governments may 
also favour certain interest groups.367 
Yet, the Economic Theory of Regulation has been criticised. The Chicago Theory of Regulation seems 
primarily suited to explain economic regulation but the theory cannot provide a conclusive explanation for 
a large array of social regulations. Indeed, some measures, like environmental measures for example, might 
impose huge costs on the sources of pollution, which is the polluting industry. Therefore, it seems one-
sided that primarily industry would ask for regulatory measures.368 Moreover, the Chicago Theory of 
Regulation does not pay attention to the motivation and behaviour of the government itself in the 
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regulatory process. The Chicago Theory of Regulation finally is criticised by Public Choice scholars for its 
assumption that the outcome of the regulatory process would be economically efficient.369 
2.1.1.3. Public Choice Theory 
Public choice theory attempts to offer an understanding of the complex interactions between the different 
actors in the law making process. A seminal contribution to the public choice literature came from 
Buchanan and Tullock in 1962.370 Buchanan and Tullock posit that individual behaviour in the political 
arena basically is the same as in the market: individuals are rational, pursue their private interests and try 
to maximise utility.371 Citizens, on the one hand, will use their voting-power to obtain the maximum benefit 
for themselves from the collective decision-making process. Politicians, on the other hand, are willing to 
supply legislative benefits to voters, either individuals or groups, to obtain their votes in order to maximise 
their changes for re-election or to gain power. Indeed, Buchanan indicates that the government should not 
be understood as a benevolent despot that tries to maximise public welfare, but as an agent that seeks to 
increase its spending and power, by, for example, higher taxes. This is also called the Leviathan hypothesis 
of government. Buchanan argues that decentralisation could prevent that a government would behave as a 
Leviathan.372 
Unlike the Chicago Theory of Regulation it is not assumed that the outcome of the regulatory process 
would be economically efficient.373 Indeed, public choice theorists argue that special interest groups might 
have such powerful influence on the legislative process that general preferences might be overridden.374 An 
explanation for the domination of special interest groups on the legislative outcome is the idea of the 
ignorant voter.375 This notion can be explained as follows: special interest groups can receive large 
concentrated benefits through lobbying. This lobbying is commonly referred to as rent seeking 
behaviour.376 Rent seeking by industry lobby groups for example could consists of pursuing government 
intervention that would provide a comparative advantage to these particular industries. The cost for society 
of such regulation, however, will be spread over many individual taxpayers. Moreover, the number of 
individual voters is so great that nobody would expect his marginal vote to have an impact on politics. If all 
individuals would inform themselves critically about legislative proposals, this might result in decisions 
that would better serve the public interest and prevent redistribution to special interest groups. However, 
on an individual basis, this effort does not pay. Indeed, a citizen only receives a small share of the gain from 
more efficient regulations. Consequently, special interest groups may organise and lobby without explicit 
reaction from the general public that pays and regulatory policies may sometimes be the result of interest 
group manipulation rather than honest consideration of the public interest.377 
Two broad types of lobby groups can be distinguished: groups representing a sectional interest, like 
producer associations, and groups that are zealous for a certain cause, like environmentalists.378 In a now 
famous study, Olson examined what features made a group more or less effective in the political arena. 
Olson’s study draws two important conclusions. First, it is easier to form an effective lobby group from a 
smaller, rather than a larger group of members. Although larger groups have an advantage in size, they 
might be more subject to free-riding. Second, the effectiveness of a lobby group depends on the 
homogeneity of the common interests of the group. Hence, the lobby group will be most effective if the 
group is small, single-oriented and well-organised.379 Olson’s theory might explain why certain interest 
groups, like industry representations, which constitute relatively small and homogeneous groups, are able 
to organise and represent their interests more effectively than larger and more diffuse groups, like 
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consumers or environmental lobby groups.380 Concluding, inefficient regulations might emerge as a result 
of incomplete representation through interest groups in the political decision-making process.381 
There is no reason to assume that environmental regulations would be immune from rent seeking. In 
fact, as they might have significant economic consequences, environmental regulations will be conducive to 
rent seeking.382 Maloney and McCormick were the first to examine rent seeking behaviour in the 
environmental law making process. They argue that producers and victims of pollution may find it in their 
self-interest to form coalitions and to lobby for input restrictions or output reductions.383 Recent work by 
Aidt even indicates that lobbying might lead to political equilibria that are economically efficient. As 
different lobby groups give voice to different aspects of environmental policy, it can be ensured that all 
aspects are considered in the political debate and reflected in the environmental policy. If all members of 
society have their interests represented by a lobby group and if interest groups faithfully represent the 
interests of their members, then the political equilibrium might be socially efficient, leading to a complete 
political internalisation of the externality. The lobby groups will induce the government both to select the 
efficient level of externality-generating activities and the efficient regulatory instruments. The 
internalisation will be incomplete if some citizens do not organise lobby groups. Referring to Olson’s 
theory, some groups cannot overcome the free-rider problem; some groups have much lower organisational 
costs or are much more effective in providing selective benefits than others.384 Hence, the outcome of the 
interplay of diverse interest groups in the political arena need not be inherently distortionary, yet fully 
efficient outcomes might be rare.385 
In short, the private interest approach, based on the three theories described above, focuses on the 
way in which (environmental) regulation is affected by the lobbying of interest groups. There is no doubt 
that many environmental statutes and regulations have been enacted to protect the public’s well-being. 
However, it must also be clear that environmental policy is not immune to special interest pressures. Due to 
the cost and complexity of environmental rules, environmental policy might be very sensitive to rent 
seeking. Rent seeking in environmental policy is not new, and it is not likely to go away. As long as 
environmental regulations might reallocate a huge amount of money from one set of interests to another, 
those interests will ensure to have their say. Yet, the fact that environmental policy measures may be 
influenced by interest groups does not mean they never achieve environmental goals. Many environmental 
policy decisions are a mixture of benefits to interest groups and general social welfare maximisation. 
Indeed, environmental policies, influenced by the push and pull of various interests, may vary from wealth 
transfers to measures that are sensible responses to environmental concerns.386 
Which theory – the Chicago theory of regulation arguing that the demand for regulation primarily 
comes from industry and that the law making process might be efficient, or the public choice theory which 
points to the behaviour of the government itself in the regulatory process, eventually being a Leviathan – 
best reflects the situation in the European Union with respect to environmental regulation, and in particular 
to environmental liability, will be studied in Chapter 6, which deals with the Environmental Liability 
Directive. 
Rent seeking might influence the instrument choice to remedy environmental damage (permits, 
subsidies or regulation), the environmental quality standards that must be achieved, or the level at which 
regulation is set (centralisation or decentralisation). The next paragraph will present the main actors 
involved in the environmental law making process — government, industry and environmentalists — and 
will elaborate their attitude towards rent seeking and their various stakes in the lobbying process with 
respect to instrument choice and the level of environmental quality. Paragraph 2.2 then turns to 
environmental federalism and the influence of rent seeking on the level at which regulation is set. 
2.1.2. Rent-seeking Behaviour in Environmental Regulation 
There is an abundance of literature that tries to provide theoretical and empirical support for rent seeking in 
the case of environmental regulation.387 For instance, attention has been paid to the way in which interest 
groups might try to influence the instrument choice for environmental policy to their advantage. Three 
instrument options mostly are considered relevant in the literature: traditional command and control 
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regulation, emission taxes on all emitted units or a grandfathered permit market, in which polluters can 
obtain their initial distribution of permits free of charge or by auction.388 Research has shown that 
command-and-control instruments can, in quite realistic circumstances, be more beneficial to certain 
important interest groups than incentive-based policy measures.389 In their seminal article of 1975, 
Buchanan and Tullock already indicated that economic rather than environmental considerations could 
determine the choice of policy instruments and that standards might be preferred over taxes.390 Using this 
basic framework, several authors have examined the effects of lobbying on the choice of environmental 
policy instruments.391 
Interest groups might also try to influence the level of environmental quality that must be achieved. 
Yet, the lobbying behaviour of the main actors involved in environmental regulation might not always be 
straightforward. As will be discussed below, industry does not always oppose stringent regulation, nor can 
it be assumed that support for more stringent regulations comes primarily from those who have honest 
consideration of the public interest.392 
The main actors in environmental regulation are the government, the polluting industry and 
environmental groups.393 This paragraph will try to provide an answer on the following questions: how will 
the main actors lobby, what are their interests, and in what way can they be expected to influence 
environmental regulation? Although the behaviour of the different actors is studied separately, in reality 
the actors may react on each other and co-operate. 
2.1.2.1. Government 
Lobbying by interest groups affects the final design of the environmental policy and the resulting economic 
outcome. The politicians, representing the government, cannot just pursue the economic interests of the 
majority, aiming to be re-elected. In order to achieve political acceptability and avoid conflict, politicians 
must mediate among the main organised interests and balance public interest and private interest 
considerations.394 
As far as the instrument choice, or the kind of environmental regulation to achieve the environmental 
goal, is concerned, also politicians may have their own interests in choosing a particular instrument. 
Indeed, the final policy might depend on the particular subject, but one can assume that politicians would 
choose that policy instrument that would maximise state revenue and hence power. Moreover, for re-
election purposes, politicians might choose that policy of which the benefits are more visible than the 
costs.395 
With respect to the stringency of regulation (or simply the fact that a regulation is issued), sometimes, 
the motivation for a certain environmental regulation is the political ambition to provide some action in 
response to an accident. The demand for regulation might in such case not be initiated by a well-defined 
interest group. In case of an accident, a so-called shadow interest group might come into existence. 
Potential victims of an accident that caused environmental harm might be such a shadow interest group.396 
As such groups might become an effective lobby group, rational politicians, who wish to be re-elected, 
might under certain circumstances respond to those groups. 
2.1.2.2. Industry 
Several analyses examined the implications of different policy instruments on the welfare of industry and 
generated a number of insights into just why a certain policy might be adopted instead of what economic 
theory and the public interest approach would expect. From these analyses, it appears that industry would 
prefer direct regulation. Buchanan and Tullock (1975) showed that emission standards (or more precisely 
quotas on polluting outputs) would generally be preferred to effluent taxes by firms themselves, as these 
measures effectively may limit entry.397 Indeed, environmental regulations may produce a cartel-type 
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outcome with increased profits for the industry, if new firms cannot easily comply with the standards. 
Dewees398 confirmed and extended the findings of Buchanan and Tullock. He showed that industrial 
interest groups would prefer systems of marketable emissions to effluent standards if the permits were 
distributed free of charge to existing sources. Leidy and Hoekman,399 who treat the issue in the context of an 
open economy, find further reasons for various interest groups to prefer direct regulation to emission taxes. 
In summary, industry would be expected to oppose a tax because a tax raises production costs for capital-
intensive firms and does not create barriers to entry.400 
With respect to industry’s lobbying strategy, more technically advanced firms of an industry might 
argue that the ‘best available technique’ should be employed, in order to have a competitive advantage over 
competitors. Environmental measures that prescribe more stringent standards for the new than for existing 
plants (as is often the case since retrofitting can be expensive) may be welcomed by industry lobby groups 
as a new barrier to entry into the polluting industry. In the literature, this has been defined as ‘predatory 
regulation’.401 It must be noted that in these circumstances, industry might have an ally in environmental 
lobby groups. 
If the motivation for a certain environmental regulation is the political ambition to provide some 
action in response to an accident as discussed above, then industry, realising that environmental regulation 
can not be avoided, might try to co-operate and try to change the contents of the regulation to its 
advantage.402 An example might be a grandfather clause, which stipulates that the regulation will not be 
applicable to firms that are already in existence. In such a way, regulation might introduce a barrier to entry 
and protect existing industry. Industry will oppose a tax, as it does not create barriers to entry. 
With respect to the stringency of regulation, a common presumption is that industry will always try to 
lobby for lenient regulation. However, lobbying activities of industry might go into various directions. 
Sometimes industry might lobby for lenient standards; sometimes stringent regulation will be favoured. In 
general, rent seeking by industry consists of pursuing governmental intervention that would provide a 
comparative advantage to that particular industry. Various regulatory measures that create a barrier to 
entry or reduce output like tariffs and licences often reduce competition, create cartels, increase industry 
profits and would provide such a comparative advantage.403 
In sum, industry will not necessarily lobby for lenient regulation; it will strive for that policy that 
provides the industry with a comparative advantage. Dependent on the situation, this might be lenient 
regulation, but also stringent standards, in case of predatory regulation or a grandfather clause. 
2.1.2.3. Environmental Groups 
The environmental policy traditionally preferred by environmental groups has been command and control 
regulation.404 Environmental organisations look unfavourably on certain incentive-based instruments. 
Many environmentalists object to such instruments on philosophical grounds, as policies like pollution 
taxes or systems of tradable emission permits would provide firms with a licence to pollute and therefore 
these policies are considered to be immoral and unacceptable. Environmental organisations must also be 
careful not to alienate their members by supporting such policy measures. Moreover, environmental groups 
may have serious doubts about such policy instruments in practice. If the government sets too low a tax 
rate, then the environmental objective will not be realised. Furthermore, it may not be an easy matter to 
raise tax rates when needed. Furthermore, from an environmentalist’s perspective, a policy instrument that 
explicitly limits levels of polluting activities might more reliably achieve environmental goals than a price 
instrument, like a tax, the response to which is uncertain.405 Finally, as Hahn indicates, environmental 
groups may be more concerned with symbols, such as forced scrubbing, than actual environmental 
outcomes. Environmentalists may want a high symbolic value for environmental quality for several 
reasons. First, it may signify a long-term commitment if a government sets standards either at the limits of 
technological feasibility or beyond the realm of what is currently feasible. Another explanation is that 
symbols might help to influence the preference structure and values of individuals. Thus, environmentalists 
may want future generations to grow up with an environmental ethic.406 
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As far as the quality of regulation is concerned, it is clear that environmentalists lobby for 
environmental quality improvement. Therefore, environmental groups try to maximise membership in 
order to achieve lobbying power for environmental improvement. Yet, free riding is rational, as no 
individual can be excluded from the benefit of good environmental quality.407 From this perspective, the 
extent to which environmental groups have mobilised their members so efficiently is surprising. According 
to Olson’s theory, environmental groups represent a large-group case, where it would be difficult to 
organise. But in seeming contradiction to the prediction of the theory, environmental groups have proved 
to be a very powerful force in the policy arena.408 To explain why this membership exists, reasons other 
than economic ones must be taken into account like morality, friendship, and social objectives or significant 
support from foundations.409 
In sum, to argue that environmental laws would only serve private interests would be equally too 
one-sided as to argue that environmental regulation only serves the public well-being. Indeed, many 
environmental statutes are enacted in an attempt to protect public interests.410 Nevertheless, it must be 
admitted that environmental regulations may be very conducive to rent seeking. 
Indeed, in the environmental context, both regulated firms and `public interest’ representatives have 
strong incentives for rent-seeking, as they both might gain from reductions in output and the creation of 
barriers to entry. Indeed, regulated firms and public interest groups may not always agree on the design of 
specific regulatory programs, they often share a common interest.411 Interests of industry and the 
environmentalists may coincide, for example, in the case of predatory regulation.412 Therefore, one should 
not be surprised that economic interests lobby, and make alliances with `public interest’ organisations to 
ensure favourable treatment for their own interests.413 
It merits now examining how rent seeking might influence the level at which regulation is set. 
2.2. Environmental Federalism 
2.2.1. Reasons for Centralisation, Based on Private Interest Distortions 
Lobbying might not only concern the contents of the regulation, but also the question at what level of 
government the regulation will be issued. Interest groups, having a stake in a certain area of regulation, 
might prefer that level of government to issue a regulation at which their strength is greatest in comparison 
to other interest groups with different concerns in the same area.414 Interest groups might therefore lobby to 
ensure that a certain regulation is issued at a particular level of government. Hence, sometimes, public 
choice theory might explain why certain regulations are decided at the central level and why regulations 
are harmonised, in contrast to what would be efficient according to economic theory.415 This paragraph will 
discuss the influence of interest groups on the level of environmental decision-making. 
With respect to environmental regulation, there are three frequently advanced private interest 
distortions, which might influence the level of decision-making for environmental policy. First, private 
interest distortions might cause that certain interests are systematically underrepresented at a particular 
decision-making level. Moreover, two arguments that were dealt with in the public interest approach are 
also prominent in the private interest debate: states might engage in a race-to-the-bottom due to interest 
group lobbying and the harmonisation of marketing conditions might be incited by interest groups. This 
paragraph will examine whether these claims give rise to a preference for environmental regulation at local 
or central level. 
The three claims will be examined successively. First, attention will go to the relative strength of 
interest groups at different governmental levels. It is frequently advanced that environmental groups are 
underrepresented at the local level relative to business interests due to public choice distortions. On this 
ground it is often argued that responsibility for environmental regulation should be assigned to the central 
level.416 It will be examined whether such distortion indeed exists, and whether it would justify centralised 
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environmental regulation. Second, it will be examined whether the risk of a race-to-the-bottom due to 
lobbying would justify centralised environmental decision-making and third it will be studied whether the 
argument that harmonisation of marketing conditions might be incited by interest groups claims gives rise 
to a preference for regulation at central level. 
The examination of these private interest distortions might help to explain why certain regulations are 
decided at the central level and why regulations are harmonised, in contrast to what would be efficient 
according to economic theory. In such way, the private interest approach aims to contribute to the theory 
on the optimal decision-making level for environmental liability rules. 
2.2.1.1. Relative Strength of Interest Groups at Different Governmental Levels 
Advocates of centralised regulation frequently claim that the decision-making process would be 
systematically more distorted at local level than at the central level. The justifications for this claim rest 
upon both the public attention for environmental matters and the interest group structure at respectively 
local and central level. According to Esty, the public indifference with respect to many state and local 
environmental decisions, as well as greater media attention to central level activities might lead to more 
private interest distortion at state and local levels than at the central level. Moreover, Esty expects that at 
central level lobbying excesses of a certain interest group would be opposed by countervailing interest 
groups. In contrast, Esty assumes that state and local environmental policy manipulation would be more 
disguised, due to the difference in the interest group structure at local level. Industry groups, that favour 
less stringent regulation, tend to be small and cohesive at the local level, and therefore can induce states to 
adopt lenient environmental standards, whereas the citizens, who support more stringent regulations, are a 
larger and more diffuse group. As a result of economies of scale in organisation, advocates of centralised 
regulation argue that environmental groups would be less disadvantaged at the central level than at the 
local level, where they would be underrepresented relative to business interests. Therefore, the interest 
group structure of environmentalists and industry pressure groups at respectively state and central level 
would suggest that centralised decision-making would provide a more balanced playing field for 
conflicting interests. Hence, this would suggest that responsibility for environmental regulation should be 
assigned to the central level.417 
Yet, as Revesz indicates, there are several reasons to be sceptical about the soundness of this claim.418 
Indeed, Olson’s theory of collective action showed that large groups generally perform less efficiently than 
smaller groups. Moreover, the larger the group, the more difficult it might be to overcome the free-riding 
problem.419 Thus, acting at the central level might even magnify the free-rider problems that environmental 
groups face. It can therefore not be guaranteed that these organisational problems for environmental 
interest groups would be less serious at the central level.420 Indeed, Olson’s theory of collective action does 
not predict greater lobbying power of environmental groups at the central level than at the local level. 
Moreover, as Revesz rightly indicates, the question is not only whether environmental groups would 
be more effective at the local or central level, but also and more importantly, how the effectiveness of 
environmental groups at both levels relates to the effectiveness of other interest groups with different 
concerns in the same area, which in most circumstances will be the industry lobby groups. Indeed, for 
many environmental problems, firms with international operations, like the automobile industry, will 
comprise an important portion of the industry that will be affected by an environmental regulation. Yet, 
such firms will not be hampered by any additional free-rider problems or any reduction in the homogeneity 
of their interests when participating in the policymaking process at the central level. For environmental 
groups, on the contrary, the national aggregation of environmental interests might result in the loss of 
homogeneity of interests. Indeed, at local level, some environmental groups might care in particular about 
air quality, whereas in other states other environmental problems are much more important. This might 
complicate organisational problems, even if there would be economies of scale at the central level.421 The 
cost of organisation indeed increases as regional and national diversity of interests have to be overcome. 
Based on these findings, Ogus argues that the further removed the lobbying arena is from local activists, the 
greater the relative power will be of sectional interests over ideological interests. This would mean that the 
relative power of industry interest groups would be greater at central level than the power of 
environmental lobby groups at central level. Based on this reasoning, one might even expect that 
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centralised environmental regulation would tend to meet powerful and well-organised industry lobby 
groups, instead of environmental concerns.422 
Hence, contrary to the assertions of central environmental regulation advocates, the above reasoning 
might indicate that environmental groups would not necessarily be more powerful at the central level than 
at the state level. 
Concluding, lobbying of both environmental interest groups and of industry interest groups will take 
place at the central as well as at the local level. Furthermore, it can not be guaranteed that environmental 
lobby groups are more powerful at the central level than at local level. In some circumstances it might be 
the opposite. Hence, the claim that the environmental decision-making process would be systematically 
more distorted at local level than at the central level and therefore would justify centralised environmental 
regulation is precipitate. A case by case examination will be necessary to determine the relative strength of 
all interest groups involved at different governmental levels, the possible lobby attitudes and the eventual 
outcome at the different levels. Only then, a reasoned decision can be made on the optimal decision-making 
level for a particular environmental regulation. Moreover, if both levels would yield equivalent 
environmental policy, a decentralised environmental policy may be preferable if there is significant 
heterogeneity of the effects of pollution across jurisdictions. A decentralised policy could then be closer to 
the preferences and needs of the jurisdictions. 
2.2.1.2. Race-to-the-bottom Due to Interest Group Lobbying 
Besides the claim that the environmental decision-making process would be systematically more distorted 
at state or local levels than at the central level due to lobbying, it is often argued that the risk of a race-to-
the-bottom in environmental standards between states, caused by lobbying at state level, would justify 
centralised environmental decision-making. 
The race-to-the-bottom argument has already been studied when dealing with the public interest 
approach. This paragraph will look upon the argument from the private interest approach and will examine 
whether the lobbying activities at the local level would justify centralised environmental regulation. The 
frequently advanced reasoning is that uniform centralised rules would avoid the economic competition 
between jurisdictions that might induce these jurisdictions to set excessively lax environmental standards in 
order to attract industry. It must be admitted that environmental regulations affect competition and 
therefore attract significant attention from powerful economic interest groups such as oil, chemical and 
labour lobbies. On the other hand, the consequences of environmental regulation also attract significant 
interest from non-economic interest groups like environmentalists.423 Lobbying activities at local level can 
therefore not be ignored, but whether such lobbying justifies centralised environmental regulation still has 
to be examined. 
There has emerged a large theoretical and empirical literature that explores interjurisdictional 
competition, its welfare implications and the existence of a race-to-the-bottom. This literature has been 
discussed in the public interest approach. Models of interjurisdictional competition, like the Oates and 
Schwab model,424 show that economic competition among governments might encourage good 
environmental decisions. Yet, relaxation of the assumptions of these models showed that there are also 
circumstances where things can go awry. Game-theoretic models that explore the distortions that 
competition can generate have been discussed as well. Yet, overall, it was concluded that there is little 
systematic evidence of any race-to-the-bottom. Although there is no doubt that industry will lobby and that 
governments actively engage in various forms of economic competition, this does not address the issue. 
Such competition may encourage good public decisions. The important issue is how large the kinds of 
distortions due to lobbying and strategic behaviour are. If they represent only small deviations from 
efficient outcomes, they may not be harmful. Thus, the fact that local governments introduce policy 
measures and act strategically to influence industrial location does not prove that there will be a race-to-the-
bottom and neither that this competition would justify centralised environmental regulation.425 
If there were distorting lobbying, eventually justifying centralised environmental regulation, then one 
might expect that state governments should exhibit less concern about environmental problems than does 
the central government and consequently that decentralisation of environmental policies might lead to a 
deterioration of environmental quality at state level. Moreover, there would be few examples in which 
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decentralised jurisdictions would introduce environmental measures that are more stringent than the 
standards that are determined at the central level. 
Based on studies conducted in the United States, it appears however that decentralisation did not lead 
to worse environmental policies. Moreover, various states have introduced regulations, for example 
automobile emission standards, hazardous waste regulation or municipal solid waste regulation that go 
beyond federal government requirements.426 
Many states adopted innovative forms of regulation and imposing costs on in-state firms, also in areas 
that were not federal compelled. Of course the mere existence of state environmental statutes is not 
necessarily evidence of state environmental concern because the statutes may be symbolic and not enforced. 
However, the fact that states are adopting environmental programmes that are not federally compelled, and 
that impose costs on in-state firms, contradicts the simplistic argument for central intervention that the local 
level would be more affected by private interest distortions than the central legislative process.427 
It must also be admitted that not every state is as active in environmental regulation. Some states 
might take a clear lead in certain environmental regulatory fields, citizens of other states may prefer more 
lax standards than the central government requires and therefore have no reason to adopt additional 
environmental programmes. These different responses might be explained in two ways. Either, private 
interest distortions may preclude at least some states from enacting the types of environmental regulation 
that reflect the preferences of their citizens. Alternatively, it may be that preferences for environmental 
protection are not distributed homogeneously among states and that citizens of states with less stringent 
environmental standards value environmental protection less than competing goals. If indeed differences in 
preferences for environmental improvements are the reason why certain states adopt more stringent 
regulations than do others, the pattern of regulation observed across states would not be the result of 
private interest distortions but instead would reflect differing preferences for environmental protection, 
and hence would not need to be corrected by centralised regulation.428 
Furthermore, three recent studies in the United States have examined the impact on environmental 
policies of the decentralisation of responsibilities for certain aspects of environmental management during 
the Reagan period. It appears that none of the three studies found any evidence of a race-to-the-bottom.429 
List and Gerking, who used state-level data, examined at both local and central governmental level 
environmental quality and abatement expenditures. It was examined whether environmental quality was 
sacrificed as state and local governments acquired more autonomy in implementing standards and in 
enforcing regulations. They find no evidence of any deterioration in environmental quality or a decline in 
abatement efforts. On the contrary, they did find some indications of improvements. Thus, state 
environmental quality appears to reflect more than just the dictates of federal policy.430 In another 
assessment of the devolution of environmental policy in the Reagan era, Millimet studied airborne 
emissions of sulphur dioxide and industry spending on pollution abatement. He showed that actual 
emissions were lower and abatement spending higher than forecasted by his model. This finding suggested 
a race-to-the-top instead of to-the-bottom.431 This result was confirmed by Fredriksson and Millimet whose 
results provide some evidence for a strategic race to the top among U.S. states.432 
Hence, the presumption that (industry) lobbying at local level would cause a race-to-the-bottom in 
environmental quality, justifying centralised environmental regulation, may also be a bit hastened. The 
findings of the studies above might suggest that, also at local level, industry will not necessarily lobby for 
lenient regulation. Indeed, various strategies are possible. As Revesz indicates, firms might create rents and 
barriers to entry by stringent regulation. In such circumstances, the impetus for environmental regulation 
comes, implicitly or explicitly, from the regulated firms themselves. Stringent regulation gives them an 
advantage over (foreign) competitors. Moreover, stringent regulation might provide benefits to producers 
of pollution control equipment. The demand for environmental regulation then comes from manufacturers 
of pollution control equipment, or environmentally friendly technologies. On the other hand, it can not be 
excluded that there might be circumstances in which industry indeed may lobby for lenient regulation, for 
example to obtain an interregional comparative advantage.433 
In sum, the diverse nature of lobbying activities explains why the outcome of lobbying activities at 
either local or central level can not be easily predicted. It can only be observed that lobbying activities at the 
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local level do not necessarily need to lead to under-regulation at the local level or to a race-to-the-bottom, 
and that this argument therefore would not justify centralised regulation. Indeed, public choice theory can 
better explain ad post interest group rationalisations than provide ex ante predictions for future 
regulations.434 Public choice theory is not able to answer who will win by lobbying and at what level 
regulation is best to be set. Only a case-by-case study might make it possible to give some indications at 
which level certain lobby groups will be strongest and what they will lobby for. 
2.2.1.3. Harmonisation of Marketing Conditions incited by Interest Groups 
The ‘harmonisation of competition’ reasoning was advanced as an argument for centralisation of 
environmental regulation, within the public interest approach. Yet, this argument might also be examined 
from the private-interest approach. 
Indeed, centralisation to harmonise conditions of competition might much more serve the interests of 
industries in heavily regulated areas than the public interest. Industry in states that already have relatively 
stringent environmental standards may have an incentive to lobby at the central level. The purpose of such 
lobbying would be to make these stringent environmental standards compulsory throughout the federation 
in order to force their competitors also to comply and, thus to obtain a competitive advantage and to create 
barriers to entry. In other words, predatory regulation may explain why many environmental regulations 
emerge at the central level if economic theory would predict that the problem would be better dealt with at 
the local level.435 Moreover, industries with strong economies of scale tend to prefer uniform federal 
regulation to a patchwork of different state standards.436 Also for new regulatory fields, industry might 
prefer centralised regulation. Faure and Lefevere argue that this might explain why some industries will 
lobby in favour of environmental regulation at the European level. For new areas, where no national 
legislation exists, industry lobby groups may encounter less countervailing power of environmental 
organisations than at the local level where the environmental problems occur.437 Hence, centralised 
regulation might be more lenient than the regulation that could have been issued at national level. 
In sum, centralisation because of the harmonisation of competition might more serve the interests of 
industries in heavily regulated areas than the public interest. The harmonisation of competition argument 
therefore does not plead for centralisation, neither from a public interest approach nor from a private 
interest approach. 
2.2.2. Consequences and Responses to Lobbying Activities 
The results above illustrate that lobbying of both environmental interest groups and of industry interest 
groups might take place at the central as well as at the local level. Moreover, it appears that lobbying efforts 
of industry might go in either direction, depending on whether they intend to erect barriers to entry or 
whether they strive for lenient regulation. This makes it very difficult to predict how lobbying will evolve 
and at what level a certain regulation is best set. Indeed, public choice theory can better explain ex post 
interest group behaviour than provide ex ante predictions on future regulations. Only a case-by-case study 
might make it possible to give some indications at which level certain lobby groups will be strongest and 
what they will lobby for. Nevertheless, at the local level as well as at the central level, lobbying cannot be 
avoided but transparency and, for example, consultation of environmental interest groups or other non-
governmental organisations (NGO’s) might reduce capturing of the regulator by private interests to the 
detriment of the public interest. 
2.3. Application to Environmental Liability 
In a first step, the harmonisation of environmental liability rules was examined on the basis of the public 
interest approach. It was concluded that there are in fact few reasons for a centralised environmental 
liability regime. Yet, as for environmental regulation in general, it merits to examine the optimal decision-
making level for environmental liability rules in a federal system from a private interest approach as well. 
Indeed, the potential influence of lobbying in the decision-making process on environmental liability rules, 
for example for soil pollution, will have to be examined in order to refine the theory on the optimal 
decision-making level for environmental liability rules. However, as for environmental regulation in 
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general, at the theoretical level, it is very difficult to proclaim what industry will lobby for and what the 
best level of regulation is. Only in a real context it might be possible to indicate where possible lobbying 
activities might occur and even then it is very difficult to predict the outcome of the law-making process. 
Nevertheless, paragraph 2 of chapter 6, which examines private interest distortions in the making of the 
Environmental Liability Directive in the European Union, will go into more detail than what is possible 
here at the theoretical level. 
Indeed, at the theoretical level, advocates of centralised regulation might claim that the decision-
making process for liability rules would be systematically more distorted at state and local levels than at the 
central level. At state level, industry interest groups would be stronger relative to environmental lobby 
groups, so that states, fearing to loose industry, might be hampered to introduce a stringent liability regime 
for environmental damage. Furthermore, states may only be willing to introduce a stringent liability regime 
if they are sure that other states have to do the same.438 As a result of economies of scale in organisation, 
advocates of centralised regulation might argue that environmental groups would be less disadvantaged at 
the central level than at the state level, where they would be underrepresented relative to business interests. 
Hence, in these circumstances, centralisation of the environmental liability regime would solve public 
interest distortions at the local level. However, as for the general situation, the question is not only whether 
environmental groups would be more effective at the state or central level, but more importantly, how the 
effectiveness of environmental groups at both levels relates to the effectiveness of other interest groups with 
different concerns in the same area. Hence, the reasoning that the decision-making process for liability rules 
would be systematically more distorted at state and local levels than at the central level might not always 
hold in a real context. 
Besides the fact that the relative power of different interest groups at different governmental levels 
might depend on the situation, it is unclear in which direction lobbying efforts will go. It might be that the 
environmental liability regime at central level might generate, as a compromise, to the `average’ stringency 
of regulations that had existed at the decentralised level. On the other hand, if some states already have a 
stringent environmental liability regime, interest groups of these heavily regulated states may have 
incentives to extend their strict national regulations to the central level, forcing their foreign competitors to 
comply with this regulation with which they already comply and hence to create barriers to entry. 
Moreover, environmental lobby groups at the central level will only encourage this demand for a uniform 
stringent liability regime. In these circumstances the harmonisation or centralisation of a environmental 
liability regime could be abused to serve the private interests of industry in already heavily regulated 
states, by erecting barriers to entry instead of serving the public interest.439 Still, it is unclear whether 
environmental liability rules would be used by interest groups to create barriers to entry, although the risk 
should not be ignored. 
In sum, as for regulation in general, it appears difficult to estimate what industry will lobby for and 
what the best level of regulation is. However, it seems clear that the private interest distortions would not 
automatically justify a centralised regime, as lobbying affects the local as well as the central level. 
Unfortunately, public choice theory is not able to predict the magnitude and consequences of the distortions 
at the local level compared to the central level. However, in any case, transparency in the debate at either 
level might be welcomed in order to guarantee that a regulation would serve the public interest. 
Turning to the example of soil pollution it seems that, as for liability rules in general, at the theoretical 
level it is very difficult to proclaim at which governmental level lobbying will be strongest. Nevertheless, 
soil pollution mostly is a local problem, and it could be assumed that therefore, it might be easier for 
environmental lobby groups to ensure that citizens, confronted with local contamination, support their 
actions for stringent liability rules. At the central level, at which most citizens are much less involved, 
industry might have more lobbying power. The argument that centralisation would be necessary because 
industry interest groups would be stronger relative to environmental lobby groups at local level, might 
therefore not hold for liability rules for soil pollution. 
Yet, paragraph 2 of chapter 6, which examine the private interest distortions in the making of the 
Environmental Liability Directive in the European Union, will give more insight in how lobbying might 
influence the law-making process. 
2.4. Summary of the Private Interest Approach 
This chapter first presented a brief overview of the theories that examine the influence of lobbying on the 
law-making process: Capture Theory, Public Choice Theory and the Economic Theory of Regulation. 
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Moreover, the various stakes of the government, the industry and environmentalists, the main lobby 
groups in the environmental law making process, were discussed. In a second step, these results were 
applied to environmental federalism. Lobbying might take place at all levels of decision-making. Indeed, 
lobbying might not only concern the contents of the regulation, but also at what level of government the 
regulation will be issued. Therefore, the influence of interest groups on the level of environmental decision-
making was examined. Finally, the potential influence of lobbying on environmental liability rules, in 
particular for soil pollution was examined in order to refine the theory on the optimal decision-making 
level for environmental liability rules. 
The private interest approach, combining Capture Theory, Public Choice Theory and the Economic 
Theory of Regulation, focuses on the way in which (environmental) regulation is affected by the influence 
of a variety of interest groups. It would be too one-sided though, to argue that environmental laws only 
serve private interests. Many environmental statutes are enacted in an attempt to protect public interests. 
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that environmental regulations may be very conducive to rent seeking. 
Yet, from the examination of the various stakes of the actors in the environmental decision-making process, 
it was concluded that rent seeking behaviour might not always be straightforward. Contrary to common 
belief, industry does not always oppose regulation, nor can it be assumed that support for more regulations 
comes primarily from those who have the public’s well-being at heart. In the environmental context, both 
regulated firms and `public interest’ representatives have strong incentives for rent-seeking, as they both 
stand to gain from reductions in output and the creation of barriers to entry. Indeed, regulated firms and 
public interest groups may not always agree on the design of specific regulatory programs, they often share 
a common interest. Interests of industry and the environmentalists may coincide, for example, in the case of 
predatory regulation. Therefore, one should not be surprised that economic interests lobby, and make 
alliances with `public interest’ organisations to ensure favourable treatment for their own interests. 
These results were applied to environmental federalism. Interest groups, having a stake in a certain 
area of regulation, might prefer that level of government to issue a regulation at which their strength is 
greatest in comparison to other interest groups with different concerns in the same area. Interest groups 
might therefore lobby to ensure that a certain regulation is issued at a particular level of government. 
Hence, sometimes, public choice theory might explain why certain regulations are decided at the central 
level and why regulations are harmonised, in contrast to what would be efficient according to economic 
theory. 
Three frequently advanced private interest distortions, that might influence the level of decision-
making for environmental policy, were examined. First, it is often argued that private interest distortions 
might cause that environmental interests are systematically underrepresented at the local level. Moreover, 
two arguments that were dealt with in the public interest approach are also prominent in the public choice 
debate: states might engage in a race-to-the-bottom due to interest group lobbying and the harmonisation 
of marketing conditions might be incited by interest groups. It was examined whether these three claims 
would justify centralisation of environmental regulation. 
As far as the first, often repeated argument for federal intervention was concerned, it was concluded 
that lobbying of both environmental interest groups and of industry interest groups will take place at the 
central as well as at the state level. Moreover, it can not be ensured that environmental lobby groups are 
more powerful at the central level than at state level. In some circumstances it might be the opposite. 
Furthermore, it appears that lobbying efforts of industry might go in either direction, depending whether 
they intend to erect barriers to entry or whether they strive for lenient regulation. Hence, the claim that the 
environmental decision-making process would be systematically more distorted at state and local level than 
at the central level and therefore would justify centralised environmental regulation is precipitate. This 
negative conclusion should not imply that states would enact optimal environmental regulation, or that 
states exhibit less serious private interest distortions than the central government. The lobbying process is 
so complex that any general conclusion is almost certain to be wrong. A case by case examination will be 
necessary to determine the relative strength of all interest groups involved at different governmental levels, 
the possible lobby attitudes and the eventual outcome at the different levels. Only then, a reasoned decision 
can be made on the optimal decision-making level for environmental regulation. Nevertheless, if the 
stringency of environmental policy is independent from the institutional design, a decentralised 
environmental policy may be preferable if there is significant heterogeneity of the effects of pollution across 
jurisdictions so that the regulation can be adapted to the preferences and needs of the citizens. 
The presumption that (industry) lobbying at state level would cause a race-to-the-bottom in 
environmental quality, justifying centralised environmental regulation, appeared also to be somewhat 
hastened. Industry will not necessarily lobby for lenient regulation. Indeed, various strategies are possible. 
Firms might create rents and barriers to entry by stringent regulation. In such circumstances, the impetus 
for environmental regulation comes, implicitly or explicitly, from the regulated firms themselves. Stringent 
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regulation gives them an advantage over (foreign) competitors. Moreover, stringent regulation might 
provide benefits to producers of pollution control equipment. The demand for environmental regulation 
then comes from manufacturers of pollution control equipment or environmentally friendly technologies. 
On the other hand, it can not be excluded that there might be circumstances in which industry may indeed 
lobby for lenient regulation, for example to obtain an interregional comparative advantage. 
Finally, it was argued that centralisation because of harmonisation of competition might serve the 
interests of industries in heavily regulated areas instead of the public interest, for example through 
predatory regulation. Thus, the harmonisation of competition argument did not plead for centralisation, 
even when examined from a private interest approach instead of a public interest approach. 
In sum, the diverse nature of lobbying activities explains why the outcome of lobbying activities at 
either state or central level can not be easily predicted. It can only be concluded that lobbying affects the 
local as well as the central level and that lobbying activities at the state level do not necessarily need to lead 
to under-regulation at the state level or to a race-to-the-bottom. Hence, private interest distortions would 
not automatically justify a centralised regime. Only a case-by-case study might make it possible to give 
some indications at which level certain lobby groups might be strongest, what they would lobby for and 
what the best level for regulation would be. 
The results for environmental federalism were accordingly refined to environmental liability rules in a 
federal system. As for regulation in general, it appears difficult to estimate what industry will lobby for, 
what the best level of regulation is and what the result of lobbying will be. However, it seems clear that the 
private interest distortions would not automatically justify a centralised regime, as lobbying affects the local 
as well as the central level. Unfortunately, public choice theory is not able to predict the magnitude and 
consequences of the distortions at the local level compared to the central level. However, in any case, 
transparency in the debate at either level might be welcomed in order to guarantee that a regulation would 
serve the public interest. As far as liability rules for soil pollution were concerned, it was argued that soil 
pollution mostly is a local problem, and it might be assumed that therefore, it might be easier for 
environmental lobby groups to ensure that citizens support their actions for stringent liability rules at local 
level then at central level, at which most citizens are much less involved. The argument that centralisation 
would be necessary because industry interest groups would be stronger relative to environmental lobby 
groups at local level, might therefore not hold for liability rules for soil pollution. 
Therefore, also based on the private interest approach, there remains a strong case for decentralised 
environmental decision-making where the benefits and costs of such measures are localised. 
It merits now merging both public and private interest approaches in order to develop a framework 
for decision-making on the optimal level of environmental liability rules. As an example, the framework 
will be applied to liability for soil pollution. Indeed, only a combined public-private interest approach that 
explicitly recognises the interaction of different interest groups can grasp the complexity of environmental 
policy. 
3. Framework for Decision-making on the Optimal Governmental Level for Liability for 
Environmental Damage in a Federal System, Based on a Public and Private Interest 
Approach 
This doctoral research aims to refine the existing scholarly debate on harmonisation of environmental 
regulation in a federal system by examining the ‘optimal policy level’ of liability rules in a federal system 
from a public interest approach as well as from a private interest approach. The combination of these two 
theoretical approaches might allow to unravel all factors that might influence the optimal level of 
regulation. In the above paragraphes, it was examined which distortions could arise, and, starting from 
decentralisation, for which reasons the decision-making power might be shifted to a higher governmental 
level. By combining the results of both theoretical approaches, it is now possible, in a first step, to develop a 
framework that might be used in order to provide guidance on the optimal level of liability rules for 
environmental damage in a particular federal system. 
A framework inherently means simplification. The objective however is not to offer a simple answer 
on the question at which level to regulate soil pollution or any other environmental problem, but to offer a 
means to deal with the problem and to evaluate different policy options. In that sense, the framework 
intends to formalise and generalise the analysis of the public interest and private interest approach above 
and to show which policy options might be available in a particular situation. As such, the framework may 
also provide a useful guidance for other kinds of environmental policies. 
In a second step, on the basis of the framework, a few intermediate conclusions can be formulated. 
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3.1. Framework for the Optimal Decision-making Level of Environmental Liability Rules in a 
Federal System 
The starting point of the framework, presented in Figure 2, is decentralisation. Rules can then be optimally 
adapted to the preferences of the citizens. Consequently, it will be indicated which circumstances would 
ask for central intervention. Based on the results of the public and the private interest approach, it is 
possible to derive five evaluation factors upon which a framework for decision-making on the optimal 
policy level for liability rules might be built. These five evaluation factors are the presence of externalities, 
the indications for a race-to-the-bottom or political drag, market access distortions through divergence of 
rules, the need to guarantee a minimum level of protection, all four based on the public interest approach 
and finally the influence of interest group distortions, based on the private interest approach. These five 
evaluation factors, that preferably should be evaluated in order to formulate a balanced conclusion about 
the optimal decision-making level for a particular environmental problem, were of course discussed above 
in detail. The weight and importance of each of these factors might depend on the actual situation though. 
Moreover, in certain cases these factors might be connected with each other. 
Thus, the framework presents the five evaluation factors and shows the possible policy responses that 
might be opted for, depending on the distortions that might exist in an actual situation. Hence, starting 
from this framework, a balanced conclusion could be made about the optimal decision-making level of 
environmental liability rules in a federal system. 
As an example, the framework will be applied to soil pollution (see Figure 3, by means of dotted 
lines). Indeed, soil (pollution) can be considered as a — predominantly local — public good, on which 
federalism-theories can perfectly be applied. Again, it will be indicated which circumstances would point to 
either centralisation or decentralisation and some guiding criteria will be formulated. 
An explanation of the evaluation factors and the possible policy responses, for liability for environmental 
damage and for liability for soil pollution as an example will follow below. 
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Explanation of the Framework 
Presence of Transboundary Externalities 
A first factor for evaluation is the presence of transboundary externalities. The problem of transboundary 
externalities was discussed in detail in paragraph 1.2.1. It was argued that if there are no transboundary 
externalities, centralisation of regulation should not be based on this argument. On the other hand, if there 
are transboundary externalities, it is not much disputed that these externalities need to be corrected through 
some form of interjurisdictional collaboration. However, the importance of transboundary spillovers may 
vary from one field of regulation to another. Some fields of regulation might require broad 
interjurisdictional cooperation, whereas in other domains spillovers might be solved by Coasean bargaining 
and more emphasis can be placed on regulatory competition and decentralised decision-making. Therefore, 
if there are externalities, it might first be examined whether other solutions are feasible, as Coasean 
bargaining. Moreover, even if other solutions are not workable, it was suggested that centralisation of 
regulation should be limited and targeted to the transboundary externalities. Full harmonisation of 
regulation might not take local circumstances into account and therefore might even be counterproductive. 
Yet, besides the question whether there are transboundary externalities, and irrespective whether the 
answer is affirmative or negative, it might be examined whether economies of scale might be reached to 
solve problems that are common over different jurisdictions. Indeed, it was argued that in some 
circumstances, in order to solve a problem adequately, it might be necessary to entrust decision-making 
power to a higher regulatory level that has a competence that is large enough to deal with the problem. 
Moreover, centralisation of certain tasks like technical and scientific research would generate economies of 
scale. This reasoning is more lenient towards centralisation of certain tasks, not only to solve transboundary 
spillovers but also to solve problems that are common over different jurisdictions. However, centralisation 
of certain tasks is not equal to and should not justify harmonisation and fixed uniform standards. On the 
other hand, the fact that differing local circumstances and preferences have to be taken into account, does 
not argue for decentralised regulation without co-operation either, but for flexible regulatory policies and 
strategies. 
Hence, the possible policy measures for environmental liability that might result from the analysis of 
the transboundary externalities factor can be summarised as follows (see Figure 2 above): if there are no 
externalities and no economies of scale can be reached, decentralised liability rules would be preferable. If 
there are no externalities but economies of scale in data gathering or scientific research can be reached, 
interjurisdictional cooperation for research or data gathering might be considered. If there are externalities, 
but if they might be solved by other solutions than centralisation, it can be examined whether economies of 
scale might be reached. If no economies of scale would be possible, decentralisation probably would be the 
best option. If on the other hand economies of scale would be possible and if there are advantages of 
expertise that can be profited from without having to give in on diversity, an interjurisdictional cooperation 
of research and data gathering might be considered. Finally, if solutions other than centralisation do not 
seem feasible, centralisation for transboundary damage only might be the best option in order to take local 
circumstances into account. Additionally, it might be examined whether cooperation in research and data 
gathering would contribute to solve common environmental problems. In the affirmative, a combination of 
centralisation for transboundary damage only and interjurisdictional cooperation of research and data 
gathering might solve the externality problem and improve environmental quality. Otherwise, only 
centralisation for transboundary damage might be considered. The weight and importance of 
transboundary externalities and accordingly the policy measures that might be chosen might depend on the 
actual situation though. 
The transboundary externalities argument can be illustrated for soil pollution (see Figure 3 above). It 
might be argued that although the transboundary character of environmental damage might provide an 
argument for centralisation, in most circumstances, soil pollution will cause in-state torts (see 1.2.1.1). 
Moreover, as was examined in Chapter 2 (see 3.1.1), the causes and consequences of soil pollution can vary 
significantly within a jurisdiction and over jurisdictions. In these circumstances, regulation tailored to local 
needs and preferences might be necessary. If occasionally transboundary spillovers of soil pollution might 
happen, alternative solutions could be examined as for example co-operation between jurisdictions. When 
co-operation is not feasible, centralisation for transboundary damage only might be considered, however, 
for soil pollution this seems rarely the case. Hence, full centralisation or harmonisation of liability rules for 
soil pollution would not be justifiable as it would not take diverse causes, circumstances and preferences 
into account. It could be examined whether economies of scale might be reached in technical research. If so, 
this might plead for co-operation or centralisation of certain tasks, like research or data gathering. However, 
again, the promise of economies of scale in scientific research does not argue for a centralisation in an 
excessive sense. 
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In sum, centralised regulation of liability rules for soil pollution preferably would not go further than 
a kind of transboundary — or special areas — only regime to remedy transboundary soil pollution. This 
might however be completed with centralisation of supporting scientific research and data analysis, as all 
states and citizens might benefit from it. The policy options that might be considered for liability rules for 
soil pollution with respect to transboundary externalities are given by the dotted lines in Figure 3 above. 
Existence of a Race-to-the-bottom 
A second factor for evaluation is the risk of a race-to-the-bottom. The discussion in detail can be found in 
paragraph 1.2.2. As was indicated there, the existence of a race-to-the-bottom is heavily debated. 
Theoretical studies as well as empirical evidence for a race-to-the-bottom in environmental standard setting 
did not point clearly into one direction. Indeed, there are no strong indications that prove that a race-to-the-
bottom in environmental regulation will surely happen; neither can it be excluded that a race-to-the-bottom 
might happen in certain cases. Moreover, the risk is probably not so much a race-to-the-bottom but a 
‘regulatory chill’ or ‘political drag’. This is very difficult to prove though, and might therefore need further 
research. The risk of a political drag in environmental regulations should be neither neglected nor 
exaggerated. Hence, referring to the framework in Figure 2, if after examination it would appear that no 
evidence of a race-to-the-bottom or ‘political drag’ can be found, centralisation of environmental regulation 
cannot be based on this argument and decentralisation probably would be the best policy measure. On the 
other hand, if there is a feeling that a race-to-the-bottom or a political drag might exist, the question that 
might be asked, is whether centralisation of liability would be appropriate to prevent or overcome such a 
race or a ‘political drag’. 
Indeed, it appeared from the public interest literature that, although a race-to-the-bottom, or more likely a 
‘political drag’ in environmental regulation cannot be fully excluded, this would not justify full 
centralisation of environmental standards or liability rules. States might then compete by other means. 
Moreover, centralisation would not leave opportunities open for more stringent standards, or co-operation 
between states, according to states’ preferences. A limited centralisation or other proposals enhancing the 
efficiency of environmental regulation, to prevent a regulatory chill, might be considered. However, which 
response would be best, depends on the circumstances and the environmental problem under examination. 
A context-specific analysis might thus be required. Only then, an optimal co-operation between the central 
and state level can be found, in order to prevent a race-to-the-bottom or a ‘political drag’ in environmental 
regulation. Hence, contrary to common belief, the risk of a race-to-the-bottom or ‘political drag’, is no 
convincing argument for centralised environmental liability rules. Therefore, referring to the framework in 
Figure 2, the possible policy measures that might result from the finding of a race-to-the-bottom are co-
operation or limited centralisation. 
Turning to soil pollution, it seems doubtful, maybe even more than for environmental regulation in 
general, that liability rules for soil pollution would play a significant role in attracting or repulsing industry 
to or from a certain state. Therefore, it seems doubtful that industry, and certainly multinationals, will 
relocate because of lenient liability rules for soil pollution in other countries. Moreover, states themselves 
would have no advantage of a lenient liability regime for soil polution in order to attract industry as in such 
case they would have to renounce on restoration claims. Hence, it seems unlikely that a race-to-the-bottom 
in liability rules for soil pollution would happen. Therefore, the answer on the question whether a race-to-
the-bottom might exist for liability rules for soil pollution will be in most cases negative and 
decentralisation would be the best policy option. Furthermore, in the case that there is suspicion that a 
‘regulatory chill’ might exist, this would not justify full centralisation of liability rules for soil pollution. 
Indeed, other solutions to enhance the efficiency of liability rules for soil pollution should also be examined. 
Only if no other possibilities are feasible, co-operation or limited centralisation might ease race-to-the-
bottom concerns, as shown in Figure 3. The dotted line however indicates that the risk of a race-to-the-
bottom in liability for soil pollution is not very likely, and that therefore the best policy option is 
decentralisation. 
Market Access 
Market access presents the third factor that might be evaluated in order to formulate a balanced conclusion 
about the optimal decision-making level for environmental liability rules. The argument was dealt with in 
paragraph 1.2.3. 
The questions that must be answered to decide on the optimal decision–making level for 
environmental liability rules are first, whether differences in these liability rules might hamper market 
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access (for the whole discussion see 1.2.3.1) and second, whether centralisation or harmonisation of these 
liability rules would improve legal certainty and reduce transaction costs (see 1.2.3.2). 
With respect to the first question, it is questionable that the realisation of free trade would justify the 
harmonisation of private law, as environmental liability rules. As was shown in paragraph 1.2.3, it is 
certainly possible to realise free trade without the total harmonisation of all legal rules. Moreover, equal 
marketing conditions would not necessarily be achieved through the harmonisation of environmental 
liability rules. Indeed, harmonisation of liability rules would not create a level playing field, as differences 
in the availability of natural resources, labour standards, etc., are far more important factors that determine 
the conditions of competition. Moreover, it seems doubtful that stringent liability rules for environmental 
damage would act as a trade barrier for certain products. Indeed, liability does not hamper market access as 
product standards might do. If a product is imported, in case of damage, a causal link between the 
environmental harm and the product concerned still must be proven. Therefore, in comparison to product 
standards, liability rules might prevent disguised protectionism. 
If liability rules for soil pollution in particular are considered, it might be argued that stringent 
liability rules for soil pollution might influence the production process and require additional 
precautionary measures like investing in environment-friendly technology, which would make production 
costs more expensive. Lenient rules, on the other hand, would not oblige such investments. In such 
circumstances, however, centralisation of liability rules for soil pollution would only be justified if these 
rules cause transboundary externalities. If the effect of these lenient liability rules has merely in-state effects, 
it is difficult to justify centralisation. 
Hence, it seems doubtful that harmonisation of liability rules for environmental damage, including 
soil pollution would be necessary to ensure market access and fair marketing conditions. In most 
circumstances the answer will be negative and it can be examined whether centralisation would create legal 
certainty and reduced transaction costs, as shown by the policy options in Figure 2. Figure 3 again 
illustrates the case for soil pollution. 
Turning to the second question, it must be realised that increased legal certainty and a reduction in 
transaction costs, through harmonisation of environmental liability rules, are not easy to realise. Indeed, 
most developed countries have certain provisions to deal with environmental damage. Moreover, 
environmental damage might be very diverse, and one single pollution case might cause different types of 
damage. The consequences of harmonisation must therefore be very carefully examined. There indeed 
might be a risk of increased legal complexity, if different rules, on central and local level, would apply to 
various types of environmental damage, caused by a single pollution case. 
Referring to the soil pollution example, in particular soil pollution and clean up requirements of 
contaminated soil might be locality specific and dependant on the physical and geographical characteristics 
of the region. Additionally, soil protection might be rooted in a jurisdiction’s culture. Therefore, it might be 
questionable whether the eventual transaction costs savings of harmonisation would outweigh the benefits 
of differentiated legal rules. 
If, in a certain case centralisation seems necessary to avoid transboundary externalities, to increase 
legal certainty and to reduce transaction costs, general principles of tort law could be defined centrally, or a 
specific liability rule for certain activities could be set centrally, combined with a differentiation of the 
specific contents of this rule. In such circumstances, transaction costs might be lowered, market access 
might be promoted and still differing preferences could be respected. A co-operative approach could be 
adopted, with central minimum requirements of protection, but allowing regions to implement the 
standards or to adopt more stringent measures in accordance with the objectives of free trade and 
competition, and conform to the citizen’s preferences. 
However, total harmonisation of environmental liability rules, including liability for soil pollution, 
does not seem desirable. Therefore, in most circumstances, the best policy option, based on the examination 
of the market access factor, might be decentralisation, as shown in Figure 2, for environmental liability and 
in Figure 3 for soil pollution, indicated with the dotted lines. 
Minimum level of Protection 
The final factor for consideration under the public interest approach, the harmonisation in order to 
guarantee a minimum level of protection, falls beyond the pure economic arguments for harmonisation of 
regulation. As was argued in paragraph 1.2.4, if the minimum level of protection argument would be 
accepted, it must be emphasised that the reason for harmonisation would not be based on economic 
efficiency, but on the desire to provide a minimum level of protection against environmental harm. 
Furthermore, if citizens’ preferences are not homogeneous, harmonisation might amount to paternalism. 
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Moreover, even if minimum level of protection argument for harmonisation would be accepted, the 
argument addresses the concern to guarantee all citizens minimum quality standards, which refers to 
harmonisation of regulation. It was argued that this argument might in some restrictive circumstances 
justify the harmonisation of regulation, but it is more difficult to justify the harmonisation of tort law. It is 
questionable that the harmonisation of tort law would be the appropriate instrument to achieve such a 
minimum level of protection. Indeed, it might be more efficient to develop minimum quality standards that 
must be achieved, before and after an accident, rather than to harmonise the liability rules itself in the 
different jurisdictions. 
For soil pollution in particular, the same reasoning can be followed. A minimum level of 
environmental quality could be ensured through minimum quality standards that would have to be 
achieved after the clean-up of contaminated soil. Hence, this could justify the centralisation of minimum 
soil quality standards, but it would not be necessary to harmonise liability rules to achieve this basic 
environmental quality after clean-up. Each jurisdiction could organise this according to the preferences of 
its citizens. Moreover, again, there might be other options than total harmonisation of soil quality 
standards, like centralisation or coordination of minimum standards, but allowing states to go further, 
according to their needs and preferences. 
In sum, the minimum level of protection argument might justify in some circumstances the 
centralisation of regulation, by defining certain minimum quality standards, but not necessarily the 
harmonisation of environmental liability in general or specifically liability for soil pollution. These policy 
options are again visualised in Figure 2, for environmental liability and in Figure 3, for soil pollution. 
Lobbying Distortions 
The previous four evaluation factors were based on the public interest approach. Yet, as discussed in 
paragraph 2, lobbying might also influence the optimal decision-making level for regulation. A general 
conclusion about the optimal policy making level, however, is hard to give. Indeed, lobbying of both 
environmental interest groups and of industry interest groups can take place at the central as well as at the 
local level. It must be examined in every situation whether environmental lobby groups would be more 
powerful at the central level than at local level. In some circumstances it might be the opposite. 
Furthermore, it was already indicated that lobbying efforts of industry might go in either direction, 
depending whether they intend to erect barriers to entry or whether they strive for lenient regulation. 
Hence, the often made claim that the environmental decision-making process would be systematically more 
distorted at local level than at central level and therefore would justify centralised environmental regulation 
is precipitate. On the other hand, it cannot be ensured that the local decision-making level would enact 
optimal environmental regulation, or that the local level exhibits less serious public choice problems than 
the central government. The lobbying process is so complex that any general conclusion is almost certain to 
be wrong. 
As shown in the framework in Figure 2, lobbying distortions might influence two other factors for 
evaluation, the race-to-the-bottom factor and the market access factor. 
Yet, the presumption that (industry) lobbying at local level would cause a race-to-the-bottom in 
environmental quality (see dashed line in the framework to represent the connection), justifying centralised 
environmental regulation as for instance environmental liability rules, appeared also to be somewhat 
hastened. Industry will not necessarily lobby for lenient regulation or lenient liability rules. Indeed, various 
strategies are possible. Firms might create rents and barriers to entry by stringent regulation. In such 
circumstances, the impetus for environmental regulation comes, implicitly or explicitly, from the regulated 
firms themselves. Stringent regulation gives them an advantage over (foreign) competitors. Moreover, 
stringent regulation might provide benefits to producers of pollution control equipment. The demand for 
environmental regulation then comes from manufacturers of pollution control equipment, or 
environmentally friendly technologies. On the other hand, it can not be excluded that there might be 
circumstances in which industry indeed may lobby for lenient regulation, for example to obtain an 
interregional comparative advantage. 
Lobbying distortions can also be connected with market access (see dashed line in the framework to 
represent the connection). It is argued that centralisation because of harmonisation of competition might 
serve the interests of industries in heavily regulated areas instead of the public interest, for example 
through predatory regulation. Hence, a careful examination of the possible consequences of centralisation 
might be advisable. Thus, the market access factor does not plead for centralisation, even when examined 
from a private interest instead of a public interest approach. 
As for environmental liability rules in general, when dealing with liability rules for soil pollution, it 
must be realised that it might be difficult to estimate what exactly industry will lobby for and what the 
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optimal decision-making level will be. Yet, as far as liability rules for soil pollution are concerned, it was 
argued that soil pollution mostly is a local problem, and it might be assumed that therefore, it might be 
easier for environmental lobby groups to ensure that citizens support their actions for stringent liability 
rules at local level then at central level, in which most citizens are much less involved. The argument that 
centralisation would be necessary because industry interest groups would be stronger relative to 
environmental lobby groups at local level, might therefore not hold for liability rules for soil pollution. 
Concluding, if there would be no lobbying distortions, obviously decentralisation might be preferred. 
Moreover, the existence of lobbying distortions would not automatically justify a centralised regime, as 
lobbying affects the local as well as the central level. Unfortunately, public choice theory is not able to 
predict the magnitude and consequences of the distortions at the local level compared to the central level. 
However, in any case, transparency in the debate at either level might be welcomed in order to guarantee 
that the liability regime would serve the public interest, which is the policy option indicated in Figure 2 and 
Figure 3. 
A Multi-level Regulatory Structure?  
Based on the above framework, presented in Figure 2, it was tried to present the different policy options 
that might result from the five factors for evaluation. However, as was stated before, the objective of the 
framework is not to offer the one and only solution on the question on which level to regulate a certain 
environmental problem. The one and only solution does not exist. In every case, it will have to be examined 
for each factor what might be the best option, which weight the factor has in that situation and then an 
overall conclusion might be formulated. Based on the framework, however, when all factors are taken 
together, it appears that a presumption could be made for a multi-level regulatory structure. Indeed, from 
the evaluation of the factors above, it can be concluded that most distortions would allow for a mixed 
system that would benefit from the merits/expertise of both governmental levels, but would not justify 
excessive centralisation or harmonisation. The main power of decision-making would be with the local 
authorities, whereby the central government could provide a supporting framework of data gathering and 
technical information provision. Moreover, the central government could provide a solution for 
transboundary damage and nature conservation area’s and could define general principles to protect the 
environment. How much centralisation will be needed will depend on the actual problem though. Case by 
case, the importance of the different distortions has to be weighted, in order to make a decision on the 
optimal policy level for a certain environmental problem. Nevertheless, although this framework cannot 
offer ‘the’ solution, it tries to offer a means to deal with the problem and to evaluate different policy options 
and to offer guidance in the decision-making process. 
As an example, the framework was applied to liability rules for soil pollution. In order to formulate a 
balanced opinion on the optimal decision-making level of liability rules for soil pollution, it was useful to 
examine carefully the above mentioned five evaluation factors. The dotted lines of Figure 3 show the 
possible policy measures that result from the different distortions. It must be realised, however, that again, 
no one and only solution might exist. Even if the framework is refined towards soil pollution, in a real 
situation the importance of the distortions by the five factors will have to be weighted, and even then, 
multiple solutions might exist. However, this framework tries to offer some guidance and useful evaluation 
criteria. 
3.2. Conclusions 
The above developed framework might help to grasp the complexity of environmental policy and the 
interaction of the different evaluation factors that influence the optimal decision-making level of 
environmental regulation and of liability rules for environmental damage in a federal system. The objective 
of the framework moreover was not to offer a one-and-only solution, but to offer a means to examine at 
which level to regulate environmental problems and to evaluate different policy options that might exist. 
A few intermediate conclusions can be formulated: 
First, for each situation the existence of the various distortions and the weight that must be given to 
them might be different. Therefore, a one and only solution on the optimal level of governmental decision-
making might not exist. The framework can only offer some guidance. 
Second, even when the framework is refined to the soil pollution example, no one and only solution 
on the optimal regulatory level can be offered. In every specific case, the different factors will have to be 
weighted in order to examine how much co-operation or centralisation would be needed. 
Third, it appears from the analyses that only in a few circumstances centralisation would be the only 
(and best) solution to solve a distortion. Yet, centralisation or even harmonisation of environmental 
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regulation is often proposed by the European Commission in the European Union. One might ask whether 
there might be specific circumstances in the European Union, justifying centralisation or even 
harmonisation, or whether the reasons for centralisation are not necessarily based on public interest 
considerations. 
The remaining of this research will examine the harmonisation of liability for environmental damage 
in the European Union. The reasons for adopting a Directive on Environmental Liability with Regard to the 
Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, including soil pollution, in the European Union will 
be evaluated using the five factors above. The above developed framework will be applied to the Directive 
in order to refine the existing theory on the optimal decision-making level of environmental regulation. 
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LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION BY MEANS OF 
DIRECTIVE 2004/35/CE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 
The framework on the optimal decision-making level of environmental regulation and specifically of 
liability rules for environmental damage in a federal system will now be used to analyse the harmonisation 
of environmental liability rules in the European Union. 
The desire to harmonise environmental liability rules in the European Union already existed at 
European level for about 20 years. After a cumbersome legislative process, Directive 2004/35/CE on 
Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage440 was 
adopted on 21 April 2004. The EU Member States have now until 30 April 2007 to transpose the Directive 
into national law. 
The question might arise whether it merits to study, on the basis of the above developed framework, 
the desirability of harmonisation of liability rules for environmental damage and, as an example, for soil 
pollution in the European Union, if a Directive on Environmental Liability has already been adopted. The 
answer is definitively affirmative. First, the fact that a directive has been adopted does not mean that a 
reflection on the necessity of harmonisation of environmental liability rules, and as an example liability 
rules for soil pollution, is not possible anymore. Indeed, the framework allows for providing a reasoned 
opinion on the optimal decision-making level of environmental liability rules, including liability rules for 
soil pollution, in the European Union. The outcome can be compared with the reasons for harmonisation 
provided by the Commission in the course of the development process of the European Liability Directive, 
the distortions that are believed to exist, and the weight that is given to them at European level. In this way, 
this research might help to show the complexity of environmental policy, illustrated by soil pollution, and 
so refine the existing scholarly debate on the optimal decision-making level of environmental regulation. 
Second, as the Directive has been adopted, this research will be able to examine as an example the 
application of the Environmental Liability Directive to soil pollution and might indicate the consequences, 
opportunities and threats for soil pollution policy in the European Union. 
Chapter 4 will provide an insight in the legislative process and the provisions of Directive 
2004/35/EC. In a first step, the history of European environmental policy will be sketched, and the 
competence of the European Union to harmonise environmental liability rules will be clarified. Next, the 
development process of Directive 2004/35/CE — or the Environmental Liability Directive — and the 
reasons provided for by the Community for the harmonisation of environmental liability rules at European 
level will be discussed. Then, the Directive’s provisions and its application to soil pollution can be studied. 
Chapter 4 does not aim to provide a full overview of European environmental policy, rather it will 
elaborate on those aspects of European environmental policy that are necessary in order to examine in 
Chapters 5 and 6 whether the harmonisation in the European Union of environmental liability rules, 
including liability rules for soil pollution, corresponds with the economic theory on federalism. 
Chapter 4 will consist of three paragraphs. Paragraph 1 will first sketch the history of European 
environmental policy, thereby focusing on the division of competences between the European Union and 
the Member States for environmental policy. The history of European environmental law is inextricable 
linked with the political debate on the surrender of sovereignty of the Member States to the European level. 
Therefore, in a second step, paragraph 1 will outline how the balance between sovereignty and 
harmonisation of environmental rules at European level was sought. Particular attention will go to the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are used to ease the tension between the desire of the 
Member States to preserve their sovereignty to react to local environmental problems, and the need for a 
global approach to protect the environment. Indeed, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
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establish the conditions under which the Commission can take up its competence to legislate in the 
environmental field. Furthermore, it will be examined if and to what extent Member States are entitled to 
adopt national measures once the Community has taken up its competence. Finally, implementation and 
enforcement issues will be discussed. Readers familiar with the matter may want to skip this paragraph and 
continue directly with paragraph 2 which examines Directive 2004/35/CE. 
Paragraph 2 will study the European environmental liability regime. The development process of 
Directive 2004/35/CE — or the Environmental Liability Directive — and the reasons provided by the 
Community for the harmonisation of environmental liability rules at European level will be discussed. 
Next, the Directive’s scope and provisions will be examined in detail. 
Paragraph 3 then turns to soil pollution in the EU. In a first step, the extent of the problem and EU 
policy towards soil pollution will be sketched. Next, the application of the Environmental Liability 
Directive to soil pollution will be examined in depth. 
1. Competence of the European Union in the Environmental Field 
The Community’s institutions’ competences are limited to what has been expressly conferred to the 
European level by the EC treaty. Indeed, Article 5 of the EC treaty provides that ‘The Community shall act 
within its limits of the powers conferred upon it by this treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein’. 
Hence, a Community measure will be invalid if the Community had no competence to deal with the 
matter.441 Environmental matters belong to the `shared or concurrent competences’ of the EU. This means 
that Member States are entitled to legislate and that the European Union does not take action unless its 
action would contribute substantial value added to the action undertaken by the Member States. 
This paragraph will clarify the competence of the European Union442 to legislate in the environmental 
field and will outline how the balance between sovereignty and harmonisation of environmental rules at 
European level is sought. 
1.1. Division of Competences between the EU and the Member States for Environmental 
Matters 
1.1.1. Competence of the EU to Legislate in the Environmental Field 
At its founding in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) had no environmental policy. As stated 
in Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome, the EEC had as primary objective the promotion of a harmonised 
development of economic activities. The protection of the environment was not mentioned in the Treaty at 
that time.443 Hence, the objective of the first directives, which may be interpreted retrospectively as 
environmental measures, was to remove obstacles to the free movement of goods, not to protect the 
environment.444 
It was only after the rise of environmental consciousness late 1960’s and 1970’s, culminated in the 1972 
UN Stockholm Environment Conference, that the EEC started to pay attention to the development of an 
environmental policy.445 At the European Council Summit meeting in Paris of that same year, it was 
declared that economic expansion, which was expressly included as an aim in Article 2 of the EEC Treaty, 
had to emerge in an improved quality as well as an improved standard of life.446 Consequently, although 
the term ‘environmental protection’ was not as such to be found in the objectives enumerated in Article 2 of 
the EEC Treaty, by the extensive interpretation of ‘economic expansion’, environmental protection could 
become a subject of Community decision-making. In response to the Council Summit meeting, the first 
Environment Action Programme (EAP), which set out the environmental objectives, principles and 
priorities for Community action for the next years, was adopted, covering the period from 1973 to 1976. 
This was followed by other multi-annual programmes of the same type, which led to the adoption of a 
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series of directives.447 Since 1972, numerous directives and regulations have been adopted on almost every 
aspect of environment policy. 
Yet, due to the absence of a specific Treaty base, environmental initiatives in this period rested upon 
the provisions of Article 100 (now article 94) and Article 235 (now Article 308), or as was mainly the case, 
both these provisions.448 
Article 100 (now article 94 EC Treaty) provided that the Community could issue directives ‘for the 
approximation of laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States that directly affect 
the establishment or functioning of the common market’.449 Hence, Article 100 could be used where 
differences in national environmental legislation had an adverse effect on the establishment of the common 
market.450 
Besides Article 100, in the field of environmental protection, article 235 (now article 308) was often 
used as an additional legal basis. Indeed, as the Community‘s powers extend only to what has been 
conferred to the Community by the Treaty, Article 100 could not be used as legal basis for environmental 
measures other than that where necessary for the functioning of the common market. Therefore, the 
Council generally invoked Article 235 EEC Treaty (now article 308 EC Treaty).451 Article 235 (now Article 
308) provided a kind of catch-all authority to the Community and could be used ‘if action by the 
Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market one of 
the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers’.452 
To a certain extent, European action in the environmental field had logic on its side. Cross-border 
environmental problems, such as river pollution, could be best dealt with at European level. Yet, despite the 
absence of a Treaty basis, in these relatively early days of EU environmental policy, the Commission 
managed to issue a series of directives that had little to do with the establishment of a common market in 
goods and services or with cross-border environmental problems, as for example the protection of bathing 
water.453 An explanation might be that policy making during the 1970’s and early 1980’s was extremely 
closed and technocratic in nature, dominated by national experts, with very little input from the public or 
local actors.454 The Commission purposely concentrated upon ‘technical issues’ such as environmental 
standards in order to avoid the political debate about the surrender of sovereignty.455 Jordan states that this 
was part of the Monnet method of cajoling Member States into deeper integration than they otherwise 
might have accepted.456 Hayward calls this period ‘integration by stealth’.457 In this way, during the 1970’s 
and early 1980’s, the discussion on the competence of the EEC to develop a comprehensive environment 
policy was circumvented. 
The Single European Act (SEA), which was signed in 1986 and which entered into force in 1987, 
represented a milestone for the development of European environmental policy. The Single European Act 
introduced a specific chapter on environmental policy (Articles 130r to 130t, now Articles 174 to 176 EC 
Treaty) in the Treaty. Hence, the Community’s task in developing a Community environment was formally 
acknowledged and given legal justification by the SEA.458 Nevertheless, the competence of the EEC was 
delimited by the wording in Article 130r that ‘the Community could take action relating to the environment 
if the objectives of environmental policy could be better attained at Community level than at the level of the 
individual Member States’.459 This provision would become later known and be applied more generally as 
the subsidiarity principle, which will be discussed in detail in the next paragraph. By the above provision, 
the SEA tried to reassure both States which favoured a comprehensive environmental policy at EU level, 
and those seeking to place limits on the competence of the EC in environmental matters.460 
As regards the legal basis for Community action, the Commission could now base the proposed 
environmental measure on the specific Treaty Articles on the environment. Nevertheless, Article 100 (now 
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Article 94 EC Treaty), was still used as legal basis if the measure was considered necessary for the 
establishment of the common market. 
Yet, at that time, the characterisation of a proposal for a directive as a matter relating to the ‘internal 
market’ or to the ‘environment’ led to a different process of decision-making, co-decision procedure in 
Article 100a (now Article 95) versus consultation procedure in Article 130s (now Article 175), which led to a 
fierce dispute between the Member States on the legal basis of the action to be taken. In the Titanium 
Dioxide case of 1991, the European Court of Justice delimitated the reach of both Articles.461 The court ruled 
that preference had to be given to the legal basis that provided the European Parliament the right to 
cooperate in the decision-making (hence Article 100a (Article 95)), in order to reflect the democratic 
principle that citizens could take part in the exercise of power through the European Parliament. However, 
in a judgement of 17 March 1993, the court reached the opposite outcome in the action for annulment 
procedure of the 1991 Council Directive on Waste.462 In that case, the Court accepted Article 130s (now 
Article 175) as the correct legal basis for the Directive instead of Article 100a (now Article 95), despite its 
effect on the internal market, because the aim and content of the Directive was related to the objectives and 
principles of Article 130. Reading the two judgements together, leads to the conclusion that the aim and 
content of the proposed directive are decisive: when the aim and content of the proposed measure were 
mainly related to the objectives and principles stated in Article 130, then the measure had to be based on 
Article 130s (now Article 175), despite its possible impact on the internal market. When the reverse was 
true, Article 100a (now Article 95) would have been the correct Treaty basis.463 Although the co-decision 
procedure has been extended by the Amsterdam Treaty, the choice of legal basis still has important 
consequences, as the achievement of the internal market belongs to the Commission’s exclusive 
competences and therefore is not subject to the subsidiarity principle, which will be discussed in 1.1.2.464 
The entry into force of the EC Treaty in November 1993, which was signed on 7 February 1992 in 
Maastricht, brought further progress for European environmental policy. For the first time, the term 
environment was actually referred to in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty, which set out the objectives and 
activities of the Community. Moreover, the EC Treaty added the concept of ‘sustainable and non-
inflationary growth respecting the environment’ to the European Community’s tasks in Article 2 and wrote 
the precautionary principle into the title on environment. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, further clarified the text of Article 2. 
Furthermore, the clause calling for environmental protection requirements to be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of other policies, which had been in Article 130r, was placed in Article 6. 
Hence, by 1999, environmental protection had become a general principle of EU law. The Amsterdam 
Treaty also renumbered the Treaty Articles so that the relevant Treaty Articles that allow the EU to legislate 
in the environmental field are now either Article 174-176 EC Treaty (formally Articles 130r to 130t), relating 
to EU environmental policy or Article 95 EC Treaty (formally Article 100a), relating to the internal 
market.465 No substantive changes have been made by the Treaty of Nice.466 
Article 175 EC now confers on the EC the competence to adopt all measures which are needed to 
achieve the objectives referred to in Article 174 EC.467 The standard decision-making procedure is the co-
decision procedure. Under this procedure, the parliament is consulted twice on the measure proposed and 
it may eventually prevent the adoption of the measure.468 
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The wording of Article 175 EC indicates that the Community’s competence to legislate in the 
environmental field is delimited by the objectives listed in Article 174 EC. However, as Epiney points out, in 
reality, this does not pose a real limitation to the competence of the EC in environmental matters. Indeed, 
the description of the objectives in Article 174 EC is very extensive. The environmental policy of the EU 
should contribute to preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, to protecting 
human health, to using national resources in a rational way and to promoting international activities in this 
field. The formulation of these objectives is so broad that is hard to think of a Community measure that 
would not satisfy at least one objective.469 
Second, Article 95 EC would be the appropriate Treaty basis if the measure is considered to be 
necessary for the establishing or the functioning of the internal market, like for example the harmonisation 
of environmental product standards or emission limit values.470 
Hence, the Community evolved from a position of no competence to deal with environmental matters 
to a position in which it is hardly possible to indicate areas within the environmental field that are of 
exclusive competence of the Member States. Indeed, Articles 174 and 175 EC or Article 95 EC do not contain 
any criteria which would it make it possible to define the ‘domestic competence’ of the Member States in 
the environmental field, although Art 175 § 2 and Art 95 § 2 leave some room for derogations, for example 
for fiscal measures and Article 176 entitles the Member States to maintain or introduce more stringent 
protective measures once community environmental measures have been adopted.471 
In sum, nowadays, the Community’s competence can extend to all environmental domains, provided 
that the foreseen measure contributes to the realisation of one of the broad objectives set out in article 174 
EC or to the functioning of the internal market.472 Nevertheless, as will be explained in the next paragraph, 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality establish the conditions under which the Commission 
may make use of its competence. 
1.1.2. Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality (Article 5 (2) EC) 
1.1.2.1. The Balance between Sovereignty and Community Action 
The subsidiarity principle,473 introduced in Article 5 of the EC Treaty, states that in areas which do not fall 
within the Community’s exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
Community.474 
The subsidiarity principle is connected with the principle of proportionality, which requires that any 
action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this treaty.475 
Hence, for all matters that belong to the concurrent competences of the Community, as environmental 
matters, Community action must be justified with regard to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality before the Community may use its competence to legislate. The principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality are intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and 
that action at Community level is justified with respect to the possibilities available at national, regional or 
local level.476 
Originally, subsidiarity is a federal term, used to give meaning to the division of power and 
responsibility between the central government and the Member States of a federal system. Subsidiarity 
conventionally means that responsibility for a certain policy should be allocated at the lowest level at which 
the objectives of the policy can be achieved. It therefore provides a strong presumption in favour of 
decentralisation.477 
Although not explicitly described as subsidiarity, the debate of allocating competences between the 
Community and the Member States has always been present in European environmental policy. Already in 
the 1970’s, the Member States were sufficiently concerned about the threat posed by EU environmental 
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policy making to their sovereignty to include a predecessor of the subsidiarity principle into the First 
Environmental Action Programme. The First EAP specified that ‘it is necessary to establish the level of 
action (local, regional, national, Community and international) best suited to the type of pollution and to 
the geographical zone to be protected. Actions likely to be most effective at Community level should be 
concentrated at that level; priorities should be determined with care’.478 
Although Jordan assumes that this provision did not include a presumption in favour of any level of 
action, Golub believes that the phrasing in the first EAP emphasised action at Community level. The third 
EAP, adopted in 1983, removed this emphasis and inserted instead a slight presumption against 
centralisation: ‘the Community level should be reserved for those measures which can be most effective 
there’.479 
According to Golub, the United Kingdom was primarily responsible for the inclusion of the provision 
that would become the predecessor of the subsidiarity principle in the EAP’s. Known for its particularly 
strong attachment to national sovereignty, the United Kingdom did not welcome a European 
environmental policy, which after all, was never mentioned in the original Treaty provisions of 1957. 
Therefore, the United Kingdom saw the provision in the EAP’s as a mechanism to limit EC competences.480 
The division of competences between the European Union and the Member States for environmental 
matters was further institutionalised by the Single European Act of 1987. The SEA incorporated a provision 
into the new environmental section of the Treaty that would become known and be applied later more 
generally as the subsidiarity principle. Article 130r (4) of the SEA held that ‘the Community should take 
action relating to the environment if the objectives of environmental policy could be better attained at 
Community level than at the level of the individual Member States’.481 The inclusion of this provision must 
be seen in the larger political context of the SEA. Basically, the SEA was the product of an 
intergovernmental bargain between the governments of the large Member States. The environmental 
provisions of the SEA constituted a delicate balance between those States which favoured expanding 
European environmental competences, and those seeking to place limits on the Community’s competences 
in the environmental field. As drafted, the provision reassured each of the camps. It could signal a 
presumption in favour of national action at the expense of the Community, or, similar to the first EAP, it 
could suggest that most issues could be solved better at Community level, thereby paving the way for a 
more comprehensive European environmental policy.482 
Besides inserting a title on the environment in the Treaty, the SEA did not really change the balance of 
power between the Member States and the Community. Indeed, Member States’ sovereignty was 
guaranteed by Article 130r (4) and the requirement of council unanimity continued to apply (Article 130s 
EEC Treaty). Hence, the title on environment simply expressed a clear commitment of the Community to 
environmental protection.483 
The EC Treaty removed the subsidiarity principle from the specifically environmental provisions of 
the Treaty and gave it a general application (Article 3b, now Article 5 EC Treaty).484 
Again, the introduction of the subsidiarity principle in Article 3b (now Article 5 EC Treaty) must be 
seen in the wider political context of that time. The Maastricht Treaty drafters wanted to complete the 
consolidation of the internal market. Yet, the Danish rejection by referendum of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992, and the narrow victory of the ‘Yes’ vote in the French referendum showed that European integration 
was met with stronger resistance in the Member States in the early 1990’s than before. The Member States 
were concerned that excessive use of Community powers for non-exclusive competences would trample 
sovereignty and cultural diversity. In this delicate situation, the Maastricht Treaty drafters turned to 
‘subsidiarity’ as a concept that would build confidence in the new Treaty. Indeed, Member States’ 
confidence was to be maintained through a guarantee of the proximity of government. Hence, subsidiarity 
was envisaged as the concept that should strike the balance between sovereignty and integration.485 
Yet, as compared with the SEA, the interpretation of the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty 
is more restrictive towards centralisation. The Maastricht Treaty places the burden of proof upon the 
Community to show that the proposed action can better be achieved by the Community, rather than the 
Member States to justify why they should retain competence over the matter. Hence, Article 3b (now Article 
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5 EC Treaty) provides a strong presumption in favour of decentralisation.486 Even more, a literal reading of 
Article 3b (now Article 5 EC Treaty) suggests that community action should be abandoned even in the 
situation where Community action would produce clear benefits compared to action at the level of the 
Member States. On the other hand, Community institutions have interpreted subsidiarity as a test of 
comparative efficiency, which level would achieve the goal more efficiently.487 Nevertheless, although the 
wording of Article 3b (now Article 5 EC Treaty) would allow for such an interpretation, it has not been 
applied retrospectively to repatriate certain competences back to the Member States.488 
As far as the division of competences in the environmental domain is concerned, with the entry into 
force of the EC Treaty, the Community clearly signalled prominence to environmental considerations by 
enshrining the environment in the preamble and Article 2 of the EC Treaty. Furthermore, the decision-
making process had been altered through the generalisation of the quality majority voting in the Council. In 
order to ease the tension between those States which favoured expanding European environmental 
competences, and those seeking to place limits on the Community’s competences, an attempt was made in 
the environmental chapter of the Treaty (Articles 130r to 130t, now Articles 174 to 176 EC Treaty) to strike 
the balance between sovereignty and Community action in the environmental field. Article 130r §2 (now 
Article 174 § 2) obliges the Community to take into account the diversity of situations in the various regions 
of the Community. Moreover, the chapter also foresees a safeguard clause stating that Member States shall 
not be prevented from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures, provided that they 
are compatible with the Treaty (Article 130t, now Article 176 EC Treaty). Finally, the Member States keep 
their veto right for politically sensitive matters, as fiscal provisions, management of water or energy 
resources or matters tending to be of great local significance, as town and country planning, land use 
(Article 130 s, now Article 175 § 2 EC Treaty).489 
Guidelines for interpreting the subsidiarity principle, enshrined in Article 5 EC Treaty, were laid 
down in a declaration at the Edinburgh European Council of December 1992. The reasons for which the EU 
might justifiably act can be grouped as follows: trans-national aspects, actions of the Member States that 
conflict with the requirements of the Treaty, in particular distortions of competition, and action of the 
Community that would produce clear benefits in terms of scale or effect. The results of the Council were 
codified in an Interinstitutional Agreement which obliges the Commission to justify all new proposals on 
the basis of subsidiarity, both in the preamble of the text and in the accompanying explanatory 
memorandum.490 The Treaty of Amsterdam built further on the declaration in a Protocol on the application 
of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the EC Treaty. This Protocol provides 
criteria for the analysis of legislative proposals on the principle of subsidiarity. It is advised that the reasons 
for preferring Community action must be substantiated by qualitative or if possible quantitative indicators. 
Furthermore, the use of less binding Community measures is recommended, and the Commission must 
consult widely and explain how its proposal complies with the subsidiarity principle.491 
In sum, subsidiarity was introduced in the EC Treaty to strike the balance between sovereignty and 
Community action. The subsidiarity principle would allow for a careful consideration a priori of the 
optimal decision-making level of an action. Nevertheless, some scholars claim that subsidiarity has been 
interpreted much more narrowly to mean that the Commission should provide a higher level of 
justification before it proposes EU legislation as a principle of good law making.492 Hence, the debate on the 
optimal division of competences between the EU and the Member States is not finished yet. 
Yet, whereas the subsidiarity principle delimits Community powers towards the Member States, the 
proportionality principle provides a criterion wereby the intensity of Community measures is assessed. 
Hence, proportionality complements the principle of subsidiarity.493 Proportionality is a long-standing 
principle in European law. A free translation of the proportionality principle would be: ‘don’t use a 
sledgehammmer to crack a nut if a nutcracker will do’. Within the context of European Community law, the 
principle was used much earlier and with more frequency than the subsidiarity principle.494 The first 
application of the principle was in a dispute under the original Coal and Steel Community Treaty, dating 
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back to 1955.495 Yet, the EC Treaty has closely allied the proportionality principle to the subsidiarity 
principle by means of an explicit reference to the proportionality principle in Article 3b, now Article 5 EC 
Treaty. 
Once the legitimacy of Community action is determined by applying the subsidiarity principle, the 
proportionality principle can assist in determining the scope of the legislation, avoiding excessive detail and 
limiting the intrusiveness of actions.496 As such, the proporationality principle aims to protect the 
sovereignty of the Member States and their subnational authorities, with respect to their residual powers.497 
Basically, the proportionality principle requires that a Community measure: 
i. is suitable to achieve the desired end; 
ii. is necessary to achieve the desired end; 
iii. does not impose a burden on the individual that was excessive in relation to the objective sought to 
achieve.498 
The Edinburgh European Council of December 1992 furthermore agreed upon a set of guidelines regarding 
the principle of proportionality, which were transposed into the Protocol attached to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The key components of the Protocol with respect to proportionality are that the Community 
should choose measures which leave the greatest degree of freedom for national decisions and the working 
of the national legal system should be respected. The use of minimum standards is preferred, whereby 
Member States are allowed to lay down stricter national standards. Also, the form of Community action 
should be as simple as possible. Furthermore is the use of a directive is preferred above a regulation and a 
framework directive above detailed measures.499 
In sum, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality place on the institutions of the European Union 
the obligation to provide both a carefully reasoned explanation of the need for Community action and a 
justification that the type of action proposed is appropriate to achieve the desired end.500 
The next paragraph describes the application of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles in the 
making of European environmental law and will examine the main reasons that are provided to justify 
Community action in the environmental field, to comply with the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles. 
1.1.2.2. Application of the Subsidiarity and Proportionality Principles in the Making of European Environmental 
Law 
As stated above, the subsidiarity principle prescribes that the Community institutions have to justify 
Community action. If action is justified, the principle of proportionality provides a test on the intensity of 
action.501 
Hence, the subsidiarity principle involves an assessment of the need of community action. In the legal 
literature, it is considered that this assessment actually comprises two cumulative tests.502 The first is an 
effective attainment test, which determines if the means available to the Member States are sufficient to 
attain the objectives of the measure envisaged at Community level, stipulated as the requirement that the 
Community shall take action only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States. The second is a test of cross-boundary effects. Indeed, the second part of the 
subsidiarity principle, stipulated as ‘therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community’ allows for a consideration of scale economies and externalities. In this 
interpretation, competences may not be subtracted from the Member States, who are closest to the citizens, 
and transferred to the European level, if the goals may also be achieved at Member State level. Only if 
Member States cannot obtain the objectives, the Community may take action. Hence, this interpretation 
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requires absolute necessity of Community action and is clearly very restrictive towards Community action. 
The Community institutions, however, have interpreted subsidiarity as a test of comparative efficiency, of 
which level would achieve the goal more efficiently. The latter interpretation is also preferred by Van den 
Bergh, who pleads for interpreting the subsidiarity principle as one single test of comparative efficiency.503 
The question then is whether the Community can achieve the envisaged goal more efficiently than the 
Member States. This interpretation of subsidiarity demands an assessment of arguments in favour of 
Community action and those in favour of action by the Member States.504 
From the way in which Community institutions have applied the subsidiarity test and how they have 
justified Community action in the Explanatory Memoranda and Recitals of new environmental Directives, 
it is possible to identify four categories of arguments used to justify Community action in the 
environmental field.505 
The most frequent and important argument advanced to justify Community action in the 
environmental field, is the presence of transboundary externalities. In economic theory, it is shown that, if 
pollution crosses the national borders of a state, that state only internalises the externality present on its 
own territory. Community action is therefore considered to be necessary in order to fully internalise 
externalities from transboundary pollution.506 This argument corresponds with the stipulation in the 
subsidiarity principle that the community may take action if the objectives of the proposed action, hence the 
internalisation of externalities, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, by reason of scale or 
effect.507 
Second, the prevention of unequal competition is an important concern and argument of the 
community institutions for Community action. Centralisation of environmental standards should establish 
a ‘level playing-field’ for industry in Europe, which is deemed to be necessary for the functioning of the 
Common Market. It is believed that disparity between national environmental standards may create 
unequal conditions for competition among Member States.508 
The third reason for Community action in the environmental field concerns the harmonisation of 
product standards to achieve the free movement of goods. Indeed, as stated above, the driving force behind 
the first directives with an environmental objective was not environmental concern, but the removal of 
obstacles for market integration.509 This reason for Community action in the environmental field might have 
grown in importance after the accession of the Nordic countries to the EU. 
Finally, general concern about the environment and human health is frequently advanced as a 
justification for Community action for environmental matters. Indeed, as listed in Article 2 and 3 of the EC 
Treaty, the Community has as its task to promote a high level of protection and improvement of the quality 
of the environment and the raising of the standard of living and quality of life. Moreover, Article 95 and 174 
EC Treaty state that Community policy on the environment shall aim for a high level of protection. On 
these grounds, the Community institutions advance that Community action in the environmental field is 
justified to guarantee a basic environmental quality to all European citizens.510 This argument is also 
frequently called the ‘European heritage’ argument.511 
Yet, it should be noted that environmental directives are often based on a combination of these 
justifications, and possibly on some additional justifications that are specific for a certain Directive. 
Once it has been determined that the Community has legal competence to act and that the proposal 
satisfies the subsidiarity principle in terms of justifying the need for action, it has to be examined that the 
proposal satisfies the proportionality principle in terms of arguing that the intensity of the action is 
appropriate. 
In arguing that the intensity of the legislative intervention does not go beyond what is required to 
meet the objectives of a directive, five arguments are generally put forward. It is mostly claimed that the 
measure is proportional to the aim to be achieved, necessary and suitable to achieve the objectives of the 
measure, fair (with respect to the burden imposed on individuals or organisations in ensuring that the 
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details of the directive are met) and that it allows variation, in the sense that the measure does not prevents 
higher standards.512 
Now the competence of the European Union to legislate in the environmental field has been explained 
and now it is outlined how the balance between sovereignty and Community action for environmental 
matters is sought by means of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, it can be examined to what 
extent Member States are entitled to adopt national measures once the Community has taken up its 
competence to legislate in the environmental field. In a second stage, implementation and enforcement 
issues will be discussed. 
1.2. Harmonisation of Environmental Standards in the European Union 
1.2.1. Harmonisation and Member States’ Room for Manoeuvre 
As long as the Community has not taken up its competence to legislate, Member States are free to pursue 
any environmental policy of their own, provided that it complies with the provisions of the treaty. Yet, once 
the Community has decided to legislate in a certain area, the extent to which Member States still have room 
for manoeuvre depends on choice of the legal basis and on the content of the measure concerned. As 
discussed above, the Community can base the proposed environmental measure on the specific Treaty 
Articles on the environment (Articles 174-176 EC Treaty) or on Article 95 EC Treaty if the measure is 
considered to be necessary for the establishing or the functioning of the internal market. Anything out of 
the scope of the measure remains within the competence of the Member States, within the limits of the EC 
Treaty.513 
Proposals for directives relating to the environment, based on Articles 174-176 EC Treaty, mostly 
prescribe minimum harmonisation. This applies for example to measures to protect the quality of water and 
air or measures to protect the fauna and flora. Minimum harmonisation by, for example a framework 
directive, is often used in fields in which differences in national standards have less impact on the 
functioning of the internal market than do for example environmental product standards. With minimum 
harmonisation, the Community can ensure a basic level of environmental quality for all European citizens, 
whilst at the same time Member States are allowed to enact more (but not less) stringent measures, 
provided that they do not constitute an obstacle to free trade. This provision has been included in Article 
176 EC Treaty.514 
Proposals for directives based on Article 95 EC Treaty aim at the approximation of laws or regulations 
of the Member States, for example of environmental product standards, to guarantee the establishment and 
the functioning of the internal market. In its proposals, the Commission will take as a base a high level of 
protection. If a Member State deems it necessary to introduce or to maintain national provisions relating to 
the protection of the environment or the working environment, it shall notify the Commission of the 
envisaged provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them. The Commission will then approve or 
reject the national measures.515 Hence, it seems that proposals based on Article 95 EC Treaty leave less room 
for manoevre to the Member States.516 
The Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam recommended the use of less binding Community measures, like for example 
minimum harmonisation. In an empirical study, Jeppesen examined how subsidiarity has affected the 
development of Community legislation between 1990 and 1998. The results show that although subsidiarity 
has led to a reduction in the number of new community initiatives, it has not induced the community to 
adopt less binding instruments. Hence, Jeppesen concludes that subsidiarity has not allowed greater 
national leeway for the Member States.517 However, the challenge within the Community is to balance 
Community action with local preferences. As Krämer puts it, the Community needs both differentiation 
and integration of environmental rules, at a high level of protection.518 
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1.2.2. Implementation and Enforcement of European Environmental Law 
Once it has been decided that the Community is the best level to deal with a certain environmental 
problem, the Community might issue legislation. Yet, in order to deal with the environmental problem, it is 
necessary that the legislation is correctly implemented and enforced by all Member States. 
The instrument most frequently used by the Community to deal with environmental matters is the 
directive. A directive is binding to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which the directive 
is addressed, but leaves as much room as possible for the Member States as far as the form and method of 
implementation technique is concerned.519 Hence, a directive must be transposed into binding provisions of 
national law, within the time limits set by the directive.520 Yet, in the European Union, there is a significant 
implementation and enforcement problem, of which the EU Commission itself is aware of.521 Its `Fifth 
Annual Survey on the implementation and enforcement of EU environmental law’ illustrates that not all 
Community environmental legislation has been implemented correctly or on time, nor is it always properly 
enforced on the ground by the Member States.522 Enforcement is indeed primarily a responsibility of the 
Member States; there is no Community enforcement policy for environmental matters. Yet, it will be clear 
that if implementation and enforcement compliance of European environmental regulation differ between 
the Member States, the objective of the measure may not be reached, which in turn might influence the 
effectiveness of European environmental policy. 
The causes of the implementation and enforcement deficit are multiple. The implementation deficit is 
not always due to the desire of Member States to protect national industry; it is also very well possible that 
the Member States could not meet the administrative duties corresponding with the implementation 
obligation. Yet, for many years, much has been done at European level to ensure the correct implementation 
of European law. Indeed, the evolution in primary legislation and in particular in case law, dealing with 
implementation issues, is substantive.523 
First, primary legislation has increasingly provided the Commission with the necessary powers to 
ensure that Member States comply with European law.524 
Indeed, the European Commission’s main enforcement tool is Article 226 EC Treaty (ex Article 169). 
Article 226 EC Treaty foresees an infringement procedure, which enables the Commission to bring Member 
States before the European Court of Justice for their failure to implement EU law. The Treaty on European 
Union, or Maastricht Treaty, enforced the infringement procedure by amending Article 228 (ex Article 171) 
to allow the Court to impose penalty payments on Member States who fail to comply with previous 
judgments of the Court in infringement cases.525 On 4th July 2000, the European Court of Justice delivered 
its first ruling on such a case.526 The Court ordered Greece to pay the Community’s first-ever penalty 
payment of 20.000,-€ for each day of delay in implementing the measures necessary to comply with an 
earlier judgment of the Court.527 Since then, the Court has used penalty payments regularly. 
Second, case law has contributed significantly to ensure timely implementation and enforcement of 
European law.528 
In a first step, case law has developed the conditions for direct effect of directives. Indeed, if certain 
conditions are met, unimplemented or incorrectly transposed directives still might have direct effect in 
proceedings before national courts. In the Van Duyn case, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that if 
the content of a directive is clear, sufficiently precise and unconditional, the directive might create 
enforceable rights and obligations for citizens in proceedings between citizens and Member States.529 This is 
called the ‘vertical direct effect’ of directives. The direct effect of directives in disputes between citizens (the 
so-called 'horizontal direct effect') has not been accepted by the ECJ. The ECJ holds that a directive cannot 
have horizontal direct effect as private individuals cannot be held liable for the consequences of their State's 
failure to act.530 Some recent judgments of the Court, however, may suggest that the ECJ may be willing to 
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reconsider its opinion, or, as might appear from these judgments,531 to confer horizontal direct effect to 
directives in an indirect way.532 
Besides the conditional direct effect of directives, national judges and authorities have the obligation 
to interpret national provisions in conformity with the directives if the time-limit for implementation has 
expired, whether or not the directive has been implemented.533 The obligation applies to all directives, even 
if they do not have direct effect. Environmental directives, especially framework directives might indeed 
not meet the conditions to have direct effect. Hence, these directives still might serve as reference for the 
interpretation of national law and will be invocable before any national court to that effect.534 
Furthermore, case law has also holds that if Member States fail to adopt all necessary and 
proportionate measures against private individuals that obstruct the implementation and enforcement of 
European legislation, this can be considered as a violation of European law.535 Moreover, although Member 
States remain free in their method of implementation of a directive, case law holds that, in case of a 
violation of implementing legislation, the sanctions should at least be effective, proportional and 
dissuasive.536 
Finally, important case law exists on basis of which Member States can be held liable for damage that 
results from non-implementation or incorrect implementation of European directives.537 In the Frankovich 
case,538 the Court determined that a Member State must create an action for damages against itself when the 
Member State did not fulfil its obligation to implement a directive correctly, thereby harming the interests 
of private parties who would have drawn rights from the directive if it had been correctly implemented. 
For Member States to be obliged to compensate individuals for breach of European law, the ECJ ruled that 
the injured party must establish that the objective of the directive includes the conferring of rights to the 
individual, second, that the content of the rights is identifiable from the directive, and third, there must be a 
causal link between the breach and the damage caused. In fact, the ruling contains a general principle of 
Member States liability for harm caused by their infringement of Community law.539 
Hence, the Community is aware of the need of, and the actions to be taken, to ensure the correct 
implementation and enforcement of European legislation to guarantee the effectiveness of European 
environmental policy. 
Summarising, paragraph 1 aimed to clarify the competence of the European Union to legislate in the 
environmental field. The historical evolution of the Union’s competence to legislate in the environmental 
field was sketched and it was explained how the balance between sovereignty and harmonisation of 
environmental rules at European level is sought by means of the subsidiarity and proportionality 
principles. Moreover, Member States’ room for manoeuvre once the Community has taken up its 
competence to legislate in the environmental field and implementation and enforcement issues were 
discussed. Paragraph 1 was meant as a starter for the next paragraph which will study the European 
environmental liability regime. 
2. A European Environmental Liability Regime 
On 21 April 2004, Directive 2004/35/CE on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and 
Remedying of Environmental Damage (hereafter Directive or ELD) was adopted. According to Article 19 of 
the Directive, Member States have now until 30 April 2007 to transpose the Directive into national law. The 
adoption of the Directive is the endpoint of a cumbersome development process which began at least 15 
years ago. Indeed, the development process of the Directive gave rise to much controversy and conflict of 
which the final text bears the mark. Much of the conflict addressed the question whether and how far the 
European Union could go in adopting a European liability regime. Harmonising environmental liability 
rules indeed touches upon political sensitive subjects as subsidiarity and sovereignty. 
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In order to understand why and how the Directive got to its final form, paragraph 2.1 will sketch very 
briefly the milestones in the environmental liability saga540 before paragraph 2.2 will turn to the provisions 
of the Directive. 
2.1. Towards a European Environmental Liability Directive: Legislative Process 
2.1.1. Impetus 
The desire to introduce a European environmental liability regime already existed at European level 20 
years ago. The impetus for this desire were a number of highly publicised disasters involving the release of 
toxic agents in the late 1970’s and 1980’s, like the accident at the industrial site in Seveso in Italy in 1976. The 
Community’s legislative response to these disasters focused on improving plant safety and emergency 
procedures, as laid down in Directive 82/501EEC, also known as the Seveso Directive.541 Yet, although it 
was hoped that this approach would reduce the risk of major accidents from happening, it was felt that 
improving plant safety was not enough. The Seveso Directive indeed did not address liability or 
compensation of victims in case that an accident happened. Hence, following the Sandoz incident in 1986, 
the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament called upon the Commission to examine new 
measures for the prevention and restoration of environmental damage that would ensure clean-up and 
restoration, coupled with arrangements for liability and compensation by the polluters for damage 
caused.542 This statement opened the door for the possible use of liability rules as a component of the 
Community’s environmental policy.543 
2.1.2. Legislative Process 
In response to the Council statement of 1986, the Commission developed a sector specific approach starting 
with waste. In 1989, a formal proposal on Civil Liability for Damage caused by Waste was laid down.544 The 
proposal envisaged a rather severe strict liability regime and was heavily criticised by industry groups, 
especially by the waste industry, which felt that is was being unfairly singled out.545 The proposal however 
never got adopted. In 1993, the Commission Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage546 was 
published. In response to the request of the Council and the public demand for systems of compensation 
whenever environmental accidents occurred, the Green Paper considered the use of a broad civil liability 
regime covering environmental damage, and presented some of the broad concepts on which a European 
liability regime could rely.547 The Commission argued that, first, civil liability could ensure that those 
responsible for environmental damage would pay compensation for the cost of remedying that damage and 
second, that civil liability had a secondary function of preventing people from causing damage in the 
future.548 
With respect to the need for action at Community level, the Commission advanced two main 
arguments. First, a Community-wide system of civil liability for environmental damage would draw on a 
basic principle of civil law, notably the concept that a person should rectify the damage that he causes. This 
legal principle is strongly related to two principles forming the basis of Community environmental policy, 
the principle of prevention and the `polluter pays’ principle. Second, the Commission held that if civil 
liability for environmental damage would operate differently in the Member States, industries in some 
Member States would be required to pay for the restoration of the damage they cause, while industries in 
other Member States would be able to avoid those costs, if restoration would not be required or if the cost 
                                                             
540  For an extensive overview of the development process of the ELD see Clarke 2003, 254-268. See also Fogleman 2004, 101-
115 or Wilde 2002. 
541  Council Directive of 24 June 1982 on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities (82/501/EEC), OJ No L 230 
of 5 August 1982, the so-called Seveso Directive. See Wilde 2002, 171-172. 
542  European Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities. No. 11/1986, § 2.1.146. 
543  Wilde 2002 171-173 and Fogleman 2004, 101. 
544  Commission Communication of 15 September 1989, proposal for a directive on civil Liability for Damage Caused by 
Waste, COM (89) 282. 
545  Clarke 2003, 255. 
546  Commission Communication of 14 May 1993, Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47. A Green 
Paper is a communication published by the Commission on a specific policy area and is intended to stimulate a debate 
among the interested parties. In the environmental field, these parties might include industry and environmental 
organisations. A Green Paper does not provide a specific proposal. Nevertheless, in some cases they might provide 
impetus for subsequent legislation (www.europa.eu.int/comm). 
547  Bergkamp 2000, 105-106. 
548  Commission Communication of 14 May 1993, Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47, 5-6. 
Liability for Environmental Damage in the European Union 
124 
would be passed on to taxpayers. It was argued that the latter industries received, in effect, a competitive 
advantage. Hence, the Commission held that the use of different systems of civil liability for remedying 
environmental damage among the Member States could lead to distortions of competition and the single 
market.549 
Although the Green Paper was only intended to open the debate on possible solutions for remedying 
environmental damage, it provoked a storm of negative responses from both industry groups and some of 
the Member States.550 Some Member States, as the UK, were against any initiative to harmonise civil 
liability for environmental damage for reasons of sovereignty and subsidiarity, other Member States 
preferred their own national regulations and industry was heavily opposed to any regulation which would 
resemble the American Superfund.551 In response to these reactions, the Commission ordered a huge 
amount on studies,552 consulted interested parties and published several working documents in the years 
after the publication of the Green Paper. Throughout that time, the Commission was influenced by the 
Council of Europe’s Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the 
Environment, which had been opened for signature in Lugano on 21 June 1993.553 The Commission even 
considered accession to the Convention as a solution.554 Again, environmental disasters555 increased the 
political pressure to proceed with the development of a liability regime for environmental damage.556 In 
November 1997, the Commission issued a working paper on environmental liability, presenting an outline 
of its thinking at that time.557 After another round of consultations and studies, the European Commission 
issued a White Paper on environmental Liability,558 proposing a civil liability regime for environmental 
damage. Compared with the Working Paper, the White Paper was less ambitious and vague in some 
elements.559 
In the White Paper the Commission described its view on the main features of a future environmental 
liability directive.560 
The Commission proposed a framework directive, based on Article 175 EC Treaty, which would not 
have retroactive effects. As far as the scope of the regime was concerned, the Commission held that the 
regime should cover both traditional damage (harm to health and property) and environmental damage 
(site contamination and damage to bio-diversity, which, according to the Commission was not sufficiently 
covered by the Member States). However, the liability regime would only apply to contaminated sites and 
traditional damage if caused by an EC-regulated hazardous or potentially hazardous activity.561 Damage to 
bio-diversity would only be covered if the area or species were protected by the Natura 2000 network. 
These protected areas are or have to be designated by the Member States under the Wild Birds Directive of 
1979562 and the Habitats Directive of 1992.563 The Commission proposed that the liability regime would be 
                                                             
549  Commission Communication of 14 May 1993, Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47, 5-6. 
550  Clarke 2003, 256. 
551  Descamps 2005, 5. 
552  McKenna & Co. 1996. 
553  Council of Europe, Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, 
Lugano, 21 June 1993. It should be remarked that the Lugano Convention has not entered into force and it is questionable 
that this will happen in the near future. See Fogleman 2004, 102. 
554  Clarke 2003, 258. 
555  On 25 April 1998, one of the most important bird breeding and overwintering sites in Spain, the Coto Donana, was 
severely damaged by the release of 5 million cubic meters of acid waste after a mine dam broke from the Aznalcollar 
mining complex. On 30 January 2000, a breach in the tailings dam of the Aurul S.A. Baia Mare Company released tailings 
waste into the river system near Baia Mare in north west of Romania. This spill released approximately 50-100 ton of 
cyanide, as well as heavy metals into the rivers Somes, Tisza and finally into the Danube before reaching the Black Sea. 
556  Descamps 2005, 5. 
557  Commission of the European Communities, Working Paper on Environmental Liability, Brussels, 1997. For a comment on 
this draft see e.g. L. Bergkamp 1998, 200-204 and De Vries 1999, 141-147. 
558  Commission Communication of 9 February 2000, White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM (2000) 66. White Papers 
are documents that contain proposals for Community action in a specific area (www.europa. eu.int/comm.). 
559  Bergkamp 2000, 105-106. 
560  For comments on this White Paper see e.g. Bergkamp 2000, 105-114, 141- 188; Betlem 2000, 58-60; Bierbooms & Brans 2000, 
182-188; Rice 2000, 39-45; Rehbinder 2000, 85-96. This research does not aim to discuss the provisions of the White Paper 
in detail. It will discuss the White Paper briefly and concentrate on the provisions that deal with the division of 
competences between the EU and the Member States for remedying environmental damage and environmental liability 
rules, which is the main focus of this research. 
561  EC Regulated dangerous activities include activities involving the discharge or emission of hazardous substances to air or 
water, dangerous substances, waste, biotechnology and genetically modified organisms, transportation of waste, as well 
as facilities subject to the Integrated Pollution and Control (IPPC) Directive and the Seveso Directive. Thus, as dangerous 
substances are used in a wide range of activities, the definition of ‘dangerous’ was very broad and covered virtually any 
industrial and commercial activity, from the large Seveso-regulated industrial plant to a dry cleaning or photo shop. See 
Bergkamp 2000, 111. 
562  Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds, OJ L 103 of 25.04.1979. 
  Chapter 4 
 125 
based on strict liability (this means that no fault by the polluter is required), for damage caused by 
inherently dangerous activities, and fault-based liability for damage to bio-diversity caused by a non-
dangerous activity. As far as the liable parties were concerned, the Commission proposed that the liable 
party should be the operator in control of the activity that caused the damage. Nevertheless, the 
Commission argued that commonly accepted defences and an alleviation of the plaintiffs’ burden of proof 
and some equitable relief for defendants should be included in the regime. Finally, the Commission argued 
for an obligation for the polluter to pay compensation for environmental restoration, provisions on the 
financial security for potentially liable parties and enhanced access to justice in environmental damage 
cases in line with the Århus Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making 
and access to justice in environmental matters.564 
Besides a framework directive on environmental liability, the Commission considered in the White 
Paper also other options to remedy environmental damage, as Community accession to the Lugano 
Convention and a regime for transboundary damage only. According to the Commission, the scope of the 
Lugano Convention was too wide and gave too little legal certainty and its definitions. Especially in the 
field of environmental damage its definitions were considered too vague and therefore, accession to the 
Lugano Convention was rejected. However, it was argued that the Lugano Convention could provide a 
useful source of inspiration for a future Community directive.565 The transboundary regime was rejected on 
the grounds that a transboundary only regime would leave a gap where liability for biodiversity damage 
was concerned, since this was not covered by most Member States. Moreover, it was reasoned that a 
transboundary only system could also lead to national and cross-border cases treated differently, which 
could possibly violate the principle of equal treatment as developed in the case-law of the European Court 
of Justice.566 Hence, the Commission considered a framework directive on environmental liability as the 
most appropriate option to remedy environmental damage in the European Union. 
However, in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the Commission had 
to justify the need for a Community-wide environmental liability regime.567 Arguments for harmonisation, 
brought forward by the Commission to justify Community action with respect to environmental liability, 
were provided in the introduction, and sections 3, 5 and 6 of the White Paper.568 The Commission’s 
arguments can be summarised as follows: a Community-wide regime would: 
• realise the three grand environmental principles enshrined in Art 174 (2) of the EC Treaty: the 
polluter pays, precautionary and preventive principles; 
• provide an adequate solution for transboundary damage; 
• ensure decontamination and restoration of the environment and better integration of environment 
into other policy areas; 
• contribute to a level playing field in the internal market and 
• respect the principle of equal treatment. 
First, in the Commission’s view, the proposed liability regime would realise the three grand environmental 
principles enshrined in Art 174 (2) of the EC Treaty: the polluter pays, precautionary and preventive 
principles. According to the Commission, these principles were not implemented in an optimal way 
throughout the Community.569 As illustration, the hiatus — in the view of the Commission — in most 
Member States’ liability regimes concerning bio-diversity damage was mentioned. With this argument, the 
European Commission clearly referred to the economic theory of cost internalisation. As a firm will always 
try to minimise its total costs, forcing the polluter to internalise the costs of pollution resulting from 
production, by obliging him to pay for the damage, would result in more precaution, and hence in 
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prevention of environmental harm. Furthermore the Commission believed that liability would encourage 
investment in research and development (R&D).570 
Second, already in the introduction to the White Paper, the Commission indicated that harmonisation 
should be accepted under the subsidiarity principle, as Member States could not adequately deal with 
transboundary environmental pollution. In section 6 of the White Paper dealing specifically with the 
subsidiarity issue, the Commission firmly states that national legislation cannot effectively cover 
transboundary environmental damage as various watercourses and protected habitats cross the borders of 
the Member States. Therefore it was argued that an EC-wide regime would be necessary in order to avoid 
inadequate solutions to transboundary damage’.571 
Third, in its plea for an EC environmental liability regime, the Commission held that a liability regime 
would ensure decontamination and restoration of the environment and boost the implementation of, and 
compliance with EC environmental legislation.572 
Fourth, the Commission stressed that an EC regime would contribute to creating a level playing field 
in the internal market.573 From this argument, it is clear that the Commission had the opinion that 
differences in the various national regimes would result in cost differences and thus in competitive 
advantages for companies in Member States with lax environmental liability regimes. 
Finally, an argument that is rather hidden in paragraph 5.2 of the White Paper, and that is linked with 
the transboundary damage argument, deals with the principle of equal treatment. The Commission held 
that a regime dealing exclusively with cross-border harm, would lead to national and cross-border cases 
treated differently, which could possibly violate the principle of equal treatment as developed in the case-
law of the European Court of Justice.574 
The White Paper gave rise to a lot of critique. Some of the large Member States, in particular Germany, 
France and the UK, still firmly opposed any European initiative to harmonise environmental liability rules 
for reasons of sovereignty and subsidiarity.575 Industry organisations questioned the need for a European 
environmental liability regime, criticised the vagueness of the regime and for many of them the White 
Paper went too far with respect to the scope of the regime, the liability provisions and the prove of causal 
link. Environmental organisations on the other hand, were disappointed as  in their view— the proposed 
regime was too weak, in particular with respect to causality, compensation of ecological damage and the 
right to sue for environmental organisations.576 Obviously, the White Paper was also critically examined by 
scholars. Some scholars, although adherents of a European liability regime, deplored the vagueness of 
certain provisions in the White Paper and the fact that in some issues no real decisions had been taken (e.g. 
causation or defences).577 Others were critical with respect to the proposals on action rights of NGO's.578 
Moreover, certain scholars were critical about the idea to ensure restoration of environmental damage by 
civil liability. It was proposed that a public law regime would be more effective than a private law regime 
and that it would be better to deal separately with the compensation of traditional damage, the 
compensation of ecological damage and the restoration of damage.579 Finally, the justifications given by the 
Commission under the subsidiarity principle were questioned580 as well as the need for a harmonised 
environmental liability directive.581 
Hence, at the end of July 2001, the Commission changed its strategy and issued a brief Working 
Paper.582 In the Working Paper, the Commission outlined the main features of a proposal for a Directive on 
prevention and restoration of significant environmental damage. Indeed, in the Working Paper the 
Commission shifted its focus from civil liability and compensation to prevention and restoration of 
environmental damage. Moreover, the Commission opted for a public law regime that would be enforced 
by competent authorities instead of a civil liability regime.583 Nevertheless, as some elements as fault and 
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strict liability were retained from the White Paper, the proposed regime was a hybrid of private and public 
law.584 
The main features of the Commission’s proposal were the following: the purpose was to establish a 
Community framework in respect of professional and commercial activities causing Significant 
Environmental Damage (SED),585 addressing both its prevention and restoration.586 
The liable party would be the operator, who was considered to be the natural or legal person who 
controlled the activity concerned. Where the activity would be subject to authorisation, the authorisation 
holder would also be considered as the operator.587 
SED would include biodiversity damage (hence the habitats and species protected under the Habitats 
Directive and Wild Birds Directive and natural sites protected by national legislation); pollution of water 
covered by the Community Water Framework Directive, and damage that created serious harm to human 
health as a result of either of the foregoing categories or land (soil and subsoil) contamination.588 
The fundamental difference with the White Paper was the juridical (public law) technique to ensure 
prevention and restoration of environmental damage.589 The Working Paper would create legal relations 
between state and private parties, not between private parties. Indeed, whereas in the White Paper, an 
important item was the right of interest groups to sue the polluter, the administrative regime of the 
Working Paper provided that the initiative to request restoration laid with the state and qualified 
organisations would only be entitled to request that action would be taken.590 
With respect to prevention, the Working Paper created a general duty on operators to prevent an 
imminent treat of SED.591 In case of imminent treat, the Member States would have to request action by the 
operator, or take the appropriate action themselves, and recover the costs of so doing.592 
As far as restoration was concerned, the Working Paper defined, similar to the White Paper, that if an 
activity was listed under EU law as an inherent dangerous activity, strict liability would apply, and if it was 
not listed, fault liability would apply. Hence, where SED had occurred, there would be a duty on Member 
States to ensure that operators would comply with their obligations. In the case of strict liability activities 
they would require the operator to take restorative measures, regardless of fault. In the case of fault based 
liability activities, they would require the operator to take restorative measures, if he was at fault. If the 
operator failed to respond to a request, the Member States would take the appropriate action themselves 
and recover the costs of so doing.593 Remarkable is that compared to the White paper the defences for the 
operator in the Working Paper were more limited.594 
With respect to the subsidiarity principle, the Working Paper sketched the proposed regime’s main 
elements without providing arguments to justify the Community’s competence in the matter. Yet, 
according to Bergkamp, as the EC had already adopted habitats and water legislation, it might be that the 
Member States felt that the subsidiarity principle was met with respect to regulated habitats and waters and 
hence that proposal would be politically acceptable. Bergkamp, however, is more doubtful about the EU’s 
competence with respect to harm to human health.595 
In any case, the reactions of the Member States on the Working Paper were moderately positive.596 
Also at academic level, the shift to a public law regime was welcomed. Nevertheless, Bergkamp argued that 
the proposed regime, being a hybrid of private and public law, might cause significant implementation 
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difficulties. He argued that, given its restoration objective, the proposed EC regime did not have to impose 
any obligations on operators. Obligations on Member States would have been sufficient. Hence, no liability 
rules should be required by the EC and Member States should be free to decide how to finance natural 
resource restoration. Thus, rather than a hybrid regime, Bergkamp advised the EC to adopt a simple public 
law regime.597 
In order to prevent another deception in the environmental liability project, the Commission 
continued on the Working Paper and tried to find a compromise between interested parties as industry and 
environmental organisations.598 On 21 February 2002, the Commission submitted a Proposal for a Directive 
to the European Parliament and the Council, in accordance with the co-decision procedure.599 The Proposal 
built further on the Working Paper. 
Indeed, the Proposal presented a framework whereby environmental damage would be prevented 
and restored. Similar to the Working Paper, environmental damage would include biodiversity damage to 
Community and nationally protected sites, damage to waters covered by the Water Framework Directive 
and land contamination which poses a threat to human health. Moreover, the regime would be based on the 
polluter-pays principle, such that operators, who undertake an inherently dangerous activity, regulated 
under EC law, could be held liable for any of the three types of harm. Operators of non-dangerous activities 
would face fault-based liability. However, they could only be held liable for damage to biodiversity. 
Furthermore, the Proposal imposed liability on the Member States to take the necessary preventive or 
restoration measures with regard to ‘orphan’ sites’.600 Insurance would not be compulsory, although the 
Proposal encouraged the operators to use insurance of another form of financial security. Finally, the 
regime would not apply retrospectively.601 
Yet, compared to the Working Paper, important concessions were made to industry groups by 
inserting broad defences against liability in terms of regulatory compliance and state—of the—art 
knowledge at the time of the damage. These provisions became heavily debated items in the debate during 
the co-decision phase that followed.602 Moreover, compared to the White Paper, the proposed Directive 
would not provide for a compensation of ‘traditional damage’ (personal injury, damage to goods and 
properties) as these were already covered under the liability regimes of the Member States. Also the 
position of public interest groups had fundamentally changed. In the Proposal, NGO’s were now excluded 
from the right to claim compensation from polluters. Instead, it was held that qualified organisations would 
only be entitled to request that action would be taken by the competent authority against the polluter.603 
As far as subsidiarity was concerned, in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal,604 the 
Commission justified European action with respect to environmental liability rules. 
First, in the Explanatory Memorandum, the Commission stated that Community action was needed to 
address site contamination and the loss of biodiversity in the Community. The Commission held that site 
contamination could pose a threat to human health and referred to some 300,000 sites in the Community 
that have already been identified as definitely or potentially contaminated. The Commission considered 
that liability rules were necessary to prevent further contamination by providing an incentive to avoid 
causing damage in accordance with the preventive principle and to ensure that the potential polluters are 
liable for the costs of restoring the environmental damage in accordance with the polluter pays principle. 
Indeed, similar to the justifications in the White Paper, the implementation of three grand environmental 
principles enshrined in Art 174 (2) of the EC Treaty: the polluter pays, precautionary and preventive 
principles, is the key justification for the ELD. Indeed, with respect to damage to protected species and 
habitats, the Wild Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive do not provide liability provisions, and hence 
the ELD could ensure implementation of the above principles.  
Second, the Commission argued that not all Member States605 adopted a liability regime for 
contaminated land. It was argued that without Community action there would be little guaranteeing that 
the polluter pays principle would be effectively applied across all the Community. 
                                                             
597  Bergkamp 2001b, 216. 
598  Wagner 2005, 76. 
599  Commission Communication of 23 January, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Environmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and Restoration of Environmental Damage, COM (2002) 17 final, 
OJ C151 E/132. 
600  Sites where the operator who caused the damage cannot be found or is insolvent. 
601  Hattan 2002, 3 and Brans 2002, 135. 
602  Clarke 2003, 261. 
603  Brans 2002, 138; Hattan 2002, 3. 
604  Commission Communication of 23 January, proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Environmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and Restoration of Environmental Damage, COM (2002) 17 final, 
OJ C151 E/132, Explanatory Memorandum, 4-6. 
605  Portugal and Greece are mentioned in the Proposal, Explanatory Memorandum, 4-6. 
  Chapter 4 
 129 
Third, according to the Commission, most Member States’ liability regimes for contaminated land did 
not mandate national authorities to ensure that orphan sites are actually cleaned up. Thus national 
legislation did not ensure that the objective of restoration was attained. 
Fourth, the Commission advanced that few, if any Member States imposed liability for biodiversity 
damage. However, the Commission referred to the European Commission’s proposal for a European Union 
Sustainable Development Strategy, adopted on 15 May 2001, which recognised that the loss of biodiversity 
in the Community has accelerated dramatically in recent decades. Hence, it was concluded biodiversity is 
one of the severe or irreversible threats to the future well-being of European society that warrants priority 
action. 
Finally, the Commission argued, as it did before in the White Paper, that without a harmonised 
framework at Community level, economic actors could exploit differences in Member States’ which would 
result in unfair competition. 
Again, this next step in the environmental liability saga was heavily criticised by interested parties. 
Industry held that the Proposal was too vague and might become unreasonably onerous for the European 
industry. Environmental organisations were disappointed by what was called the ‘watering down’ of the 
proposal, in particular by including defences and the fact that qualified organisations were now excluded 
from the right to claim compensation from polluters.606 Some environmental organisations claimed that the 
Proposal did not meet the provisions of the Århus Convention.607 
After the submission of the Proposal to the European Parliament and the Council, an extensive work 
programme followed, especially by the environment working party of the Council. The Parliament was 
slower in considering the proposed directive due to a long-lasting dispute between the Legal Affairs 
Committee and the Environment Committee as to which of them would be the lead Committee. Heavy 
lobbying on all sides in this stage of the process should also not be ignored . Chapter 6 will discuss the 
decision-making process and lobbying activities in detail. Having resolved the dispute in the Parliament by 
the confirmation of the Legal Affairs Committee as the lead Committee, the European Parliament finished 
its first reading in May 2003. In September 2003, the Council adopted its Common Position and in 
December 2003, the Parliament finished its second reading. The conciliation procedure started January 2004 
and on 30 and 31 March 2004 respectively, the Council and the European Parliament formally approved the 
final version of the Environmental Liability Directive.608 The European Parliament had wanted to reach 
agreement on the Directive before 1 May 2004 when enlargement would have required to recommence the 
political sensitive process with a new Council and a new European Parliament.609 In that case it might have 
taken a long time, if at all, before an environmental liability regime would have been adopted at EU level. 
Yet, not only the successive initiatives in the development process of the ELD have been studied and 
criticised in the academic literature. Also the final version of the ELD recently has been extensively 
examined and criticised at academic level. The critique addresses subsidiarity and sovereignty issues as 
well as the provisions of the final version of the ELD itself. Various provisions of the ELD are vague and the 
Directive leaves important issues up to the Member States. It is therefore now appropriate to examine the 
justifications given for the ELD under the subsidiarity principle, to examine the most important provisions 
of the Directive in order to indicate why the ELD has raised so many criticisms and to study in particular its 
application to soil pollution. 
2.2. Directive 2004/35/CE of 21 April 2004 on Environmental Liability with Regard to the 
Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage 
2.2.1. Legal Basis of EC Intervention in Environmental Liability 
The Environmental Liability Directive has been based on Article 175 EC, as the aim and content of the 
proposed measure is mainly related to the objectives and principles stated in Article 174-176 EC Treaty. 
Indeed ‘preventing and remedying environmental damage’ contributes to implementing the objectives and 
principles of the Community’s environment policy a set out in the EC Treaty.610 
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By using Article 175 EC the Commission offers the Member States as much space as possible to 
maintain or introduce additional or more stringent national legislation. Indeed, as discussed above, under 
Article 95 EC of the Treaty, Member States’ room for manoeuvre is much more limited. 
2.2.2. Justifications for the ELD with Respect to the Subsidiarity and Proportionality Principles 
The studies that the Commission ordered over the years to document its proposal for an Environmental 
Liability Directive reveal that most Member States have liability rules for environmental damage, that 
almost all Member States have adopted soil protection and remediation legislation and that although not all 
Member States have liability rules for harm to biodiversity, many Member States are working on the 
subject.611 Hence, this triggers the question why there was a need for an environmental liability regime at 
European level.612 A significant part of the disputes during the development process of the ELD indeed 
considered the question whether and for what reasons a harmonised environmental liability regime was 
needed in the European Union. 
In previous documents as the White Paper and the Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal of 2002, 
justifications for Community action were provided. Yet, a clear overview of justifications for a harmonised 
liability regime cannot be found anymore in the final text of the ELD. Preamble 3 of the ELD states that 
subsidiarity is met because the ELD’s objective, namely to establish a common framework for the 
prevention and remedying of environmental damage, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
and can therefore be better achieved at Community level by reason of scale or effect.613 The Commission 
does not explain why it is necessary to establish such a framework or why it cannot be achieved by the 
Member States. Moreover, the Commission’s reasoning in Preamble 3 is, as Bergkamp and Faure indicate, 
merely a description of the subsidiarity principle itself and does not provide any justification.614 
Bergkamp is also very critical about the justification of the Commission with respect to the 
proportionality principle. The Commission claims that the Directive does not go beyond what is necessary 
in order to achieve its objectives.615 However, Bergkamp holds that several provisions of the Directive are 
disproportional. For instance, Bergkamp holds that the restoration objective requires only an obligation to 
restore; provisions specifying who is to pay for restoration are not needed to achieve this objective. 
Likewise, Bergkamp states that the broad open-ended operator obligation to take action to prevent 
environmental damage would be limited only by a vague definition of ‘imminent threat’ of environmental 
damage and therefore fails to meet the proportionality principle.616 
Hence, scholars argue that the Commission, the Parliament and the Council have failed to fulfil the 
subsidiarity and the proportionality principle. Faure rightly indicates that this critique is not merely a 
scholarly debate, but that ignoring the subsidiarity and proportionality principle can have substantial 
negative effects for the European Union. Indeed, such behaviour would encourage eurosceptics and 
endanger projects where European action would be desirable.617 
Yet, Chapter 6 of this research will compare the reasons provided by the Commission for a European 
environmental liability regime, including liability rules for soil pollution, with the above developed 
framework in order to study whether these arguments indeed justify harmonisation of environmental 
liability rules at European level. Therefore, the arguments provided by the Commission in previous 
documents may be taken as a starting point. 
Hence, all together, it seems that the Commission considers that there is a need for European action in 
the field of environmental liability in order to: 
• Realise the three grand environmental principles enshrined in Art 174 (2) of the EC Treaty: the 
polluter pays, precautionary and preventive principles; 
• Address soil contamination and loss of biodiversity in the Community by means of liability rules. In 
order to ensure equal treatment, the Directive must cover both transboundary damage as damage 
within the Member States; 
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• Ensure a level playing field in the European Union. 
Yet, although the subsidiarity and proportionality principles apparently are not fulfilled, the Directive 
ultimately has been adopted and it now merits examining the scope and provisions of the Directive. 
2.2.3. Provisions of the Directive 
2.2.3.1. Purpose of the Directive 
The contribution of the ELD would be the prevention and remediation of environmental damage. As such, 
the ELD would contribute to implementing the objectives and principles of the Community’s environment 
policy as set out in the Treaty.618 
Indeed, the objective of the Environmental Liability Directive is to establish a framework of 
environmental liability based on the ‘polluter-pays’ principle, to prevent and remedy environmental 
damage.619 Yet, the term ‘environmental liability’ has been criticised as confusing because the ELD does not 
offer a real civil liability regime, but a mainly public law regime to be enforced by competent authorities, 
combined with private law aspects as strict liability and fault-based liability. This is comparable with the 
reasoning in the Working Paper of 2001.620 The ELD imposes obligations on operators to prevent 
environmental damage and if necessary to remedy it and to report threatening or actual damage to the 
authorities. The government has the authority to order the operator to take additional measures to prevent 
or to remedy environmental damage. If the operator does not comply, the competent authority can execute 
the measures, or have them executed by a third party and recover the cost from the operator. Through this 
mechanism the Commission hopes to ensure that the polluter-pays principle enshrined in Art 174 (2) of the 
EC Treaty is realised.621 
2.2.3.2. Scope of the Directive 
In line with the Working Paper of 2001, environmental damage in terms of the Directive includes damage to 
protected species and habitats, water damage and land damage.622 Yet, similar to the Working Paper and 
the Proposal, in the final version of the ELD, damage to protected species and habitats is limited to species 
of birds listed in the Wild Birds Directive623 and their habitats and those listed in the Habitats Directive624 
and any other habitat or species so determined by a Member State.625 The first two categories are also 
known as Natura 2000 sites, which covers approximately 10-15 % of the Community’s land area.626 
Consequently, harm to ‘unprotected’ species and habitats falls outside the scope of the Directive.627 Annex I 
of the Directive provides a list of criteria to determine when there is damage to protected species and 
habitats. 
Water damage only falls within the Directive’s scope if the water-course is covered by the Water 
Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC)628 and the Directive is only applicable to land contamination 
if there is a significant risk that human health is adversely affected.629 Hence, land contamination in 
uninhabited areas will fall out of the scope of the Directive.630 As mentioned above, in contrast with the 
White Paper, traditional damage, such as damage to health and property, has been excluded from the scope 
of the Directive. Furthermore, the Directive will only have a prospective effect.631 
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Hence, the scope of the ELD is more limited than its supporters originally might have hoped for. Yet, 
this means that, in case of an accident, besides the Directive, other — national or European — rules will 
exist, to remedy the damage that does not fall under the scope of the Directive. Depending on the question 
whether the Directive is applicable, one accident might for example require that two different regimes are 
applied, the regime of the Directive for the damage that falls within its scope, and a regime for damage 
outside the scope of the Directive, for example to health and property. As far as consistency and legal 
certainty is concerned, this might not be a good evolution.632 Moreover, sometimes these different regimes 
might be overlapping or inconsistent. 
2.2.3.3. Nature of Liability 
In order to implement the polluter-pays principle, the site operator who caused the damage can be held 
financially liability under the Directive.633 
The Directive provides for two distinct liability regimes: a strict liability regime and a fault liability 
regime. First, strict liability applies to operators who professionally conduct risky or potentially risky 
activities. These activities are listed in Annex III of the Directive.634 The strict liability regime covers damage 
to protected species and natural habitats, water and land damage. Second, fault-based liability applies to all 
other professional activities. Unlike strict liability, this regime only applies to protected species and natural 
habitats, not to water or land damage.635 
Yet, there are a few cases in which operators can be exempted from liability. Exemptions can be found 
in Article 4 of the Directive and include for example act of war, force majeure and environmental damage 
that falls under the scope of international conventions listed in Annex IV. Besides these exemptions, the 
Member States may adopt a partial or a complete state —of—the—art defence or permit compliance 
defence.636 These two defences were heavily disputed in the negotiation process of the ELD. Industry 
argued that a permit defence was necessary to ensure competitiveness or European industry. 
Environmental interest groups held that a permit defence would weaken the liability regime. Yet, as with 
several other controversial issues (for example insurance aspects), the Council left the choice of including 
these defences up to the Member States.637 Bergkamp pleads that Member States would adopt these 
defences as it would be a basic requirement of administrative law that a government cannot first allow an 
act and, in case of damage, prohibit that act and recover the costs of the damage from the operator to whom 
permission was given. Likewise, for the state—of—the—art defence, if it was impossible to know the risk, 
the operator could not prevent the damage and Bergkamp holds that administrative sanctions or liability 
are not appropriate.638 On the other hand, Faure and Wenneras rightly argue that allowing these defences 
would seriously undermine the regime of the Directive.639 
2.2.3.4. Preventive and Restorative Measures 
The first objective of the ELD is the prevention of environmental damage. A general preventive effect that 
the ELD might have is the economic threat of liability for the reparation of any damage that does occur. 
Moreover, in addition to this general preventive effect, the ELD imposes in Article 5 of the ELD the 
obligation on the operator to prevent environmental damage from occurring.640 This means that if there is 
an imminent treat of environmental damage, the operator shall take the necessary preventive measures. 
Operators are also obliged to inform the competent authority of all relevant aspects of the situation. The 
competent authority may require information or give instructions to the operator to be followed concerning 
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the preventive measures to be taken. If the operator fails to comply with the obligations, the competent 
authority may take these measures itself.641 
The second objective of the Directive is the restoration of environmental damage. Article 6 of the 
Directive lists the obligations of the operator to remedy the damage. When environmental damage has 
occurred, the operator shall inform the competent authority of all relevant aspects of the situation and take 
all practical steps to control, contain, remove or otherwise manage the contaminants and/or any other 
damage factors in order to limit or to prevent further environmental damage and adverse effects on human 
health or further impairment of services.642 Annex II offers a common framework for Member States to 
select the most appropriate measure to ensure that environmental damage is remedied for protected species 
and habitats, water and land. Protected species and habitats and water must be restored to baseline 
condition. This is the condition of the natural resources that would have existed if the environmental 
damage had not occurred, estimated on the best information available.643 Land on the other had, does not 
need to be remedied to its baseline condition. The ELD provides that land is remedied by removing, 
controlling, containing or reducing contaminants so as to ensure that the contaminants do not pose a 
significant risk to human health.644 
Yet, as with the defences, precise definitions of damage, baseline assessments and restoration criteria 
are passed on the Member States.645 
In contrast to the proposal of the Directive, it follows from Article 5 §4 and Article 6 §3 of the ELD that 
the authorities are not obliged to take preventive or remedial measures themselves in case of orphan 
sites.646 This might somewhat be compensated by the wording of Article 8 § 2, which stipulates that the 
competent authority shall recover, inter alia, via security over property or other appropriate guarantees, 
from the operator who has caused the damage or the imminent threat of damage, the costs it has incurred. 
In this sense, Article 8 §2 addresses aims to protect the competent authority against insolvency of the 
operator.647 Moreover, several of the Directives to which the ELD refers to, contain obligations requiring the 
authorities to take remedial measures. Article 4 §4 of the Wild Birds Directive and Article 6 §2 of the 
Natural Habitats Directive require Member States to take appropriate measures to avoid pollution. The 
Water Framework Directive obliges Member States in Article 4 §6 to ensure that all practical measures are 
taken with the aim of restoring the body of water to its status prior the incident. Moreover, the Member 
States may be held liable under the Frankovich doctrine if they have committed a serious breach of the 
Environmental Liability Directive,648 for example if they failed to oblige to operator to take preventive or 
restorative measures.649 
2.2.3.5. Competent Authority and Requests for Action 
Member States have to ensure that effective means of implementation and enforcement are available. The 
Member States therefore have to designate the competent authority(ies) responsible for assessing the 
significance of the damage and determining which remedial measures should be taken.650 
A qualified (environmental) NGO or another natural or legal person may submit comments 
concerning environmental damage or an imminent threat of environmental damage to the relevant 
competent authority and request the authority to take action under the ELD.651 The White Paper attributed 
to environmental organisations the power to require an operator to conduct preventive and remedial 
measures. This power has not been retained in the final version of the ELD, nor do citizens acquire any 
rights from the Directive, as damage to human health and property do not fall within the scope of the 
Directive. Moreover, the Directive does not foresee a sanction if a Member State does not respond 
adequately to the NGO’s request. As Brans rightly indicates, this omission, which has been one of the main 
criticisms to the ELD, might undermine the ability of the NGO’s to contribute to the effective 
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implementation and enforcement of the Directive, as foreseen in preamble 25 of the Directive.652 Moreover, 
the ELD seems not to comply with the Århus Convention.653 It is clear that this evolution has been deplored 
and criticised by various scholars and environmental interest groups. 
2.2.3.6. Insurance Aspects 
Financial security has been another heavily debated issue in the development process of the ELD. The 
positions ranged from requiring mandatory insurance to omitting any reference to financial security.654 The 
major obstacle was and is the ability of the insurance market to provide financial security instruments for 
environmental damage. Again, the issue was passed on to the Member States. The ELD only stipulates that 
Member States shall take measures to encourage the development of financial security instruments with the 
aim of enabling operators to use financial guarantees to cover their responsibilities under the Directive. The 
Commission shall, before 30 April 2010, present a report on the ‘availability at reasonable costs and on 
conditions of insurance and other types of financial security for activities covered by Annex III.655 Yet, law 
and economics theory indicates that strict liability without financial security will weaken the preventive 
effect of liability rules.656 
2.2.3.7. Cooperation between Member States for Transboundary Damage 
The Directive foresees that if environmental damage has occurred that affects — or is likely to affect — 
more than one Member State, these Member States must co-operate in ensuring that preventive actions and 
where needed remedial actions are taken and that necessary information is exchanged.657 
Moreover, if a Member State identifies environmental damage within its borders, which has been 
caused by another Member State, it may seek to recover the costs of preventative or remedial measures the 
Member state has incurred.658 This is not the same though as an obligation for the polluting Member State 
to pay for the damage. 
2.2.3.8. Member States’ Room for Manoeuvre 
In accordance with Art 176 EC Treaty, Article 16 of the ELD stipulates that Member States may maintain or 
adopt more stringent provisions in their national law to prevent and restore environmental damage.659 
Member States may for example give the ELD regime retroactive effect so that historical damage and 
damage caused before 30 April 2007 fall under the applicable national legislation. They also may add 
additional activities to the scope of the Directive and impose liability on additional responsible parties.660 
Consequently, there might be a significant variation between the Member States and the question might rise 
whether this would not introduce considerable uncertainty into the regime.661 
2.2.3.9. Implementation 
A Directive has to be implemented in national law. The ELD foresees that Member States shall bring into 
force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions, necessary to comply with the Directive by 30 
April 2007.662 However, as indicated above, several provisions of the Directive leave important choices up 
to the Member States, as for example the defences that are allowed. Furthermore, the vagueness of some 
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provisions allows several interpretations.663 Therefore, the implementation of the Directive will be complex 
and discussions on the Directive are certainly not ended yet.664 Moreover, it has to be awaited whether the 
Directive can be enforced in practice. First, as stated above, Annex I of the Directive provides a list of 
criteria to determine when there is damage to protected species and habitats. Moreover, the extensive annex 
II sets out which are the most appropriate measures to ensure the remedying of the damage. Yet, as these 
criteria are not undoubtedly clear, Bauw expects long-standing appeals before the national courts. Second, 
also the exclusion of historical damage might hinder the enforcement of the Directive. Bauw argues that the 
Directive prescribes that remedying environmental damage in relation to water or protected species and or 
natural habitats is achieved through the restoration of the environment to its baseline condition. Yet, this 
baseline condition might be difficult to establish in case historical pollution is already present. It might be 
difficult to distinguish between the historical and the recent damage. Finally, other aspects as causality 
problems and defences that might be included might influence the practical enforcement of the ELD.665 
2.2.4. Evaluation 
With the ELD, the Community aims to establish a framework of environmental liability based on the 
‘polluter-pays’ principle, to prevent and remedy environmental damage. Yet, the ELD has raised various 
criticisms and questions. The Commission fails to explain why it is necessary to establish such a framework 
or why it cannot be achieved by the Member States, as is required by the subsidiarity principle. 
Furthermore, the coverage of the Directive is limited, so that different regimes may apply to different types 
of damage, in case of an incident. Moreover, the ELD has left crucial aspects, as defences, insurance but also 
precise definitions of damage or restoration criteria, up to the Member States. Member States may also 
maintain or adopt more stringent provisions in their national law to prevent and restore environmental 
damage. Consequently, the ELD provides an uncertain framework and if the Directive comes into force, the 
EU liability regime will be a less harmonised regime and might create more uncertainty than its adherents 
originally might have thought. Moreover, it has to be awaited whether the Directive can be of much use in 
practice. 
The next paragraph, which focuses on the application of the Directive to soil pollution, will illustrate 
that the Directive raises various questions and uncertainty. 
3. Application of the Environmental Liability Directive to Soil Pollution 
This paragraph will first sketch the problem of contaminated land in the European Union and national and 
European responses to remedy soil contamination. In a second step, the application and consequences of 
the ELD to soil pollution will be examined. 
3.1. Soil Protection Policies in the European Union 
3.1.1. Soil Pollution in the European Union 
Assessing the extent of soil pollution in the European Union is extremely difficult. The European 
Environment Agency (EEA) estimates that as many as 1.5 million industrial and waste disposal sites could 
be contaminated, of which 300,000 sites are already identified as being contaminated.666 This wide range in 
estimations is due to the lack of a common definition for contaminated sites. Although almost all EU 
Member States are developing national inventories of contaminated sites, few data is of direct use. The data 
is not comparable due to different approaches to acceptable risk levels, protection targets and exposure 
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parameters and a different attitude in what the Member States regard as potentially or actually 
contaminated sites.667 As the EEA notes, not all states for example, include military sites when creating an 
inventory of contaminated sites, nor do they all include operational as well as abandoned sites.668 
Contamination of soils and groundwater around military sides especially is a problem in some of the new 
EU countries, as the Baltic States, Czech Republic and Hungary.669 
Consequently, estimates about the amount of contaminated land in the European Union are extremely 
uncertain and depend entirely on the parameters used.670 
The EU Member States have developed or are developing national strategies to prevent and remedy 
soil pollution. Yet, national responses vary considerably and depend on policy concerns, the political 
system and the physical features of each state.671 It would be impossible to clarify soil protection measures 
of all EU Member States. The next paragraphs will therefore only highlight the most important aspect of 
soil protection legislation in the Member States.672 
The scope and perspective of Member States’ legislations and the approaches used can be very 
different and depend on the main problems experienced by soil pollution. For instance, in some countries, 
soil protection legislation focuses on the protection of groundwater quality, as a source of drinking water, 
like in Denmark. In other countries, soil protection legislation is, besides industrial activities, also applicable 
to agricultural activities, as in the Netherlands. In other countries such as Spain and France this is not so 
important.673 
Due to the nature of soil pollution, with multiple causes and consequences, soil pollution is addressed 
in different policy domains. Some EU Member States deal with soil pollution in the context of general 
environmental policy, whilst other deal with it as part of waste regulation (Italy, Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal)674 but it has also become important in land use policy (like in Belgium and Denmark).675 
Moreover, national strategies are multi-layered, with varying inputs at national, regional and local 
levels, depending on the political structure of the Member States.676 In federal jurisdictions, the regional 
authorities tend to be important. In Belgium, for example, the regions are entirely responsible for 
contaminated land.677 
In order to identify contaminated land, some countries have developed a system of identification and 
registration of polluted sites (Belgium, Austria, UK, and Spain). Legislation can also put limitations on the 
transfer of polluted land (Sweden, Belgium).678 
Finally, restoration of the soil is in most Member States dominated by administrative law, which 
creates a relationship between the public authorities and the polluter.679 
Besides these Member States’ responses to soil pollution, it merits to have a look at European 
initiatives to protect soil. 
3.1.2. EC Policy for Soil Protection 
Different EU policies (for instance on water, waste, chemicals, industrial pollution prevention, nature 
protection, pesticides and agriculture) contribute to soil protection but no coherent policy to soil pollution 
exists yet at European level. 
However, a coherent approach to soil protection is in the making. The 6th Environmental Action 
Programme (EAP), approved by Council and European Parliament in 2002 and which runs until 2012, 
introduced soil protection as one of the seven thematic strategies to protect and preserve natural resources 
and asked the Commission to present a strategy to protect European soil.680 
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A first step in the development of a coherent EU soil policy was the Communication `Towards a 
Thematic Strategy for Soil Protection’ in 2002, in which the Commission described the multiple functions 
and features of soil, and the main threats to soil in the EU.681 Moreover, the Communication outlined the 
first steps towards the development of a Thematic Strategy to protect soils in the European Union. Next, the 
Commission launched a consultation process in February 2003. The Commission asked the opinion of the 
other European Institutions, the EU Member States and Regional Authorities, and consulted the broad 
community of European-wide stakeholder organisations as civil society, NGO’s, industry, international and 
professional organisations. The Dutch EU-Presidency organised a high level Conference on 18-19 
November 2004 in The Hague. Around 120 representatives of the EU Member States, the Commission itself, 
experts and stakeholders attended the ‘Vital Soil’ conference. Moreover, the Commission carried out an 
extensive internet public consultation.682 
The consultation showed support for an EU Soil Strategy, although it will be clear that some economic 
sectors who would be affected do not agree, as for example farmers.683 Nevertheless, on 22 September 2006, 
the Commission adopted a comprehensive EU Soil Protection Strategy. The Thematic Strategy for Soil 
Protection consists of a Communication from the Commission to the other European Institutions, a 
proposal for a framework Directive, and an Impact Assessment. The publication of the Strategy was 
delayed due to objections to some of its provisions by enterprise commissioner Günter Verheugen, in 
particular with respect to contaminated sites inventories. In the final text, however, most of these provisions 
seem to be unchanged.684 
In the Communication685 the Commission explains why further Community action is needed to ensure 
a high level of soil protection, sets the overall objective of the Strategy and explains what kind of measures 
must be taken. Moreover, it establishes a ten-year work programme for the European Commission. 
The Proposal for a Framework Directive686 sets out common principles, objectives and actions for the 
protection of soils across the EU. It requires Member States to adopt a systematic approach to identifying 
and combating soil degradation, taking precautionary measures and integrating soils protection into other 
policies. Yet, within this common framework, the Member States would have considerable leeway to decide 
how best to protect soil and how use it in a sustainable way on their own territory.687 The commission 
decided against setting legally binding soil quality standards or timetables in the proposal. It is argued that 
this reflects the heterogeneous state of soil degradation in the EU.688 On the other hand, it is clear that 
binding targets would make it harder to get the Directive approved.689 
Member States are required to identify areas where there is a risk of erosion, organic matter decline, 
compaction, salinisation and landslides. They must set risk reduction targets for those areas and establish 
programmes of measures that are necessary to achieve these targets. They will also have to prevent further 
soil contamination. On the basis of a common definition of contaminated sites, Member States will be 
required to draw up public inventories of contaminated sites, and establish national remediation strategies 
to address them, starting with sites that pose the greatest risk to health. This is complemented with an 
obligation for the seller or the prospective buyer to provide, to the administration and the other party in the 
transaction, a soil status report based on chemical analysis when a site is being sold where a potentially 
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contaminating activity690 has taken or is taking place. The Proposal also aims to prevent soil contamination 
by a requirement to limit the introduction of dangerous substances into the soil. Finally, the Member States 
are required to limit or mitigate the effects of sealing, for example by the rehabilitation of brownfields.691 
The Impact Assessment692 provides an analysis of the economic, social and environmental impacts of 
the different options that were considered in the preparatory phase of the strategy and of the option (a 
framework Directive) finally retained by the Commission. 
Whether and when the Framework Directive on Soil Protection will be adopted remains to be awaited. 
If it will be adopted, there will be some consequences for the Environmental Liability Directive’s 
application to soil pollution. This will be further discussed in 4.3.2. 
Yet, at present, in absence of a European soil protection policy, the prevention and the restoration of 
soil pollution is addressed indirectly in different environmental or other policy areas. EC directives that 
address soil issues are for example found in the area of air, water, waste, and chemical policies. Soil 
protection is only indirectly addressed. Nevertheless, these directives may implicitly contribute to the 
protection of the soil.693 
First, with respect to air, Directive 96/62/EC aims to improve the ambient air quality and sets air 
quality standards for various pollutants, e.g. sulphur dioxides, nitrogen dioxide or heavy metals.694 
Through the reduction of air born pollution, these Directives might contribute to the reduction of soil 
acidification and contamination with heavy metals.695 
The Water Framework Directive696 contributes to the protection of soil through the implementation of 
the programmes of measures to obtain a good ecological status in all water bodies, and through the 
implementation of the codes of good agricultural practices in particularly vulnerable zones.697 The Nitrate 
Directive698 focuses on the protection of waters against nitrate pollution but is only applicable to pollution 
caused by agricultural sources. 
With respect to waste, soil protection objectives are present in the Waste Framework Directive,699 
which stipulates that waste is to be disposed of without endangering the soil, but also in other specific 
waste legislation. Indeed, the Sewage Sludge Directive700 regulates the use of sewage sludge in such a way 
as to prevent harmful effects on soil, but is only applicable to agricultural activities. Another example is the 
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Landfill Directive701 which regulates the operation of new and existing landfills and is concentrated on the 
prevention or reduction of pollution of surface water, groundwater, soil and air.702 
In chemicals legislation, the initiatives with respect to the use of pesticides, in particular the Directives 
on Authorisation of Plant Protection Products703 and on Biocidal Products,704 as well as the REACH 
proposal705 pay attention to soil protection. 
The IPPC Framework Directive706 introduced an integrated process-oriented approach. The Directive 
regulates emissions, recommending the use of Best Available Techniques and an integrated approach to 
emissions to air, water and soil as a condition for granting permits to large industrial installations.707 
In addition, other European policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), may also have 
an impact on soil. With the last CAP reform, soil related issues have been addressed in a more coherent 
way, especially through the introduction of the compulsory cross-compliance scheme. Farmers who receive 
direct payments are obliged to respect specific statutory management requirements and maintain land in 
Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition (cross-compliance). These cross compliance standards, 
defined at national or regional level, should ensure a minimum level of soil protection for agricultural land 
with respect to erosion, organic matter and compaction.708 
Summarising, nowadays, soil pollution is a recognised as a widespread environmental problem in the 
EU. The Member States have started to develop national policies to remedy soil contamination. Yet, soil 
protection measures vary considerably among the EU Member States and depend on policy concerns, the 
political system, the physical features of each state and the main problems experienced through soil 
pollution. Moreover, Member States’ responses tend to be multi-layered, with varying inputs at national, 
regional and local level. Data of contaminated sites and remediation are not comparable due to lack of a 
common definition for contaminated sites. At present, at EU level, soil pollution is addressed fragmentary 
and indirectly in other policy areas. However, the EU Commission has taken the first steps to develop a 
comprehensive European soil protection policy. 
The Environmental Liability Directive also applies to soil pollution. The next paragraph will examine 
the impact of the Directive on soil protection policies in the Member States. 
3.2. Application of the Directive to Soil Pollution 
The ELD, which aim is to establish a framework of environmental liability based on the polluter-pays 
principle, to prevent and remedy environmental damage, also applies to soil pollution. Article 2 (1c) of the 
directive, defining ‘environmental damage’, includes ‘land damage, which is any land contamination that creates 
a significant risk of human health being adversely affected as a result of direct or indirect introduction, in on, or under 
land, of substances, preparations, organisms or micro-organisms’.709 
This paragraph will examine how much impact the directive might have on Member States’ soil 
protection policies. 
3.2.1. Scope of the Directive with Respect to Land Damage 
As stated above, Article 2 of the Directive includes land damage within environmental damage. However, 
the application of the Directive, as far as soil contamination is concerned, is limited by various provisions. 
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There are several reasons why most of the contaminated land will fall out of the scope of the Directive once 
it has been implemented.710 
First, environmental damage, which includes land damage, is only covered by the Directive if it has 
been caused by any of the (dangerous) occupational activities listed in Annex III of the Directive, and to any 
imminent treat of such damage occurring by reason of any of those activities.711 If soil contamination has 
been caused by a professional activity other than those listed in Annex III, the operator cannot be held liable 
under the Directive and recourse will have to be taken to national provisions.712 
During the legislative procedure, the European Parliament attempted to widen the scope of the 
Directive, including an amendment in its Resolution of 14 May 2003 that ‘five years from the date of its 
entry into force, this Directive shall apply to all environmental damage caused or likely to cause by the 
operation of any occupational activity, not just those listed in Annex III, or any substance used in any such 
activity or substance’.713 This amendment however was not adopted. 
Next, land damage only falls under the scope of the Directive if the risk of harm to human health is 
‘significant’.714 This means that soil contamination in uninhabited areas will fall out of the scope of the 
Directive.715 Moreover, it will be impossible for a national authority to oblige, on the basis of the Directive, 
an operator who causes ecological damage without serious risk for human health, to take restorative 
measures or the recover the costs from the restoration in case the authority acted itself. Remarkable is also 
that the Directive does not clearly indicate when there is significant harm to human health.716 
Furthermore, the Directive ‘will only apply to environmental damage or to an imminent treat of such 
damage caused by pollution of a diffuse character, where it is possible to establish a causal link between the 
damage and the activities of individual operators’.717 The Directive does not give a clear answer whether 
the authorities or the operator bear the burden of proof of the existence or non-existence of a causal 
relationship between the damage and the activities of the operator. However, from Article 3, § 1 and Article 
4 § 5 which limit the application of the Directive and Article 8 §3,718 which explicitly reverses the burden of 
proof, can be deducted that the burden of proof lies with the authorities.719 
Yet, soil might be contaminated by more than one substance, by more than one operator and causal 
links are rarely clear. The Directive does not require a causal link between one single operator and the harm 
(Article 4 § 5 considers ‘individual operators in plural’). For the cost allocation in case of multiple party 
causation however, the Directive refers to national law.720 Nevertheless, this provision still might mean that, 
for various sites that are contaminated by diffuse pollution, even causing harm to health, individual 
operators cannot be held liable under the directive if the causal link cannot be undeniably proven. 
Therefore, this provision might impose a severe restriction on the imposition of liability for contaminated 
land on the basis of the Directive. This also means that agricultural activities, where diffuse pollution is 
common, often might be excluded from the scope of the Directive.721 
Yet, Article 16 § 1 allows Member States to maintain or adopt more stringent provisions in relation to 
the prevention and remedying of environmental damage. Hence, according to Wagner, Member States 
must be allowed to clarify the causality provisions in national law, or to reverse, under restrictive 
conditions, the burden of proof on the operator.722 
A last reason why many contaminated sites will be unaffected by the Directive when it has been 
implemented is that the Directive only has a prospective effect. Indeed, Article 17 and 19 (1) confirm that 
the Directive will only have prospective effect. The Directive will not apply to damage caused by an 
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emission, event or incident that took place before 30 April 2007, when the Directive as to be implemented.723 
Consequently, the 1.5 million sites currently thought to be contaminated by the EEA will need to be 
remedied independently of the ELD, regulated — if at all — by domestic provisions in the Member 
States.724 
Hence, in the contaminated land context, despite all the concern and high-profile debates, the scope of 
the ELD is limited. The regime will only apply prospectively and a clear link needs to be established 
between the operator and the damage. The harm to health must be ‘significant’ and it must have come 
about as a result of an operation specified in Annex III of the Directive.725 The consequence of the 
Directive’s narrow definition of land damage is that many sites containing pollution will not be included 
within the scope of the Directive, so that clean-up, if it takes place at all, will be on the account of the 
individual Member States.726 Yet, Member States’ different approaches to contaminated land will result in 
significant variation in the remediation of contaminated sites that fall out of the scope of the Directive. 
It might be interesting to note here that Preamble 28 of the Proposal for a Soil Framework Directive 
stipulates that ‘in those contaminated sites where the polluter cannot be found, cannot be held liable for the 
pollution under national or Community legislation or cannot be made to bear the costs of remediation, also 
known as orphan sites, responsibility for reducing risk to human health and the environment should fall on 
the Member States. For those purposes, Member States should put in place specific funding mechanisms to 
ensure a durable financial source for the remediation of such sites’.727 This would mean that if the Proposal 
would be adopted, the ELD should be amended in order to align it with the remediation obligations as 
stipulated in the Soil Framework Directive. At this moment, the ELD only foresees that, for orphan sites, 
remedial action may be taken by the competent authority as a last resort. 
For contaminated sites within the scope of the Directive, various provisions are left to the Member 
States, like permit and state—of—the—art defences, so that operators may be exempted from liability. The 
variation that may exist in the implementation of the ELD by the Member States causes that there still will 
be significant differences in the soil policies of the Member States and hence the ELD will not create much 
harmonisation.728 On the contrary, the ELD might introduce considerable uncertainty. 
Yet, besides the variations that may exist in the implementation of the ELD by the Member States, 
there might be significant variation between the Member States in the remediation process. Indeed, the 
Directive gives Member States considerable leeway in Member States’ practice of dealing with 
contaminated land.729 
3.2.2. Remediation of Land Damage under the Scope of the Directive 
If a site is considered to be contaminated under the Directive, then Annex II sets out a framework to be 
followed in order to choose the most appropriate measures to ensure the remedying of the damage. Yet, 
compared to the provisions for damage to water or protected species and habitats, the paragraph on land 
damage is very moderate, and the polluter’s obligations to remedy the damage are limited.730 Indeed, 
Annex II (2) only requires that ‘the necessary measures shall be taken to ensure, as a minimum, that the relevant 
contaminants are removed, controlled, contained or diminished so that the contaminated land, taking account of its 
current use or approved future use at the time of the damage, no longer poses any significant risk of adversely affecting 
human health’. Only when the use of the land is changed, further measures are required. 
According to Layard, this is in line with the practice in most of the Member States.731 Yet, Wagner 
indicates that, although the provisions of Annex II are in line with the limited scope of the Directive for soil 
contamination and presumably with the practice in most of the Member States, it constraints liability to 
removing the risk from human health and therefore the Directive may stay behind national provisions in 
certain Member States, as for example in Germany or the Netherlands.732 
Moreover, Annex II (2) last paragraph indicates that a natural recovery option, which is an option in 
which no direct human intervention in the recovery process would be taken, shall be considered.733 
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The Directive leaves it to the Member States to determine when damage has occurred and when to 
intervene, to determine the appropriate method for remediation and to what level remediation should 
occur.734 This is a very flexible but pragmatic approach. Indeed, most Member States have a level at which 
risk is considered to be unacceptable. Yet, the level at which the ‘cut-off’ point is set, varies. However, as 
Christie and Teeuw indicate, it is difficult to establish background levels for a number of contaminants, 
particularly inorganic ones, as what is normal in one area is not normal in another. Hence, the use of 
acceptable soil criteria based on background levels for one region may not be suitable for one another.735 
Consequently, the Community does not have a set of European-wide ‘trigger levels’ as there exist for water 
and air.736 
Moreover, it was already indicated that, due to the limited scope of the Directive, other — national or 
European — rules will exist, to remedy the damage that does not fall under the scope of the Directive and 
sometimes the different regimes might be overlapping or inconsistent. 
In particular for soil pollution, European waste legislation must be mentioned.737 Indeed, after the 
ELD was adopted, a ruling of the European Court of Justice raised important questions about the relation of 
the ELD to European waste legislation. In the Texaco case, the Cour d'appel de Bruxelles of Belgium asked 
the European Court of Justice whether hydrocarbons which are spilled unintentionally and cause soil and 
groundwater contamination may be considered to be waste within the meaning of Waste Framework 
Directive738 and secondly whether, in these circumstances, the petroleum undertaking which supplies the 
service station (in this case Texaco) may be considered to be the producer or holder of such waste within 
the meaning of Waste Framework Directive. The ECJ ruled that hydrocarbons which are unintentionally 
spilled and cause soil and groundwater contamination indeed are waste within the meaning of Article 1(a) 
of Waste Framework Directive. Moreover, the Court held that in circumstances such as those in the main 
proceedings, the petroleum undertaking which supplied the service station can be considered to be the 
holder of that waste within the meaning of Article 1(c) of the Waste Framework Directive only if the leak 
from the service station's storage facilities which gave rise to the waste can be attributed to the conduct of 
that undertaking.739 
As a consequence of the Court’s judgment in the Texaco case, non-remediation of soil might be 
considered as ‘abandonment of waste’. This is prohibited and subject to sanctions provided by national law. 
Moreover, the producer of the product that has polluted the soil may, if the incident can be attributed to the 
conduct of the producer, be liable for the cost of remediation, even if he did not cause the pollution himself. 
Bergkamp argues that this regime is fully inconsistent with national soil remediation law and with the 
regime of the ELD.740 As the court’s Texaco judgment was released after the adoption of the ELD, the ELD 
does not resolve the conflict. Moreover, Article 3 (2) of the ELD provides that the Directive applies ‘without 
prejudice to more stringent provisions of Community legislation regulating the operation of any activities 
falling within the scope of this Directive’.741 The Directive makes no exception for European waste 
legislation, which will continue to apply in addition to the Directive. Hence, according to Bergkamp, the 
‘Texaco-liability’ might exist on top of the liability regime of the ELD.742 Clearly, overlapping of liability 
regimes might create disputes and uncertainty. 
In sum, the Member States will face the difficult task of implementing the vague ELD. Indeed, the 
ELD leaves important aspects as defences, precise definitions of damage or restoration criteria up to the 
Member States, and consequently contaminated land policy will still differ significantly between Member 
States. Moreover, the Directive will leave many of the contaminated sites in Europe to be cleaned up under 
national provisions of the Member States. 
                                                             
734  Layard 2004, 106. 
735  Christie & Teeuw 1998, 188. 
736  Layard 2004, 105-106. 
737  See Krämer 2004, 263-270. 
738  Article 1, Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste (Waste Framework Directive); as amended in 1991 and 
1996. 
739  Case C-I/03, Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 7 September 2004, Criminal proceedings against Paul Van de 
Walle, Daniel Laurent, Thierry Mersch and Texaco Belgium SA, I-07613. 
740  Bergkamp 2004, 171-177. 
741  ELD, Article 3 (2). 
742  Bergkamp 2005, 127-129. 
  Chapter 4 
 143 
4. Summary 
Chapter 4 examined the competence of the European Union to harmonise environmental liability rules and 
studied the provision of Directive 2004/35/CE, the ‘Environmental Liability Directive’, and as an example 
its application to soil pollution. 
In a first step, the history of European environmental policy was sketched, with the focus on the 
division of competences between the European level and the Member States for environmental policy. 
Indeed, the history of European environmental law is inextricable linked with the political debate about the 
surrender of sovereignty of the Member States to the European level. It was outlined how the balance 
between sovereignty and harmonisation of environmental rules at European level was sought by means of 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Moreover, Member States’ room for manoeuvre once the 
Community has taken up its competence to legislate in the environmental field and implementation and 
enforcement issues were discussed. 
Next, the provisions of the Environmental Liability Directive and the reasons for European action in 
the field of environmental liability were studied. On 21 April 2004, Directive 2004/35/CE on 
Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage was 
adopted. With the ELD, the Community aims to establish a framework of environmental liability based on 
the ‘polluter-pays’ principle, to prevent and remedy environmental damage. The development and the 
adoption of the Directive gave rise to much controversy and conflict. Much of the conflict addressed the 
question whether and how far the European Union could go in adopting a European liability regime. 
In order to understand why and how the Directive got to its final form, the milestones in the 
environmental liability saga were sketched and the reasons provided by the EU Commission for a 
harmonised environmental liability regime were examined. It is remarkable that in the final text of the ELD, 
the Commission fails to explain why it is necessary to establish a harmonised liability regime or why it 
cannot be achieved by the Member States, as is required by the subsidiarity principle. 
Subsequently, the provisions of the Directive were studied. The coverage of the Directive is limited, so 
that different regimes may apply to different types of damage in case of an accident and the ELD does not 
clarify its relation to other liability regimes. Moreover, the ELD has left crucial aspects, as defences, 
insurance but also precise definitions of damage or restoration criteria, up to the Member States. Member 
States may also maintain or adopt more stringent provisions in their national law to prevent and restore 
environmental damage. Consequently, the ELD provides an uncertain framework and if the Directive has 
been implemented, the regime will be a less harmonised regime and might create more uncertainty than its 
adherents originally might have thought. 
Finally, the application of the Directive to soil pollution as an example was examined. 
It appeared that with respect to soil pollution, despite all the concern and high-profile debates, the 
scope of the ELD is limited. The regime will only apply prospectively and a clear link needs to be 
established between the operator and the damage. The harm to health must be ‘significant’ and it must 
have come about as a result of an operation specified in Annex III of the Directive. This means that the 
Directive will leave many of the contaminated sites in Europe to be cleaned up under national provisions of 
the Member States. 
Yet, as in the general case, for contaminated sites within the scope of the Directive, various provisions 
are left to the Member States, like permit and state—of—the—art defences, so that operators may be 
exempted from liability. The variations that may exist in the implementation of the ELD by the Member 
States, together with the numerous sites that will have to be remedied — if at all — by domestic provisions 
of the Member States, makes that there still will be significant differences in the soil policies of the Member 
States and hence the ELD will not create much harmonisation. On the contrary, the ELD might introduce 
considerable uncertainty as different liability regimes will exist together. 
Moreover, besides the variations that may exist in the implementation of the ELD by the Member 
States, there might be significant variation between the Member States in the remediation process. Indeed, 
the Directive gives Member States considerable leeway in Member States’ practice of dealing with 
contaminated land. In sum, the ELD creates less integration than its adherents might have hoped for. 
Chapters 5 and 6 will now apply the theoretical framework, built up in Chapters 2 and 3, to the 
Environmental Liability Directive. 
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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DIRECTIVE 2004/35/EC ON ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 
Although the central focus of this research is the level of government at which liability rules for 
environmental damage best can be decided, and to study the Environmental Liability Directive from this 
perspective, a first question might be whether the liability regime as sketched out in the ELD can be 
considered as an efficient regime to ensure the prevention and restoration of environmental damage as 
studied in Chapter 2. 
Therefore, in a first step, an assessment of the Directive itself will be provided. It will be examined to 
what extent the provisions of the Directive correspond with the economic analysis of liability rules as 
provided in Chapter 2. Indeed, Chapter 2 of this research presented an economic analysis of liability rules 
for environmental damage and clarified the role of liability rules in the prevention and restoration of 
environmental damage, illustrated by soil pollution. It will be studied on the one hand whether the liability 
regime of the ELD will indeed stimulate operators to prevent environmental damage from happening, and 
on the other hand whether the ELD, if prevention failed, can ensure that environmental damage, as soil 
pollution, will be adequately restored. 
The main elements that might influence the preventive effect and the compensation function of the 
Directive are the choice of the liability rule, the way in which is dealt with retroactivity, causation, the 
exceptions and defences that are accorded, and whether or not (obligatory) insurance is provided for. These 
main elements will now be studied successively in order to assess the Directive’s efficiency. 
1. Choice of Liability Rule  
The ELD provides for a combination of a strict liability regime for hazardous activities and a negligence 
regime for non-hazardous activities, in order to ensure the prevention and remedying of environmental 
damage. Indeed, as studied in Chapter 4, the ELD foresees that strict liability would apply to operators who 
professionally conduct hazardous or potentially hazardous activities. These activities are listed in Annex III 
of the Directive.743 The strict liability regime covers damage to protected species and natural habitats, water 
and land damage. Fault-based liability or negligence would apply to all other professional activities. Unlike 
strict liability, this regime only applies to protected species and natural habitats, not to water or land 
damage.744 
Is this regime economically efficient? It seems helpful to summarise briefly the results of the economic 
analysis of tort law, provided in Chapter 2, in order to compare the regime provided in the ELD with 
economic theory. 
Economic Analysis of Tort Law 
The extensive analysis can of course be found in Chapter 2. This paragraph will only summarise the main 
results. In brief, in Chapter 2 it was concluded that theoretically, for environmental accidents, both a 
negligence regime and a strict liability regime could induce injurers to take optimal precautions to prevent 
environmental damage. 
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A negligence rule will lead to an optimal result as long as the legal system sets the due care standard 
equal to the optimal care level. Under the strict liability rule, the courts do not have to define any level of 
due care because the injurer will have to pay the costs of the damage regardless the precaution he took. 
Economic rational behaviour is assumed, therefore the firm will try to minimise its total costs, prevention 
and expected damage costs. The more precaution the firm takes, the smaller the expected damage costs will 
be. The firm will increase precautions up to the level where precaution costs are equal to the expected 
damage. Beyond that level precaution costs will be higher than the reduction in expected damage. Hence, 
also under a strict liability rule, the firm would select the economically optimal level of precaution that will 
minimise total costs for the society.745 
Yet, there are significant differences between a negligence or a strict libility rule, that might determine 
which rule in which circumstances is preferable. 
As Shavell pointed out, a liability rule should not only provide incentives for optimal care taking, but 
should also provide incentives for adopting an optimal activity level.746 These are the times that the polluter 
would engage in the polluting activity, to produce the social optimal amount of the good. The economic 
analysis of tort law showed that only a strict liability rule would give the injurer an incentive both to take 
efficient care and to adopt an optimal activity level. Indeed, under negligence, if the firm complies with the 
due care standard of precaution, it will not be held liable for harm. This means that the firm will not have to 
take the costs for clean-up into account in its cost calculation, if it fulfilled the due care standard. As these 
costs will not be internalised in the firm’s costs, the firms will produce too much, or put differently, engage 
too often in the polluting activity. Under a strict liability rule, however, the polluter will always be liable for 
the damage. The firm will therefore internalise in its cost calculations both the cost of prevention and the 
clean up costs and produce the socially optimal amount of the good whose production might give rise to 
environmental damage.747 
Hence, authors like Polinsky and Shavell argued that in the case of dangerous industrial activities 
(which are considered as unilateral accidents) that might cause severe environmental damage, strict liability 
would be the preferred liability regime as it is most important to control both the injurer’s level of care and 
his activity level.748 
On the other hand, Faure pointed to the fact that there may be cases where other parties than the 
polluter, such as public or private actors, can influence the magnitude of environmental damage. For 
example, public actors may be responsible to manage a natural resource area and to take precautionary 
measures if damage threatens to happen. Faure rightly argued that in these bilateral accident settings 
liability should also aim at giving these parties incentives to take preventive measures or to adopt an 
optimal activity level.749 
Nevertheless, in case of dangerous industrial activities that might cause severe environmental harm, 
the influence of the polluter will be still far more important than the influence of the other parties. A strict 
liability rule would therefore still be preferred to ensure that the polluter will take all preventive measures. 
Nevertheless, a contributory negligence defence might be added to the strict liability rule to ensure that the 
other parties also take precautions.750 
Environmental damage might also be caused by non-dangerous activities. In that case, it might be 
desirable to give all parties in the accident setting an incentive to take care, and a negligence rule might be 
adequate. 
Both liability regimes also differ with repect to compensation. Under strict liability, the victims will be 
compensated in any case. Under a negligence rule, the victims will have to bear the costs of clean-up 
themselves, as long as the injurer complied with the legal standard. It is sometimes argued that if the aim of 
installing a liability regime is to internalise the costs for the environment caused by production, the 
negligence rule will not fully reach this aim, as part of the damage will not be born by the injurer. 
Therefore, again there might be a preference to opt for a strict liability rule for environmental damage.751 
However, insolvency might distort the deterrence and compensation or restoration function of strict 
liability. Indeed, strict liability is only efficient if the injurer can pay for the consequences of the accident. If 
the injurer would be insolvent, or if the judge would underestimate the damage, underdeterrence would 
follow.752 Therefore, Cooter argued that if the judge can determine the optimal level of care, a negligence 
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rule would be preferred. On the other hand, if there is uncertainty concerning the optimal care level, a strict 
liability rule would be preferred.753 
There is one more refinement that must be made. It was implicitly assumed that the strict liability rule 
required the polluter to compensate the damage he caused, not less but also not more. Problems may arise 
if strict liability is combined with other features which might expand the burden of liability on entreprises, 
as for example joint and several liability, or the removal of the burden of proving of causation. Trebilcock 
argued that it was especially because of these other features that the strict liability regimes in the United 
States were found to be `crushing’.754 Hence, the final judgement on the efficiency of a strict liability regime 
may depend on the way in which the regime deals with issues as for example causation or joint and several 
liability.755 
Yet, overall, from an economic efficiency perspective, it is argued that for unilateral dangerous 
activities that may cause severe environmental damage, a strict liability rule might be referred. As 
mentioned above, this liability rule would give the polluter optimal incentives for precaution and result in 
an optimal activity level. Moreover, a strict liability rule might ensure full restoration in the event of 
damage. However, this assumes that a contributory negligence rule is added to provide incentives to the 
victims as well, that mechanisms are introduced to cope with the potential insolvency of the polluter (like 
compulsory insurance), that liability is not retroactive, that the risk of causal uncertainty is not shifted to the 
polluter and that no joint and several liability rule is imposed. For non-dangerous activities, a negligence 
rule might be appropriate. 
Liability Regime of the Environmental Liability Directive 
A comparison of the results of the economic analysis of tort law with the approach chosen by the ELD 
shows that the regime of the ELD is to a large extent in line with economic theory. Hazardous activities can 
often be considered unilateral and in those situations it is important to control both the injurer’s level of 
care and his activity level through a strict liability rule. In case of non-hazardous activities which may cause 
environmental harm, liability should also aim at giving other parties involved incentives to take preventive 
measures. Hence, for those cases the ELD indeed proposes a negligence rule. Thus the distinction made by 
the Community between hazardous activities for which a strict liability rule is required, and non-hazardous 
activities for which negligence is appropriate, seems therefore to follow the economic logic.756 
In addition to this general preventive effect that the economic threat of liability for damage is expected 
to have, Article 5 of the ELD explicitly imposes the obligation on the operator to prevent environmental 
damage from occurring.757 This means that if there is an imminent threat of environmental damage, the 
operator shall take the necessary preventive measures. Operators are also obliged to inform the competent 
authority of all relevant aspects of the situation. The competent authority may require information or give 
instructions to the operator to be followed concerning the preventive measures to be taken. If the operator 
fails to comply with the obligations, the competent authority may take these measures itself.758 
Besides the prevention of environmental damage, the ELD also aims to ensure the restoration of 
environmental damage if prevention failed. Article 6 of the Directive lists the obligations of the operator to 
remedy the damage. As studied in the previous chapter, when environmental damage has occurred, the 
operator shall inform the competent authority of all relevant aspects of the situation and take all practical 
steps to control, contain, remove or otherwise manage the contaminants and/or any other damage factors 
in order to limit or to prevent further environmental damage and adverse effects on human health or 
further impairment of services.759 Annex II offers a common framework for Member States to select the 
most appropriate measure to ensure that environmental damage is remedied for protected species and 
habitats, water and land. Protected species and habitats and water must be restored to baseline condition. 
Land on the other hand, does not need to be remedied to its baseline condition. The ELD provides that land 
is remedied by removing, controlling, containing or reducing contaminants so as to ensure that the 
contaminants do not pose a significant risk to human health.760 However, as mentioned before, precise 
definitions of damage, baseline assessments and restoration criteria are passed on to the Member States,761 a 
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practice which is used for various provisions in the ELD and which will be discussed in more detail when 
examining the ELD from the public interest approach. 
Yet, originally, Article 5 of the Commission’s proposal for an environmental liability regime included 
an obligation for Member States to take, in case of environmental damage, remedial measures and Article 6 
proposed that Member States had to ensure that restoration measures were taken also in those cases, where 
the responsible operator did not cover the necessary costs (‘orphan damage’).762 These obligations on the 
Member States would have had an additional preventive effect as all operational activities under Annex III 
of the Directive require a permit which is to be issued by the Member States’ administrations. If the 
Member States run the risk to have, in certain circumstances, to pay themselves for the restoration of the 
damage, the Member States might be more attentive to the content of the permit, the conditions attached to 
it and the financial guarantees that the operator can present to prove his ability to pay for the restoration 
costs. Moreover, the Member States would have had an incentive to carefully monitor whether the 
conditions laid down in the permit were actually complied with. However, the final version of the ELD 
deleted the obligation on the Member States to restore the damage to the environment themselves. Yet, as 
was already indicated in paragraph 2.2.3.4 of chapter 4, this might somewhat be compensated by Article 8 § 
2 of the ELD, which requires that the competent authority shall recover, inter alia, via security over property 
or other appropriate guarantees, from the operator who has caused the damage or the imminent threat of 
damage, the costs it has incurred.763 Moreover, several of the Directives to which the ELD refers to, contain 
obligations requiring the authorities to take remedial measures as for instance Article 4 §4 of the Wild Birds 
Directive, Article 6 §2 of the Natural Habitats Directive and Article 4 §6 of the Water Framework Directive. 
Finally, the Member States may be held liable under the Frankovich doctrine if they have committed a 
serious breach of the Environmental Liability Directive, which would be the case if they failed to oblige the 
operator to take preventive or restorative measures.764 
Nevertheless, the absence of an explicit obligation on the Member States to restore, in case of orphan 
damage, the damage to the environment themselves, denies the positive effect of Member States’ 
responsibility on prevention and restoration, which definitely is a weakness of the regime.765 
In sum, in broad lines, the combined strict liability/negligence regime that the Community has agreed 
upon in the ELD and its explicit obligations for the polluter to prevent damage and remedy environmental 
damage in Article 5 and 6 of the ELD, seems to be in line with the economic analysis of tort law, although it 
is deplorable that the Member States themselves do not have any direct responsibility towards prevention 
and restoration. 
Yet, the efficiency of the regime does not only depend on the type of liability regime. Indeed, the 
ELD’s practical use will to a large extent depend on the provisions concerning retroactivity and causation, 
the exceptions and defences that are accorded, and whether or not provisions for (obligatory) insurance are 
foreseen. The next paragraphs will deal with these issues in order to examine whether the ELD can indeed 
exert a preventive effect and ensure the restoration of environmental damage. 
2. Retroactivity  
In principle, the ELD stipulates that damage caused before the expiry of the deadline for implementation of 
the Directive should not be covered by its provisions.766 
Especially for environmental damage, a long time lapse might exist between an industrial activity 
causing environmental damage and the moment that the damage is recognised. This time lapse might be 
due to the fact that it sometimes might take a long time before the risks of the damage are fully understood. 
Liability rules aim to provide incentives for the polluter in taking precautions to prevent 
environmental damage ex ante and at the same time to ensure restoration ex post in case damage could not 
be prevented. Indeed, the basic idea of tort law is that the fact that the polluter knows that he will be held 
liable ex post for any damage should give him incentives ex ante for prevention in order to escape liability in 
the future. 
A retroactive application of liability for damage, which was caused in the past, conflicts with this basic 
idea of tort law and seems to be inefficient. Indeed, if suddenly certain behaviour would lead to liability ex 
post, whereas this behaviour was not considered wrongful at the time when the accident happened, for 
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example because the risks were not known, this retrospective application of new standards could never 
affect the incentives for prevention of the polluter. Indeed, it is hard to argue that retroactive liability can 
positively affect the incentives for prevention of the polluter if the polluter’s behaviour was not considered 
wrongful at the time of the accident. Hence, retroactive liability does not seem to contribute to the 
prevention of accidents.767 From an economic perspective, the fact that care was not sufficiently taken in the 
past can be considered as a ‘sunk cost’, which cannot be changed anymore. Boyd and Kunreuther even 
argue that retroactive liability may weaken incentives to take precautions against future environmental 
liability, which is clearly inefficient.768 In addition, also from a distributive point of view, retroactive 
liability can be criticised. As Faure argues, it is hardly fair that an operator of an industrial activity, whose 
behaviour at the time of the accident was not considered wrongful, should bear the consequences of a 
collective lack of knowledge of the risks of that industrial activity.769 
A few refinements might be added though. First, over time new risks might emerge or the standard of 
care might increase due to changes in technology. It would be too easy to state that the polluter will only 
have to comply with the ‘old’ standard of care, and will never be liable for new risks that emerge. Shavell 
argued that the foresight that there might be liability ex post might give incentives to obtain information 
about risk to industrial operators.770 Indeed, liability for development risks should give an operator 
appropriate incentives for investment in research to acquire information about risk and about optimal 
technologies to prevent the risk. It is doubtful, however, whether this argumentation could also justify a 
retrospective change of a liability rule or changes in the standard of care itself. It is hard to defend that an ex 
post change in the liability rule will positively affect the incentives for proper behaviour which was not 
considered wrongful at the time when the act was committed by the operator. In this respect, it is 
appropriate to recall the aim of a liability rule. A liability rule aims to influence future behaviour and aims 
to give operators incentives for taking precautions. Acts that happened in the past cannot be changed 
anymore and are therefore ‘sunk costs’. An ex post change of the liability rule for these past actions could 
never have positively affected future incentives for prevention. A retrospective change of a liability rule 
might lead to over- or underdeterrence and is therefore inefficient.771 
Yet, this outcome creates a dilemma. Indeed, the standard setting process can be seen as a process of 
learning whereby the standard is not static, but dynamically changes in time.772 It clearly would be wrong 
to state that due care standards never change. There may be many reasons, as for example new 
technological insights, that would justify a more stringent standard of care, adopted by the judge. This new 
case law could have an important signalling function for other operators in the market who can adopt their 
future behaviour. The question however arises what should be done with the operator in the particular case 
in which the new standard is set. Should the operator be sacrificed for the benefit of a more efficient care 
standard in the future and hence should this operator be made retroactive liable although his behaviour 
was not considered wrongful at the time the act was committed? A possible solution to this dilemma is the 
technique of prospective overruling, which means that the court will follow an old duty of care in the 
particular case, but announces that it will follow a different reasoning in the future.773 
In sum, the discussion above shows that a distinction has to be made between on the one hand a 
retrospective application of a new liability regime and on the other hand the liability for development risks. 
Faure holds that a liability regime for risks which are not known today is not necessarily inefficient, 
because, if this is known in advance, it will give incentives to obtain information on these new risks and on 
the optimal techniques to prevent the risk. Thus, a liability for development risks is not inefficient as long as 
it may positively influence incentives for prevention and as long as the development risk is not a disguised 
retroactive liability. A retrospective application of new standards or new legislation, which could never 
have positively affected future incentives for prevention, however, cannot be justified.774 
Turning to the ELD again, the ELD seems to follow the economic logic on this point. Indeed, the 
absence of retroactive effect in the European environmental liability regime was already recommended in 
the studies preceding the White Paper.775 
Yet, Bergkamp argues that, as the Directive foresees in Article 16 that Member States may maintain or 
adopt more stringent measures in relation to prevention and remedying of environmental damage 
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including the prevention and remedying of additional activities, this would mean that Member States 
would be allowed to apply liability for development risk or even give the ELD retroactive effect so that 
historical damage and damage caused before 30 April 2007 would fall under the applicable legislation.776 
Retroactive liability, however, would obviously put a heavy burden on industry in those Member States. 
Therefore, whether certain Member States will indeed introduce retroactive liability remains to be awaited. 
As shown above, it would not be an economic efficient option. 
Thus, the ELD seems to correspond with the economic analysis of tort law by indicating that the 
liability regime should be non-retrospective. 
3. Causation 
The economic analysis of tort law starts from the idea that liability rules will deter undesirable activities 
and will give incentives for prevention. This requires however, that a clear causal relationship between the 
damage and the activity of the injurer can be established.777 Indeed, for example with respect to 
environmental liability, it is economically inefficient to hold an operator liable for environmental damage 
which he did not cause, and which he accordingly could not have prevented. However, certainly in the 
field of environmental damage, it might be difficult to establish that causal link. 
In a first step, this paragraph will clarify the problem of causation in environmental pollution. Second, 
an economic approach to causation will be sketched and possible solutions to the problem will be offered. 
Next, the case law of some EU Member States will be briefly looked at and fourth, the provisions of the ELD 
with respect to causation will be examined. Finally, a conclusion will be formulated. 
3.1. The Problem of Causation in Environmental Pollution 
With respect to environmental pollution, it is often very hard to establish a clear causal link between 
damage to the environment and the wrongful act of a single operator. The problem of scientific uncertainty 
concerning the causal link between an industrial activity and (health or environmental) damage is receiving 
increasing attention in the legal literature.778 
Van den Bergh distinguishes two types of situations which may cause causal uncertainty.779 The first 
type concerns the situation where there are uncertain victims. Suppose for example that in a neighbourhood 
of a certain factory the number of cancers is higher than the national average. Suppose also that this 
increased risk might be due to the factory, which emits dangerous substances into the air. Causal 
uncertainty arises when it cannot be established with certainty which of the many cancers in the 
neighbourhood are caused by the factory (which is called the exess risk) and which are due to other causes 
(also called the background risk). Hence, causal uncertainty arises when the damage may have multiple 
causes and when it is not certain whether the damage has been caused by a particular injurer or by another 
cause. The second type of situation arises when multiple injurers may be involved but when it is unsure 
which injurer has caused the particular damage. The well-known Dutch DES-judgement might clarify this 
situation of causal uncertainty. The drug DES caused birth defects, and some daughters of mothers who 
took DES during the pregnancy suffered physical harm. The causal link between the drug and the 
daughters’ systoms was undisputed, and the manufacturers that brought DES on the market were also 
known. Yet, uncertainty existed with respect to which manufacturer had sold the product to a particular 
mother, and hence who could be held liabe.780 Clearly, many other examples could be given of situations, in 
which it would be difficult to establish, with scientific certainty, a causal relationship between a certain 
industrial activity and the damage. Yet, all situations of causal uncertainty have one thing in common: the 
fact that there is damage is certain, but the relationship between the damage and the activity is not.781 
Faure notes that there is an increasing tendency in tort law, to hold the effects of this uncertainty 
against the injurer, with the aim to protect the victim. This can take different legal forms. In some cases, full 
scientific proof of a causal relationship is not demanded from the victim; in other cases the causal 
uncertainty might result in a reversal of the burden of proof. Another tendency is to hold several tortfeasors 
jointly and severally liable when it cannot be established who of the different tortfeasors caused the 
damage. The ‘alternative causation’ rule under Dutch tort law for instance, allows the victim to claim full 
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compensation from any of the tortfeasors.782 The tortfeasor could in theory rebut the presumption of 
liability by proving that he did not cause the particular damage, but in practice this will often not be 
feasible. The Dutch Supreme Court for instance applied the ‘alternative causation’ rule to the DES-case.783 
Yet, from an economic point of view, this ‘victim-friendly’ approach might have significant negative 
consequences. Indeed, shifting the risk of causal uncertainty or a reversal of the burden of proof to the 
injurer may mean that entreprises will have to pay for the consequences of risks which were not caused by 
them. This obviously may have devastating consequences for the insurability of risks.784 
The next paragraph examines four options of how the law could deal with causal uncertainty, for 
instance with respect to environmental damage. 
3.2. Economic Approach to Causation 
The starting point of the economic approach to causation is that the injurer should only be liable for the 
damage he actually caused. The question therefore arises how the law could deal with the problem of 
causal uncertainty between a certain activity and damage. Faure indicates that four options exist.785 
1. An all or nothing liability rule with victim preference. This means that when in a particular situation is 
felt that there is a non-negligible probability that a given activity caused harm, all victims receive 
100% compensation. 
2. An all or nothing liability rule with injurers preference. This means that when in a particular situation is 
felt that there is a non-negligible probability that a given activity did not cause harm, all victims are 
refused compensation. 
3. A threshold liability rule. Under this rule, compensation is only rewarded when the probability that 
the damage was caused by the tort passes a certain threshold, for example 50%. If the probability is 
lower than the threshold, the victim receives no compensation at all, if the probability is higher than 
the threshold, the victim receives full compensation. This liability rule is known in the American 
legal literature as the ‘’more probable than not’ rule, because of the fact that the plaintiff must 
convince the judge that it is ‘more probable than not’ that its damage was caused by the act of the 
injurer. 
4. A proportional liability rule. This means that the probability that a certain tort caused the damage is 
reflected in the compensation.If scientific expertise for instance indicates that the likelyhood that the 
damage is caused by a particular tort feasor is 40%, than the victim can receive compensation for 40% 
of its damage. 
Yet, which option is most efficient from an economic point of view? It merits to have a closer look at the 
four options mentionned above. The best way to deal with causal uncertainty has been examined 
extensively in the economic literature, as for example by Shavell, Rosenberg and Kaye.786 
The first option, in which the victims can claim full compensation in case of causal uncertainty, is 
considered to be inefficient and injust. Indeed, Shavell argued that there is a good economic justification for 
limiting the liability of the injurer to the damage that he has actually caused. If there would be no need to 
prove a causal link, a consequence might be that , especially in cases of strict liability, a potential injurer 
(e.g. a factory) could abstain from activitities which are important for the society (such as the production of 
pharmaceuticals), but which may cause pollution.787 Hence, this option might lead to overdeterrence. 
The second option, the all or nothing liability rule with injurers preference, is also not eficient from an 
economic point of view. This rule would require that the victim proves with 100% certainty that his damage 
has been caused by a certain operator, in order to get compensation. In practice this might not be feasible. 
Therefore, the requirement would mean that injurers in many cases might escape liability although their 
actions might have contributed to the damage. Hence, this option would lead to underdeterrence. 
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The third and fourth option (theshold liability and proportional liability) first require that the 
probability is calculated in which the injurer has contributed to the damage. Indeed, from an economic 
perspective, a liability rule should be constructed in such a way that the injurer is only held liable for the 
excess risk, which was caused by his activity and not for the background risk, which already existed.788 
Liability for the background risk, which the injurer did not cause, would again lead to overdeterrence as in 
the first option. Thus, in a first step, it has to be established to what extent the background risk has been 
increased by the injurer’s activity. Scientific evidence might determine the percentage which indicates what 
the probability is that an injurer’s activity caused the damage. This probablity is referred to in the literature 
as the ‘probablity of causation’ and can be found by dividing the excess risk by the background risk plus 
the excess risk.789 Yet, which rule, the threshold rule or the proportional liability rule is most efficient to deal 
with causal uncertainty? 
The threshold liability rule leads to a situation in which the victim gets full compensation if the 
probability of causation passes the threshold, for example of 50%. If the probablity is lower than the 
threshold, the victim does not receive any compensation. Yet, in a particular case, the probability might be 
always lower than the threshold. For example, the probability that a certain cancer would have been caused 
by the activities of a certain factory might be 40%. This means that 40 out of 100 cancers would have been 
caused by the factory. Yet, for every individual, the probability of causation would be 40% and hence below 
the threshold. Hence, in this situation, the factory would not have to compensate any of the victims whereas 
in a number of cases, the factory might have caused the cancer. This seems inefficient, as it would give the 
factory insuffient incentives for accident reduction and the rule seems also unfair with respect to victim 
compensation.790 
The proportional liability rule might solve this problem. With a proportional liabilty rule, the victim is 
compensated by the same amount of the probability of causation. For example, if the probability that a 
factory caused the damage is 40%, the victim will be compensated by 40% of his damage. In the example 
above, this would mean that the factory would have to compensate 40% of the damage to every victims, 
which would — at the aggregate level — be the same as compensating 40 out of 100 victims, who got cancer 
because of the factory’s activities.791 From an economic perspective, this means that the injurer will be 
precisely liable for the risk which was caused by his activity, and therefore a proportional liability rule 
would give the injurer optimal incentives for prevention.792 Hence, the proportional liability rule is 
preferred by several scholars and is also defended in the economics analysis of tort law.793 
3.3. Case Law in Some of the EU Member States 
It appears that the attitude of the EU Member States with respect to causation varies significantly.794 
The most victim-friendly attitude may be found in the Netherlands. The Dutch Supreme Court in the 
DES-case applied the alternative causation rule, meaning that the DES-daughters are allowed to claim full 
compensation of any of the manufacturers. The particular manufacturer can rebut the presumption of 
liability by proving that he did not sell the drug to the mother. However, in practice, this will be often 
impossible. Hence, this result is similar to a joint and several liability rule.795 Another example relates to the 
Dutch Supreme Court case Cijsouw v. De Schelde. In this case, a victim of asbestosis could not prove when 
he had been in contact with the fatal asbestos fibre that caused his disease. However, the determination of 
the moment of contact with the final asbestos fibre was crucial for the case. Indeed, Cijsouw worked for the 
defendant firm De Schelde for several years. Yet, during the first years of his employment, the defendant 
could not have known — with respect to the state-of-the-art at that time — that he had to take measures to 
protect his employee against asbestos and thus could not be liable. The Supreme Court again shifted the 
risk of uncertainty concerning causation to the entreprise by holding that is was presumed that Cijsouw 
had been in contact with the fatal asbestos fibre during the second period of his employment with the 
defendant. This presumption could be rebutted if the defendant had been able to proof that it was not 
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during the second period that Cijsouw was employed by the defendant that he was in contact with the fatal 
fibre. Again, obviously, this was impossible for the defendant firm.796 And recently, the Dutch Supreme 
Court accepted proportional liability in its judgment of 31 March 2006 on employer’s liability for 
occupational diseases (Karamus v. Nefalit). The Supreme Court argued that, if it is proven that the 
employer did not take all the safety measures which were required with respect to the dangers of 
asbestosis, and if therefore the chances to contract lung cancer have been increased substantially, this 
employer will be liable for the consequences. The employee himself however was a notorious smoker, and 
there was no stable statistic evidence linking the chance of contracting lung cancer to the asbestosis or to the 
smoking habits of the employee. Therefore, the court decided that the employer should be sentenced to full 
compensation, less the extent to which the employee contributed to his disease.797 
The French concept of perte d’une chance also allows for the application of proportional liability.798 The 
defendant is made liable for the ‘amount’ of causation which his or her conduct accounts for, in order to 
avoid the perceived unfairness of either leaving the victim without any compensation, or making the 
defendant liable for the full amount of the damage, which he however did not cause.799 For example, in a 
French case, the plaintiff skier collided with an unidentified skier. The plaintiff claimed damages from her 
instructor as he had failed to identify the other skier whilst she lay injured on the ground. The Court of 
Cassation held that the instructor had breached his duty, whereby he had caused the victim to lose the 
chance of claiming damages against the other skier. Hence, the instructor was held liable, but only to the 
amount in which his conduct contributed to the loss of the victim.800 Typical examples where ‘loss of a 
chance’ is used are failures to provide medical treatment or breaches of the duty to inform the patient of the 
risks associated with a particular treatment.801 For example, when a doctor’s negligence resulted in a loss of 
chance of recovery of 25 per cent, then the victim might claim compensation for these 25 per cent. The 
patient’s compensation is thus not full but is proportional to the lost chance. Belgian and Dutch courts also 
accept proportional liability, as shown above.802 
German law has followed a different path then the French law to deal with these situations, by 
introducing specific rules concerning the burden of proof for the victim (Beweiserleichterung — relief of the 
burden of proof — or Beweislastumkehr — reversal of the burden of proof —). When compared to the French 
law, the German approach may put a greater hurdle on the plaintiff, but on the other hand, the plaintiff 
might also receive full compensation.803 
In the UK on the other hand, case law shows that English law still demands that the victim 
demonstrates that is was ‘more probable than not’ that his damage was caused by a particular injurer. 
Indeed, a rather similar case to the Dutch Cijsouw case, Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services, dealt with 
the exposition to asbestosis of Arthur Fairchild during his employment with several employers. The widow 
of Fairchild sued two employers but could not prove with whom of the employers her husband had 
contracted the fatal asbestos fibre. The House of Lords decided that ‘on the balance of probability’ it could 
not be proven by which employer Fairchild had been exposed to the fatal asbestos fibre and therefore the 
two employers could not be held responsible. Hence, the United Kingdom rather prefers the all or nothing 
approach than the threshold approach and the proportional liability rule.804 
Hence, as the attitude of the EU Member States clearly varies significantly with respect to causation, 
the scope of liability might also vary significantly between the Member States. It is therefore particularly 
important to examine how the ELD dealt with the problem of causation with respect to environmental 
damage. 
3.4. The ELD and Causation 
The ELD is rather vague with respect to causation. Indeed, the various provisions of the Directive must be 
carefully studied in order to find indications on the requirement of a causal relationship and the burden of 
proof. 
According to Article 5 (1) and Article 6 (1) of the ELD, the operator is obliged to take the necessary 
preventive or remedial measures in case damage might occur or has occurred. Articles 5 (1) and 6 (1) 
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however, do not provide for any causality requirement. It might be thought that the operator is obliged to 
take the necessary measures, independent whether he has caused this damage and whether he could have 
prevented it. Yet, the causality requirement could be deducted from the scope of the Directive. Article 3 (1) 
of the ELD limits the scope of the Directive to occupational activities that have caused environmental 
damage or to an imminent threat of such damage. Article 4 (5) of the ELD moreover states in case of diffuse 
pollution that ‘the Directive shall only apply to environmental damage or to an imminent threat of such 
damage caused by pollution of a diffuse character, where it is possible to establish a clear link between the 
damage and the activities of the individual operator’. Hence, it might be deducted that the preventive and 
remedial measures obliged in Articles 5 and 6 of the ELD require a causal relationship between the operator 
and the (potential) damage. It might be questioned of course why the ELD did not stipulate this clearly.805 
Further, from the Directive it cannot be read immediately whether the burden of proof of the existence 
of a causal relationship lies with the operator or with the authorities who make allegations of damage. The 
common practice is that the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, which in the case of the ELD would be 
the authorities. This practice seems to be followed by the ELD as the Articles 3 (1) and 4 (5) of the ELD limit 
the application of the Directive, whereas Article 8 (3) and (4), concerning permit defence and state-of-the-art 
defence clearly reverse the burden of proof on the operator.806 Moreover, the Commission clarified that ‘its 
proposal does not reverse the burden of proof. Anyone who can make allegations of damage (or risk of 
damage) should give some reasonable supporting evidence that these allegations are founded. The 
competent authority (or authorities) to be designated by each Member State will be the driving force of the 
scheme. The proposal foresees that the operator should be obliged to disclose to the competent authority 
the relevant data and information to help establishing the facts of the case’.807 Nevertheless, it will be clear 
that in some cases, it might be difficult to prove that causal link between the operator and the damage. For 
example, soil pollution is a very complex issue with multiple causes and different impacts on the 
environment and on human health, so that a causal link might be difficult to prove. 
It might be wondered whether the causality requirements, as far as they can be deducted from the 
wording in Articles 3 (1) and 4 (5) of the ELD could prevent that operators would be held liable for the 
damage they caused. Indeed, as shown above, the most problematic issue in liability regimes is precisely 
the causality requirement. As Wagner argues, a strict application of full proof of a causal link between the 
damage and the operator might paralyse every liability regime.808 This might even be more relevant in the 
case of environmental liability as environmental damage might be caused by multiple sources so that it 
might be difficult to retrieve the main polluter. Yet, from Article 4 (5) ELD follows that the ELD does not 
require a causal link between the damage and one single operator, as reference is made to ‘operators’. 
Nevertheless, as far as joint and several liability is concerned, the ELD passes the issue on to the Member 
States. Article 9 of the ELD states that if more than one operator causes environmental damage, the cost of 
remedying that damage is allocated among the operators according to the domestic law of Member States, 
in particular ‘the apportionment of liability between the producer and the user of a product’.809 Each 
Member state may thus decide whether to impose joint and several liability for indivisible environmental 
damage or proportionate liability, depending on its domestic law. However, this might of course influence 
significantly the burden for the industry within the different Member States. Hence, Faure advises that 
Member States would introduce proportional liability, so that an operator is only liable for the risk or the 
damage that he has contributed. Indeed, only with a proportional liability it can be prevented that operators 
might have to bear the costs for damage that they did not cause, and that they cannot prove that the 
damage was caused by others. The proportional liability rule therefore is also to be preferred from an 
insurability point of view.810 
It has to be awaited whether the causality requirements in the ELD could prevent that operators can 
be held liable for the damage they caused. Yet, Article 16 (1) of the ELD explicitly allows Member States to 
maintain or adopt more stringent provisions in relation to the prevention and remedying of environmental 
damage, so that in principle, the Member States would have the competence to reverse the burden of proof 
on the operator in cases in which it is judged necessary by the Member States.811 
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3.5. Conclusion on Causation 
As was shown above, the main problem with respect to liability for environmental damage is precisely the 
causality requirement. Yet, the ELD is rather vague with respect to causation, and passes important 
decisions on to the Member States, as for instance the acceptance of joint and several liability. Moreover, it 
appears that the attitude of the Member States varies significantly with respect to causation. Hence, after 
implementation of the Directive, the scope of liability for environmental damage, as stipulated by the 
directive, might therefore also vary significantly between the Member States. 
Yet, one of the arguments for harmonisation was the transaction costs argument, which was also put 
forward by the European Commission to justify the ELD (Chapter 6 will deal extensively with the 
justications for the ELD). If the Commission really aimed to lower transaction costs by means of the ELD, it 
could have harmonised the causality requirements in order to lower transaction costs, for instance by 
introducing proportional liability, but it did not take the opportunity. Apparantly, the costs for 
harmonisation were too high. Hence, the transaction costs argument of the Commission for harmonisation 
of liability for environmental damage becomes very weak. 
Hence, all in all, it seems that the basic framework offered by the ELD — a combined system of strict 
liability and negligence and no retroactivity — corresponds with the economic analysis of tort law, 
although the fact that the ELD does not address the causation issue, and passes important decisions with 
respect to causation on to the Member States of cause substantially weakens any ‘transaction cost reduction’ 
justification for the ELD. 
Yet, liability regimes often accept a number of defences, meaning that the polluter, who otherwise 
might fulfil the conditions for liability, may not be hold liable. As these defences to a large extent may 
determine in practice whether the regime will be enforceable, it merits examining now the defences 
accepted by the ELD from an economic efficiency perspective. 
4. Defences 
4.1. Force Majeure 
The ELD provides in preamble 20 that an operator should not be required to bear the costs of preventive or 
remedial actions in situations where the damage in question or imminent threat thereof is the result of 
certain events beyond the operator’s control.812 
Force majeure is a traditional defence accepted in almost every liability regime. There is a clear 
economic rationale for the argument that in case of force majeure, there should be no liability. Holding a 
polluter liable for environmental damage which was caused through certain events beyond his control, 
does not seem to make sense as the polluter could not influence the accident risk by taking more 
precautions. Indeed, the economic theory of tort law starts from the idea that liability should affect the 
incentives for prevention and in the case of force majeure, liability cannot influence the polluter’s incentives 
to take care, as he cannot influence the accident risk. Hence, if the injurer can not be blamed of the accident, 
he should not be held liable. Thus, even under strict liability, force majeure should remain a defence.813 
Therefore, the fact that the ELD accepts the defence of force majeure follows the economic logic and can be 
welcomed. 
The other defences that are accepted by the ELD are more controversial though. The ELD provides 
that the Member States may adopt a partial or complete defence of compliance with a permit issued under 
any of the EC legislation that is listed in Annex III to the ELD as well as a partial or complete state-of-the-art 
defence. These two particularly controversial defences will be studied now from an economic efficiency 
point of view. 
4.2. Regulatory Compliance Defence 
A regulatory compliance defence, also called a permit defence, within a strict liability regime, means that 
the operator, who otherwise would fulfil the conditions for liability, may be exempted from responsibility 
because of compliance with the regulatory standards governing his activity.814 
Article 8 (4) of the ELD states that ‘Member States may allow that operators do not have to bear the 
cost of remedial actions taken pursuant by the Directive if he demonstrates that he was not at fault or 
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negligent and that the environmental damage was caused by an emission or event expressly authorised by, 
and fully in accordance with the conditions of, an authorisation conferred by or given under applicable 
national laws and regulations which implement the legislative measures adopted by the Community 
specified in Annex III, as applied at the date of the emission or event’.815 Hence, the permit defence would 
only be available to the operators of dangerous occupational activities listed in Annex III of the Directive. 
Normally, strict liability would apply to these operators. 
Scholars are very sceptical about the introduction of a permit defence in a liability regime. Indeed, a 
permit defence implicitly assumes that regulation represents optimal standards and that regulators are 
capable of determining such standards.816 
In reality, however, command and control regulation might contain gaps and imperfections. Indeed, 
regulators need information in order to determine optimal standards. Collecting this information is costly, 
time-consuming and difficult to gather. Regulators are also dependent on information from the regulated 
industry.817 Obviously, such information might be difficult to obtain. Moreover, information about risk is 
often considered as a ‘public good’ for which industry lacks the incentives to produce data.818 Another 
fundamental problem with regulation is that regulators are under constant pressure and lobbying from 
different interest groups during the decision-making process. This might bring about the risk of so-called 
‘agency capture’.819 As was studied in the private interest approach, the regulator generally favours 
pressure groups over dispersed interests. Hence, industry might have a considerable impact on the content 
of the regulation. There is also the risk of bribery and corruption inside regulatory agencies themselves. 
Furthermore, regulation is static. It is based on the knowledge at the time of drafting.820 Due to new 
scientific evidence or technical innovations regulation soon might be outdated.821 Finally, many or most 
environmental standards are only minimum requirements.822 
Clearly, there are enough indications to believe that regulatory standards will not always be optimal. 
Hence, compliance with regulatory standards may be an insufficient ground to exempt an operator from 
liability. 
As Faure indicates, a first reason to expose an injurer to liability, although he has complied with the 
regulatory standard, is that this standard is indeed often just a minimum. If compliance with these 
minimum standards would result into an exemption from liability, the potential injurer would have no 
incentive to invest more in care than required by these standards, even if additional care could significantly 
reduce the expected accident costs. Thus, a complete permit defence thwarts any initiative to take 
precautions in excess of the regulatory standard.823 Exposing operators to (strict) liability regardless of 
compliance will induce operators to take precautionary measures beyond what is needed by the standard. 
Additionally, liability might stimulate research in cleaner production methods. This might not only serve 
environmental purposes, the development of new and safer technologies may also create new business 
opportunities and stimulate increased competition. As strict liability forces operators to internalise the full 
costs of environmental damage, a clean production method may become a business advantage. Conversely, 
a permit defence may have an environmentally counter-active effect since investing more in care than the 
regulatory standard requires, would place the operator in a competitive disadvantage.824 
A second reason to expose an injurer to liability, although he has complied with the regulatory 
standard, is that exposure to liability might counterbalance the unavoidable lobbying and public choice 
effects that come into play when permits are granted. Indeed, if compliance with the permit would exempt 
from liability, the only thing an operator would have to do is to get a permit with lenient conditions from a 
friendly public servant.825 
Finally, tort law may be a stop gap for situations that were not foreseen in the regulation. Exposure to 
liability, notwithstanding the permit, might be in such case an important guarantee that the operator will 
take efficient care.826 This reason for not granting a permit defence seems particularly relevant when the 
damage concerns soil pollution or damage to biodiversity, which is exactly the field of application of the 
ELD. One can indeed argue that soil pollution or damage to biodiversity may have a large variety of causes 
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and that there might be unknown risks, so that regulation might only cover a minor part of the potential 
damage to soil or biodiversity. Complying with the conditions in regulation and licenses is in this case 
therefore merely the minimum an operator has to do. Indeed, if the operator can take cost efficient 
measures to further reduce damage to the environment, it would be efficient to hold him liable, even if he 
complied with the regulatory standards.827 
Yet, the sceptical attitude of most scholars towards a permit defence is not fully shared by Rose-
Ackerman and Bergkamp. Theoretically, the regulator is supposed to weigh costs and benefits of different 
standards and to choose that standard that reflects the public interest and the level of risk accepted by the 
citizens. Thus, if the regulator balanced all interests involved, and accordingly determined the optimal care 
standard that would deliver the highest social net benefit, Rose-Ackerman argues that the court in a civil 
liability case should not be ‘second guessing’ the care standard defined by the regulator. She pleads that in 
such circumstances a permit defence might be attributed.828 In the environmental field, an example might 
be land use planning and development, where decisions on the allowed degree of damage to biodiversity 
depend to a large extent upon prior zoning and planning decisions. Suppose that a regulator has balanced 
all interests involved and has, on the basis of available information, taken an efficient decision concerning 
the biodiversity damage that would be allowed before granting the permit. In that case it might not be 
economically efficient if the permit holder would be held liable for damage to biodiversity if the damage 
consists exactly of the harm which had been foreseen as a result of the permit.829 It is precisely in these 
situations that Rose-Ackerman pleads for no ‘second guessing’ and the attribution of a permit defence.830 
Similarly, Bergkamp argues that it is undesirable and inefficient to oblige the polluter to pay twice: once to 
comply with the permit conditions and once, despite compliance with public law and regulation, for the 
damage associated with his activity. According to Bergkamp, the regulator cannot change the rule of the 
game during the game itself and hold the polluter to a different ex post standard by a civil court than the 
standard agreed upon in the permit.831 Bergkamp therefore strongly favoured the insertion of a regulatory 
compliance defence in the ELD.832 
Nevertheless, the case that the regulator will be able to define the optimal standard, which would 
justify a permit defence, seems more to be an exceptional case than the general rule.833 Therefore, in general, 
the economic theory on tort law indicates that compliance with regulatory standards should not exempt 
from liability. 
If compliance with regulatory standards should not exempt from liability, the question obviously 
raises why the ELD foresees the option of a permit defence in Article 8(4). 
The permit defence was among the most contentious issues in the liability debate. Originally, the 
Commission did not intend to allow for a permit defence, as can be concluded from the text of the White 
Paper where the permit compliance is not included in the list of common accepted defences.834 Yet, the final 
text of the ELD clearly is the result of fierce lobbying by diverse interest groups, and the permit defence 
clause definitely is no exception to this practice. Indeed, the permit defence was a key demand of industry 
lobby groups.835 On the other hand, the permit defence was heavily condemned by environmental groups 
who feared that compliance with a permit would allow operators to avoid liability too easily, without even 
having to show that they took all necessary measures to avoid environmental damage.836 Moreover, a 
complete permit defence is rarely accepted in the liability regimes of the Member States. If it is recognised 
as a ground for exemption for liability, the permit defence mostly is restricted to cases in which the 
authorities have explicitly authorised not only the emission, but also the damage. More often, the operator 
can only invoke permit compliance as a mitigating factor.837 
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Yet, together with the state-of-the-art defence, which will be discussed below, the permit defence was 
inserted into the Commission's Proposal for an Environmental Liability Directive at the eleventh hour, 
largely at the insistence of the enterprise directorate.838 Article 9 (1c) of the Commission’s Proposal 
provided that ‘This Directive shall not cover environmental damage or an imminent treat of such damage caused by 
an emission or event allowed in applicable law and regulations, or in the permit or authorisation issued to the 
operator’.839 The defence was not available if the operator acted negligently.840 By the wording in Article 9 
(1c), the Commission excluded from the scope of the Directive all damage caused by activities that were 
carried out in compliance with a permit. Put differently, permit compliance would exclude any liability suit 
from being brought altogether.841 
The permit defence as proposed by the Commission was heavily debated by the Member States in the 
Council and by the European Parliament during the co-decision procedure that followed. 
The UK, France, Portugal and Austria wanted operators who complied with their permit to enjoy full 
exemption from liability. Most other delegations in the Council wanted such defences to be no more than 
`mitigating factors’.842 Yet, on the environment ministers meeting in Luxembourg of 13 June 2003, it was 
agreed that both the permit defence and state-of-the-art defence should not justify exemption from liability, 
but will be mitigating factors reducing compensation payable by polluting firms.843 
The European Parliament favoured a compromise so that permit compliance would in certain cases be 
a mitigating factor, and in others a defence. According to the Dutch MEP Toine Manders, the directive 
should ensure that the authorities will take permits compliance or the use of state-of-the art technology into 
account when deciding the level of compensation firms should pay after pollution incidents.844 
Yet, as with several other controversial issues, the Council left the choice of including the permit 
defence, when transposing the ELD into their domestic law, up to the individual Member States whilst at 
the same time the wording of the defence was tightened. Indeed, Article 8(4) of the Directive lays the 
burden of proof with the operator, who has to demonstrate that he was not at fault or negligent and was 
fully in accordance with the conditions of the permit. However, in some cases, it might be difficult for an 
operator to prove he was not at fault or negligent in causing environmental damage. The defence therefore 
seems to be intended to be narrow.845 
Yet, as Wenneras rightly indicates, the consequences of the permit defence must be judged within the 
context of subsidiary state responsibility. As for orphan damage, the ELD does not oblige Member States to 
engage in clean-up themselves if operators cannot be held liable because of permit defence. Yet, in order to 
ensure restoration, it is crucial that Member States should be responsible for clean-up in cases where permit 
defences exempt operators from restoration. Public responsibility might also induce authorities to issue 
better regulation and stricter permits. Moreover, in cases where damage occurs despite the operator 
complying fully with the permit, the authorities may have failed to regulate the activity appropriately and 
therefore can be considered morally responsible. It is therefore of grave concern that, although the 
European Parliament insisted on state liability in its first reading of the proposal, the Commission and the 
Council rejected state responsibility in cases where operators cannot be held liable because of permit 
defence.846 
It might be argued that state liability is not necessary as authorities may still be held liable under 
national law or under the Francovich doctrine if there is a breach of EC law.847 Yet, in most Member States it 
is difficult of even impossible to hold states responsible for insufficient regulation.848 Moreover, Francovich 
liability is unlikely to apply to damage to natural resources, as Francovich liability requires the breach of 
rights of individuals and economic loss.849 In addition, the requirements of EC law concerning the issuing of 
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permits are few and general in nature and it may prove very difficult to demonstrate a sufficiently serious 
breach.850 
Concluding, the permit defence provision in the ELD is out of step with the economic theory on tort 
law and the normal practice within the Member States. The permit defence might even undermine the 
ability of the Directive to ensure prevention and restoration of environmental damage. Furthermore, as 
Member States have the discretion to acknowledge permit defence or not, the burden for the industry might 
vary significantly within Member States.851 It therefore would have been preferable if the ELD had not 
foreseen the option of a permit defence in order to achieve its objectives of prevention and remedying of 
environmental damage.852 
4.3. State-of-the-art Defence 
The state-of-the-art defence holds that an operator should not be liable if his activities were not considered 
to cause harm according to the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time of the activity.853 
The ELD stipulates in Article 8 (4) (b) that ‘where an emission or activity or any manner of using a 
product causes damage and the operator demonstrates that scientific and technical knowledge at the time 
when the emission was released or the activity took place did not consider it likely that such damage would 
occur, Member States may allow the operator not to bear the restoration costs’.854 
As stated above, the state-of-the-art-defence was added to the Proposal of the Commission together 
with the permit defence, mainly to meet industry’s requests. In particular, this clause was inserted to 
exempt damage caused by genetically modified products (GMO’s).855 The text of the Proposal even 
provided that ‘the Directive shall not cover environmental damage cause by emissions or activities which 
were not considered harmful according to the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when 
the emission was released or the activity took place’.856 As for the permit defence, the final text leaves the 
discretion to include the defence to the Member States. The defence obviously has angered environmental 
groups, especially because the GMO Directive (Directive 2001/18/EC), states that liability issues if a GMO 
causes environmental damage (which in itself may be difficult to prove), are not addressed because they 
will be incorporated in the general European environmental liability regime.857 
The Commission justified the state-of-the-art defence by stating that ‘failure to include this exemption 
would have unduly stifled technological development in the EU’.858 Yet, the economic theory of tort law 
holds that liability for development risks might give incentives to the operator to obtain information on 
new risks and the optimal precautionary measures that might be taken to prevent the risk. It must be clear 
however, that liability for development risks should not turn into a disguised retro-active liability regime, 
whereby in reality the contents of the liability rule have changed.859 Hence, based on the economic theory of 
tort law, one could argue that the ELD, aiming at prevention of environmental liability, should include 
liability for development risks, in order to force operators to obtain information of risks. Indeed, as Krämer 
states, from the point of view of the environment, there is no reason not to ensure that the precautionary 
principle is applied also in cases of development risks.860 
Yet, as with the permit defence, the ELD does not follow the economic logic. Moreover, as with the 
permit defence, it is regrettable that Member States have the discretion to acknowledge the state-of-the-art 
defence or not, and therefore the burden for the industry might vary significantly within Member States. 
Some comfort might be obtained, however, from the restrictive application of a similar provision in Council 
Directive 85/374/EEC (Product Liability Directive) by the courts. For instance, in the case A and Others v 
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National Blood Authority,861 the UK High Court decided that the state-of-the-art defence cannot be invoked 
unless the existence of a defect in the product at issue was unknown. Put differently, the defence does not 
apply to a known defect, even if measures to avoid the risk that was caused by the defect were not available 
at the time.862 It would be advisable if the state-of-the-art defence in the ELD would have a similar 
restrictive application. 
5. Insolvency and Financial Guarantees 
Another controversial issue in de development process of the ELD concerned the issue of mandatory 
insurance for economic operators. 
As was already indicated above, strict liability will only give incentives for prevention if the 
insolvency risk can be cured. Indeed, if the potential magnitude of the damage would largely outweigh the 
financial possibilities of the polluter, and no remedies would be available, strict liability would lead to 
under-deterrence and negligence would even be preferred. Therefore, from a theoretical perspective it 
could be argued that a strict liability regime should not be introduced without financial guarantees as a 
serious insolvency risk might rise. If prevention of environmental damage would be the goal of the liability 
system, it would than be better to opt for a negligence rule.863 
During the development process of the ELD, Member States’ delegations in the Council were deeply 
split over the issue of financial security for economic operators. Holding presidency in the first half of 2003, 
Greece proposed introducing mandatory insurance for hazardous activities five years after the directive 
entered into force. Other activities would be subject to the same requirement four years later. However, a 
big block of countries was against the idea of mandatory insurance, including the UK, Italy, France and 
Ireland, plus the European Commission itself, which originally proposed subsidiarity on the issue. 
Germany and Belgium argued pro mandatory insurance, though they indicated that clear guidelines were 
needed before the obligation could come in. Denmark originally opposed mandatory insurance but 
afterwards accepted it.864 
On 2 September 2003, the Council issued a Common Position stating that ‘Member States should take 
measures to encourage the use by operators of any appropriate insurance or other forms of financial 
security and the development of financial security instruments and markets in order to provide effective 
cover for financial obligations under the Directive’.865 The Common Position clearly signalled that the 
majority of the Member States rejected mandatory insurance. 
This reluctance of the Member States is also reflected in the final text of the ELD. Article 14 of the ELD 
indeed does not require mandatory insurance, but only provides that the Member States should encourage 
the development of financial security instruments. Article 14 of the ELD states that ‘Member States shall 
take measures to encourage the development of financial security instruments and markets by the 
appropriate economic and financial operators, including financial mechanisms in case of insolvency, with 
the aim of enabling operators to use financial guarantees to cover their responsibilities under the 
Directive’.866 The Commission will review the situation in 2010, and will examine whether the regime 
should be modified. If appropriate, the Commission shall submit proposals for a system of harmonised 
mandatory financial security.867 
Overall, commentators have generally explained the Common Position and the Directive as excluding 
any compulsory financial guarantees. The absence of such an obligation could be worrisome because, as 
indicated above, it follows from Article 5 §4 and Article 6 §3 of the ELD that the Member States are not 
obliged to take preventive or remedial measures themselves in case of orphan sites.868 
From an economic point of view, it is regrettable that the ELD does not impose an obligation to have a 
certain kind of financial security yet. Indeed, the effectiveness of a strict liability rule to provide incentives 
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for prevention decisively depends on the availability of financial security. As Faure argues, simply trying 
the new strict liability regime of the ELD and expecting the financial and insurance markets to develop the 
necessary insurance instruments seems like a dangerous route to take. The question obviously rises 
whether insurance companies and financial markets can and want to insure environmental risks. Indeed, in 
the end, it will be the insurance and financial markets which will decide in practice whether they are 
willing to provide insurance for environmental risks.869 Yet, it must be clear that this financial security did 
not necessarily had to be liability insurance. The ELD could have allowed for a wide variety of mechanisms 
that could be used to provide this financial security, like first party insurance instead of liability insurance 
or guarantees in an environmental savings account.870 On the other hand, Clark argues that various national 
liability regimes have been introduced in the last years, without compulsory financial security and they did 
not collapse. Hence, according to Clark, the fact that the ELD did not provide for compulsory financial 
security, is no good reason why the ELD should not be adopted.871 
Moreover, Bocken rejects this ‘no mandatory financial security’ interpretation of the ELD.872 He points 
to the fact that Article 8 §2 of the Directive provides that ‘the competent authority shall recover inter alia, via 
security over property or other appropriate guarantees from the who has caused the damage…the costs it has 
incurred’.873. 
Bocken therefore interprets the Directive as follows, Article 8 §2 aims to protect the authorities against 
the insolvency of the operator by obligatory requiring Member States to set up a system of security interest 
that effectively enables the competent authorities to recover from the operator the costs of ex officio 
measures. This obligation to foresee financial guarantees to prevent the authorities against insolvency of the 
operators is, according to Bocken, often overlooked. However, one should not forget that Member States 
have the obligation that the objective of the Directive is reached. Article 14 §1 on the other hand, requires 
Member States to encourage the development of financial guarantees in order to allow the operators to 
protect themselves against liability and to satisfy their obligations under Article 8 §2. In contrast to Article 8 
§2, the latter provision is not compulsory. However, as stated above, Article 14 §2 opens the possibility for a 
Commission Proposal with respect to a harmonised system of mandatory financial security if the situation 
does not prove satisfactorily in eight years.874 Hence, the opinion of some of the Members States that they 
could support the Directive as there was not much in the document that might require them to strengthen 
their existing laws, as Clarke writes875, might, according to Bocken, be a wrong appreciation of the 
Directive. 
In sum, although the combined strict liability regime for dangerous activities/negligence for non-
dangerous activities, as proposed in the ELD seems to be in line with the economic theory of tort law, it is 
regrettable that the strict liability regime has not been combined with some kind of obligation to provide 
financial security as one can assume that an insolvency risk may emerge. In such case, the prevention and 
restoration of environmental damage cannot be ensured, which is precisely the objective of the ELD. 
However, the obligation in Article 8§2 to foresee financial guarantees to prevent the authorities against 
insolvency of the operator might compensate to some extent. Moreover, in any case, it remains to be 
awaited whether the absence of mandatory financial security in order to allow the operators to protect 
themselves against liability would pose a problem for the effectiveness of the Directive. 
6. Summary 
As far as the choice of liability regime is concerned, the ELD complies with the economic analysis of tort 
law which predicts that a strict liability is more efficient in case of hazardous activities since in those 
situations it is more important to control the injurer’s activity. For other situations, a fault regime can 
suffice, which is precisely what the ELD proposes. 
However, the crucial elements that in reality will determine the ability of the Directive to achieve the 
prevention and remediation of environmental damage are the way in which is dealt with retroactivity and 
causality, the defences that are accorded and whether or not provisions for (obligatory) insurance are 
foreseen. As argued above, some provisions in the ELD might seriously undermine the ability of the 
Directive to exert a preventive effect and to ensure restoration of damage. Indeed, in theory, strict liability 
could be a strong incentive for operators to take all possible risk-minimising measures and it could be a 
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way of implementing the precautionary principle. However, the restricted scope of the Directive, the fact 
that the burden of proof lays with the authorities, the (possible) availability of the permit and the state-of-
the-art defence and the absence of mandatory insurance in the ELD itself might cause that the ELD might 
not set a strong incentive for the potential liable operators to invest in risk-minimising measures. All 
depends in this respect on the implementation of the ELD in the Member States. Moreover, the risk might 
exist that operators cannot be held liable and that restoration cannot be ensured as Member States do not 
have direct responsibility for prevention and restoration under the ELD regime. Furthermore, as final 
decisions concerning these crucial elements are passed on to the Member States, they will certainly 
influence the burden for industry within the Member States, which will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
In sum, the regime of the ELD shows some inefficiencies. It must be clear though that these 
inefficiencies do not necessary result from the fact that the regime has been issued at European level. 
Indeed, also at national level these inefficiencies might arise. However, the ELD is clearly the result of a 
political and economical bargaining process, which definitely has influenced the content of the Directive. 
Moreover, given the burdensome development process of the ELD, one might get the idea that at some 
point it was just important to get a Directive adopted and that its provisions could be fine-tuned in later 
amendments. Indeed, the Directive would certainly benefit from some amendments in a later stage. 
Meanwhile, the Directive has entered into force and interpreting the Directive in light of its aim and general 
principles of EC environmental law seems the only option to give the ELD the chance to become an 
effective instrument to ensure prevention and restoration of environmental damage in the EU. 
Yet, this research did not just want to provide an efficiency analysis of the ELD regime. The main 
question of this research was the level of government at which environmental liability rules, including 
liability rules for soil pollution, best could be decided. It now merits examining whether the reasons for a 
harmonised liability regime, provided for by the Commission in the development of the ELD correspond 
with the economic theory on federalism and if not, how the harmonisation in the European Union of 
environmental liability rules, including liability rules for soil pollution, can be explained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
  
OPTIMAL DECISION-MAKING LEVEL OF LIABILITY RULES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
A significant part of the critique during the development process of the ELD considered the question 
whether and for what reasons there was a need to shift environmental liability rules from the Member 
States to the European level. 
Therefore, the question that will be dealt with in this chapter is whether the Environmental Liability 
Directive corresponds with the predictions of the theoretical framework on the optimal decision-making 
level of liability rules for environmental damage and if not, why was harmonisation of environmental 
liability rules, including liability rules for soil pollution, considered necessary in the European Union? 
As for the theoretical analysis, the arguments provided by the Commission to justify the Directive will 
be studied from a public interest approach as well as from a private interest approach. In a first step, the 
arguments of the Commission for a harmonised environmental liability regime in the European Union will 
be compared with the economic theory of federalism (paragraph 1). In a second step, additional 
explanations for the harmonisation of environmental liability rules in the European Union will be sought on 
the basis of the private interest approach (paragraph 2). In this way, the examination of the Environmental 
Liability Directive complements the theoretical framework and might offer a better understanding of all 
factors that play in a real harmonisation debate. 
1. Public Interest Approach on the Optimal Decision-making Level of Liability for 
Environmental Damage in the European Union 
This paragraph will compare the arguments that where provided by the Community to justify the 
Environmental liability Directive with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, with the arguments for 
harmonisation provided by the economic theory of federalism in the environmental field.876 
In a first step, the analogy of the bottom-up approach of the economic theory on federalism with the 
interpretation of the subsidiarity principle by the Community institutions will be indicated. Next, the 
arguments for harmonisation that the Commission advanced during the decision-making process of the 
ELD with regard to the principle of subsidiarity will be examined on the basis of the theoretical framework 
that was developed in this research. Do the arguments for harmonisation, provided for by the Commission, 
justify a shift of environmental liability rules, including liability rules for soil pollution, from the Member 
States to the European level from an economic perspective? This is the question that will be dealt with in 
this paragraph. 
1.1. Tiebout versus Subsidiarity: Decentralisation as a Starting Point in the EU? 
As was studied in the theoretical part of this research, the economic theory on federalism is based upon the 
Tiebout Model and the Decentralisation Theorem of Oates and generally takes a bottom-up approach 
towards centralisation. The starting point is that through decentralisation rules can be adapted to the 
preferences of the citizens. It was argued, however, that, due to externalities and market failure, transaction 
costs or imperfect information, some decisions might better be decided at a higher level of decision-making. 
                                                             
876  In paragraph 2.2.2 of chapter 4, it was already indicated that scholars are also very critical about the justification of the 
Commission with respect to the proportionality principle. The Commission merely claims that the Directive does not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to achieve its objectives (ELD, Preamble 3), whereas Bergkamp holds that several 
provisions of the Directive are disproportional. Yet, as the main question that will be dealt with in this research is why 
harmonisation of environmental liability rules was considered necessary in the European Union in the first place, the 
reminder of this chapter will concentrate on the reasons provided by the Commission for an environmental liability 
regime at European level as required by the subsidiarity principle. 
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The reasons for harmonisation of regulation were grouped into four main arguments: the transboundary 
character of an externality, the risk of a race-to-the-bottom, market access concerns and the desire to 
guarantee a minimum level of protection. 
In the European Union, the subsidiarity principle was enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty to strike the 
balance between sovereignty of the Member States and harmonisation of environmental rules at European 
level. The principle of subsidiarity is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the 
citizen and that action at Community level is justified with respect to the possibilities available at national, 
regional or local level.877 By stating that ‘in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community’, the 
subsidiarity principle indeed shows resemblance with the bottom-up approach of the economic theory on 
federalism. 
As was already explained in Chapter 4, the Community institutions tend to have interpreted the 
subsidiarity principle as a test of comparative efficiency, answering the question which level would achieve 
the envisaged goal more efficiently. This interpretation of subsidiarity requires an assessment of arguments 
in favour of Community action and those in favour of action by the Member States.878 It appears that in this 
assessment, the Community institutions clearly involve economic efficiency as an instrument to justify 
harmonisation with regard to subsidiarity.879 Indeed, as shown in Chapter 4, from the Explanatory 
Memoranda and Recitals of new environmental Directives, it is possible to identify four main arguments 
generally used to justify Community action in the environmental field: the presence of transboundary 
externalities, the prevention of unequal competition, also called the need for a ‘level playing-field’, 
harmonisation to achieve free movement of goods and the European heritage argument.880 These 
arguments for Community action clearly resemble the arguments for centralisation of the economic theory 
on federalism. 
Moreover, the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality to the 
Amsterdam Treaty, provides obligatory guidelines, which should be used in examining whether the 
principle of subsidiarity is met. These guidelines also resemble the arguments for centralisation of the 
economic theory on federalism: Community action would be justified if the issue under consideration has 
trans-national aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by action by Member States; if actions by 
Member States alone or lack of Community action would conflict with the requirements of the Treaty (such 
as a need to correct distortions of competition or avoid disguised restrictions on trade) or would otherwise 
significantly damage Member States’ interests; or if action at Community level would produce clear 
benefits by reason of scale or effect compared with action at the level of the Member States.881 
Yet, the subsidiarity principle remains an elastic concept which leaves significant discretion to the 
Commission and does not offer a clear rule to decide on the optimal policy level of environmental liability 
rules in the Community.882 The Tiebout Model and the Decentralisation Theorem of Oates on the other 
hand are based on quite restrictive assumptions. Therefore one could question the relevance of these 
theories in real world problems and in particular in providing guidance on the optimal policy level of 
environmental liability rules in the European Union. Yet, even though these models cannot fully grasp the 
complex and political decision-making procedures of the Community, as the interpretation of the 
subsidiarity principle by the Community institutions shows similarities with the bottom-up approach of the 
economic theory on federalism and the Community institutions clearly involve economic efficiency as an 
instrument to justify harmonisation with regard to subsidiarity, a comparison of the arguments provided 
for by the Community under the subsidiarity principle and the theoretical models would certainly be 
justified. The comparison would show how in both cases the balance between centralisation and 
decentralisation would be sought and might clarify whether and for which reasons Community action in 
the field of environmental liability has been considered appropriate. 
Hence, taking decentralisation as a starting point, for what reasons should environmental liability 
rules be shifted from the Member States to the European level?883 
                                                             
877  <Europa.eu.int/scadplus/glossary/subsidiarity_en.htm>. 
878  Jeppesen 2002, 63, 97. 
879  Van den Bergh 1994, 351-352. 
880  Jeppesen 2002, 74; Van den Bergh, Faure & Lefevere 1996, 128-131 and Shaw, Nadin & Seaton 2000, 92. 
881  Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Article 5. 
882  Jeppesen 2002, 96. 
883  Jeppesen 2002, 2 and Van den Bergh 1994, 351. 
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1.2. The Search for Arguments for Centralisation of Liability Rules for Environmental Damage 
in the EU 
As was already remarked in Chapter 4, in view of the fierce debates during the adoption process of the ELD 
precisely on the Community’s competence to harmonize environmental liability, it is striking that in the 
final text of the ELD, the Commission fails to explain why a harmonised liability regime is necessary or why 
its goals cannot be achieved by the Member States, as required by the subsidiarity principle. 
Indeed, although the subsequent documents in the ELD adoption process provide arguments for 
Community action, a clear overview of arguments for a harmonised liability regime cannot be found 
anymore in the final text of the ELD. In paragraph 2.2.2 of chapter 4, it was indicated that Preamble 3 of the 
ELD only states that subsidiarity is met because the ELD’s objective, namely to establish a common 
framework for the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at Community level by reason of scale or effect.884 
The Commission does not explain why it is necessary to establish such a framework or why it cannot be 
achieved by the Member States. Moreover, the Commission’s reasoning in Preamble 3 is, as Bergkamp and 
Faure indicate, merely a description of the subsidiarity principle itself and does not provide any 
justification.885 
In order to examine for what reasons it was considered necessary to harmonise environmental liability 
rules, the subsequent Commission documents in the ELD decision-making process must be consulted. The 
three documents in the ELD decision-making process that can be referred to in order to examine the reasons 
for a shift of environmental liability rules from the Member States to the European level are the 
Commission Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage,886 the White Paper on Environmental 
Liability,887 and the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Directive on Environmental Liability 
with regard to the Prevention and Restoration of Environmental Damage.888 
Paragraph 2 of chapter 4 already examined in detail the development of these documents and the 
justifications for European action that were provided by the Commission in each document. Figure 4 
recapitulates this examination and provides an overview of the different arguments for European action 
presented in these subsequent documents, in order to serve as a basis for the public interest analysis. 
                                                             
884  ELD, Preamble 3. 
885  See Bergkamp 2005, 102 and Faure 2005, 8. 
886  Commission Communication of 14 May 1993, Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47. 
887  Commission Communication of 9 February 2000, White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM (2000) 66. 
888  Commission Communication of 23 January 2002,  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on Environmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and Restoration of Environmental Damage, COM (2002) 17 
final, OJ C151 E/132. 
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Reasons for harmonisation advanced by the Commission for Community competence: 
overview of the subsequent documents 
Year Document Reasons advanced by the Commission 
1993 Commission Green Paper on 
Remedying Environmental 
Damage 
1. A Community-wide system of civil liability for 
environmental damage would be based on the 
concept that a person should rectify the damage 
that he causes, which strongly related to two 
principles forming the basis of Community 
environmental policy, the principle of 
prevention and the "polluter pays" principle. 
2. Different systems of civil liability for 
remedying environmental damage among the 
Member States could lead to distortions of 
competition and the single market. 
2000 White Paper on 
Environmental Liability 
A Community-wide system of civil liability for 
environmental damage would: 
1. Realise the three grand environmental 
principles enshrined in Art 174 (2) of the EC 
Treaty: the polluter pays, precautionary and 
preventive principles; 
2. Provide an adequate solution for 
transboundary damage;  
3. Ensure decontamination and restoration of 
the environment and better integration of 
environment into other policy areas;  
4. Contribute to a level playing field in the 
internal market 
5. Respect the principle of equal treatment. 
2001 Working Paper on 
Prevention and Restoration 
of Significant Environmental 
Damage  
Shift from a civil liability regime to a public law 
regime for prevention and restoration of 
environmental damage that would be enforced 
by competent authorities. No arguments are 
provided to justify Community action. 
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2002 Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament 
and of the Council on 
Environmental Liability 
with regard to the 
Prevention and Restoration 
of Environmental Damage 
(Explanatory Memorandum) 
1. Community action is needed to address site 
contamination and the loss of biodiversity in 
the Community. Similar to the justifications in 
the White Paper, it is argued that a liability 
regime would realise the implementation of three 
grand environmental principles enshrined in Art 
174 (2) of the EC Treaty: the polluter pays, 
precautionary and preventive principles. 
2. Not all Member States adopted a liability 
regime for contaminated land. Without 
Community action there would be no guarantee 
that the polluter pays principle would be 
effectively applied across all the Community. 
3. Member States’ liability regimes for 
contaminated land do not mandate national 
authorities to ensure that orphan sites are 
cleaned up and hence do not ensure that the 
objective of restoration is attained. 
4. Few, if any Member States imposed liability 
for biodiversity damage; 
5. As was argued in the White Paper, without a 
harmonised framework at Community level, 
economic actors could exploit differences in 
Member States’ which would result in unfair 
competition. 
Figure 4 Reasons for harmonisation advanced by the Commission for Community competence 
As can be seen in Figure 4, a comparison of the subsequent documents reveals that over time, some of the 
arguments provided by the Commission show consistency, some arguments have been added, and others 
have disappeared. Moreover, there also seems to be a shift from mainly economic arguments in the White 
Paper, comparable to the arguments for harmonisation of the economic theory on federalism (for example 
the harmonisation for transboundary damage or harmonisation to avoid unequal competition), to an 
emphasis on the prevention and restoration of environmental damage in the Explanatory Memorandum to 
the Commission Proposal. 
Three arguments that are consistently repeated in the subsequent documents. First, it is argued that 
Community action would be needed to ensure the realisation of the environmental principles which are 
enshrined in Art 174 §2 EC Treaty, notably the precautionary, polluter pays and preventive principles. 
Second, Community action would prevent distortion of competition. Third, Community action would 
ensure the restoration of environmental damage. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal added 
that Community action would be needed to address site contamination and the loss of biodiversity in the 
EU. Moreover, it is argued that not all Member States have liability rules for contaminated land or 
biodiversity, and the restoration of orphan sites is not always ensured, so that there is no guarantee that the 
polluter pays principle is fulfilled and restoration is ensured without Community action. Remarkable on 
the other hand, is that Community action for transboundary damage, which might be an argument for 
harmonisation in the economic theory of federalism, has only been mentioned in the White Paper, but has 
not been repeated in the Explanatory Memorandum. 
The above mentioned arguments can be grouped into six main reasons for European action in the field 
of environmental liability: the transboundary character of an externality argument, the race-to-the-bottom 
argument, the level-playing field argument, the realisation of the polluter pays, prevention and 
precautionary principles, decontamination and restoration of the environment, and harmonisation to 
guarantee a minimum level of protection. These arguments provided for by the Commission to justify a 
European liability regime will now be examined successively. For each argument, it will be studied whether 
the argument would justify harmonisation from an economic perspective and whether the ELD reflects this 
outcome. Each argument will be examined for environmental liability rules in general as well as for soil 
pollution in particular. Moreover, it will studied whether the ELD would indeed solve the problem for 
which harmonisation was deemed necessary. 
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1.2.1. Transboundary Character of an Externality 
In the White Paper the Commission advanced the argument that a Community-wide liability regime would 
provide an adequate solution for transboundary damage. The Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal to 
the ELD does not mention transboundary damage explicitly as a reason for Community action anymore. 
However, the Directive clearly addresses transboundary damage. Article 15 of the ELD provides that 
Member States shall cooperate when environmental damage affects or is likely to affect several Member 
States.889 
As studied in the theoretical part, in the economic theory of federalism the transboundary aspect of 
damage is an argument that might justify (a certain level of) harmonisation. 
Indeed, the Tiebout Model, favouring decentralisation of the provision of public goods, only holds if 
decisions of one jurisdiction, have no external (negative) effects on other jurisdictions. When policies of a 
certain jurisdiction have a transboundary effect on a neighbouring jurisdiction, there is an argument for 
centralisation. The reasoning is twofold. 
First, jurisdictions will not internalise the consequences of their actions that might accrue across their 
borders. Hence, jurisdictions will have no incentive to impose stringent liability rules on their own industry 
and consequently will under-regulate the harmful activity.890 Therefore, the internalisation of 
transboundary externalities could be ensured by shifting powers to a higher governmental level. 
Article 5 of the Amsterdam protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality, also underwrites this idea by stating that ‘action can be taken if there are transnational 
aspects which cannot be satisfactory regulated by action by Member States.891 
Second, economies of scale could be reached by a — certain level of — centralisation.892 The reasoning 
is that in order to solve the externality problem adequately, decision-making power should be entrusted to 
a higher regulatory level that has a competence that is large enough to deal with the problem. Moreover, by 
centralisation of certain tasks like technical and scientific research, economies of scale could be reached. 
Nevertheless, in the theoretical part of this research, it was concluded that the transboundary 
externality argument would not justify full harmonisation of liability rules to solve transboundary 
externalities. Instead, in order to take local circumstances into account, a so-called ‘transboundary only’- 
regime could be preferred. However, it was indicated that, according to the economies of scale reasoning, it 
could be examined whether there are economies of scale and advantages of expertise that can be profited 
from without having to give in on diversity. Hence, it was concluded that the transboundary externality 
argument would allow for a mixed system that would benefit from the merits/expertise of both 
governmental levels, but would not justify excessive centralisation or harmonisation. 
It merits now examining whether the ELD corresponds with the theory on federalism with respect to 
transboundary externalities. 
Based on the first line of reasoning of the transboundary externalities argument, stating that the 
internalisation of transboundary externalities could be ensured by shifting powers to a higher 
governmental level, it could be accepted that the Directive rightly addresses transboundary environmental 
damage. The transboundary externalities argument, however, provides an explanation for only part of the 
shift of environmental liability rules from the Member States to the European level. Indeed, whilst certain 
environmental damage will be inter-state, the Directive also addresses intra-state damage which potentially 
Member States could solve better. 
The Directive covers damage to protected species and habitats, commonly referred to as damage to 
biodiversity, water damage and land damage. There seems little doubt that damage to water might indeed 
potentially fall under inter-state damage. Examples of water damage are numerous. In the Explanatory 
Memorandum, the Commission itself mentions the Baia Mare and Baia Borsa accidents in Romania of 
January and March 2000 where rivers were heavily polluted.893 
The Commission, however, failed to justify the inclusion of land damage and damage to biodiversity. 
For land damage, the Commission states that Community action is needed to address effectively and 
efficiently site contamination and quotes that about 300.000 sites have been identified as definitively or 
                                                             
889  ELD, Article 5. 
890  Faure 2003a, 38-39. See also Esty & Geradin 2001, 34. 
891  Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Article 5. 
892  Faure 2003a, 38-39. See also Ogus 1999, 405-418. 
893  Other examples that can be referred to are the heavy pollution of the Rhine river caused by a fire at the Basle Sandoz 
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Environmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and Restoration of Environmental Damage, Explanatory 
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potentially contaminated.894 The question however is to what extent contaminated sites are transboundary 
issues. Bergkamp contends that ‘contaminated sites, subject to very few exceptions, do not have cross-
border effect, and therefore should be left to the Member States.895 The Commission does not elaborate 
what ‘cross-border’ land issues might be and does not explain why intra-state contaminated sites would 
better be restored by an environmental liability regime at European level than by the regimes of the 
Member States. 
With respect to biodiversity, most Member States do have liability regimes for environmental damage, 
yet biodiversity is mostly not covered. Farnsworth holds that the Directive might be innovative because it 
introduces liability for damage precisely in this area.896 Yet, it is clearly insufficient to state that ‘the loss of 
biodiversity in the Community has accelerated dramatically in recent decades making it one of the severe 
threats in the future’ and that ‘Community action to protect and restore biodiversity is warranted to ensure 
that socially-efficient means are used to finance the remedying of damage to biodiversity in the Community 
and, by doing so, to encourage efficient prevention’, to justify a shift of environmental liability rules from 
the Member States to the European level.897 
The main problem is that the Commission does not elaborate further and does not provide concrete 
examples of why an environmental liability regime at European level would better prevent and restore 
environmental damage, including land damage, than the regimes at national level.898 Hence, a common 
critique on the ELD is that the Commission failed to justify the scope of the Directive. 
Indeed, if transboundary environmental damage might be a problem in the European Union but if 
Member States could adequately deal with pollution within their borders, then according to economic 
theory and to the subsidiarity principle, a European liability regime would only be justified for 
transboundary environmental damage instead of an overall liability regime. This would result in a 
`transboundary only’-regime. 
At European level, this idea of a `transboundary only’ regime was rejected, since it was argued in the 
White Paper on Environmental Liability that this could lead to inequalities in treatment of victims in 
Member States depending on whether they were victim of a transboundary or of a local pollution.899 
Bergkamp indicates that when referring to equality, the Commission no longer argues within the 
scope of the subsidiarity principle, but simply pleads for uniformity.900 As will be argued in the last 
paragraph, this argument could fit into the public choice theory which holds that industry in heavily 
regulated (and probably polluted) areas lobbies (supported by green NGO's) to force their very stringent 
environmental regulations upon other Member States that might not need such stringent measures. In that 
way, this industry might erect artificial barriers to entry. 
Yet, the subsidiarity principle has been included in the EC Treaty to prevent EU action justified 
mainly on a request for uniformity, possibly by industry in heavily regulated areas.901 As mentioned above, 
the subsidiarity principle allows the community to take action if and only in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States. As it is not proven that uniformity is 
necessary for the Member States in order to deal effectively with environmental damage, there is no need 
for full harmonisation. The equality argument is hence not very convincing, neither from an economic, nor 
from a legal perspective. 
The second strand of the transboundary damage argument, the realisation of economies of scale, 
appears to be a bit more lenient towards centralisation of certain tasks, not only to solve transboundary 
spillovers but also to solve problems that are common over different jurisdictions. Indeed, the reasoning 
suggests that jurisdictions might profit from the centralisation of certain tasks or from some guiding 
framework developed by the central government. 
This line of reasoning was follewed by the environmental NGO’s. Birdlife International, European 
Environmental Bureau, Greenpeace International and WWF European Policy office submitted in their 
comments on the White Paper that ‘the argument that national laws provide sufficient protection in relation 
to such damage is a fallacy. Indeed, part of the justification for establishing an EU environmental liability 
scheme was that national rules cannot cope with the various complexities that underlie environmental 
                                                             
894  Proposal for a Directive on Environmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and Restoration of Environmental 
Damage, Explanatory Memorandum, 4 and European Environmental Agency, Management of contaminated sites in 
Western Europe, Topic Report No 13/1999, Copenhagen, June 2000. 
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liability and that therefore persons, property and biodiversity are not sufficiently protected by national laws 
in relation to environmental damage’.902 Moreover, the third guideline on subsidiarity in the Protocol of the 
Amsterdam Treaty holds that Community action would be justified if action at Community level would 
produce clear benefits by reason of scale or effect compared with action at the level of the Member States.903 
The question arises whether an European environmental liability regime, which also covers intra-state 
damage, is justified because of the complexity of environmental liability and because Community action 
would better achieve the prevention and remediation of environmental damage than the Member States for 
reasons of scale or effect. Yet, the Commission does not provide any clear proof for this assumption. 
In sum, although transboundary environmental pollution may occur in certain cases in the EU, from 
an economic point of view, this argument by itself is not sufficient to justify the shift of environmental 
liability rules from the Member States to the European level. With respect to the particular case of soil 
pollution, soil pollution itself mostly will cause in-state torts. Moreover the causes and consequences of soil 
pollution can vary significantly within a jurisdiction and over jurisdictions. In these circumstances, 
regulation tailored to local needs and preferences seems appropriate. Therefore, a far-reaching 
harmonisation or even centralisation of liability rules for soil pollution would not be justified. Economies of 
scale in technical research might plead for co-operation or centralisation of certain tasks, like research or 
data gathering on soil contamination and restoration. However, again, the promise of economies of scale in 
scientific research does not argue for a centralisation in an excessive sense. Thus, with respect to the nature 
of soil pollution, full centralisation or harmonisation of liability rules for soil pollution would not be 
justifiable as it would not take diverse causes, circumstances and preferences into account. Therefore, the 
transboundary externality argument seems a weak argument to justify the harmonisation of environmental 
liability rules and in particular liability rules for soil pollution in the European Union. 
The question obviously arises whether the prevention and restoration of transboundary damage, 
including soil pollution, can be succesfully realised through the ELD. Unfortunately, the answer is negative. 
Indeed, it is doubtful that the Directive will ensure the restoration of transboundary damage. Article 
15 of the ELD merely provides for ‘cooperation’ between Member States. This includes the appropriate 
exchange of information with a view to ensuring that preventive action, and if necessary, remedial action is 
taken in respect of any environmental damage. In case a Member State identifies damage within its borders, 
caused by industry of another Member State, it may seek to recover the costs it has incurred in relation to 
the adoption of preventive or remedial measures.904 Yet, article 8(4) of the ELD states that Member States 
may allow a permit or state-of-the-art defence. If the state, where the accident happens, offers the defence, it 
obviously will be very difficult for the injured State to be compensated for the damage. Therefore, the lack 
of an obligation to compensate the injured state may undermine the preventive effect of the liability regime 
and certainly the restoration of transboundary damage.905 
Hence, it appears that the transboundary externality argument would only justify a European 
`transboundary only’-regime but not full harmonisation. Thus, the regime of the ELD goes further than 
what would be suggested by economic theory with respect to transboundary externalities. Moreover, it 
seems that precisely the prevention and remediation of transboundary damage cannot be ensured through 
the ELD. Yet, there might be other reasons that might justify the ELD. 
1.2.2. Race-to-the-bottom Argument 
In the three subsequent documents in the ELD decision-making process, the Commission argued that 
without a harmonised framework of liability for environmental damage, economic actors might exploit the 
differences between Member States which might lead to distortions of competition and the level playing 
field in the internal market.906 
As was already indicated in the theoretical part of the research, distortion of competition, eventually 
leading to a race-to-the-bottom might be the most heavily debated and most frequently advanced economic 
argument, also in the European Union, to justify harmonised environmental (liability) regulation. 
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It was also indicated that the race-to-the-bottom argument is sometimes confused with the creation of 
a ‘level playing field’, especially in the European Union. Indeed, harmonisation to prevent a race-to-the-
bottom in environmental standards, in reality might aim to create a ‘level playing field’, or the 
harmonisation of conditions of competition between states in order to reduce interstate competition 
resulting from differences in environmental quality standards.907 The ‘level playing field’ argumentation 
will be taken up again in the next paragraph on market access. This paragraph will concentrate on the race-
to-the-bottom argument in its narrow sense. 
In the theoretical part, it was concluded that it seems doubtful that a race-to-the-bottom in 
environmental liability rules would occur. On the one hand, there are more important factors that influence 
industry location decisions than environmental liability regulation, and on the other hand, states would 
have no advantage of a lenient liability regime.908 
Indeed, in theory, in the European Union, a state could try to attract industry by reducing the burdens 
that might be imposed on industry through liability rules. For example, a state might impose a higher 
burden of proof on the victims of environmental damage or a state might require a clear cause-damage 
relationship. Moreover, a state might neglect the enforcement of its environmental quality standards.909 
This behavior would be difficult to detect and to prove and a kind of political drag would then exist. The 
same reasoning could apply to liability rules for soil pollution. A state might indeed impose a higher 
burden of proof on the victims of soil pollution, or neglect the enforcement of its soil quality standards. In 
reality, it is however very unlikely that states would show such behaviour. To the contrary, Faure suggests 
that if environmental liability rules were to have an effect, a race-to-the-top would be more likely to expect 
than a race-to-the-bottom. Indeed, a lenient environmental liability regulation would limit a state’s 
possibilities to claim restoration for environmental damage caused by (foreign) industry. Therefore, a lax 
liability regime might be counter to a state’s interests.910 Still, political pressure and risk of a political drag 
should not be ignored in the case of environmental liability regulation. 
The question, however, arises whether a race-to-the-bottom in environmental liability rules and in 
particular liability rules for soil pollution, indeed has to be feared in the EU?911 
Although the Commission advances the argument repeatedly, the Commission does not provide any 
indications that point to the existence of or the risk of a race-to-the-bottom in environmental regulation, or 
in soil protection legislation. It seems doubtful, maybe even more than for environmental regulation in 
general, that a race-to-the-bottom in environmental liability rules or in soil protection legislation would 
happen, especially because Member States would have no advantage of a lenient liability regime as it 
would limit a state’s possibilities to claim restoration for environmental damage caused by industry as for 
example soil pollution. Yet, although there is no evidence of relaxed liability rules, it might be possible that 
state officials might believe or are under political pressure to believe that a stringent liability regime might 
repulse industry from locating in their Member State and that industry might move to other Member States. 
Hence, they might fail to adopt stringent quality standards and a stringent liability regime or neglect the 
enforcement of this regime. Further research in this area could provide more information on governmental 
behavior. Nevertheless, it might be doubtful that in Europe, states would engage in a game in which they 
would strive for a low level of environmental liability and renounce on restoration claims in order to attract 
industry. Moreover, even in the case of a ‘regulatory chill’, theory shows that this would not justify full 
centralization of environmental liability regulation. Indeed, other solutions to enhance the efficiency of 
environmental liability rules, including liability rules for soil pollution, may also be examined. 
The race-to-the-bottom argument provided for by the Commission, therefore is not convincing to 
allow for a harmonised environmental liability regime, including liability for soil pollution, in the European 
Union through the ELD. 
Hence, again, the ELD might be justified for other purposes than the prevention of a race-to-the-
bottom. 
1.2.3. Market Access Argument 
Together with the race-to-the-bottom argument, the Commission has repeatedly argued that a shift of 
environmental liability rules from the Member States to the European level would be needed to avoid a 
distortion of competition and to realise a level playing field.912 
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It is sometimes claimed that harmonisation of environmental regulation would be justified in order to 
ease the tensions between various jurisdictions, created by the differences in the stringency of their 
environmental regulations, on the one hand through harmonisation of marketing conditions and on the 
other hand through the reduction of transaction costs through harmonisation of legal rules. 
As far as the harmonisation of marketing conditions is concerned, it was argued in the theoretical part 
of this research that although the realisation of free trade could justify the harmonisation of elementary 
environmental product or process standards in order to avoid incompatibilities which would create barriers 
to entry or distortions of competition, it is questionable that the realization of free trade would justify the 
harmonisation of private law, as environmental liability rules. 
Indeed, it is certainly possible to realise free trade without the total harmonisation of all legal rules, 
including environmental liability rules. Moreover, equal marketing conditions would not necessarily be 
achieved through the harmonisation of (environmental) liability rules. As Faure indicates, harmonisation of 
liability rules in the EU would not create a level playing field, as there are other, far more important factors 
that determine the conditions of competition.913 Indeed, differences in the availability of natural resources 
or labor standards still would create variations in marketing conditions. Furthermore, if countries would 
prefer liability rules to target environmental-unfriendly products, instead of using regulatory restrictions 
(which might be under WTO restrictions), this would not hamper free trade. On the contrary, it would have 
a significant advantage. Indeed, the use of liability rules would prevent disguised protectionism, as a causal 
link between the environmental harm and the product concerned still must be proven.914 Hence, it seems 
doubtful that environmental liability rules would act as a trade barrier or cause competitiveness concerns 
and that a total harmonisation to ensure market access and fair marketing conditions would be necessary. 
Countries could set their liability rules according to their preferences, and still guarantee market access, 
whereby disguised protectionism might be prevented. 
The second strand of the market access argument, the ‘reduction of transaction costs through 
harmonization of legal rules’ reasoning concentrates on the concern that differences in legal rules might 
cause high transaction costs, and hence that this equally might hamper market access. The reduction in 
transaction costs through harmonization would improve market access. With respect to transaction costs, it 
was argued that transaction costs savings do not require a total harmonisation of a certain liability rule, 
which might neglect differences in citizen’s preferences. Indeed, it is very well possible that, for a certain 
tort, the applicable liability rule would be harmonized, for example a negligence rule, but that the content 
of the due care standard is left at state level, according to the preferences and needs of the citizens. Hence, 
centralization of a specific liability rule for certain activities might be combined with a differentiation of the 
specific contents of this rule. In that case, transaction costs could be lowered, and differing preferences 
could be still respected. Therefore, harmonisation of liability rules in order to reduce transaction costs might 
allow for a certain level of centralization, but not for full harmonisation.915 
With respect to soil pollution in particular, it was argued at theoretical level that it seems doubtful that 
stringent liability rules for soil pollution would act as a trade barrier for certain products. First, there are far 
more important factors that determine conditions of competition than liability rules for soil pollution, like 
for example labour standards.916 Second, a causal link between the soil pollution and the product concerned 
still must be proven, so that disguised protectionism could be prevented.917 Hence, it seems doubtful that 
differences in the stringency of liability rules for soil pollution would significantly hamper market access. 
With respect to transaction costs savings, soil pollution and clean up requirements of contaminated 
soil might be locality specific and dependant on the physical and geographical characteristics of the region. 
Therefore, it was argued that harmonisation would not outweigh the benefits of differentiated legal rules. 
Hence, from a theoretical point of view, the market access argument would not justify a 
harmonisation of environmental liability rules, including liability rules for soil pollution neither to realise a 
level playing field nor for the reduction of transaction costs. At the maximum, a co-operative approach 
could be adopted in order to facilitate market access, with central minimum requirements of protection, but 
allowing regions to implement the standards or to adopt more stringent measures in accordance with the 
objectives of free trade and competition, and conform to the citizen’s preferences. 
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Yet, if the Commission holds that harmonisation of environmental liability rules, including liability 
rules for soil pollution, was necessary to realise a level playing field and to reduce transaction costs in the 
European Union, the question obviously arises whether the ELD can realise these ambitions. A careful 
examination of the ELD reveals however, that the Directive does not create a level playing field and 
certainly does not reduce transaction costs. 
From the examination of the provisions of the ELD in Chapter 4, it already appeared that the coverage 
of the Directive is limited, so that different regimes may apply to different types of damage, in case of an 
accident and the ELD does not clarify its relation to other liability regimes. Moreover, the ELD has left 
crucial aspects up to the Member States. For instance, and without being exhaustive, Member States may 
decide whether to allow permit compliance and state-of-the-art defences, they may decide to introduce joint 
and several liability, Member States may also maintain or adopt more stringent provisions in their national 
law to prevent and restore environmental damage, and precise definitions of damage or restoration criteria 
are passed on to the Member States. Hence, there still might be significant differences in the 
implementation of the Directive by the Member States and consequently, the burden for industry in the 
different Member States might differ significantly. Hence, the ELD provides an uncertain framework and 
might create more uncertainty than its adherents originally might have thought, so that the ELD certainly 
will not create a level playing field, increase legal certainty or realise a reduction in transaction costs. 
Some concrete examples with respect to soil pollution will prove this statement. 
The Directive takes a prospective approach. Yet, such a prospective approach is not universally 
adopted in Member States. In Spain, for example, prospective owners are required to check the Property 
Register to determine whether the land they wish to buy has been registered as polluted. As Vaques notes, 
they neglect to take the Register into account at their own peril.918 As domestic provisions may continue to 
apply even if the Directive comes into force — Article 16 of the ELD allows Member States to maintain or 
adopt more stringent measures —, this may introduce considerable uncertainty into the regime. Similarly, 
Member States can decide to allow for a complete or partial permit compliance or ‘state of the art’ defence. 
Again, this will not be the case in all Member States. In Italy, for example, firms that cause environmental 
damage will be exempted from liability if they can show the damage was caused by emissions permitted by 
the authorities, whereas in Lithuania or Spain, compliance with a provision will not necessarily exempt the 
operator from liability.919 Furthermore, precise definitions of damage, baseline assessments and restoration 
criteria are also be left to Member States, and so are differing rules on making the polluter pay, the 
availability of subsidies and state support. Moreover, as was already indicated in the previous chapter, the 
scope of the ELD with respect to soil is limited.920 The consequence of the Directive’s narrow definition of 
land damage is that many sites containing pollution will not be included within the scope of the Directive, 
so that clean-up, if it takes place at all, will be on the account of the individual Member States.921 Yet, 
Member States’ different approaches to contaminated land will result in significant variation in the 
remediation of contaminated sites that fall out of the scope of the Directive. 
Hence, the ELD will not create legal certainty or reduce transaction costs with respect to 
environmental liability rules, including liability for soil pollution. The argument of the creation of a level 
playing field is therefore not sufficient to allow for a harmonised European environmental liability regime. 
1.2.4. Realisation of the Polluter Pays, Prevention and Precautionary Principles 
In all three documents, the Commission holds that Community action is needed to realise the 
implementation of three grand environmental principles enshrined in Art 174 (2) of the EC Treaty: the 
polluter pays, precautionary and preventive principles.922 
In its Explanatory Memorandum to the ELD, the Commission specifically stated that ‘the positive 
incentives provided by liability for efficient levels of prevention should prevail, provided that there is a 
consistently applied liability policy at Community level. Significant differences among liability standards at 
Member State level could considerable weaken the positive effects of liability on prevention.’923 
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Yet, although from the point of view of the environment the realisation of the polluter pays, 
precautionary and preventive principles only can be welcomed, it is doubtful that the realisation of these 
principles justifies the shift of environmental liability rules from the Member States to the European level. 
Indeed, it should be clear that the principles as such do not explain why environmental regulation should 
be issued at the European level. In this respect one could refer to the whole range of regulations that exist 
already today in the Member States and that in a certain way incorporate these principles. 
Moreover, the question obviously arises whether the liability regime of the ELD will indeed create 
more incentives for prevention than the existing national liability regimes and whether it can be ensured 
that the polluter pays for the damage caused. However, again, the answer is unfortunately negative. 
Certain provisions in the ELD might undermine the ability of the Directive to exert a preventive effect 
and to ensure that the polluter pays for the damage. Moreover, remarkable and contradictory to the 
Commissions’ own statement in the Explanatory Memorandum, is that the Directive itself establishes the 
basis for differences between the Member States, precisely for these issues that might weaken the 
preventive effect of the ELD. 
Indeed, in theory, strict liability could be a strong incentive for operators to take all possible risk-
minimising measures and it could be a way of implementing the precautionary principle. However, the 
restricted scope of the Directive, the fact that the burden of proof lays with the authorities, and especially 
the provision that Member States may allow for a permit and/or a state-of-the-art defence and the absence 
of mandatory insurance might cause that the ELD might not set a strong incentive for the potential liable 
operators to invest in risk-minimising measures. Moreover, Member States do not have direct responsibility 
for prevention and restoration under the ELD regime. As already argued in paragraph 1 of chapter 5, this 
might somewhat be compensated by the wording of Article 8 § 2, which stipulates that the competent 
authority shall recover, inter alia, via security over property or other appropriate guarantees, from the 
operator who has caused the damage or the imminent threat of damage, the costs it has incurred. 
Nevertheless, an explicit obligation on the Member States to restore the damage to the environment 
themselves would have been preferable, as Member States’ responsibility could have a positive effect on 
prevention of the damage, as explained in paragraph 1 of chapter 5.924 
With respect to soil pollution in particular, it is interesting to note that in the Proposal for a Soil 
Framework Directive, the Commission tries again to introduce responsibility for the Member States. 
Indeed, Preamble 28 states that ‘in those contaminated sites where the polluter cannot be found, cannot be 
held liable for the pollution under national or Community legislation or cannot be made to bear the costs of 
remediation, also known as orphan sites, responsibility for reducing risk to human health and the 
environment should fall on the Member States’.925 This shows that the Commission indeed believes that 
Member States’ responsibility could have a positive effect on prevention of environmental damage. It 
remains to be awaited whether this responsibility will be accepted by the Member States themselves. 
In sum, the Commission offers no evidence that the liability regime of the ELD creates more incentives 
for prevention than the existing national liability schemes or that the regime will ensure that the polluter 
pays for the damage caused.926 Therefore, the polluter pays, precautionary and preventive principles do not 
explain or justify, at least from an economic perspective, the need for European action. 
1.2.5. Decontamination and Restoration of the Environment 
Repeatedly, the Commission expressed its expectations that a European liability regime would encourage 
decontamination and restoration of the environment and improve the implementation of EC environmental 
legislation.927 In particular, the restoration of orphan damage was an argument for Community action 
mentioned in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission Proposal: ’Member States’ liability regimes 
for contaminated land do not mandate national authorities to ensure clean up of orphan sites and hence do 
not ensure that the objective of restoration is attained’.928 
Bergkamp however holds that the Commission’s expectations are probably more idealistic than 
realistic. Liability is neither a sufficient nor a necessary instrument for realising these two objectives.929 
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Moreover, Bergkamp points out that the argument that a European liability regime is necessary to ensure 
the restoration of damaged habitats is not sufficient, as Member States are already requested to do so.930 He 
suggests that, if the objective of an EU environmental liability regime is the remediation of contaminated 
land, then EC law should solely impose an obligation on Member States to reach this objective. 
Consequently, the Member States will be free to choose the instruments they will use. This may, but does 
not have to involve additional liability rules.931 
Yet, does the directive realise decontamination and restoration of the environment? 
Overlapping with the previous argument for centralisation, certain provisions in the ELD might 
undermine the ability of the Directive to ensure restoration of damage. Again, the restricted scope of the 
Directive, the fact that the burden of proof lays with the authorities, which sometimes might make it very 
difficult to prove that a certain polluter caused the damage, and the provision that Member States may 
allow for a permit and/or a state-of-the-art defence might cause that restoration cannot be ensured as 
polluter cannot be held liable under the Directive. Originally, Article 5 of the Commission’s proposal for an 
environmental liability regime included an obligation for Member States to take, in case of environmental 
damage, remedial measures and Article 6 proposed that Member States had to ensure that restoration 
measures were taken also in those cases, where the responsible operator did not cover the necessary costs 
(‘orphan damage’).932 
However, the final version of the ELD deleted the obligation on the Member States to restore the 
damage to the environment, including soil pollution, themselves. Hence, the ELD denies the positive effect 
on prevention and restoration of Member States’ responsibility, which Krämer and Schueler definitely 
consider as a weakness of the regime.933 Yet, again reference can be made to Article 8§2,, stipulating that the 
competent authority shall recover, inter alia, via security over property or other appropriate guarantees, 
from the operator who has caused the damage or the imminent threat of damage, the costs it has incurred 
and which aims to protect the competent authority against insolvency of the operator, so that restoration 
can be ensured.934 
Yet, with respect to soil pollution in particular, it appears that the Directive will not ensure the 
decontamination of many contaminated sites in the EU. Indeed, the Directive only has a restricted scope. 
The regime will only apply prospectively and a clear link needs to be established between the operator and 
the damage. The harm to health must be ‘significant’ and it must have come about as a result of an 
operation specified in Annex III of the Directive.935 As stated above, many contaminated sites will not be 
included within the scope of the Directive so that clean-up will be on the account of the Member States.936 
Furthermore, the fact that the burden of proof lays with the authorities, and the option for the Member 
States to allow for a permit and/or a state-of-the-art defence might cause that polluters cannot be held 
liable and restoration cannot be ensured. Of course, the competent authority may take remedial measures 
itself, as a means of last resort,937 although an explicit obligation on the Member States probably had been 
more effective to guarantee the restoration of soil pollution. 
In sum, it seems that the Directive will also not be able to live up to the expectations with respect to 
the decontamination of soil pollution. 
1.2.6. Harmonisation to Guarantee a Minimum Level of Protection 
The first preamble of the ELD states that ‘there are currently many contaminated sites in the Community, 
posing significant health risks, and the loss of biodiversity has dramatically increased over the last decade. 
Failure to act could result in increased site contamination and greater loss of biodiversity in the 
Community. Prevention and remedying of environmental damage contributes to implementing the 
objectives and principles of the Community’s environmental policy as set out in the Treaty’’.938 
It seems that with this line of argumentation, the Commission tries to justify the ELD by holding that 
it would guarantee all European citizens a minimum level of protection against environmental damage. 
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In a first step, it might be examined from a legal perspective whether harmonisation of environmental 
liability rules in order to guarantee a minimum level of protection would be justified on the basis of the 
Treaty provisions. In a second step, it can be examined whether the minimum level of protection argument 
would justify harmonisation of environmental liability rules, including liability rules for soil pollution from 
an economic perspective. 
First, in Articles 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty it is stated that the Community is concerned about the 
environment and that the Community shall promote higher standards of living and better quality of life. 
Arguably, the protection of the environment is a means of achieving that aim. Article 174§2 sets out the 
aims of European environmental policy, namely a high level of protection taking into account the diversity 
of situations in the various regions of the Community, based on the precautionary principle and on the 
principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be 
rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.939 Furthermore, the second guideline of the Protocol on 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality holds that Community action is justified 
if ‘actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would conflict with the requirements of the 
Treaty or would otherwise significantly damage Member States' interests’.940 
The question is whether by not acting, the Community would be acting outside the requirements of 
the Treaty. Farnsworth argues that the answer is given by the fact that Article 174(2) states a priority.941 
Farnsworth argues that given the wording of Article 174§2 and the application of the precautionary 
principle in practice can be interpreted that if there is a strong assumption that an activity might cause 
environmental damage, it is better to act before damage materialises, rather than to wait until scientific 
evidence is available to prove the causal connection. For example, in hindsight, it could be that the Seveso 
accident or Baia Mare accident might have been prevented if stricter (European) legislation had been in 
place to prevent such accidents. Consequently, based on the aims of European environmental policy in 
Article 174 §2 EC Treaty, European action with respect to environmental liability rules would be justified to 
guarantee high level of environmental quality in the European Union.942 
Yet, would the minimum level of protection argument be a valid argument for centralisation from an 
economic perspective? 
From an economic point of view, the reasoning that harmonisation is necessary to ensure a high level 
of protection or a high level of environmental quality, is hard to justify. Indeed, although the aim to 
guarantee a minimum level of protection against environmental damage is a noble political aim, it fully 
ignores the different preferences of the citizens in the different Member States and in a paternalistic way 
assumes that the Commission knows better than the Member States what the minimum level of protection 
is for their citizens. 
As was explained in the theoretical part of this research, the minimum level of protection argument 
falls beyond the pure economic arguments for harmonisation of liability rules. Some authors do stay within 
the economic reasoning and argue that harmonisation would be justified in order to guarantee a minimum 
level of protection as unacceptably low environmental standards in a certain state could present negative 
psychic spillovers to citizens in other states.943 For example, a certain Member State might dispose of 
especially scenic or ecologically significant natural resources, which may be admired be citizens of other 
Member States. Yet, the Belgian interpretation of what is worth preserving might differ to the Greek 
interpretation, but both, applying it to the spillover argument, should have the right to enjoy the other 
country’s resources.944 Consequently, it is argued that psychic externalities should be taken into account 
when developing an environmental policy.945 The prevention of psychic externalities would be one way to 
accept the existence of the ELD on the basis of the minimum level of protection argument. 
Other authors consider environmental protection as a human right, freed from economic justification, 
so the ELD would not have to be justified on economic grounds.946 
Some critical remarks might be appropriate though. Faure argues that if the minimum level of 
protection argument is accepted as a valid justification for a European environmental liability regime, it 
must be emphasized that the reason for harmonisation would not be based on economic efficiency, but on 
the desire to provide a minimum level of environmental quality and of protection against environmental 
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accidents.947 Moreover, the minimum level of protection justification addresses the concern to guarantee all 
citizens minimum quality standards, which in fact refers to harmonisation of regulation. Therefore, this 
argument might in some circumstances justify the harmonisation of regulation; however Faure is sceptical 
whether European environmental protection should incorporate a liability regime. It is indeed questionable 
that the harmonisation of tort law would be the appropriate instrument to achieve such minimum level of 
protection. Even more skeptical are Bergkamp and Revesz on the minimum level of protection argument. 
Indeed, Bergkamp argues that it might be more efficient to develop minimum quality standards that must 
be achieved, before and after an accident, rather than to harmonize the liability rules itself in the different 
jurisdictions.948 Moreover, as Revesz indicates, it is questionable that environmental quality standards 
should be harmonised, in order to guarantee a minimum level of protection, if, for example in the European 
Union, there is no minimum social security, no provision of general health care or no harmonisation of 
minimum wages.949 
Hence, although the minimum level of protection argument might in some circumstances justify the 
harmonisation of regulation, it is doubtful whether it is really necessary to harmonise environmental 
liability rules. 
Furthermore, even if it is accepted that the Community should contribute to the protection of 
environmental quality and human health, if this alone may be sufficient to justify European action, it 
becomes hard to find any examples of Community environmental measures which cannot be justified. In 
effect, all Community measures could then be justified by arguing that the aim is to guarantee a minimum 
level of protection which obviously is not the idea of the subsidiarity principle. 
In sum, from a theoretical perspective, if it would be already accepted that the minimum level of 
protection is a valid justification for a European environmental liability regime, it must be emphasized that 
the reason for harmonisation would not be based on economic efficiency. Moreover, it would be preferably 
to develop quality standards that must be achieved, before and after an accident, rather than to harmonize 
the liability rules. It should then be the responsibility of the Member States to achieve this environmental 
quality by means that correspond with their citizens’ preferences.950 
Turning back to the ELD and the soil pollution example, supposing that this minimum level of 
protection argument would be accepted as an argument for centralisation, one might ask what the 
consequences are with respect to soil pollution in the European Union and would the ELD effectively 
realise this minimum level of protection for soil pollution? 
In a first step, the consequences of harmonisation of liability rules for soil pollution might be 
examined. The economic theory on federalism generally takes a bottom-up approach towards 
centralisation, as the main idea is that through decentralisation rules can be adapted to the preferences of 
the citizens. Indeed, starting from decentralisation, according to the Tiebout model, jurisdictions would be 
free to set their own clean-up standards and their own liability rules according to their citizens preferences. 
Hence, if preferences differ between countries, environmental policies should also differ between countries 
and a uniform environmental policy might not be optimal. By harmonising liability rules for soil pollution 
through the ELD, it may be concluded that Commission assumes that it knows better than the Member 
States what the minimum level of protection with respect to soil pollution is for their citizens and that all 
European citizens have the same preferences with respect to soil quality. 
Yet, the question is, are preferences for soil quality really the same for all citizens in the European 
Union? 
The Eurobarometer survey illustrates that Member States’ perception is quite divergent with respect 
to the most efficient solutions for environmental problems as soil pollution, as well as to the most efficient 
level for regulation.951 Moreover, soil clean-up is a difficult operation with very high costs. Expenditure for 
decontamination of contaminated sites greatly varies between Member States. Such disparities might reflect 
different preferences and perceptions of the severity of the contamination, different remediation policies 
and targets, and different ways of estimating expenditure.952 Hence, harmonisation of liability rules might 
neglect the preferences of the citizens in the different citizens and therefore harmonisation may amount to 
paternalism. 
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Moreover, this minimum level of environmental quality could also be realised through setting 
minimum quality standards that would have to be achieved after the clean-up of contaminated soil.953 
Hence, the minimum level of protection argument could justify the centralisation of minimum soil quality 
standards, but it would not be necessary to harmonise liability rules to achieve this basic environmental 
quality after clean-up. Each jurisdiction could organise this according to its preferences. 
Second, it might be wondered whether the ELD would effectively realise this minimum level of 
protection for soil pollution. Due to the limited scope of the Directive for soil pollution, many sites will still 
have to be restored, if at all, under the Member States’ legislations, therefore soil quality still might vary 
significantly between the Member States for those sites that fall outside the ELD regime. Therefore, it is not 
sure that the aim of a minimum soil quality standard throughout the European Union can be reached. 
1.3. Summary of the Public Interest Approach 
This paragraph examined whether the Environmental Liability Directive corresponds with the predictions 
of the theoretical framework on the optimal decision-making level of liability rules for environmental 
damage, with the example of soil pollution, and why there was a need to shift environmental liability rules 
from the Member States to the European level. Therefore, the arguments that where provided by the 
Commission to justify the Environmental liability Directive with regard to the subsidiarity principle, were 
compared with the arguments for harmonisation provided by the economic theory of federalism in the 
environmental field. 
It appears that from an economic point of view, the reasons advanced by the Commission for the ELD 
seem rather weak, and would not justify a shift from the Member States to the European level of 
environmental liability rules, including liability rules for soil pollution. 
From an economic point of view, the only valid argument for centralisation was the internalisation of 
transboundary damage, however, only a so-called `transboundary only’-regime would be justified rather 
than full harmonisation. Yet, it was shown that the Directive would not necessarily solve this 
transboundary damage. It was also argued that economies of scale in technical research might allow for co-
operation or centralisation of certain tasks, like research or data gathering on for example soil 
contamination and restoration. However, again, the promise of economies of scale in scientific research 
would not justify for a centralisation in an excessive sense. 
Next it was shown that fears for a race-to-to-bottom or unfair marketing conditions, due to different 
liability rules in the Member States, seem not very likely to be realised, and therefore these arguments do 
not justify harmonisation of environmental liability rules in the European Union. Moreover, it was shown 
that the ELD will not create a level playing field or realise a reduction in transaction costs, neither for 
environmental liability rules in general nor for liability for soil pollution in particular. 
With respect to the next two arguments provided for by the Commission, it was argued that the 
realisation of the polluter pays, precautionary and preventive principles and restoration and 
decontamination of environmental damage as such do not explain why environmental regulation should be 
issued at the European level. Moreover, it was indicated that the ELD will not necessarily realise the 
polluter pays, precautionary and preventive principles, or the restoration and decontamination of the 
environment. 
Finally, if the minimum level of protection argument would be accepted as a valid argument for 
shifting environmental liability rules from the Member States to the European level, it must be emphasized 
that this reason for harmonisation would not be based on economic efficiency, but on the desire to provide 
a minimum level of environmental quality and of protection against environmental accidents. Moreover, if 
the preferences of the citizens in the different Member States are ignored, harmonisation of environmental 
liability rules on the basis of this argument only amounts to paternalism. 
The conclusion at the normative level is, however, not necessarily that there should be no European 
action at all with respect to environmetnal liability. Subsidiarity is not a question of either centralised or 
decentralised decision-making, but may involve a mixture of powers at different levels. With respect to soil 
pollution for example, a European register of contaminated land might on the one hand increase 
transparency which could help in creating a level playing field for multinational corporations and on the 
other hand it could improve clean-up of contaminated sides. Yet, for soil pollution, even more than for the 
damage to protected species and natural habitats and for damage to water, local circumstances and 
preferences need to be taken into account. Indeed, the diversity of soils implies that any soil protection 
policy needs to have a strong local element build in. The strongest argument for decentralisation of liability 
rules for soil pollution is that local conditions, geography, economic strengths and concerns might vary 
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substantially from place to place. Furthermore, local knowledge and expertise with specific soil conditions 
might prove essential to develop the proper liability rules for soil reclamation. Therefore, certainly in the 
specific case of soil pollution, the arguments for a harmonisation of liability rules for soil pollution seem to 
be weak. 
Hence, the Commission fails to explain properly why a harmonised liability regime for environmental 
damage, including soil pollution is necessary or why its goals cannot be achieved by the Member States, as 
required by the subsidiarity principle. 
Concluding, the regime of the ELD shows some inefficiencies as was illustrated in Chapter 5. 
Moreover, the comparison of the theoretical framework with the way in which the balance between 
centralisation and decentralisation is sought in the regime of the ELD, also shows that there is ‘more 
Europe’ and that the ELD goes further than what the theoretical framework would predict. Put differently, 
from an economic point of view, there is an inefficient shift of competences from the Member States to the 
European level with respect to environmental liability rules and for example of liability rules for soil 
pollution. 
Therefore, it merits searching for additional explanations for the existence of the ELD and for certain 
provisions in the ELD by means of the private interest approach. Indeed, in order to understand why the 
decision-making level of environmental liability rules was shifted from the Member States to the European 
level, how the ELD got to its final form, and why certain provisions are as they are, rent seeking behaviour 
and lobbying of different interest groups in the decision-making process of the ELD should not be ignored. 
The private interest approach will be addressed in the next paragraph. 
2. Private Interest Approach on the Optimal Decision-making Level of Liability for 
Environmental Damage in the European Union 
The existence or the harmonisation of certain environmental regulations can not always be explained on the 
basis of the public interest approach. For a full understanding of environmental policy, the influence of 
lobbying of different interest groups in the law making process must be recognised.954 
Hence, as for the theoretical part, the public interest approach will now be complemented with a 
private interest approach, which tries to take rent seeking into account in the law making process. The 
contribution of this paragraph would be to throw light upon the conditions under which ELD was adopted 
and to provide additional explanations for the existence of the ELD and for certain provisions in the ELD. 
This paragraph will consist of two parts. Firstly, the adoption process of the ELD will be studied with 
respect to interest group lobbying. In a first step, it will be explained which actors were involved in the 
decision-making process of the ELD and what their stakes were. Secondly, the adoption process of the ELD 
will be examined chronologically and it will be indicated at which stages and at which institutions lobbying 
took place. Thirdly, three items that were heavily debated during the adoption process of the ELD will be 
discussed, in order to explain how certain provisions got to their final form. 
Fourthly, it will be examined whether the lobbying activities, observed in the adoption process of the 
ELD, and the result of this lobbying, correspond with the predictions of the private interest theory, as 
discussed in the theoretical part (paragraph 2.1 of chapter 3). In particular, it will be examined, on the one 
hand, whether the inefficient shift of competences to the European level with respect to environmental 
liability rules resulting in ‘too much Europe’, as concluded in paragraph 1 of this chapter, has been caused 
by interest group lobbying and, on the other hand, whether the inefficiencies in the Directive itself can be 
explained by interest group lobbying. 
Finally, it will be examined whether lobbying behaviour by interest groups would cause more 
distortions at the national level than at the central level so that this would justify Community action in the 
field of environmental liability, as studied in the theoretical part (paragraph 2.2 of chapter 3). 
2.1. Rent-seeking Behaviour in the Adoption Process of the ELD 
This paragraph will try to unravel the adoption process of the ELD with respect to interest group lobbying. 
In particular, the following questions will be addressed: who came up with the idea of a European Directive 
with respect to environmental liability and for what reasons? Who were the main actors in the adoption 
process of the ELD and what were the different actors’ interests in the different stages of the adoption 
process of the ELD? Was there lobbying pro harmonisation of environmental liability rules at European 
level, when and by whom? Was this lobbying successful and why? And at which level of government did 
this lobbying take place? 
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Paragraph 2.1.1 will first explain who were the main actors in the adoption process of the ELD and 
what were there stakes in the different stages of the adoption process. 
Paragraph 2.1.2 will then examine the adoption process of the ELD chronologically and will indicate 
at which stages and at which institutions lobbying took place, and what was lobbied for. 
By doing so, this chapter complements chapter 4, which provided an insight in the development 
process and the provisions of Directive 2004/35/EC. 
It must be realised that lobbying behaviour is a very complex matter. The reasons behind certain 
lobbying behaviour might not always be clear and some reasons might even be hidden. In this paragraph, 
plausible explanations will be sought for the lobbying behaviour of the different actors in the adoption 
process of the ELD and certain assumptions will be made with respect to the underlying reasons for certain 
lobbying behaviour. This sometimes requires a ‘reading between the lines’ of official statements and it 
would be rather hard to find somebody who would openly confirm some of the assumptions. Yet, although 
this paragraph will try to provide a thorough insight in the conditions under which ELD was adopted, it 
cannot be claimed that this research will be able to unveil all hidden reasons behind the lobbying behaviour 
of the different actors. 
2.1.1. Who is Who in the Lobbying Process Behind the ELD 
A public choice analysis of the lobbying process in the European Union does not take place along the 
classical lines whereby rent seeking behaviour by interest groups (such as industry or NGO's) is examined. 
Rather, when examining lobbying efforts at the level of the EU, attention must also be paid to the role that 
the various European institutions play. Indeed, in the European legislative process the reasons for shifting 
powers to the central level have often more to do with competition and power struggle between the various 
institutions involved (European Commission, European Parliament and Member States) than with 
struggles by traditional interest groups. The latter of course still play a role, but often in an indirect way. 
Therefore, an analysis of the legislative process at the European level should also pay attention to the 
institutional players involved. 
Hence, the main players in the decision-making process of the ELD were the European Commission, 
the European Parliament, the Member States, negotiating with each other in the Council of the European 
Union, the industry and environmental interest groups, each with their own stakes. The stakes of these 
different actors in the adoption process of the ELD will now be examined successively. 
The European Commission 
In order to sketch the interests of the European Commission in the Environmental Liability Directive, it 
might merit reminding the background or the ELD. As was already mentioned in Chapter 4, the desire to 
introduce a European environmental liability regime already existed at European level 15 years ago. The 
impetus for this desire were a number of environmental disasters involving the release of toxic agents in the 
late 1970’s and 1980’s, like the accident at the industrial site in Seveso in Italy in 1976. The Community’s 
legislative response to these disasters focused on improving plant safety and emergency procedures, as laid 
down in Directive 82/501EEC, also known as the Seveso Directive.955 Yet, the Seveso Directive did not 
address liability or compensation of victims in case that an accident happened. Hence, following the Sandoz 
incident in 1986 and in response to public indignation, the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament called upon the Commission to examine new measures for the prevention and restoration of 
environmental damage that would ensure clean-up and restoration, coupled with arrangements for liability 
and compensation by the polluters for damage caused.956 This statement opened the door for the possible 
use of liability rules as a component of the Community’s environmental policy.957 
Hence, in response to the Council statement, the Commission started the development process of a 
European environmental liability regime, which would take more than 15 years. The Commission favoured 
an environmental liability regime at European level and considered that a framework of environmental 
liability rules would broaden its means for environmental protection. Moreover, besides the traditional 
command-and-control regulation at European level, like IPPC,958 an environmental liability regime, based 
on economic incentives, would contribute to ensuring prevention and restoration of environmental 
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damage.959 Hence, a European environmental liability regime would contribute to the three grand 
environmental principles enshrined in Article 174 §2 of the EC Treaty: the polluter pays, the precautionary 
principle and the preventive principles. 
The question now obviously arises whether the Commission only aimed to protect the environment, 
or whether there were also other reasons at stake? 
It cannot be ignored that the ELD enlarges the Community’s competences, for example with respect to 
soil protection policy. Yet, in paragraph 1 of this chapter, it was concluded that there are very few 
arguments for having a harmonised liability regime for soil pollution. So why did the Commission want to 
include liability for soil pollution in the Directive? 
Soil protection and remediation definitely is an area of interest to the European Commission, but for 
which it does not have direct competence yet. Nevertheless, it seems that the Commission is determined to 
develop a comprehensive policy for soil pollution in the European Union, or as Van Calster puts it, the 
Community intends to get a finger in the pie. Van Calster argues that there might be two main reasons for 
the attention of the European legislator for harmonising soil protection legislation. A first reason might be 
the strong interest in biodiversity issues, and nature conservation legislation, which has become an 
important part of EC environmental law practice, in the European Court of Justice and in national courts. 
Connected to nature conservation legislation is town and country planning. Yet, with respect to the 
subsidiarity principle, it would be difficult to justify the need of European action in this area. Soil protection 
and remediation concerns are inherent in any nature protection and town and country planning and in this 
way the EU might get a finger in the pie. A second reason might be the possible impact on the internal 
market of diverging soil protection legislation in the Member States. Indeed, the main reason for European 
action in the environmental field often is internal market considerations. According to Van Calster, this 
rationale most certainly plays a role in justifying the Commission’s initiatives in the soil protection area, 
with respect to the subsidiarity principle.960 
The ELD for the first time directly addresses soil protection remediation, which might open the door 
for further soil protection measures at Community level. Indeed, as stated before, the Commission has 
published a Proposal for a Framework Directive for soil protection961 which sets out common principles, 
objectives and actions for the protection of soils across the EU.962 The fact that the ELD already addresses 
soil pollution might maybe help to get the Directive adopted. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note, that if the Proposal would be adopted, the ELD should be amended 
in order to align it with the remediation obligations as stipulated in the Soil Framework Directive. Indeed, 
Preamble 28 of the Proposal for a Soil Framework Directive stipulates that ‘in those contaminated sites 
where the polluter cannot be found, cannot be held liable for the pollution under national or Community 
legislation or cannot be made to bear the costs of remediation, also known as orphan sites, responsibility for 
reducing risk to human health and the environment should fall on the Member States. For those purposes, 
Member States should put in place specific funding mechanisms to ensure a durable financial source for the 
remediation of such sites’. As already noted several times, the ELD does not foresee this obligation on the 
Member States, although the Commission had included also this provision in the Proposal for the ELD. The 
Commission might in this way also reach its objectives with respect to Member States’ responsibility for the 
Environmental Liability Directive. 
Hence, to the question of who came up with the idea of a European Environmental Liability Directive 
and for what reasons, one might answer that although the request officially came from the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers, representing the Member States, as a response to public 
indignation after environmental accidents, the Commission, who has to start off the law making procedure, 
might have welcomed this request for other reasons than only protecting the environment. Indeed, the 
Commission might have seen this as a means for enlarging its competences in fields for which it did not 
have any direct competence yet, as for example soil protection policies. 
European Parliament 
In order to encourage the prevention and restoration of environmental damage in the European Union, the 
European Parliament, as the representative of the European citizens, favoured an environmental liability 
regime at European level. In April 1994 already, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on 
the Commission to submit ‘a proposal for a directive on civil liability in respect of (future) environmental 
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damage’.963 In that resolution, the Parliament applied for the first time Article 192(2) (ex-Article 138b(2)) of 
the EC Treaty, which gives the Parliament the competence to ask the Commission to submit legislative 
proposals. Since then, the Parliament has called for action in the field of environmental liability on several 
occasions, such as in the Commission’s annual working programmes, in parliamentary questions and in 
letters to the Commission.964 
Yet, during the adoption process of the ELD, the Parliament saw itself confronted with a conflict of 
competence between the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, which was more 
inclined towards environmental concerns and which favoured a strict environmental liability regime, and 
the Legal Affairs Committee, which was more receptive to industry concerns with respect to a harmonised 
environmental liability regime. As will be discussed below, the Legal Affairs Committee became the lead 
Committee in the adoption process of the ELD. 
Member States 
In 1986, the Member States, through the Council of Ministers, called upon the Commission to examine new 
measures for the prevention and restoration of environmental damage.965 Yet, the first steps towards the 
ELD, including the Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage in 1993 and the White Paper on 
Environmental Liability in 2000, which proposed a civil liability regime, did not get an unqualified 
approval by all Member States. Some of the smaller Member States, like Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Sweden, expressed a favourable opinion with respect to 
Community action in the field of environmental liability.966 An explanation might be that they preferred a 
harmonised regime in order to avoid that by having a national environmental liability regime, they would 
put an additional burden on their industry compared to Member States who did not foresee a national 
environmental liability regime. Yet, some of the large Member States, in particular Germany, France and the 
UK, firmly opposed any European initiative to harmonise environmental liability rules for reasons of 
sovereignty and subsidiarity and intended to implement strict liability rules at national level.967 
Hence, the Commission, on the basis of the regime of the White Paper, was not able to convince the 
Member States to shift environmental liability rules from the Member States to the European level. 
A turning point was reached with the publication of the Working Paper on Prevention and 
Restoration of Significant Environmental Damage in the summer of 2001.968 As the comments of interested 
parties show, the reactions on the Working Paper were mostly moderately positive. The Belgian 
government for example stated that ‘Belgium in general favours the harmonisation, at the level of the 
European Union, of environmental law and more particularly in the area of enforcement and civil liability. 
It regretfully accepts that, while agreement on a comprehensive environmental liability regime may not be 
possible at this moment, alternative approaches towards prevention and restoration of damage have their 
merits. In this context, it considers the preparation of a draft directive on prevention and restoration of 
significant environmental damage as a meaningful contribution to the legal instruments for the actual 
protection of the European environment and for the enforcement of EU environmental law’. A similar 
attitude was shown by the Dutch authorities. 
Especially Member States that already experienced severe environmental damage caused by industrial 
activities as Spain,969 were definitely more positive towards a European environmental liability regime than 
countries that did not experience environmental disasters. This might be explained because these Member 
States felt there was a need to have a kind of environmental liability regime, and that it would be easier to 
harmonise it at European level, so that they did not have to fear that their industry would face a higher 
burden than the industry in other Member States. It is also remarkable that Portugal and Greece, the only 
two (pre-accession) Member States who did not already have an environmental liability regime in place, 
did not oppose the Directive on the basis of subsidiarity. Farnsworth argues that they were waiting for 
Europe to take the lead in this area, so that they would be in a stronger position to develop their own 
legislation around the Environmental Liability Directive.970 
Nevertheless, Member States’ opinions on the content of a European environmental liability regime 
were diverse and large disagreement existed between Member States on key issues as financial security, 
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subsidiary state liability and permit and state-of-the-art defences. The final text of the ELD allows 
substantial Member State discretion in various contentious provisions. Maybe this made a European 
environmental liability regime acceptable also for the more sceptical Member States. Or, as Clark puts it, a 
reason why the more sceptical Member States might have decided to support the ELD was because there 
did not appear to be much that would require them to strengthen their existing laws.971 
Industry 
The first initiatives of the Commission gave rise to a lot of critique from industry. Industry organisations 
questioned the need for a European environmental liability regime, criticised the vagueness of the regime 
and for many of them the White Paper went too far with respect to the scope of the regime, the liability 
provisions and the prove of causal link. Yet, the main difference with the Member States that opposed the 
Commission’s initiatives, was that those Member states were against a European liability regime for reasons 
of sovereignty, but intended to implement their own liability regime at national level, whereas industry at 
that time was against a liability regime itself for competitiveness reasons.972 
Again, the publication of the Working Paper on Prevention and Restoration of Significant 
Environmental Damage973 represented a turning point. After publication of the Working Paper, Unice, a 
large business interest group, held that ‘the working document contains a number of positive elements, 
which would represent progress in the discussion on environmental liability in Europe’’.974 
Commentary papers of industry lobby groups on the Commission Proposal for a Directive on 
Environmental Liability indeed show that industry did not oppose the public law regime provided for by 
the Commission.975 The question obviously arises why the industry, who initially heavily opposed a 
harmonised environmental liability regime at European level, supported the shift of environmental liability 
rules from the Member States to the European level. A plausible explanation might be that the industry, 
realising that a kind of environmental liability regime was inevitable at either European or at national level, 
preferred a consistent (if possible lenient) approach throughout the Community to the patchwork of 
liability regimes, which existed or which were developed in the Member states.976 Industry might then have 
considered that it would be better to try to turn the content of the Directive into their advantage, instead of 
opposing it. Moreover, industry might also have considered that a minimum approach at European level 
might prevent Member States to introduce more stringent liability rules than the Directive requires, in order 
not to loose industry. 
Hence, during the adoption process of the ELD, industry fiercely lobbied for the insertion of defences 
and the absence of compulsory insurance. Professional associations representing industry, trade and the 
insurance sector, like the European Federation of Insurance Intermediaries (BIPAR), the Comité Européen 
des Assurances (CEA), the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Eurochambres), 
UAPME, the small business organisation representing the interests at European level of crafts, trades and 
SME’s, and the Union of Industrial and Employer’s Confederations of Europe (UNICE) held that only a 
Directive on environmental liability with a strictly limited scope, confirming permit and state-of-the-art 
exemptions and excluding all compulsory insurance would be acceptable for them.977 Yet, the final text of 
the ELD shows that important concessions were made to industry groups by inserting broad defences 
against liability in terms of regulatory compliance and state-of the-art knowledge at the time of the 
damage.978 With respect to the insurance issue, Member States are only encouraged to develop financial 
security mechanisms instead. The ELD does not foresee compulsory insurance. 
Concluding, the industry initially heavily opposed a harmonised environmental liability regime. 
However, probably because the industry realised that an environmental liability regime was inevitable, 
either at European or at national level, it might have preferred a consistent, favourable regime throughout 
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the European Union, and therefore started to lobby not on the level of regulation, but on the content of the 
future Directive. 
Environmental Interest Groups 
Environmental NGO’s from their side believed in all stages of the decision-making procedure that ‘a strong 
EU-wide regime on Environmental Liability is vital to improve the protection of Europe’s most vulnerable 
wildlife and further the process of sustainable development. The adoption of the Directive is a necessary 
step in the right direction’.979 As far as the final text of the ELD was concerned, environmental NGO’s 
however were ‘disappointed that the final Directive was not nearly as ambitious as the previous proposals 
and that it allows Member States to introduce serious derogations from the ‘polluter pays’ principle, in 
particular the ‘permit’ and ‘state-of-the-art’ provisions, restricted scope and limited requirements for 
financial security’.980 
In sum, Member States, industry and environmental NGO’s, all for their own reasons, welcomed or at 
least did not oppose the idea of the Community to shift environmental liability rules from the Member 
States to the European level. Therefore, the interests of all actors involved in the ELD decision-making 
process may not be ignored when examining the reasons for a shift of environmental liability rules from the 
Member States to the European level, and when explaining the provisions of the ELD itself. 
Moreover, in hindsight, it appears that the publication of the Working Paper of 2001 was the moment 
at which the decision was taken to give the European Community the competence to deal with 
environmental liability rules. Indeed, at that moment, the Commission felt it that it was supported by most 
of the Member States, industry and environmental NGO’s to continue the preparatory work for a Directive 
and to develop a proposal for a Directive, which then could, by means of the co-decision procedure, become 
law. Consequently, from that moment on lobbying addressed, to a much greater extent,the content of the 
future directive than the level at which an environmental liability regime would be issued. 
Figure 5 on the next page illustrates the relations between the different actors in the ELD adoption 
process graphically. 
Next, paragraph 2.1.2 will examine the adoption process of the ELD chronologically and will indicate 
at which stages lobbying took place, by whom, at which level of decision-making and what was lobbied for. 
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Figure 5 Who is Who in the legislative process behind the ELD 
2.1.2. Insight into the Adoption Process of the ELD 
In order to fully understand how the ELD got to its final form, it is important to know the whole adoption 
process. Therefore, this paragraph will provide a chronological overview of the adoption process of the 
ELD. It will be indicated at which stages lobbying took place, by whom, at which governmental level and 
what was lobbied for. Moreover, the most heavily debated items, by the Member States as well as by 
industry and environmental NGO’s, in the ELD adoption process, were financial security provisions, 
subsidiary state liability and the possibility to allow for permit defence or state-of-the-art defence. Although 
there were obviously other points of discussion, this paragraph will indicate how the provisions for these 
items changed during the adoption process as a consequence of lobbying and negotiation between the 
Commission, the European Parliament, and the Member States in the Council during the co-decision 
procedure and will try to explain how the final provisions with respect to these items came into existence. 
Figure 6 on the next page shows the adoption process graphically and might provide guidance for the text 
below. 
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Adoption process of the ELD 
   Lobbying 
   
14-05-1993 Green Paper on Remedying Environmental 
Damage (COM (93) 47 final) 
09-02-2000 White Paper on Environmental Liability 
(COM(2000)66 final) 
30-07-2001 Working Paper on Prevention and 
Restoration of Significant Environmental 
Damage (Environmental Liability).  
 
The Working Paper is sent out for 
consultation and marks the shift from a 
civil liability regime to a public law regime 
to be enforced by competent authorities 
 
 
 
Preparatory  
phase 
 
Initially 
industry 
lobbies against 
EC liability 
regime. From 
Working Paper 
onwards 
ENGO’s and 
industry lobby 
relevant desk 
officer in 
Commission, to 
influence 
orientation and 
content of the 
proposal 
23-01-2002 
 
 
 
Publication of the Commission’s Proposal 
for a Directive on Environmental Liability 
with regard to the Prevention and 
Remedying of Environmental Damage 
(COM (2002)17 final 
The Proposal presents a framework to 
prevent and restore environmental 
damage, based on polluter pays principle, 
strict liability for dangerous activities, fault-
liability for non-dangerous activities. It 
includes the following provisions:  
1. Damage caused by activities 
allowed in a  permit or activities 
that were not considered 
dangerous to the state-of-the-art 
are exceptions and are not 
covered by the Directive (Art. 9); 
2. MS are obliged to take measures 
with regard to ‘orphan’ sites 
(preambule 11 and 15), also 
called subsidiary state liability;  
3. Insurance is not compulsory 
although MS are encouraged to 
develop financial security 
instruments (art. 16). 
18-01-2002 The European Economic and Social 
Committee gives its Opinion on the 
Proposal 
 
Co-decision 
procedure 
 
July 2002 
 
European Parliament votes in plenary on a 
conflict of competence between 
Environment and Legal Affairs Committee. 
Legal Affairs is given the lead, the views of 
the Environment Committee would be 
incorporated in the Legal Affairs 
Committee’s report to the plenary 
(enhanced Hughes procedure, Rule 162a, 
or enhanced cooperation between 
committees of the EP’s Rules of Procedure) 
 
4-03-2003 1st Environment Council meeting under the 
Greek Presidency 
 
29-04-2003 Vote in European Parliament Legal Affairs 
Committee 
14-05-2003 European Parliament First Reading vote 
 
 
Positions:  
ENGO’s: 
-Obligation for 
MS to take 
measures with 
regard to 
‘orphan’ sites 
(subsidiary 
state liability)  
-Compulsory 
financial 
security. 
-Permit 
compliance and 
‘state-of-the-
art 
considerations 
should not 
allow the 
operator to 
escape clean-
up costs 
 
 
 
 
Industry: 
-Permit and 
state-of-the-art 
defence 
-No 
compulsory 
financial 
security 
 
 
ENGO’s and 
Industry now 
address EP and 
Council  
 
 
Most 
debated 
issues: 
1. Permit 
defence and 
state-of-the-
art defence 
2. Subsidiary 
state liability 
3. Obligatory 
financial 
security 
provisions 
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 The EP adopts 48 amendments to the 
proposal, including: 
1. Conversion of regulatory 
compliance and state-of-the-art 
exemptions into mitigating 
factors (Art. 11 1st reading); 
2. Preservation of obligation for MS 
to take measures with regard to 
‘orphan’ sites (subsidiary state 
liability) (preambule 13 and 18 
1st reading);  
3. Compulsory insurance for IPPC 
and Annex I activities, phased in 
over time (art 17 1st reading). 
 
13-06-2003 
 
Political Agreement Environment Council 
under Greek Presidency 
The Council introduces 26  of 48 
amendments of the EP in full or in part and 
amends the following provisions:  
1. The permit compliance and 
state-of-the-art defence as 
mitigating factors, exonerating 
the operator from liability, 
become an option for MS. 
Compliance conditions are 
tightened;  
2. No subsidiary State liability if 
the operator is insolvent or 
unidentified =  a step too far for 
the MS; 
3. No obligatory insurance. MS 
are encouraged to develop 
financial security provisions and 
the Commission is requested to 
report on the directive’s 
effectiveness and may on that 
base make proposals for 
mandatory financial security. 
 
18-09-2003 Formal adoption of the Council Common 
Position 
 
19-09-2003 The Commission agrees with the 
modifications and supports the Common 
Position 
 
17-12-2003 
 
Second Reading vote in the European 
Parliament 
The Parliament adopts 4 amendments to 
the Council Common Position. The issues 
at stake concern: 
• Creation of harmonised 
compulsory financial security for 
water and soil damage; 
•  Elimination of the operator's 
right to limit his liability in 
accordance with internat. 
Conventions;  
• The Commission report on the 
application of the provisions in 
relation to the exclusion of sea 
and nuclear pollution from the 
scope of the directive; 
• Measures to be taken by the 
competent authority in the case 
of remedial action. 
 
21-01-2004 The Council states that it is unable to 
approve all Parliament amendments 
 
EP: the 
rapporteur of 
the lead 
Committee 
exerts 
important 
influence on 
the 
amendments 
put forward by 
the EP + 
contact of all 
MEP’s in order 
to influence 
vote in plenary 
Council: More 
difficult, 
contact with 
Council 
working groups 
is possible but 
sometimes 
better to 
contact 
national 
officials in the 
MS, 
responsible for 
environment 
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27-01-2004 Start conciliation procedure  
19-02-2004 EP and Council reach agreement by means 
of an exchange of letters. The main 
elements of the agreement are: 
• 6 years after entry into force of 
the Directive the Commission 
shall present a report on its 
effectiveness. In the light of that 
report, the Commission shall, if 
appropriate, submit proposals for 
harmonised mandatory financial 
security.  
• In another report to be 
submitted 10 years after the 
entry into force of the Directive 
the Commission shall review the 
application of the provisions in 
relation to the operators' right to 
limit their liability in accordance 
with international conventions.  
 
30-03-2004 Council decision at 3rd reading 
The Council adopts by qualified majority 
the Directive following agreement with the 
EP under the conciliation procedure.  
The Irish, German and Austrian 
delegations vote against.   
 
31-03-2004 Parliament’s third reading vote of the 
Directive to adopt conciliation text 
 
19-04-2004 Last plenary session of European 
Parliament 
 
21-04-2004 
 
Council and Parliament adopt the Directive 
2004/35/EC on environmental liability with 
regard to the prevention and remedying of 
environmental damage. Publication in the 
Official Journal L 143 of 30 April 2004 
 
 
30-04 2004  Start implementation period Implementation 
period 
1-05-2004 
 
Enlargement: 10 new countries join the EU. 
The EP, Council and Commission wanted to 
reach agreement on the ELD, as 
enlargement would have meant 
recommencing the adoption process with a 
new Council and a new EP.   
 
ENGO’s and 
Industry lobby 
groups turn to 
MS, in order to 
influence 
implementation 
process 
31-01- 2007 The ELD should be implemented in the 
legislation of the MS 
  
Figure 6 Adoption process of the ELD 
As Figure 6 shows, it is possible to make a distinction between a preparatory phase towards a European 
environmental liability regime, roughly dating from 1993, with the publication of the Green Paper on 
Remedying Environmental Damage until the publication of the Working Paper on Prevention and 
Restoration of Significant Environmental Damage of 2001 and the actual adoption process of the ELD, 
starting from preparation of the Proposal for a Directive by the Commission, over the co-decision 
procedure until the adoption by the Council and the European Parliament of the Directive. 
The preparatory phase could be seen as a period in which the discussion on the level of issuing 
environmental liability rules should be taken, still was open. Lobbying therefore addressed the level of 
regulation. Moreover, it took place at European level. Indeed, at that time, industry still heavily opposed a 
harmonised environmental liability regime at European level. Hence, industry groups as for example 
UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe) tried to oppose and if possible to 
halt the whole EC liability initiative and attempted to convince the Commission officials that a strict 
liability regime, as proposed in the White Paper would seriously undermine the competitiveness of 
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European business.981 Maybe industry felt that by lobbying at European level against an environmental 
liability regime for competitiveness reasons, they might indirectly prevent Member States from adopting 
too stringent liability rules in order not to loose industry. Environmental NGO’s on the other hand, lobbied 
at the Commission for harmonisation of environmental liability rules. 
Yet, as explained in the previous paragraph, from the moment that the Working Paper was received 
moderately positive by the Member States and industry, in principle the decision, at which level 
environmental liability regulation should be issued, had been taken. The Commission felt that the Member 
States and the industry, who changed its position, each for their own reasons, did not fundamentally object 
to a European environmental liability regime and that there might be a good chance to get a proposal 
through the co-decision procedure. Hence, the Commission continued to develop a draft proposal for a 
European Environmental Liability Directive and unless the Member States would not be able to reach 
agreement in the end, a directive would be issued at the European level. For the industry and the 
environmental NGO’s it therefore became most important to influence the content and provisions of the 
future Directive instead of the level of regulation. 
Lobbying to influence the content of a future Directive is possible at different stages of the adoption 
process and at different governmental levels, and hence might address the three different European law-
making institutions: the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers but also the 
Member States. 
The preparation of the proposal by the Commission is the first moment that offers lobby groups the 
opportunity to influence the content of the directive. Only the Commission can make proposals and start off 
the law making procedure, which is called the Commission’s right of initiatives.982 The task of drawing up 
the proposal and guiding it through the legislative procedure is given to a desk officer within the 
responsible Directorate-General of the Commission. In order to draft the proposal, the desk officer will 
carry out extensive consultations with interested parties. Therefore, the desk officer is the most important 
contact in this stage to influence the orientation and content of the proposal.983 Lobbying with the aim to 
influence the content of future legislation is an activity that is often regarded with suspicion at national 
level. In contrast, such input into the European Community’s law-making procedures is viewed as a 
necessary element in the legislative process and is generally welcomed by the Community institutions. 
Indeed, since the Commission has limited resources, it is keen on obtaining additional information from 
outside its own services. Therefore, anyone with an interest in the subject can provide (correct) information 
and submits his views on the proposed law. Lobbying in this sense is seen as a means of gathering 
information.984 Hence, in the particular case of the ELD, the Commission, and in this respect DG 
Environment,985 was contacted by diverse industry lobby groups and environmental NGO’s to express their 
views and concern on the matter but also other DG’s (as DG Industry) pressed hard for the concessions 
sought be industry in this stage of the ELD adoption process.986 
Although neither the Parliament nor Council have any formal input at this stage, the Commission 
desk officer will generally, in this early law-making procedure, have informal contacts with people from 
these institutions in order to get their opinion.987 Lobbying efforts at this stage at the Parliament is focused 
mainly on those Members of Parliament (MEP’s) who are supposed to obtain particular influence in a later 
stage, as for example the likely rapporteur of the lead Committee or MEP’s in the lead Committee who are 
most interested in the proposal. The function of a rapporteur and the lead committee will be explained 
below. The Commission desk officer will also have contacts with Council officials and technical advisers. 
Although the Council is not formally involved at this early stage, there will often be extensive informal 
consultations long before the proposal is drawn up. The Commission official needs to know the general 
feeling of each of the Member States, since there is little point in proceeding with a proposal if it has 
absolutely no chance of being finally adopted by the Council. In this respect, desk officers of the Member 
States’ Permanent Representations may have close contacts with the Commission and may influence 
proposals. It might therefore also be interesting for lobby groups to contact these people at an early stage. 
Turning to the adoption process of the ELD, lobbying with the aim to influence the content of the 
Directive was fierce at the time of drafting the proposal. The two lobby groups that opposed each other 
were the industry lobby groups and the environmental NGO’s. Industry argued that both permit 
compliance and state-of-the-art defences should be inserted in the text and that there should be no 
                                                             
981  Clarke 2003, 257. 
982  EC Treaty, Article 251. 
983  Gillies 1998, 179. 
984  Ibidem. 
985  At that stage, the desk officer for the Environmental liability Directive was Mr. Charles Pirotte. 
986  Clarke 2003, 261. 
987  Gillies 1998, 179. 
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compulsory insurance.988 Environmental NGO’s on the contrary, pleaded that permit compliance and state-
of-the-art considerations should not allow the operator to escape clean-up costs; that there should be a kind 
of compulsory financial security and that there would be an obligation for the Member States to take 
measures with regard to orphan sites, also called subsidiary state liability.989 
The draft proposal of the ELD shows the influence of these lobbying activities. In particular, the 
Commission proposal provided that ‘damage caused by activities allowed in a permit or activities that were 
not considered dangerous to the state-of-the-art are exceptions and are not covered by the Directive’.990 
These exceptions fundamentally weakened the liability regime and became crucial elements in the co-
decision phase that followed. Actually, permit and state-of-the-art compliance were deliberately presented 
not as defences but as exclusions because the Commission proposal contained a duty on the authorities to 
act where there was no liable party to do so, in general called subsidiary state liability.991 By excluding 
permit and state-of-the-art compliance from the whole regime the Commission intended to meet Member 
States’ concern that the authorities would inherit the liability in cases where operators could show permit 
compliance or state-of-the-art.992 The Commission also provided for a ‘safety net’ of sorts in preamble 15, 
stating that Member States should ensure that the necessary preventive or restorative measures are taken 
when the polluter pays principle could not be implemented. In such cases, Member States should adopt 
whatever provisions they deem fit in conformity with their legal systems provided that they ensure 
effectively that the necessary or restorative measures are financed.993 By this measure the Commission tried 
to ensure that restoration would take place. Insurance was not compulsory although Member States were 
encouraged to develop financial security instruments.994 
The full draft of the proposal for the ELD was submitted to the Cabinets of the Commissioners and 
then to the College of Commissioners for approval. Once a text has been approved by the College of 
Commissioners, the text becomes an official Commission proposal for a directive or regulation and the 
proposal will be published in all working languages.995 The proposal will then be transferred to the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers according to the co-decision procedure.996 
The first reading stage of the ELD co-decision procedure experienced a difficult start, at least as far as 
the European Parliament was concerned. Indeed, whereas the Council under the Spanish presidency, 
favouring European action with respect to environmental liability, started with a large number of working 
parting meetings during the months January-June 2002, the parliament saw itself confronted with a conflict 
of competence between two Parliament Committees. Since the Council cannot complete its first reading 
until it has received the resolution of the Parliament, this dispute slowed down the adoption process of the 
ELD.997 
Indeed, when a proposal has been received by the EP, it will be assigned to a ‘lead’ Committee, which 
will appoint a rapporteur, a single MEP who will prepare a draft report on the proposal. The report 
proposing amendments to the proposal will be voted on by the full European Parliament during its plenary 
session. An environmental proposal would normally be assigned to the Committee on Environment, Public 
Health and Food Safety. The rapporteur and his staff within his political group may be important contacts 
for anyone seeking to lobby. Indeed, the rapporteur exerts an important influence on the amendments put 
forward by the Committee and the EP. In the particular case of the ELD, the Parliament saw itself in a 
                                                             
988  For comments of industry lobby groups see: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/liability/ 
wrkdoc_comments.pdf>. 
989  Birdlife International, EEB, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and WWF, Environmental liability Directive, Second 
Reading Briefing for MEP’s. 
990  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on environmental liability 
with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, COM (2002) 17 final, 21 February 2002, Article 9. 
991  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on environmental liability 
with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, COM (2002) 17 final, 21 February 2002, Preamble 
11. 
992  Clarke 2003, 261. 
993  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on environmental liability 
with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, COM (2002) 17 final, 21 February 2002, Preamble 
15. 
994  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on environmental liability 
with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, COM (2002) 17 final, 21 February 2002, Article 
16. 
995  Gillies 1998, 180. 
996  The codecision procedure (Article 251 of the EC Treaty) was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. It gives the European 
Parliament the power to adopt instruments jointly with the Council of the European Union and the procedure comprises 
one, two or three readings. It increases contacts between the Parliament and the Council, the co-legislators, and the 
European Commission. See www. europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/codecision_procedure. 
997  Clarke 2003, 262. 
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conflict between the competence of the Environment Committee, which would arguably be more inclined 
towards environmental concerns, and the Legal Affairs Committee, which would be more receptive to 
industry concerns. The Legal Affairs Committee, which had taken the lead on consideration of the White 
Paper, stated that it was within the Committee’s competences to deal with issues of legal liability. The 
Environment Committee believed that it should lead on the Directive, as the Directive was an entirely new 
instrument to prevent and restore environmental damage, based on Article 175 of the Treaty. The question 
of Committee competence was referred to the Parliament as a whole in July 2002. For the first time in the 
Parliament’s history, Members of the European Parliament voted on an issue of Committee competence, 
and, by a very slim margin, they referred the dossier to the Legal Affairs Committee.998 It was agreed 
however, that the views of the Environment Committee would be incorporated in the Legal Affairs 
Committee’s report to the plenary.999 
The Legal Affairs Committee nominated the MEP Mr. Toine Manders (The Netherlands, European 
Liberal Democrat Reformist Party) as their rapporteur. MEP Mr. Mihail Papayannakis (Greece, European 
United Left/Nordic Green Left) was spokesman for the Environment Committee. Overall, the legal Affairs 
Committee proposed a much narrower regime than the Commission proposal, whereas the Environment 
Committee widened the Commission proposal, by adopting amendments to delete the `compliance with 
permit’ and `state of the art’ exemptions, and by introducing requirements for financial security and 
extending the definition of `biodiversity’.1000 
For the lobby groups it was important at this stage of the adoption process not only to contact the 
rapporteur or his staff of the lead Committee, but also to provide all MEP’s with information on the issue to 
try to persuade them to vote in a certain way. Indeed, although MEP’s will often follow the 
recommendations of the Committee, this is not always the case. Indeed, the lobbying activity in advance of 
the plenary vote was intense from industry, environmental NGOs, local authorities, Member States and 
farmers’ associations. The main stakes remained the same however as during the preparation of the 
Commission proposal: the scope of the Directive, compulsory financial security, subsidiary state liability 
and permit compliance and state-of-the-art defences.1001 
The Parliament’s first reading vote finally came to an end on 14 May 2003. In a plenary vote, the 
Parliament passed a resolution holding somehow the middle between the two Committees views.1002 
The resolution converted the regulatory compliance and state-of-the-art exemptions into mitigating 
factors that the competent authority and the reviewing court should take into account when deciding the 
level of responsibility and the amount of financial compensation in respect of liability to be recovered from 
the operator.1003 The obligation for Member States to take measures with regard to ‘orphan’ sites (subsidiary 
state liability) was retained as well as the ‘safety net’ provided for in the Commission Proposal.1004 With 
respect to financial security, the Parliament strengthened the Commission’s proposal by providing that 
compulsory insurance for IPPC and Annex I activities, should be phased in over time.1005 
In the meantime, after the first ardent work by the Spanish Presidency, the momentum in the Council 
subsided when Denmark took over the presidency (July-December 2002). Indeed, the progress on the 
proposed Directive was less significant under the Danish Presidency, as other issues, such as the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, were given priority. Moreover, there was no drive 
                                                             
998  Birdlife International and WWF, The European Directive on Environmental Liability – `Polluter Pays’: from principle to 
practice? An Environmental NGO commentary on the Environmental Liability Directive: its adoption at EU level and 
what it means for the future, July 2004, 14. 
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to finish a Common Position by the end of the year. Momentum was regained in January 2003 under the 
leadership of the Greek Presidency. The Greek government hoped that the Council would reach a political 
agreement by the end of its Presidency in June 2003. This timing was important to allow enough time for a 
Second Reading in the European Parliament and to complete a possible conciliation process between the 
Parliament and the Council before the enlargement of the Union with 10 eastern European Countries on 1st 
May 2004, otherwise the whole adoption process had to be redone with a new Parliament and a new 
Council.1006 
As far as lobbying is concerned, lobbying at the Council is much more difficult and can be extremely 
expensive and time-consuming. Moreover, the positions of the permanent representatives in the COREPER 
(which precedes the meeting of the Council of Ministers) are normally established by their governments. 
Therefore, for a lobby group it might be more effective to contact national officials in the Member States, 
responsible for environment than to contact the Council directly. Hence, in this stage it might therefore 
have been fruitful for the lobby groups also to lobby at the Member State level.1007 
Whether or not due to the lobbying of industry and ENGO’s, negotiations in the Council were 
difficult. There still were large disagreements between the Member States on many of the key issues despite 
frequent working group meetings. The Greek Presidency tried hard to reach compromises with regards to 
the permit compliance and ‘state of the art’ exemptions, as well as the financial security system. Similar to 
the Parliament amendments, the Greek Presidency proposed that permit compliance and the state-of-the-
art defence should be treated as `mitigating factors’ to be taken into account by national authorities when 
allocating clean-up costs. However, a number of Member States were unwilling to accept a compromise 
along these lines, and even made the exemptions `red-line’ issues for the negotiations. In particular, France, 
UK, Austria, and Portugal were unwilling to accept the compromise solution. Instead, they wished to stick 
to the permit and state-of-the-art exceptions based on the Commission's original proposal.1008 
With respect to the financial security system, the Greek Presidency proposed a phased-in system, 
recognising the arguments by the insurance sector and some Member States that the market would not be 
ready to provide financial security products by the date of entry into force of the Directive.1009 
With the Parliament resolution passed on to the Council only on the 14th May 2003, the Greek 
Presidency had 6 weeks left to persuade Member States to agree a Common Position, before Italy would 
take over the Presidency of the Council in July 2003. Against all odds, the Greek government succeeded in 
reaching a political agreement on 13th June 2003.1010 On 18th September 2003, the Council, under Italian 
Presidency, formally adopted a Common Position on the Directive.1011 
The Common Position does not entirely follow the Greek compromise proposal. Moreover, the 
Common Position reflects how the disagreement between the diverse Member States on various topics was 
solved: thorny issues were passed on to the Member States. Indeed, using the permit compliance and state-
of-the-art defence as mitigating factors, exonerating the operator from liability, became an option for the 
Member States. Nevertheless, compliance conditions were tightened.1012 The Common Position also deleted 
the Commission Proposal’s ‘safety net’ and the obligation on the Member States to remedy the damage 
itself in case the operator is insolvent or unidentified. Subsidiary state liability definitively was a step too 
far for the Member States. It was therefore stipulated that the Member States may decide to take preventive 
or remedial measures themselves in case the operator is insolvent or unidentified.1013 The decision to clean 
up therefore lies with the Member State. 
With respect to financial security, there are some important changes in the Common Proposal, when 
compared to the Commission’s proposal. Conform to the Commission’s proposal, the Common Position’s 
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Article 14 did not provide for compulsory insurance either. This provision in the Common Position was 
without doubt influenced by the views of industry and insurers and by some of the Member States who did 
not want to impose new financial burdens on their industry. Yet, there are differences between the 
Common Position and the Commission’s proposal. Article 14 of the Common Position holds that ‘Member 
States shall take measures to encourage the development of financial security instruments. The wording 
‘use by operators’ of the corresponding Article 16 of the Commission’s proposal had been dropped. The 
Common Position seems thus more restrictive. Moreover, Article 14 § 2 has been added: the Commission is 
requested to report, eight years after the entry into force of the Directive, on the Directive’s effectiveness 
and may on that base make proposals for mandatory financial security. Nevertheless, as already explained 
in paragraph 5 of chapter 5, overall, commentators have generally explained the Common Position and the 
Directive as excluding any compulsory financial guarantees. Yet, Bocken rejects this interpretation.1014 He 
points to the fact that Article 8 §2 of the Common Position provides that ‘the competent authority shall 
recover inter alia, via security over property or other appropriate guarantees from the who has caused the 
damage … the costs it has incurred’.1015 
Bocken therefore interprets the Common Position as follows, Article 8 §2 aims to protect the 
authorities against the insolvency of the operator by obligatory requiring Member States to set up a system 
of security interest that effectively enables the competent authorities to recover the costs of ex officio 
measures from the operator. This obligation to foresee financial guarantees to prevent the authorities 
against insolvency of the operators is, according to Bocken, often overlooked, although Member States have 
the obligation to ensure that the objective of the Directive is reached. Article 14 §1 on the other hand, 
requires Member States to encourage the development of financial guarantees in order to allow the 
operators to protect themselves against liability and to satisfy their obligations under Article 8 §2. In 
contrast to Article 8 §2, the latter provision is not compulsory. Article 14 §2 however opens the possibility 
for a Commission Proposal with respect to a harmonised system of mandatory financial security if the 
situation does not prove satisfactorily in eight years.1016 
Besides the three most debated items, other items were also passed on to the Member States. For 
example, the cost allocation in case of multiple party causation is left entirely within the competence of the 
Member States.1017 Moreover, Member States are allowed to introduce or maintain more stringent national 
measures. Member States may thus apply the Directive’s liability system for example to nuclear damage, oil 
pollution damage, diffuse pollution and to provide for traditional damage and historical damage 
(retroactivity) to be covered.1018 Finally, the calculation method for the costs is not precisely laid down, and 
the administrations have a large discretion in the assessments of costs. Hence, the text offered a significant 
discretion to the Member States, which probably made it possible to agree on a Common Position. 
In accordance with the co-decision procedure, the Council Common Position on the ELD, was sent 
back to the Parliament and the Commission for a second reading. The Commission agreed with the 
modifications and supported the Common Position.1019 
With respect to the Parliament, the Common Position will go back to the same lead committee and the 
same rapporteur and again the rapporteur is responsible for recommending to the committee and the 
Parliament as a whole whether to accept, reject or amend the Common Position. Therefore, the rapporteur 
and his staff will remain important contacts for lobby groups in the second stage of the co-decision 
procedure.1020 
The European Parliament adopted four amendments to the Common Position. In particular, the 
Parliament amended Article 14§2. It read that ‘five years after entry into force of the Directive the 
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Commission shall report on the measures adopted by the Member States pursuant Paragraph 1. If no 
appropriate instrument for financial security have been developed, the Commission shall submit proposals 
for a harmonised compulsory financial guarantee for water and soil damage, based on a gradual 
approach’.1021 In fact, the amendment version seemed a weaker version of the Greek compromise proposal, 
mentioned above, for a regime of financial security gradually phased in.1022 
On 21 January 2004, the Council (under Irish Presidency) states that it is unable to approve the 
Parliament’s amendments with respect to financial security and on 27 January, the conciliation procedure, 
aimed to reach agreement on a text acceptable to both sides, was started. On 19 February 2002, the 
Parliament and the Council reached agreement by exchange of letters. With respect to the financial security 
issue, the agreement held that 6 years after entry into force of the Directive the Commission shall present a 
report on its effectiveness. In the light of that report, the Commission shall, if appropriate, submit proposals 
for harmonised mandatory financial security.1023 
It was also agreed in the conciliation procedure that in another report to be submitted ten years after 
the entry into force of the Directive, the Commission shall review the application of the provisions in 
relation to the operators' right to limit their liability in accordance with international conventions. 
Moreover, the Parliament sought to ensure that the competent authority should take the necessary remedial 
measures by itself, only as a means of last resort. This suggestion has been accepted by the Council.1024 
On 30 March 2004, the Council adopted by qualified majority the Directive, following the agreement 
with the European Parliament under the conciliation procedure. The Irish, German and Austrian 
delegations voted against. On 31 March 2004, the Parliament held its third reading vote to adopt the 
conciliation text.1025 
On 21 April 2004, the Council and the European Parliament finally formally adopted Directive 
2004/35/EC on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remediation of environmental 
damage. The Directive was published in the Official Journal L143 of 30 April 2004.1026 
Yet, with respect to lobbying, the publication of the Directive in the official Journal, does not mean the 
end of the work. Indeed, now the ELD has been adopted, the best strategy for industry and environmental 
lobby groups is to turn their lobbying efforts to the Member States, in order to influence the implementation 
process in order to make sure that the Directive is implemented in the way they prefer.1027 
The above paragraph tried to unveil the adoption process of the ELD and tried to clarify why the 
decision-making level of environmental liability rules was shifted from the Member States to the European 
level and how certain provisions came into existence. Indeed, the existence and content of the ELD clearly 
shows the influence of lobbying activities, both by industry and environmental NGO’s as the influence of 
the Member States. 
2.2. Private Interest Analysis of the Adoption Process of the ELD 
It now merits examining whether the lobbying activities, observed in the adoption process of the ELD, and 
the result of this lobbying, corresponds with the predictions of the private interest theory, as discussed in 
the theoretical part (paragraph 2.1 of chapter 3). In particular, it can now be examined, on the one hand, 
whether the inefficient shift of competences to the European level with respect to environmental liability 
rules resulting in ‘too much Europe’, as concluded in paragraph 1, has been caused by interest group 
lobbying and, on the other hand, whether the inefficiencies in the Directive itself can be explained by 
interest group lobbying. Next, it will be examined whether lobbying behaviour by interest groups would 
cause more distortions at the national level than at the central level so that this would justify Community 
action in the field of environmental liability, as studied in the theoretical part (paragraph 2.2 of chapter 3). 
                                                             
1021  European Parliament legislative resolution on the Council Common Position for adopting a European Parliament and 
Council Directive on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage 
(10933/5/2003 –C5-0445/2003-2002/0021(COD)), P5_TA-PROV(2003)0575, European Parliament website. 
1022  Bocken 2006, 26. 
1023  <http://www.europarl.eu.int/code.newsletter/2004_03_en.htm>. 
1024  <http://www.europarl.eu.int/code.newsletter/2004_03_en.htm>. 
1025  Fogleman 2004, 103. 
1026  Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Environmental Liability with 
Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, OJ L 143/56 of 30.04.2004. 
1027  See for example Birdlife International and WWF, The European Directive on Environmental Liability – `Polluter Pays’: 
from principle to practice? An Environmental NGO commentary on the Environmental Liability Directive: its adoption at 
EU level and what it means for the future, July 2004, 28 and Cefic, Europia and OGP, The Environmental Liability 
Directive (Dir 2004/35/CE), Recommendations for implementation, May 2004. 
  Chapter 6 
  195 
2.2.1. Becker versus Buchanan 
In paragraph 2.1 of chapter 3, the theories that explicitly examine rent seeking behaviour in the law making 
process, notably the Capture Theory, the Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Choice Theory were 
examined. Does the existence of the ELD and its content correspond with the predictions of (one of) these 
theories? 
Within the Economic Theory of Regulation, Becker argued that politicians carry out the political 
allocations resulting from the competition among various pressure groups. The political equilibrium then 
depends on the capability of each pressure group in producing pressure on the government.1028 On the 
other hand, Buchanan, one of the most prominent public choice scholars, indicated that the government 
should not be understood as a benevolent despot that tries to maximise public welfare, but as an agent that 
seeks to increase its own spending and power, which became known as the Leviathan hypothesis of 
government. Decentralisation would prevent that a government would behave as a Leviathan.1029 Also 
within the public choice theory, Mancur Olson showed that lobby groups would be most effective if the 
groups are small, single-oriented and well-organised.1030 According to his theory, interest groups, like 
industry, which constitute relatively small and homogeneous groups, are able to organise and represent 
their interests more effectively than larger and more diffuse groups, like consumers or environmental lobby 
groups and hence inefficient regulations might emerge as a result of incomplete representation of interest 
groups in the political decision-making process.1031 
The question now arises whether the lobbying behaviour, observed in the adoption process of the 
ELD, and the result of this lobbying resembles a Becker-like situation whereby the different interest groups 
compete with each other to obtain political influence, and that as a consequence of this competition a kind 
of equilibrium is reached, or whether the existence and content of the ELD can be better explained by the 
theory that the Commission, behaving as a Buchanan-like Leviathan, was more receptive for lobbying of 
single-oriented and well-organised industry lobby groups?1032 
In order to answer this question, it merits distinguishing between the lobbying for the level at which 
environmental liability rules would be issued and the lobbying with respect to the content of the Directive. 
With respect to lobbying for the level of regulation, it was indicated in the previous paragraph that the 
Member States, industry and environmental NGO’s, all for their own reasons, welcomed or at least did not 
oppose the idea of the Community to shift environmental liability rules from the Member States to the 
European level. Indeed, environmental NGO’s supported the shift of environmental liability rules from the 
Member States to the European level, as in their view, a strong EU-wide regime on Environmental Liability 
would be vital to improve the protection of Europe’s environment and the adoption of the Directive would 
be a first step in the right direction.1033 Member States decided to support a European environmental 
liability regime, although their reasons for this support differed and although large disagreement existed 
between them on key issues as financial security, subsidiary state liability and permit and state-of-the-art 
defences. Industry originally opposed any European initiative with respect to environmental liability, but 
realised that an environmental liability regime was inevitable, either at European or at national level, and 
therefore preferred a consistent, favourable regime throughout the European Union instead of a patchwork 
of different (more stringent) national liability regimes. One could argue that the Commission merely took 
into account the preferences of the Member States, environmental NGO’s and industry, and therefore 
issued an environmental liability regime at European level. From this point of view, the lobbying behaviour 
with respect to the level of environmental liability rules, would show resemblances with Becker’s theory of 
competition. On the other hand, it certainly cannot be ignored that the Commission might have welcomed a 
European environmental liability regime for other reasons than only public welfare and protection of the 
environment. Indeed, the Commission might have seen the ELD as a means for enlarging its own 
competences in fields for which it did not have any direct competence yet, as for example soil protection 
policies. This would correspond to Buchanan’s theory on government behaviour. Hence, the lobbying 
behaviour with respect to the content of the regulation shows some elements of both the Becker and the 
Buchanan theory on lobbying behaviour. Moreover, it seems that all actors involved in the adoption process 
of the ELD, each for their own reasons, preferred an environmental liability regime at European level, and 
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therefore competences were shifted from the Member State level to the European level, contrary to what 
economic theory would suggest. 
In sum, the answer on the question whether the inefficient shift of competences to the European level 
with respect to environmental liability rules has been caused by interest group lobbying is probably 
affirmative. 
With respect to the content of the Directive itself, it was shown in the analysis of the adoption process 
of the ELD that the industry, realising that it would be more advantageous to have a consistent, moderate 
regime at European level instead of various (stringent) national liability regimes, considered that it would 
be better to try to turn the content of the Directive into their advantage, instead of opposing it. 
Consequently, the industry, supported by some of the Member States who did not want to put to much 
pressure on their industries, fiercely lobbied for the insertion of permit compliance and state-of-the-art 
defences and the absence of mandatory insurance. Contrary to what would be efficient according to 
economic theory (as discussed in Chapter 5), the industry succeeded in obtaining its claims. Hence, 
although the other main actors in the ELD adoption process, all for their own reasons, preferred an 
environmental liability regime at European level, it seems that with respect to the content of the European 
regime, industry lobbying was most successful. Indeed, as will be discussed in paragraph 2.2.2.1, the final 
text of the ELD shows the strength of industry lobbying relative to environmental NGO’s lobbying. Hence, 
the lobbying behaviour of the main actors in the ELD adoption process with respect to the content of the 
Directive might fit better into Olson’s theory of successful, single-oriented and well-organised lobby 
groups, rather than in Becker’s theory of competition. 
Hence, it seems that also the inefficiencies in the Directive itself can be explained by interest group 
lobbying, and in particular by industry lobbying. 
In sum, it appears that public choice theory indeed provides a useful tool to explain why the ELD has 
been issued at European level, in contrast to what would be efficient according to economic theory, and 
why certain provisions are adopted, again contrary to what would be efficient according to economic 
theory.1034 
Yet, at all government levels lobbying might exist. The question therefore obviously arises whether the 
Member States would have had more efficient national environmental liability regimes? It now merits 
examining whether lobbying behaviour by interest groups would cause more distortions at the national 
level than at the central level so that this would justify Community action in the field of environmental 
liability, as studied in the theoretical part (paragraph 2.2 of chapter 3). 
2.2.2. Reasons for Centralisation, Based on Private Interest Distortions 
In the theoretical framework, it was argued that with respect to environmental regulation, there are three 
frequently advanced public choice distortions that might influence the level of decision-making for 
environmental policy. 
A first public interest distortion is that interest groups, having a stake in a certain area of regulation, 
might prefer that level of government to issue a regulation at which their strength is greatest in comparison 
to other interest groups with different concerns in the same area.1035 Interest groups might therefore lobby 
to ensure that a certain regulation is issued at a particular level of government, at which their influence is 
greatest. If certain interests are systematically underrepresented at a particular governmental level, the 
outcome of the regulatory process clearly cannot be efficient. 
The next two distortions that were dealt with in the public interest approach, are also prominent in the 
public choice debate: states might engage in a race-to-the-bottom due to interest group lobbying and the 
harmonisation of marketing conditions might be incited by interest groups. This paragraph will examine 
whether these claims give rise to a preference for environmental liability rules at European level, although 
there would be no firm reasons for centralisation based on the public interest approach. 
2.2.2.1. Relative Strength of Interest Groups at National and European Level 
Advocates of centralised regulation frequently claim that the decision-making process would be 
systematically more distorted at local level than at the central level. The justifications for this claim rest 
upon both the public attention for environmental matters and the interest group structure at respectively 
local and central level. According to Esty, the public indifference to many state and local environmental 
decisions, as well as greater media attention to central level activities might lead to more private interest 
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distortion at state and local levels than at the central level. Moreover, Esty expects that at central level 
lobbying excesses of a certain interest group would be opposed by countervailing interest groups.1036 
This assumption, however, might not always hold. It merits at this point making a distinction between 
the American and the European context. As indicated above, American scholars, like Esty or Rose-
Ackerman, argue that the risk of capture is larger at the state level than at the federal level where an open 
transparent debate exists. European scholars on the other hand, seem to fear more regulatory capture at the 
European Community level, due to the lack of transparency of the Brussels bureaucracy.1037 
Ogus argues that, in Europe, if the lobbying power of industrialist groups tends to prevail over that of 
environmentalists at the state level, the disparity might even be greater at Community level. Ogus advances 
two explanations for weak(er) lobbying power of environmentalists at the European level. 
Firstly, due to the disparity of interests and power of environmental lobby groups at the Member 
States level, industry lobby groups might co-ordinate their lobbying efforts across national frontiers more 
easily than environmentalists. Moreover, environmental lobby groups show a lack of resources compared 
to industry lobby groups.1038 Hence, in Europe, industry may be confronted with strong ‘green’ interest 
groups at the Member State level, especially in the ‘green’ Member States such as Denmark and Germany, 
whereas such countervailing powers may be weaker in Brussels. Hence one can expect European industry 
to engage in serious lobbying efforts centrally in Brussels. For example, the German environmentally 
sensitive industries, competing with a powerful green lobby within Germany, may strive for regulation at 
Community level, where they can find allies from industries in other States, and where the strength of 
environmentalists is more diluted.1039 Industry lobby efforts may go either direction: in case of a new 
regulatory field, they might lobby in favour of a harmonisation of European limit values, on the other hand 
they may wish to extend their strict (national) regulations to the European level, forcing foreign competitors 
to follow the same strict regulation with which they already comply. In that case, industry will lobby for 
predatory regulation to erect artificial barriers to entry. Environmental interest groups at European level 
may be in favour of these standards and may, therefore, support the demand to transfer strict national 
standards to a European standard. Thus industry in heavily regulated and possibly polluted areas may, 
supported by the environmental lobby, force their stringent emission limit values upon their competitors in 
other Member States.1040 
Secondly, even if the authorities in Brussels are receptive to interest group lobbying, they do not have 
the same motivation to respond to the lobbying as governments at the Member State level. The European 
Commission and the Council are not voted into power by the European citizens and therefore do not need 
to purchase electoral support through the promise of legislative favours. This is especially a disadvantage 
for environmental lobby groups. Indeed, the political influence of environmentalists on the Commission 
and the Council might be weakened by the fact that they have no direct electoral link with these authorities 
and therefore cannot force them to issue stringent environmental regulation. On the other hand, the 
Commission is dependent on the polluting industry. Indeed, if effective laws are to be devised, the 
Commission needs to obtain information on best available production techniques from the polluting 
industry, and hence, to a certain degree, will need to appease them. An additional problem for the 
environmentalist lobby is the absence of effective enforcement at European level of environmental 
regulations. The European Environment Agency was created in 1990,1041 but its responsibility consists 
mainly of collecting information from national agencies. It does not have the powers to monitor polluters. It 
is generally admitted that the Member States have a poor record of implementing European Directives on 
environmental matters and it cannot be expected that a Member State will pursue a strict enforcement 
policy if it suspects that other Member States are not doing the same.1042 
Hence, in the case of the European Union, it appears that it seems a bit precipitate to state that 
environmental lobby groups are underrepresented at the state level relative to industry interests and that 
therefore responsibility for environmental regulation should be assigned to the European level. At the 
European as well as at the Member State level, it might happen that a small number of concentrated 
industrial interests might overwhelm environmental lobby groups, consisting of a large number of 
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environmentally conscious citizens. Moreover, the relative lobbying power of environmentalists and 
industry lobby groups seems to depend on the particular situation in the Member States. 
For liability rules for soil pollution in particular, it is very difficult to proclaim at which governmental 
level lobbying with respect to soil pollution will be strongest. Nevertheless, soil pollution mostly is a local 
problem, and it might be assumed that therefore it might be easier for environmental lobby groups to 
ensure that citizens, confronted with local contamination, support their actions for stringent liability rules. 
At the central level, at which most citizens are much less involved, industry might have more lobbying 
power. The argument that centralisation would be necessary because industry interest groups would be 
stronger relative to environmental lobby groups at Member State level, might therefore not hold for liability 
rules for soil pollution. 
The question arises then at which level environmental regulation could be best decided if both levels 
can be affected by interest group lobbying. Which governmental level will yield more lenient or more 
stringent regulation? As already indicated above, the eventual policy outcome due to lobbying might go in 
either direction. At Member State level, industry might lobby for more lenient standards, but they may be 
opposed by a strong environmental interest group. At European level the lobbying efforts of industry might 
go in either direction, depending on whether industry wants to erect barriers to entry, or lenient regulation. 
Moreover, the power of environmental lobby groups at the European level compared to the Member State 
level, might depend on the particular situation in the Member States. In ‘green’ Member States as Germany 
or Denmark, environmental lobby groups may be stronger than the lobby groups at European level, 
whereas the situation might be different in Greece or Portugal. Hence, it is difficult to predict which 
governmental level will yield optimal environmental regulation, when affected by lobbying. Yet, in this 
context, it is interesting to refer to a study of Fredriksson and Gaston1043 who argue that centralised and 
decentralised environmental decision-making will result in equivalent environmental regulations. In their 
study, they examine the implications of lobbying on centralised or decentralised environmental decision-
making. They model workers, environmental and capital owner lobby groups that seek to influence the 
policy outcome by offering political contributions and they differentiate between two levels of 
environmental decision-making, the central level and the local level. Fredriksson and Gaston make the 
plausible assumption that capital is mobile between jurisdictions of a federation, but immobile at 
centralised level. Organised lobby groups offer the government political contributions in return for more 
favourable environmental policy outcomes. The government on the other hand tries to maximise both 
aggregate social welfare and political contributions. At decentralised level, workers lobby, as they are 
affected by capital flight and their lobbying might influence the local government to reduce the level of 
regulatory stringency. Under centralised decision-making, industry lobbying may be larger. If the capital 
stock is assumed immobile, which means that firms cannot move to other federations, capital owners will 
lobby for political favours, the centralised outcome may degenerate to the decentralised outcome. This 
occurs because worker lobbying in the decentralised case has a similar effect on environmental regulations 
to that of capital owner lobbying in the centralised case. Yet, implicitly, their study seems to indicate that if 
capital flight is still possible at the central level, the central level might issue more stringent environmental 
regulations. Nevertheless, an important finding of their model is that, under quite realistic circumstances, 
the stringency of environmental regulation is likely to be independent of institutional design.1044 Moreover, 
they predict that, rather than regulations becoming more stringent at the federal level, ‘new’ centralised 
regulations would develop into the `average’ stringency of regulations that had existed at the decentralised 
level. As an example they refer to the packaging waste regulation in the European Union. The initial 
proposal immediately was criticised by various industry groups and the new drafts of the regulations were 
successively less demanding.1045 
In sum, lobbying of both environmental interest groups and of industry interest groups will take place 
at the European as well as at the Member State level. Furthermore, it is unlikely that environmental lobby 
groups are more powerful at the European level than at state level. In some Member States this might be the 
opposite. Moreover, lobbying efforts of industry might go in either direction, depending whether they 
intend to erect barriers to entry or whether they strive for lenient regulation. Hence, the claim that the 
environmental decision-making process would be systematically more distorted at state and local levels 
than at the federal level and therefore would justify centralised environmental regulation is precipitate, at 
least in the European case. 
With respect to the ELD in particular, compared to the Member States’ environmental liability regimes 
which were already in place, the ELD also includes damage to biodiversity, which might be considered as a 
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novelty. One might therefore argue that in that respect, the ELD might be considered as a new regulatory 
field. This is also reflected in lobbying behaviour of industry. As was already stated above, comments of the 
industry on the Working Paper or the Commission Proposal indicate that industry did not oppose a 
European action in the field of environmental liability as they preferred a consistent (minimum) approach 
throughout the Community compared to various (more stringent) national liability regimes.1046 
Environmental NGO’s supported the shift of environmental liability rules from the Member States to the 
European level, as in their view, a strong EU-wide regime on Environmental Liability would be vital to 
improve the protection of Europe’s environment and the adoption of the Directive would be a first step in 
the right direction.1047 Yet, the final text of the ELD shows the strength of industry lobbying relative to 
environmental NGO’s lobbying. Indeed, although environmental NGO’s did their very best, industry lobby 
groups, supported by some of the Member States who did not want to put too much pressure on their 
industries, realised several of their stakes, as for example the introduction of a permit compliance or state-
of-the-art defence and the absence of compulsory insurance. The ELD adoption process might in this 
respect be comparable with the packaging waste regulation example given by Fredriksson and Gaston. 
Indeed, due to lobbying, when comparing the Commission proposal with the final text of the ELD, the text 
of the Directive became during the co-decision procedure successively less demanding. Hence, it is possible 
that the regime of the ELD developed into the `average’ stringency of liability rules that had existed at the 
Member State level. 
Hence, the claim that centralised regulation would be justified as the decision-making process would 
be systematically more distorted by lobbying at Member State level than at the European level does not 
hold for the European Union, and might therefore not justify the ELD. 
Yet, the question whether environmental liability rules had been better decided at Member States level 
and whether the environment had been better protected by national rules, is, precisely with respect to 
lobbying, difficult to answer. Moreover, the answer probably would have been dependent on the liability 
regime of the Member State under consideration. 
2.2.2.2. Race-to-the-bottom Due to Interest Group Lobbying 
In addition to the claim that the environmental decision-making process would be systematically more 
distorted at state or local levels than at the central level due to lobbying, it is often argued that the risk of a 
race-to-the-bottom in environmental standards between states, caused by lobbying at state level, would 
justify centralised environmental decision-making. 
The fact that the presumption that (industry) lobbying at state level would cause a race-to-the-bottom 
in environmental quality, justifying centralised environmental regulation, appeared to be a bit hastened 
was already discussed in the theoretical part. Industry will not necessarily lobby for lenient regulation. 
Indeed, various strategies are possible. Firms might create rents and barriers to entry by stringent 
regulation. In such circumstances, the impetus for environmental regulation comes, implicitly or explicitly, 
from the regulated firms themselves. Stringent regulation gives them an advantage over (foreign) 
competitors. Moreover, stringent regulation might provide benefits to producers of pollution control 
equipment. The demand for environmental regulation then comes from manufacturers of pollution control 
equipment or environmentally friendly technologies. On the other hand, it can not be excluded that there 
might be circumstances in which industry may indeed lobby for lenient regulation, for example to obtain an 
interregional comparative advantage. Furthermore, states may only be willing to introduce a stringent 
liability regime if they are sure that other states have to do the same.1048 
Nevertheless, the risk of a race-to-the-bottom in liability rules for soil pollution is not very realistic. 
Indeed, soil pollution is a mostly local problem. If Member States would issue lenient liability rules for the 
sake of industry, they would lose their means to recover the costs of clean-up from the polluters. Hence, 
they do not have any incentive to issue lenient liability rules for soil pollution, eventually leading to a race-
to-the-bottom. 
Yet, with respect to the ELD, there are no indications that industry strived for a real race-to-the-
bottom or that Member States would be willing to introduce inefficient lenient liability regimes. More 
realistically, it seemed that industry preferred a somewhat consistent (minimum) approach in the 
Community instead of different (more stringent) national environmental liability regimes. 
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2.2.2.3. Harmonisation of Marketing Conditions Incited by Interest Groups 
The ‘harmonisation of competition’ reasoning was advanced as an argument for centralisation of 
environmental regulation, within the public interest approach. Yet, this argument might also be examined 
from the private-interest approach. 
Indeed, as was explained in the theoretical framework, centralisation because of the harmonisation of 
competition might serve the interests of industries in heavily regulated areas rather than the public interest. 
On the one hand, industry in states that already have relatively stringent environmental standards may 
have an incentive to lobby at the central level. The purpose of such lobbying would be to make these 
stringent environmental standards compulsory throughout the Union in order to force their competitors 
also to comply and, thus, to obtain a competitive advantage and to create barriers to entry. In other words, 
predatory regulation may explain why many environmental regulations emerge at the central level if 
economic theory would predict that the problem would be better dealt with at the local level.1049 Moreover, 
industries with strong economies of scale tend to prefer uniform federal regulation to a patchwork of 
different state standards.1050 Also for new regulatory fields, industry might prefer centralised regulation. 
Faure and Lefevere argue that this might explain why some industries will lobby in favour of 
environmental regulation at the European level. For new areas, where no national legislation exists, 
industry lobby groups may encounter less countervailing power of environmental organisations than at the 
local level where the environmental problems occur.1051 Hence, centralised regulation might be more lenient 
than the regulation that could have been issued at national level. 
The harmonisation for marketing conditions effectively seems to have been an argument for industry 
to support a shift of environmental liability rules from the Member States to the European level. Indeed, in 
a joint paper on the implementation of the Directive, CEFIC, EUROPIA and OGP state that `our industries 
have accepted their environmental responsibility and have not objected to the principle of a Directive 
regulating their liability. Our industries however expect that a new environmental liability regime should 
be fair and contain legally clear definitions and concepts. CEFIC, EUROPIA and OGP urge the Member 
States to implement the Directive in a fair and harmonised way in order to avoid distortion of competition 
and legal uncertainty’.1052 
In particular, these industry lobby groups ask that `Member States should exempt responsible 
operators from any liability if they act in compliance with permits and state-of-the-art knowledge’.1053 
Indeed, as the Council could not agree a common line, the decision was passed on to the Member States to 
accept permit compliance and state-of-the-art knowledge as defences and to relieve the operator — fully, in 
part or not at all — of restoration costs. Operators who act in compliance with their permits and apply state-
of-the-art knowledge might be or might not be liable depending on the implementation of this provision by 
the Member States. Therefore, CEFIC, EUROPIA and OGP demand that `all Member States would 
recognise permit and state-of-the-art defences in order to avoid distortions of competition’. Moreover, they 
argue that `the option for Member States to decide whether to apply joint and several liability or 
proportional liability could create serious discrepancies between Member States and result in distortion of 
competition. Only application of proportional liability in all Member States would create an effective, fair 
and harmonised regime, saving financial and other resources and helping the environment by avoiding 
lengthy procedures’.1054 Hence, it seems clear that a harmonised (lenient) environmental liability regime at 
European level to equal marketing conditions was favoured by the industry. 
It is interesting to note that the fact that the Directive also included liability rules of soil pollution did 
not create much of a discussion during the adoption process. Maybe this was because industry preferred 
(minimum) harmonisation with respect to liability for soil pollution rather than differing rules in the 
various Member States, or maybe because, as Layard suggests, the effective impact of the ELD for soil 
pollution is rather limited.1055 
Environmental NGO’s from their side hope that the provisions of the Directive might be strengthened 
in the future and that their lobbying activities might counteract industry’s desire for a minimum regime at 
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European level. In particular, they lobby at their national governments not to choose for allowing 
companies, operating in compliance with the permit or according to the state of the art, an automatic 
exemption from all environmental restoration costs. Moreover, they hope that the Commission will use its 
review obligations as opportunities to improve the Directive in the future.1056 
Yet, it might be clear that the harmonisation of environmental liability rules, including liability rules 
for soil pollution for equal marketing conditions, serving the interests of industry, instead of the public 
interest, is not a good argument to justify the shift of environmental liability from the Member States to the 
European level by means of the ELD. 
In sum, it appears that none of the arguments of the private interest approach would justify a shift of 
environmental liability rules from the Member States to the European level. 
2.3. Summary of the Private Interest Approach  
The private interest approach tried to provide additional explanations for the existence of the ELD and for 
certain provisions in the ELD. In particular, it was examined on the one hand, whether the inefficient shift 
of competences to the European level with respect to environmental liability rules, resulting in ‘too much 
Europe’, had been caused by interest group lobbying and, on the other hand, whether the inefficiencies in 
the Directive itself could be explained by interest group lobbying. 
Firstly, the adoption process of the ELD was studied with respect to interest group lobbying. It was 
explained who were the actors involved in the decision-making process of the ELD and what were their 
stakes. The adoption process of the ELD was examined in detail and it was indicated at which stages and at 
which institutions lobbying took place, in particular with respect to permit compliance and state-of-the-art 
defence, subsidiary state liability and mandatory financial insurance. 
It was indicated that the existence and content of the ELD clearly showed the influence of lobbying 
activities, both by industry and environmental NGO’s as the influence of the Member States.Therefore, the 
lobbying of all actors involved in the ELD decision-making process add to explain the existence and the 
content of the ELD. 
Secondly, it was examined whether the lobbying activities, observed in the adoption process of the 
ELD, and the result of this lobbying, corresponded with the predictions of private interest theories which 
were discussed in the theoretical part, as the Economic Theory of Regulation (Becker) and the Public Choice 
theory (Buchanan, Olson). It appeared that the lobbying behaviour with respect to the level of regulation 
showed some elements of both the Becker and the Buchanan theory on lobbying behaviour. Moreover, it 
seemed that environmental NGO’s, industry and Member State, all for their own reasons, welcomed or at 
least did not oppose the idea of a European environmental liability regime. The Commission on its side 
might have welcomed a European environmental liability regime for other reasons than only public welfare 
and protection of the environment as for example enlarging its own competences in fields for which it did 
not have any direct competence yet, as soil protection policies. Hence, competences were shifted from the 
Member State level to the European level, contrary to what economic theory would suggest. Thus, the 
answer on the question whether the inefficient shift of competences to the European level with respect to 
environmental liability rules can be explained by interest group lobbying and private interest distortions is 
probably affirmative. 
With respect to the content of the ELD itself, it was shown that industry was most successful in 
obtaining its claims, compared to environmental NGO’s. Hence, the lobbying behaviour of the main actors 
in the ELD adoption process with respect to the content of the Directive might fit better into Olson’s theory 
of successful, single-oriented and well-organised lobby groups, rather than in Becker’s theory of 
competition. Yet, it seems that also the inefficiencies in the Directive itself can be explained by interest 
group lobbying, and in particular by industry lobbying. 
Finally, it was examined whether lobbying behaviour by interest groups would cause more distortions 
at the national level than at the central level so that this would justify Community action in the field of 
environmental liability. 
It was shown that in the case of the European Union, it seems precipitate to state that environmental 
lobby groups are underrepresented at the state level relative to industry interests and that therefore 
responsibility for environmental regulation should be assigned to the European level. At the European as 
well as at the Member State level, industry lobby groups might have more lobbying power relative to 
environmental interest groups. Indeed, due to lacking resources, and the disparity of interests and power of 
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environmental lobby groups at the Member States level, industry lobby groups might co-ordinate their 
lobbying efforts across national frontiers more easily than environmentalists. The adoption process of the 
ELD indeed reflected this inequality and showed that industry lobby groups realised to obtain important 
concessions in particular with respect to permit compliance and state-of-the-art defence and compulsory 
insurance. Furthermore, a race-to-the-bottom seems rather unrealistic in the case of environmental liability 
rules. Indeed, there are no indications that industry strived for a race-to-the-bottom. More realistically, it 
seemed that industry preferred a somewhat consistent (minimum) approach in the Community. Finally, 
harmonisation of environmental liability rules might be used by industry to obtain a (minimum) 
harmonised regime in order to avoid distortions of competition. Yet, harmonisation of marketing 
conditions to serve the private interest, it certainly is no valid argument for the shift of environmental 
liability rules from the Member States to the European level. 
Hence, the claim that the private interest distortions in the European Union would cause even more 
distortions at the national level and therefore would justify a European environmental liability regime is 
precipitate. This negative conclusion should not imply that the Member States would enact optimal 
environmental regulation, or that private interest distortions are less serious in the Member States than at 
the European level. The lobbying process is so complex that any general conclusion is almost certain to be 
wrong. 
Concluding, the private interest approach provides useful insights into the lobbying behaviour of the 
actors involved in the adoption process of the ELD and provides additional explanations for the existence 
of the ELD and for certain provisions in the ELD. Indeed, the private interest approach provides a useful 
tool to explain why the ELD has been issued at European level, in contrast to what would be efficient 
according to economic theory, and why certain provisions are adopted, again contrary to what would be 
efficient according to economic theory. 
3. Framework for Decision-making on the Optimal Governmental Level for Liability for 
Environmental Damage in the European Union, Based on a Public and Private Interest 
Approach  
It now merits merging both public interest and private approaches in order to explain for what reasons 
environmental liability rules were shifted from the Member States to the European level. Indeed, only a 
combined public-private interest approach that explicitly recognises the interaction of different interest 
groups can grasp the complexity of environmental policy. 
Figure 7 applies the framework that was developed in Chapter 3 and illustrates the difference between 
theory and practice. 
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It appears that from an economic point of view, the reasons advanced by the Commission for the ELD seem 
rather weak, and would not justify a shift from the Member States to the European level of environmental 
liability rules, including liability rules for soil pollution. 
From an economic point of view, the only valid argument for centralisation was the internalisation of 
transboundary damage, however, only a so-called `transboundary only’-regime would be justified rather 
than full harmonisation. Yet, it was shown that the Directive would not necessarily solve this 
transboundary damage. It was also argued that economies of scale in technical research might allow for co-
operation or centralisation of certain tasks, like research or data gathering on soil contamination and 
restoration. However, again, the promise of economies of scale in scientific research would not justify for a 
centralisation in an excessive sense. Next, it was shown that fears for a race-to-to-bottom or unfair 
marketing conditions, due to different liability rules in the Member States seem not very likely to become 
true, and therefore these arguments do not justify harmonisation of environmental liability rules in the 
European Union. Moreover, it was shown that the ELD will not create a level playing field or realise a 
reduction in transaction costs, neither for environmental liability rules in general nor for liability for soil 
pollution in particular. Also the realisation of the polluter pays, precautionary and preventive principles 
and restoration and decontamination of environmental damage as such do not explain why environmental 
regulation should be issued at the European level. Moreover, it was indicated that the ELD will not 
necessarily realise the polluter pays, precautionary and preventive principles, or the restoration and 
decontamination of the environment. Finally, it was argued that if the minimum level of protection 
argument would be accepted as a valid argument for shifting environmental liability rules from the 
Member States to the European level, it must be emphasized that this reason for harmonisation would not 
be based on economic efficiency, but on the desire to provide a minimum level of environmental quality 
and of protection against environmental accidents. Moreover, if the preferences of the citizens in the 
different Member States are ignored, harmonisation of environmental liability rules on the basis of this 
argument only amounts to paternalism. 
Hence, the reasons advanced by the Commission for the ELD seem rather weak, and would not justify 
a shift of environmental liability rules from the Member States to the European level and hence, from an 
economic point of view, there is an inefficient shift of competences from the Member States to the European 
level with respect to environmental liability rules as shown by the example of liability rules for soil 
pollution. 
The conclusion at the normative level is, however, not necessarily that there should be no European 
action at all with respect to environmental damage, including soil pollution. It was argued that subsidiarity 
is not a question of either centralised or decentralised decision-making, but may involve a mixture of 
powers at different levels. 
The main point is that the Commission fails to explain properly why a harmonised liability regime is 
necessary or why its goals cannot be achieved by the Member States, as required by the subsidiarity 
principle. However, as was stated above, ignoring the subsidiarity principle can have substantial negative 
effects for the European Union. Indeed, such behaviour would encourage eurosceptics and endanger 
projects where European action would be desirable. Therefore, in order to respect the division of 
competences between Member States and the European level, European action should be properly justified. 
Nevertheless, the question remains why environmental liability rules were shifted from the Member 
States to the European level in contrast to what would be efficient according to economic theory. The 
private interest approach therefore provided additional explanations for the existence and the content of the 
ELD. It appeared that environmental NGO’s, industry and Member States, and the Commission, all for 
their own reasons, welcomed the shift of environmental liability rules from the Member States to the 
European level. Thus, the interests of all parties in the ELD decision-making process may not be ignored 
when explaining the shift of environmental liability rules from the Member States to the European level, but 
also when explaining the provisions of the ELD itself. Indeed, the final text of the ELD clearly shows the 
influence of lobbying activities, both by industry and environmental NGO’s as the influence of the Member 
States themselves. Therefore, private interest theory explains to a large extent why there is an 
Environmental Liability Directive, and why certain provisions are as they are. 
Yet, meanwhile the Directive has entered into force. Interpreting the Directive in light of its aim and 
general principles of EC environmental law seems the best option to give the ELD the chance to become an 
effective instrument to ensure prevention and restoration of environmental damage in the European Union. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This doctoral research aimed to refine the existing scholarly debate on the optimal decision-making level of 
environmental regulation. The diverse arguments pro and contra harmonisation of environmental 
regulation and the sometimes fierce debates on harmonisation at academic as well as political level incited 
this research. In particular, this doctoral research aimed to answer the question whether the harmonisation 
of environmental liability rules in the European Union, including liability rules for soil pollution, was 
desirable from an economic point of view and for what reasons harmonisation did take place? 
To answer this question, the research was based on the economic analysis of law, also known as ‘Law 
and Economics’ methodology. In a first step, on the basis of the economic analysis of tort law, it was 
examined which type of liability rule would be most efficient from an economic point of view to prevent 
and restore soil pollution. Next, the optimal decision-making level of these liability rules was examined 
from two different theoretical perspectives within Law and Economics methodology, a public interest 
approach and the private interest approach. The public interest approach, based on the economic theory of 
federalism, considers regulation as a means to correct market failures and assumes that governments are 
able to correct these market failures and that they take decisions to improve social welfare. The private 
interest approach on the other hand, is based on capture theory, economic theory of regulation and public 
choice theory and stresses the role of interest groups in the law-making process and points to the danger of 
government failure as a result of lobbying by interest groups. The basic idea of this approach is that interest 
groups try to influence political decisions in order to seek rents for themselves, which is unproductive from 
a social welfare point of view. On the basis of these two perspectives, a theoretical framework on the 
optimal decision-making level of liability rules for environmental damage was developed, with soil 
pollution as an example. This framework was applied to the harmonisation of environmental liability rules, 
including liability rules for soil pollution, through Directive 2004/35/CE in the European Union. By the 
comparison of economic theory and recent developments in the European Union, this PhD research aims to 
contribute to the existing theories on the optimal decision-making level of environmental regulation and to 
provide more insight in the harmonisation process in a real world situation. 
As the harmonisation debate is a very complex matter, four subquestions were formulated to answer 
the central research question. It merits now providing an answer on all four subquestions and next, to the 
central research question. 
In order to point out the relevance of this research, the first of the subquestions was: what is the 
contribution of environmental liability rules in the prevention and restoration of enironmental damage and which type 
of liability rule would be best to prevent and restore environmental damage? 
Indeed, prior to the question at which level liability rules for environmental damage can be best 
decided, the question what liability rule would be most efficient from an economic point of view to prevent 
and restore environmental damage had to be answered. 
In Chapter 2, the economic analysis of tort law was applied to environmental damage. In a first step, 
the role of liability rules in the prevention and restoration of environmental damage was clarified. It was 
argued that the function of liability is twofold. On the one hand liability fulfils a prevention function, by 
giving individuals incentives to internalise the negative effects that their activities pose on others. In this 
way, liability guides individual behaviour in order to maximise social welfare. On the other hand, liability 
could provide for compensation for the damage in case an accident would occur. Thus, besides regulation, 
liability rules can play a valuable complementary role in preventing and restoring environmental 
damamage, as for instance soil pollution. Indeed, most countries have established a framework of 
regulations to prevent and restore environmental damage, including soil pollution. Yet, in order to deal 
with the lacunas in regulation, liability can be introduced. Therefore, liability and regulation apparently are 
complementary. 
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Second, in order to determine the optimal liability rule to complement the existing regulatory 
framework for environmental damage, a distinction was made between dangerous activities and non-
dangerous activities. For dangerous activities it was argued that a strict liability would be optimal as it also 
might reduce the activity level, whereas a negligence rule might be sufficient for non-dangerous activities. 
It is not claimed that liability is the perfect solution for all kinds of environmental damage, nevertheless, 
liability can play a valuable complementary role in preventing and restoring environmental damage. Thus, 
it merits further research on the optimal decision-making level at which these liability rules for 
environmental damage might be decided in a federal system as the European Union. As an example, 
liability for soil pollution will be examined. 
Accordingly, the second subquestion was: what is the optimal decision-making level of liability rules for 
environmental damage in a federal system from a theoretical perspective? 
In order to answer this second subquestion, in Chapter 3 the arguments of the public interest 
approach and the private interest approach on harmonisation of environmental regulation were examined. 
The public interest approach starts from decentralisation of regulatory policies and examines 
accordingly whether there might be reasons for federal intervention. This bottom-up approach towards 
centralisation is based upon the Tiebout model and the Decentralisation Theorem of Oates. The starting 
point is that through decentralisation rules can be adapted to the preferences of the citizens. However, due 
to externalities and market failure, transaction costs or imperfect information, some decisions might better 
be decided at a higher level of decision-making. 
The reasons for centralisation, and eventually harmonisation, were grouped into four main 
arguments: the transboundary character of an externality argument, the race-to-the-bottom argument, the 
market access argument and minimum level of protection argument. Each argument was first examined for 
(environmental) regulation. Second, each argument has been applied to environmental liability rules and 
liability rules for soil pollution as an example. 
It would lead us to far afield to give an extensive summary of the analysis of each of the arguments, 
but a brief summary of the outcome seems appropriate. 
It appeared that none of the arguments for harmonisation would justify a total harmonisation of 
environmental liability rules. Nevertheless, it was argued that there might be a supportive role for the 
federal government in the provision of information and scientific research. Besides that, a federal 
government might develop solutions for transboundary damage or for special conservation area’s. 
Furthermore, general principles of tort law to protect the environment could be defined at the central level, 
or a specific liability rule for certain activities could be set centrally, combined with a differentiation of the 
specific contents of this rule. In such circumstances, transaction costs might be lowered, market access 
might be promoted, a minimum level of protection could be guaranteed and still differing preferences 
could be respected. 
The same reasoning held for liability rules for soil pollution. Perhaps the strongest argument for 
decentralisation of liability rules for soil pollution is that local conditions, geography, economic strengths 
and concerns might vary substantially from place to place. Furthermore, local knowledge and expertise 
with specific soil conditions might prove essential to develop the proper liability rules for soil reclamation. 
Therefore, certainly in the specific case of soil pollution, a one-size-fits-all approach probably might fit 
nobody. 
Yet, it was argued that the existence or the harmonisation of certain environmental regulations in the 
real world can not always be explained on the basis of the public interest approach alone. Indeed, for a full 
understanding of environmental policy, the influence of lobbying of different interest groups in the law 
making process must be recognised. The public interest approach therefore was complemented with a so-
called private interest approach. This approach tries to take rent seeking into account in the law making 
process. The reasons for a certain policy can sometimes be best understood if not only the public interest, 
but also the behaviour of the government officials and pressure groups is taken into account. 
First, a brief overview of the theories that examine the influence of lobbying on the law-making 
process was prestented: Capture Theory, Public Choice Theory and the Economic Theory of Regulation. 
Moreover, at a theoretical level, the various stakes of the government, the industry and environmentalists, 
the main lobby groups in the environmental law making process, were discussed. Second, attention was 
paid to environmental federalism. It was indicated that lobbying might not only concern the contents of the 
regulation, but also at what level of government the regulation will be issued. Interest groups, having a 
stake in a certain area of regulation, might prefer that level of government at which their strength is greatest 
in comparison to other interest groups with different concerns in the same area. Three frequently advanced 
private interest distortions, that might influence the level of decision-making for environmental policy, 
were examined. First, it is often argued that private interest distortions might cause that environmental 
interests are systematically underrepresented at the local level. Moreover, two arguments that were dealt 
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with in the public interest approach are also prominent in the public choice debate: states might engage in a 
race-to-the-bottom due to interest group lobbying and the harmonisation of marketing conditions might be 
incited by interest groups. It was examined whether these three claims would justify centralisation of 
environmental regulation. 
It appeared that with respect to environmental liability rules, it is difficult to estimate at a theoretical 
level what the main actors, and in particular industry, will lobby for, what the best level of regulation is and 
what the result of lobbying will be. However, it seemed clear that the private interest distortions would not 
automatically justify a centralised regime, as lobbying affects the local as well as the central level. 
Unfortunately, public choice theory is not able to predict the magnitude and consequences of the distortions 
at the local level compared to the central level. However, in any case, transparency in the debate at either 
level might be welcomed in order to guarantee that a regulation would serve the public interest. As far as 
liability rules for soil pollution were concerned, it was argued that soil pollution mostly is a local problem, 
and it might be assumed that therefore, it might be easier for environmental lobby groups to ensure that 
citizens support their actions for stringent liability rules at local level then at central level, at which most 
citizens are much less involved. The argument that centralisation would be necessary because industry 
interest groups would be stronger relative to environmental lobby groups at local level, might therefore not 
hold for liability rules for soil pollution. Therefore, also based on the private interest approach, there 
remained a strong case for decentralised environmental decision-making where the benefits and costs of 
such measures are localised. 
The results of both public and private interest approaches were combined in order to develop a 
framework for decision-making on the optimal level of environmental liability rules. Indeed, only a 
combined public-private interest approach that explicitly recognises the interaction of different interest 
groups can grasp the complexity of environmental policy and the interaction of the different factors that 
influence the optimal decision-making level of environmental liability rules in a federal system. The 
framework was applied to liability for soil pollution as an example. 
The framework aimed to provide guidance to the answer of the second subquestion, what is the optimal 
decision-making level of liability rules for environmental damage in a federal system from a theoretical perspective? 
The objective of the framework was not to offer a simple answer on this question —as it appears that a 
one and only solution does not exist — but to offer a means to deal with the problem and to evaluate 
different policy options. The starting point of the framework is decentralisation. Rules can then be 
optimally adapted to the preferences of the citizens. Consequently, it is indicated which circumstances 
would ask for central intervention. Based on the results of the public and the private interest approach, five 
evaluation factors upon were indicated which might support the decision-making on the optimal policy 
level for liability rules. These five evaluation factors are the presence of externalities, the indications for a 
race-to-the-bottom or political drag, market access distortions through divergence of rules, the need to 
guarantee a minimum level of protection, all four based on the public interest approach and finally the 
influence of interest group distortions, based on the private interest approach. The weight and importance 
of each of these factors might depend on the actual situation. Moreover, in certain cases these factors might 
be connected with each other. 
On the basis of the framework, a few intermediate conclusions were formulated with respect to the 
optimal decision-making level of environmental liability rules in a federal system: 
First, for each situation the existence of the various distortions and the weight that must be given to 
them might be different. Therefore, a one and only solution on the optimal level of governmental decision-
making might not exist. The framework can only offer some guidance. 
Second, even when the framework is refined to soil pollution, no one and only solution on the optimal 
regulatory level can be offered. In every specific case, the different factors will have to be weighted in order 
to examine how much co-operation or centralisation would be needed. None of the factors would justify a 
total harmonisation of liability rules for soil pollution though. Perhaps the strongest argument for 
decentralisation of liability rules for soil pollution is that local conditions, geography, economic strengths 
and concerns might vary substantially from place to place. Furthermore, local knowledge and expertise 
with specific soil conditions might prove essential to develop the proper liability rules for soil pollution. 
Therefore, certainly in the specific case of soil pollution, a one-size-fits-all approach probably might fit 
nobody. Nevertheless, this does not mean that in some circumstances, a multi-level regulatory structure 
might not be beneficial. The main power of decision-making could be with the local authorities, whereby 
the central government could provide a supporting framework of data gathering and technical information 
provision. Moreover, the central government could provide a solution for transboundary damage and 
nature conservation areas. 
Third, it appears that only in a few circumstances centralisation would be the only (and best) solution 
to solve a distortion. 
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Yet, the desire to harmonise environmental liability rules in the European Union already existed at 
European level for about 20 years. On 21 April 2004, Directive 2004/35/CE on Environmental Liability with 
Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage (ELD) was finally adopted. One might 
ask whether there might be specific circumstances in the European Union, justifying centralisation or even 
harmonisation of environmental liability rules, including liability for soil pollution, or whether the reasons 
for centralisation are not necessarily based on public interest considerations. 
A third sub-question therefore was: for what reasons did the Community consider harmonisation of 
environmental liability rules necessary and what are the scope and the provisions of Directive 2004/35/CE on 
Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, also called the 
Environmental Liability Directive, also with respect to soil pollution? 
In Chapter 4, first, the competence of the European Union to harmonise environmental liability rules 
was clarified. Next, the development process of Directive 2004/35/CE — or the Environmental Liability 
Directive — and the reasons provided for by the Community for the harmonisation of environmental 
liability rules at European level were discussed. Finally, the Directive’s provisions and its application to soil 
pollution were studied. 
With Directive 2004/35/CE on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and 
Remedying of Environmental Damage, the Community aims to establish a framework of environmental 
liability based on the ‘polluter-pays’ principle, to prevent and remedy environmental damage. The 
development and the adoption of the Directive gave rise to much controversy and conflict. Much of the 
conflict addressed the question whether and how far the European Union could go in adopting a European 
liability regime. Yet, it is remarkable that in the final text of the ELD, the Commission fails to explain why it 
is necessary to establish a harmonised liability regime or why it cannot be achieved by the Member States, 
as is required by the subsidiarity principle. Therefore, in order to examine for what reasons it was 
considered necessary to harmonise environmental liability rules, the subsequent Commission documents in 
the ELD decision-making process were consulted. The three documents in the ELD decision-making 
process that can be referred to in order to examine the reasons for a shift of environmental liability rules 
from the Member States to the European level are the Commission Green Paper on Remedying 
Environmental Damage, the White Paper on Environmental Liability, and the Explanatory Memorandum to 
the Proposal for a Directive on Environmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and Restoration of 
Environmental Damage. It appears that the Commission advances six main reasons for European action in 
the field of environmental liability: the transboundary character of an externality argument, the race-to-the-
bottom argument, the level-playing field argument, the realisation of the polluter pays, prevention and 
precautionary principles, decontamination and restoration of the environment, and harmonisation to 
guarantee a minimum level of protection. 
Subsequently, the provisions of the Directive were studied. It appeared that the coverage of the 
Directive is limited, so that different regimes may apply to different types of damage in case of an accident 
and the ELD does not clarify its relation to other liability regimes. Moreover, the ELD has left crucial 
aspects, as defences, insurance but also precise definitions of damage or restoration criteria, up to the 
Member States. Member States may also maintain or adopt more stringent provisions in their national law 
to prevent and restore environmental damage. 
With respect to the application of the Directive to soil pollution, it appeared that, despite all the 
concern and high-profile debates, the scope of the ELD is limited. The regime will only apply prospectively 
and a clear link needs to be established between the operator and the damage. The harm to health must be 
‘significant’ and it must have come about as a result of an operation specified in Annex III of the Directive. 
This means that the Directive will leave many of the contaminated sites in Europe to be cleaned up under 
national provisions of the Member States. 
Moreover, also for contaminated sites within the scope of the Directive, various provisions are left to 
the Member states, like permit and state-of-the-art defences, so that operators may be exempted from 
liability. The variations that may exist in the implementation of the ELD by the Member States, together 
with the numerous sites that will have to be remedied — if at all — by domestic provisions of the Member 
States, makes that there still will be significant differences in the soil policies of the Member States and 
hence the ELD will not create much harmonisation. On the contrary, the ELD might introduce considerable 
uncertainty as different liability regimes will exist together. 
Finally, besides the variations that may exist in the implementation of the ELD by the Member States, 
there might be significant variation between the Member states in the remediation process. Indeed, the 
Directive gives Member States considerable leeway in Member States’ practice of dealing with 
contaminated land. Consequently, the ELD provides an uncertain framework and the regime will be a less 
harmonised regime and might create more uncertainty than its adherents originally might have thought. 
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The analysis in Chapter 4 and the answer on the third subquestion inevitably lead to the last 
subquestion: does the Environmental Liability Directive correspond with the theoretical framework, with respect to 
economic efficiency as well as to the decision-making level of liability rules for environmental damage and if not, why 
was harmonisation of environmental liability rules, including liability rules for soil pollution, considered necessary in 
the European Union? 
As for the theoretical analysis, it was appropriate to examine first whether the liability regime as 
proposed by the Directive could be considered as efficient. This is independent from the question on the 
optimal decision-making level of liability rules for environmental damage. Second, the optimal decision-
making level of liability rules for environmental damage could be examined for the particular case of the 
European Union, by means of the theoretical framework that was developed in Chapter 3. The arguments 
that where provided by the Community to justify the Directive were examined both from a public interest 
approach and a private interest approach. In this way, the examination of the Environmental Liability 
Directive complements the theoretical framework and might offer a better understanding of all factors that 
play in a real harmonisation debate. 
Chapter 5 examined the economic efficiency of the Directive. It was concluded that as far as the choice 
of liability regime is concerned, the ELD complies with the economic analysis of tort law which predicts 
that a strict liability is more efficient in case of hazardous activities since in those situations it is more 
important to control the injurer’s activity. For other situations, a fault regime can suffice, which is precisely 
what the ELD proposes. 
However, the crucial elements that in reality will determine the ability of the Directive to achieve the 
prevention and remediation of environmental damage are the way in which is dealt with retroactivity and 
causality, the defences that are accorded and whether or not provisions for (obligatory) insurance are 
foreseen. As studied above, some provisions in the ELD might seriously undermine the ability of the 
Directive to exert a preventive effect and to ensure restoration of damage. Indeed, in theory, strict liability 
could be a strong incentive for operators to take all possible risk-minimising measures and it could be a 
way of implementing the precautionary principle. However, the restricted scope of the Directive, the fact 
that the burden of proof lays with the authorities, the availability of the permit and the state-of-the-art 
defence and the absence of mandatory insurance might cause that the ELD might not set a strong incentive 
for the potential liable operators to invest in risk-minimising measures. Moreover, the risk might exist that 
operators cannot be held liable and that restoration cannot be ensured as Member States do not have direct 
responsibility for prevention and restoration under the ELD regime. Furthermore, as final decisions 
concerning these crucial elements are passed on to the Member States, they will influence certainly the 
burden for industry within the Member States, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
In sum, the regime of the ELD shows some inefficiencies. It must be clear though that these 
inefficiencies do not necessary result from the fact that the regime has been issued at European level. 
Indeed, also at national level these inefficiencies might arise. However, the ELD is clearly the result of a 
political and economical bargaining process, which definitely has influenced the content of the Directive. 
Moreover, given the burdensome development process of the ELD, one might get the idea that at some 
point it was just important to get a Directive adopted and that its provisions could be fine-tuned in later 
amendments. 
Yet, why was there a need to shift environmental liability rules from the Member States to the 
European level? 
Chapter 6 examined whether the Environmental Liability Directive corresponds with the predictions 
of the theoretical framework on the optimal decision-making level of liability rules for environmental 
damage and if not, how the harmonisation in the European Union of environmental liability rules, 
including liability rules for soil pollution, can be explained. Therefore, the arguments that where provided 
by the Commission to justify the Environmental Liability Directive with regard to the subsidiarity principle, 
were compared with the arguments for harmonisation provided by the economic theory of federalism in 
the environmental field. 
It appeared that from an economic point of view, the reasons advanced by the Commission for the 
ELD seem rather weak, and would not justify a shift from the Member States to the European level of 
environmental liability rules, including liability rules for soil pollution. 
Indeed, from an economic point of view, the only valid argument for centralisation was the 
internalisation of transboundary damage, however, only a so-called `transboundary only’-regime would be 
justified rather than full harmonisation. Yet, it was shown that the Directive would not necessarily solve 
this transboundary damage. It was also argued that economies of scale in technical research might allow for 
co-operation or centralisation of certain tasks, like research or data gathering on soil contamination and 
restoration. However, again, the promise of economies of scale in scientific research would not justify for a 
centralisation in an excessive sense. 
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Next, it was shown that fears for a race-to-to-bottom or unfair marketing conditions, due to different 
liability rules in the Member States seem not very likely to become true, and therefore these arguments do 
not justify harmonisation of environmental liability rules in the European Union. Moreover, it was shown 
that the ELD will not create a level playing field or realise a reduction in transaction costs, neither for 
environmental liability rules in general nor for liability for soil pollution in particular. 
With respect to the next two arguments provided for by the Commission, it was argued that the 
realisation of the polluter pays, precautionary and preventive principles and restoration and 
decontamination of environmental damage as such do not explain why environmental regulation should be 
issued at the European level. Moreover, it was indicated that the ELD will not necessarily realise the 
polluter pays, precautionary and preventive principles, or the restoration and decontamination of the 
environment. 
Finally, if the minimum level of protection argument would be accepted as a valid argument for 
shifting environmental liability rules from the Member States to the European level, it must be emphasized 
that this reason for harmonisation would not be based on economic efficiency, but on the desire to provide 
a minimum level of environmental quality and of protection against environmental accidents. Moreover, if 
the preferences of the citizens in the different Member States are ignored, harmonisation of environmental 
liability rules on the basis of this argument only amounts to paternalism. 
The conclusion at the normative level was, however, not necessarily that there should be no European 
action at all with respect to environmental liability. Subsidiarity is not a question of either centralised or 
decentralised decision-making, but may involve a mixture of powers at different levels. With respect to soil 
pollution in particular, a European register of contaminated land might on the one hand increase 
transparency which could help in creating a level playing field for multinational corporations and on the 
other hand it could improve clean-up of contaminated sides. Nevertheless, the diversity of soils implies that 
any soil protection policy needs to have a strong local element build in. Therefore, certainly in the specific 
case of soil pollution, the arguments for harmonisation of liability rules for soil pollution seems to be weak. 
Concluding, the regime of the ELD shows some inefficiencies and the comparison of the theoretical 
framework with the way in which the balance between centralisation and decentralisation is sought in the 
regime of the ELD shows that there is ‘more Europe’ and that the ELD goes further than what the 
theoretical framework would predict. Put differently, from an economic point of view, there is an inefficient 
shift of competences from the Member States to the European level with respect to environmental liability 
rules as shown by the example of liability rules for soil pollution. 
Therefore, additional explanations were sought for the existence of the ELD and for certain provisions 
in the ELD by means of the private interest approach. Indeed, in order to understand why the decision-
making level of environmental liability rules was shifted from the Member States to the European level, 
how the ELD got to its final form, and why certain provisions are as they are, rent seeking behaviour and 
lobbying of different interest groups in the decision-making process of the ELD should not be ignored. The 
use of private interest theories might help to unveil reasons for the harmonisation of environmental liability 
rules in the European Union that cannot be explained by the economic theory of federalism. 
In particular, it was examined on the one hand, whether the inefficient shift of competences to the 
European level with respect to environmental liability rules, resulting in ‘too much Europe’, had been 
caused by interest group lobbying and, on the other hand, whether the inefficiencies in the Directive itself 
could be explained by interest group lobbying. 
First, the adoption process of the ELD was studied with respect to interest group lobbying. It was 
explained who were the actors involved in the decision-making process of the ELD and what their stakes 
were. The adoption process of the ELD was examined in detail and it was indicated at which stages and at 
which institutions lobbying took place, in particular with respect to permit compliance and state-of-the-art 
defence, subsidiary state liability and mandatory financial insurance. 
It appeared that the existence and content of the ELD clearly showed the influence of lobbying 
activities, both by industry and environmental NGO’s as the influence of the Member States.Therefore, the 
lobbying of all actors involved in the ELD decision-making process add to explain the existence and the 
content of the ELD. 
Next, it was examined whether the lobbying activities, observed in the adoption process of the ELD, 
and the result of this lobbying, corresponded with the predictions of private interest theories which were 
discussed in the theoretical part. It seemed that the lobbying behaviour with respect to the level of the 
regulation showed some elements of both the Becker and the Buchanan theory on lobbying behaviour. 
Moreover, it seemed that environmental NGO’s, industry and Member States, all for their own reasons, 
welcomed or at least did not oppose the idea of a European environmental liability regime. The 
Commission on its side might have welcomed a European environmental liability regime for other reasons 
than only public welfare and protection of the environment as for example enlarging its own competences 
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in fields for which it did not have any direct competence yet, as soil protection policies. Hence, competences 
were shifted from the Member State level to the European level, contrary to what economic theory would 
suggest. Thus, the answer on the question whether the inefficient shift of competences to the European level 
with respect to environmental liability rules can be explained by interest group lobbying and private 
interest distortions is probably affirmative. 
With respect to the content of the ELD itself, it was shown that industry was most successful in 
obtaining its claims, compared to environmental NGO’s. Hence, the lobbying behaviour of the main actors 
in the ELD adoption process with respect to the content of the Directive might fit better into Olson’s theory 
of successful, single-oriented and well-organised lobby groups, rather than in Becker’s theory of 
competition. Yet, it seems that also the inefficiencies in the Directive itself can be explained by interest 
group lobbying, and in particular by industry lobbying. 
Hence, also the answer on the question whether the inefficiencies in the Directive itself could be 
explained by interest group lobbying is probably affirmative. 
Finally, it was examined whether lobbying behaviour by interest groups would cause more distortions 
at the national level than at the central level so that this would justify Community action in the field of 
environmental liability, as examined in the theoretical part. 
It was shown that in the case of the European Union, it seems precipitate to state that environmental 
lobby groups are underrepresented at the state level relative to industry interests and that therefore 
responsibility for environmental regulation should be assigned to the European level. At the European as 
well as at the Member State level, industry lobby groups might have more lobbying power relative to 
environmental interest groups. Indeed, due to lacking resources, and the disparity of interests and power of 
environmental lobby groups at the Member States level, industry lobby groups might co-ordinate their 
lobbying efforts across national frontiers more easily than environmentalists. The adoption process of the 
ELD indeed reflected this inequality and showed that industry lobby groups realised to obtain important 
concessions in particular with respect to permit compliance and state-of-the-art defence and compulsory 
insurance. Furthermore, a race-to-the-bottom seems rather unrealistic in the case of environmental liability 
rules. Indeed, there are no indications that industry strived for a race-to-the-bottom. More realistically, it 
seemed that industry preferred a somewhat consistent (minimum) approach in the Community. Finally, 
harmonisation of environmental liability rules might be used by industry to obtain a (minimum) 
harmonised regime in order to avoid distortions of competition. Yet, harmonisation of marketing 
conditions to serve the private interest, it certainly is no valid argument for the shift of environmental 
liability rules from the Member States to the European level. 
Hence, the claim that the lobbying would cause more distortions at the national level than at the 
central level and therefore this would justify a European environmental liability regime is precipitate. This 
negative conclusion should not imply that the Member States would enact optimal environmental 
regulation, or that private interest distortions are less serious in the Member States than at the European 
level. The lobbying process is so complex that any general conclusion is almost certain to be wrong. 
In sum, the private interest approach provides useful insights into the lobbying behaviour of the 
actors involved in the adoption process of the ELD and provides additional explanations for the existence 
of the ELD and for certain provisions in the ELD. Indeed, the private interest approach clarifies why the 
ELD has been issued at European level, in contrast to what would be efficient according to economic 
theory, and why certain provisions are adopted, again contrary to what would be efficient according to 
economic theory. 
Hence, the question whether the harmonisation of environmental liability rules in the European 
Union, including liability rules for soil pollution, was desirable from an economic point of view and for 
what reasons harmonisation did take place can be answered as follows: from an economic point of view 
there are few reasons for harmonisation of environmental liability rules, including liability rules for soil 
pollution, and hence, harmonisation was not desirable. Yet, harmonisation did take place mainly in 
response to private interests. 
In order to visualise the analysis, the framework on the optimal decision-making level of liability rules 
for soil pollution, which was developed in Chapter 3, and which combined both public interest and private 
approaches was applied to the particular case of the Environmental liability Directive. The framework 
shows that, from an economic point of view, the reasons advanced by the Commission for the ELD seem 
rather weak, and would not justify a shift of environmental liability rules from the Member States to the 
European level and hence, from an economic point of view, there is an inefficient shift of competences from 
the Member States to the European level with respect to environmental liability rules and for example of 
liability rules for soil pollution. However, private interest theory explains to a large extent why there is an 
Environmental Liability Directive, and why certain provisions are as they are. 
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Concluding, this research learns us that: the shift as such of environmental liability rules to the 
European level was inefficient and does not correspond with the economic criteria or centralisation. At the 
same time, the analysis in this research also made clear that an ELD was unavoidable for private interest 
reasons. Remarkably, there seemed to be a strange coalition between different interests who all (for various 
reasons) were in favour of shifting legislative powers for environmental liability to Brussels. The most 
important institutional player -the European Commission- clearly was in favour of the ELD because it 
would strengthen its institutional position and because it would allow the Commission to undertake action 
in an area where it in fact had no formal competences (eg. soil pollution). Moreover, both industries and 
ENGO's were in favour for different reasons: ENGO's hoped that shifting powers to Europe would lead to a 
more stringent environmental liability regime, so that European powers would lead to an overall increase 
of environmental quality in Europe. Industry was, for different reasons, also in favour of harmonization. 
Their main concern was harmonization of marketing conditions for industry. 
However, if one looks at the final contents of the ELD, Chapter 5 showed that many inefficiencies 
appeared. They were precisely the result of the fact that all the parties involved were in favour of shifting 
powers to Europe, but of course disagreed on the contents of the environmental liability regime. ENGO's 
were against a state of the art and a permit compliance defence, whereas this was strongly favoured by 
industry. As a result of that, Europe now indeed has an environmental liability directive, but the impact is 
(precisely because it is the result of a compromise) rather limited. Therefore, it is also difficult to establish 
who can be qualified as a winner in the lobbying process. The reason is that many crucial issues have either 
been deferred to the Member States or have been shifted to a longer term (like the decision on whether or 
not to introduce financial securities). Industry therefore did get an environmental liability directive (which 
was also wanted by ENGO's and the European Commission) but the final scope of liability will crucially 
depend upon issues which will have to be fixed by the Member States (such as causation and the influence 
of the permit on liability). The ELD therefore surely does not harmonize marketing conditions and it is 
equally doubtful whether it will lead to an overall improvement of environmental quality. The real winner 
is probably the European Commission who could once more prove to be able to make legislation in an 
important area of environmental law. The fact that the result may be an inefficient compromise following 
the legislative process apparently did not bother neither the civil servants at the Commission, nor the 
politicians in the Council who adopted the ELD. 
Furthermore, the process of the coming into being of the ELD nicely illustrates that the decision-
making on centralization/decentralization in Europe not surprisingly does not take place along the lines of 
economic reasoning. Economic criteria for centralization are advanced by the Commission, but mostly these 
criteria do not justify centralisation. Apparently, other values than economics play a more important role in 
the decision concerning shifting of powers to the European level. In some cases, these reasons may be 
justice related. For example, the European Commission clearly refused a `transboundary only’ regime for 
environmental liability (whereby the European regime would only apply to cases of transboundary 
pollution) since this was considered to violate the equality principle. However, in addition to these justice 
related arguments, it is more likely that the desire for power and expansion of competences by the 
European institutions was the most important driving force behind the ELD and probably in other areas as 
well. 
Although one could therefore pessimistically argue that economic analysis is apparently not taken 
into account when decisions are made at the European level concerning (de)centralization we believe that 
using economic arguments in the way we have presented in this research still is useful. At the positive 
level, the advantage of economics is that it allows a better understanding of why certain shifts to a central 
level have taken place. Even if public interest criteria cannot always provide an explanation, private interest 
theory can in some cases provide a better understanding of inefficient centralization attempts. In addition 
to the positive use of economics, one can also use economic arguments at the policy level. Indeed, for those 
(lawyers, politicians or other social engineers) interested in promoting public welfare, the economic criteria 
are useful since they illustrate in what circumstances centralisation may effectively contribute to increasing 
social welfare. Moreover, economic theory can also be used to show at to some extent an inefficient shift to 
the European level takes place merely because of an increased struggle for power between the European 
Commission and the Member States. Finally, public choice analysis sometimes clearly shows that especially 
in the area of environmental law, centralisation is merely desired by industry in order to erect barriers to 
entry. 
Hence, even those who are traditionally critical of the use of economic arguments in the policy debate 
may find it useful to employ these arguments either at the positive or at the normative level. This type of 
economic analysis indeed also allows showing several undesirable (averse) effects of a centralisation which 
does not take place on the basis of economic criteria. Hence, economic analysis may provide also a 
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contribution in fighting the lobbying by interest groups and the European Commission for an inefficient 
shift of powers to Europe. 
Yet, meanwhile the Directive has entered into force. Interpreting the Directive in light of its aim and 
general principles of EC environmental law seems the best option to give the ELD the chance to become an 
effective instrument to ensure prevention and restoration of environmental damage in the European Union. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Dit onderzoek tracht een bijdrage te leveren aan het debat over het optimale beslissingsniveau van 
milieuregulering in een federaal systeem. De diverse argumenten voor en tegen harmonisatie van 
milieuwetgeving en de — bij tijden — hevige debatten over harmonisatie, zowel in academisch kringen als 
op politiek niveau, inspireerden dit onderzoek. Centraal staat de vraag of harmonisatie van 
milieuaansprakelijkheidsregels in Europa, waaronder aansprakelijkheid voor bodemverontreiniging, 
wenselijk was vanuit economisch perspectief, en om welke redenen harmonisatie plaatsvond. 
Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, maakt het onderzoek gebruik van een rechtseconomische 
methodologie. In een eerste stap wordt de economische analyse van aansprakelijkheidsrecht gebruikt om te 
onderzoeken welk type aansprakelijkheidsregel, vanuit economisch perspectief, het meest efficiënt is om 
milieuverontreiniging te vermijden en te herstellen. Vervolgens wordt het optimale beslissingsniveau van 
deze aansprakelijkheidregels onderzocht vanuit twee verschillende theoretische invalshoeken binnen de 
rechtseconomie: een ‘public interest benadering’ en een ‘private interest benadering’. De ‘public interest’ 
benadering, gebaseerd op de economische theorie rond federalisme, ziet regulering als een mogelijkheid 
om marktfalen te corrigeren. De public interest theorie veronderstelt dat de overheid in staat is om dit 
marktfalen te corrigeren en beslissingen neemt in het publiek belang. De ‘private interest’ benadering 
daarentegen is gebaseerd op drie economische theorieën die de rol van belangengroepen in het 
wetgevingsproces benadrukken. Deze theorieën zijn de ‘capture theory’, de ‘economic theory of regulation’ 
en ‘public choice theory’. De basisidee van deze theorieën is dat belangengroepen proberen om politieke 
besluiten (en dus wetgeving) te beïnvloeden, om zo zelf winsten of voordeel te behalen. Dit is onproductief 
vanuit een welvaartseconomisch perspectief. Op basis van deze twee invalshoeken wordt een theoretisch 
kader ontworpen met betrekking tot het optimale beslissingsniveau voor aansprakelijkheidsregels voor 
milieuverontreiniging. Als voorbeeld wordt bodemverontreiniging bestudeerdntreniginggde ecoonmische 
theorie rond federalisme. Dit theoretisch kader wordt vervolgens getoetst aan de harmonisatie van 
milieuaansprakelijkheidsregels, waaronder aansprakelijkheid voor bodemverontreini 
ging, in de Europese Unie, door middel van Richtlijn 2004/35/EC. Door de vergelijking van economische 
theorie met de actuele ontwikkelingen in de Europese Unie, hoopt dit doctoraatsonderzoek bij te dragen 
aan de bestaande theorieën in verband met het optimale beslissingsniveau voor milieureglementering in 
een federaal systeem. Een tweede doelstelling is meer inzicht te verstrekken in de redenen voor 
harmonisatie in een concrete situatie. 
Aangezien harmonisatie een zeer complexe materie is, worden vier subvragen geformuleerd om de 
bovenstaande centrale onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden. 
Om de relevantie van dit onderzoek te duiden, luidt de eerste subvraag: wat is de bijdrage van 
milieuaansprakelijkheidsregels in het voorkomen en herstellen van milieuverontreiniging en welk type van 
aansprakelijkheidsregel is het meest efficiënt in het voorkomen en herstellen van milieuverontreiniging? 
Inderdaad, voorafgaand aan de vraag op welk beslissingsniveau aansprakelijkheid voor 
milieuverontreiniging best geregeld kan worden, moet de vraag beantwoord worden welke 
aansprakelijkheidsregel het meest efficiënt is vanuit economisch perspectief om milieuverontreiniging te 
vermijden en indien nodig te herstel te verzekeren. 
Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, wordt in Hoofdstuk 2 de economische analyse van het 
aansprakelijkheidsrecht toegepast op milieuverontreiniging. Er wordt aangetoond dat de functie van 
aansprakelijkheid tweevoudig is. Enerzijds heeft aansprakelijkheid een preventieve functie, doordat 
aansprakelijkheid individuen een reden geeft om rekening te houden met de negatieve effecten van hun 
activiteiten op anderen. Daardoor kan aansprakelijkheid het gedrag van individuen sturen zodat welvaart 
in de samenleving gemaximaliseerd kan worden. Anderzijds kan aansprakelijkheid compensatie voor 
schade in geval van een ongeval verzekeren. Er wordt daarom geconcludeerd dat, naast regulering, 
aansprakelijkheidsregels een waardevolle complementaire rol kunnen spelen in de preventie en het herstel 
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van bodemverontreiniging. Inderdaad, de meeste Europese lidstaten hebben wetgeving ter preventie en 
herstel van bodemverontreiniging. Om leemtes in de wetgeving op te vangen, wordt deze vaak met 
aansprakelijkheidsregels gecombineerd. Kortom, regulering en aansprakelijkheid zijn complementair. 
Om de optimale aansprakelijkheidsregel te bepalen om de bestaande regulering voor 
bodemverontreiniging aan te vullen, wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen inherent gevaarlijke 
activiteiten en niet-gevaarlijke activiteiten. Voor gevaarlijke activiteiten blijkt risicoaansprakelijkheid 
optimaal, aangezien dan ook het activiteitenniveau beperkt kan worden. Voor niet-gevaarlijke activiteiten 
volstaat schuldaansprakelijkheid. Er wordt niet beweerd dat aanprakelijkheid de perfecte oplossing is voor 
alle gevallen van milieuschade. Niettemin kan aansprakelijkheid een waardevolle complementaire rol 
spelen in de preventie en herstel van bodemverontreiniging. Conclusie: verder onderzoek naar het optimale 
beslissingsniveau voor aansprakelijkheidsregels voor bodemverontreiniging in een federaal systeem zoals 
de Europese Unie, is zonder twijfel waardevol. 
Aldus luidt de tweede subvraag: wat is het optimale beslissingsniveau voor aansprakelijkheidsregels 
voor milieuverontreiniging in een federaal systeem vanuit theoretisch perspectief? 
Om deze tweede subvraag te beantwoorden, worden in Hoofdstuk 3 de argumenten van de ‘public 
interest’ benadering en van de ‘private interest’ benadering voor harmonisering van milieureglementering 
onderzocht. 
Het uitgangspunt van de ‘public interest’ benadering is decentralisatie van besluitvorming. 
Vervolgens wordtisatie, onderscheiddn dat onderzocht of er redenen zijn om deze besluitvorming op te 
tillen naar een hoger beslissingsniveau. Deze zogenaamde ‘bottom-up benadering’ met betrekking tot 
centralisatie is gebaseerd op het Tiebout Model en het Decentralisatie Theorema van Oates. Het idee is dat 
door decentralisatie wetgeving aangepast kan worden aan de preferenties van de burgers. Echter, door 
externaliteiten (of externe effecten) en marktfalen, transactiekosten of onvolledige informatie, kan het zijn 
dat sommige beslissingen beter genomen worden op een hoger overheidsniveau. 
Op basis van de ‘public interest’ benadering worden vier redenen voor centralisatie, en eventueel zelfs 
voor harmonisatie, onderscheiden: het grensoverschrijdend karakter van milieuschade, het race-to-the-
bottom argument, harmonisering van marktvoorwaarden en het minimum beschermingsniveau of 
Europees-erfgoed argument. Elk argument wordt eerst onderzocht voor milieuregulering. Vervolgens 
wordt het argument toegepast op milieuaansprakelijkheidsregels, en als voorbeeld op aansprakelijkheid 
voor bodemvervuiling. 
Het valt buiten het bestek van deze samenvatting om een uitgebreide analyse van deze argumenten 
(hiervoor zie Hoofdstuk 3) te geven, maar een kort overzicht lijkt aangewezen. 
Het blijkt dat geen van bovenstaande argumenten een volledige harmonisatie van 
milieuaansprakelijkheidsregels zou rechtvaardigen. Wel zou de federale overheid een ondersteunende taak 
kunnen hebben wat betreft informatieverstrekking en wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Daarnaast zou de 
federale overheid oplossingen voor grensoverschrijdende schade of voor speciale beschermingsgebieden 
kunnen uitwerken. Algemene principes van aansprakelijkheid ter bescherming van het milieu, of een 
specifiek aansprakelijkheidsregime voor bepaalde activiteiten zouden eveneens op centraal niveau 
gedefinieerd kunnen worden, gecombineerd met differentiatie wat betreft de inhoud van dit regime. In 
zulke omstandigheden zouden transactiekosten verlaagd kunnen worden, markttoegang verbeterd, een 
minimum beschermingsniveau gegarandeerd worden en toch zouden verschillen in preferenties van de 
burgers gerespecteerd kunnen worden. 
Dezelfde redenering gaat ook op voor aansprakelijkheid voor bodemverontreiniging. Het meest 
doorslaggevende argument voor decentralisatie van aansprakelijkheid voor bodemverontreiniging is dat 
geografie, plaatselijke condities, economische mogelijkheden en problemen substantieel kunnen verschillen 
van plaats tot plaats. Bovendien zijn kennis van en ervaring met de specifieke bodemtoestand op een 
bepaalde plaats cruciaal om een gepast aansprakelijkheidsregime te ontwerpen voor 
bodemverontreiniging. Daarom, zeker in het geval van bodemverontreiniging lijkt de ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
benadering geen goede keuze. 
Het blijkt echter dat in het echte leven het bestaan of de harmonisering van milieureglementering niet 
altijd verklaard kan worden op basis van de ‘public interest’ benadering alleen. Voor een volledig inzicht in 
het milieu-wetgevingsproces, moet de invloed van belangengroepen op de besluitvorming erkend worden. 
De ‘public interest’ benadering wordt daarom aangevuld met de zogenaamde ‘private interest’ benadering. 
Deze benadering onderzoekt de invloed van lobbying of ‘rent seeking’ op het wetgevingsproces. De 
(achterliggende) redenen voor een bepaalde politiek kunnen soms het best begrepen worden als niet alleen 
het publiek belang, maar ook het gedrag van de overheid en van belangengroepen in overweging genomen 
wordt. 
Eerst wordt een overzicht gegeven van de economische theorieën die de rol van belangengroepen in 
het wetgevingsproces onderzoeken: de ‘capture theory’, de economic theory of regulation en public choice 
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theory. Daarna worden, op theoretisch niveau, de belangen geanalyseerd van de voornaamste 
belangengroepen op het gebied van milieuwetgeving: de overheid, de industrie en milieugroeperingen. 
Vervolgens gaat de aandacht uit naar ‘milieu-federalisme’. Lobby-activititeiten kunnen immers niet alleen 
de inhoud van een bepaalde regelgeving beïnvloeden, maar ook het beslissingsniveau waarop deze 
regelgeving tot stand zal komen. Belangengroepen, die baat hebben bij een bepaalde regulering, zullen dat 
beslissingsniveau prefereren waar hun macht het grootst is ten opzichte van andere groeperingen, die 
andere bezorgdheden hebben. Meer bepaald worden drie ‘private interest’ storingen onderzocht, die het 
beslissingsniveau voor milieureglementering kunnen beïnvloeden. Ten eerste wordt vaak beweerd dat 
milieubelangen systematisch ondervertegenwoordigd zijn op het decentraal niveau. Verder hebben twee 
argumenten voor harmonisatie uit de ‘public interest’ benadering raakpunten met de ‘private interest’ 
benadering: landen zouden over kunnen gaan tot een race-to-the-bottom, als gevolg van lobby-activiteiten 
van de industrie, en de harmonisatie van marktvoorwaarden kan in het voordeel zijn van bepaalde 
belangengroepen. Er wordt onderzocht of deze drie ‘private interest’ storingen centralisatie of harmonisatie 
van milieureglementering, en in het bijzonder milieuaansprakelijkheid, zouden rechtvaardigen. 
Het blijkt dat, wat betreft milieuaansprakelijkheid, het moeilijk is om op theoretisch niveau in te 
schatten wat de posities van de belangrijkste belangengroepen in het milieu-wetgevingsproces zullen zijn, 
wat het optimale niveau van regulering zal zijn, en wat het resultaat van de lobbying zal zijn. Niettemin 
kan gesteld worden dat lobby-activiteiten niet automatisch centralisatie rechtvaardigen, omdat lobbying 
zowel op decentraal als centraal niveau plaatsvindt. Helaas is de public choice theorie niet in staat om de 
invloed en de gevolgen van lobbying op het decentraal niveau ten opzichte van het centraal niveau te 
voorspellen. Alleen openheid op ieder niveau kan garanderen dat beslissingen genomen worden in het 
publiek belang in plaats van in het voordeel van bepaalde belangengroepen. Wat betreft aansprakelijkheid 
voor bodemverontreiniging, kan gesteld worden dat bodemverontreiniging meestal een lokaal probleem is, 
en men kan daarom veronderstellen dat het gemakkelijker zou kunnen zijn voor milieugroeperingen om de 
steun van de burgers te krijgen voor hun acties voor strenge aansprakelijkheidsregels op decentraal niveau, 
dan op centraal niveau, waar de burgers veel minder betrokken zijn. 
De redenering dat centralisatie nodig zou zijn omdat industrie sterker zou zijn dan 
milieugroeperingen op decentraal niveau, lijkt daarom niet te op te gaan voor aansprakelijkheid voor 
bodemverontreiniging. Kortom, ook op basis van de ‘private interest’ benadering, blijft er een sterke 
voorkeur voor een decentraal milieubeleid, waar de kosten en baten van dit beleid tastbaar zijn. 
De resultaten van de public en private interest benaderingen worden gecombineerd tot een 
‘framework’ of leiddraad ter ondersteuning van het onderzoek naar het optimale beslissingsniveau voor 
milieuaansprakelijkheidsregels in een federaal systeem. Immers, alleen een gecombineerde public-private 
interest benadering kan de complexiteit van milieubeleid weergeven en de verschillende factoren aangeven 
die het optimale beslissingsniveau voor milieuaansprakelijkheidsregels beïnvloeden. Als voorbeeld wordt 
bodemverontreiniging bestudeerd. 
Het doel van dit framework is niet om een eenduidig antwoord te geven op de vraag wat nu het 
optimale beslissingsniveau is voor aansprakelijkheidsregels voor milieuverontreiniging in een federaal 
systeem vanuit theoretisch perspectief. De vraag of milieuaansprakelijkheid in een federaal systeem 
gedecentraliseerd of gecentraliseerd moet worden kan immers niet in zwart-wit bewoordingen beantwoord 
worden. De enige juiste oplossing bestaat niet. Het framework dient eerder gezien te worden als een middel 
om het probleem te bestuderen en om verschillende beleidsopties te evalueren. Het uitgangspunt van het 
framework is decentralisatie. Vervolgens kan onderzocht worden in welke omstandigheden centralisatie 
gerechtvaardigd zou zijn. Gebaseerd op de resultaten van de public en de private interest benadering, 
worden vijf evaluatiefactoren opgesteld, die de beslissing in verband met het optimale beslissingsniveau 
voor milieuaansprakelijkheidsregels kunnen ondersteunen: aanwezigheid van externe effecten, risico op 
een race-to-the-bottom, verschillen in markvoorwaarden, de noodzaak van een minimum 
beschermingsniveau, en de invloed van lobby-activiteiten. Het bestaan, gewicht en het belang van elk van 
deze factoren is afhankelijk van de concrete situatie. schermingsniveau, ce-to-the-bottomor 
milieuaansprakelijkhidsregels, kunnen ondersteunen. u lijkBovendien kunnen deze factoren elkaar 
beïnvloeden. 
Steunend op dit framework, kan nu een antwoord gegeven worden op de tweede subvraag. Het blijkt 
dat, vanuit theoretisch perspectief, geen eenduidig antwoord gegeven kan worden op de vraag op welk 
niveau aansprakelijkheid voor milieuverontreiniging best gereguleerd kan worden. In een concrete situatie 
zullen de verschillende factoren en gevolgen tegen elkaar afgewogen moeten worden om te onderzoeken of 
samenwerking of centralisatie nodig zou zijn. Echter, geen van de factoren zou een volledige harmonisatie 
van aansprakelijkheid voor milieuverontreiniging rechtvaardigen. Ook zijn er, vanuit economisch 
perspectief, maar weinig omstandigheden waarin economisch perspectief, decentralisatie de enige en beste 
oplossing zou zijn. Specifiek voor bodemverontreiniging, is het belangrijkste argument voor decentralisatie 
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van aansprakelijkheid voor bodemverontreiniging dat plaatselijke omstandigheden, geografie, gevolgen 
van vervuiling en economische belangen substantieel kunnen variëren tussen landen. Bovendien zijn 
kennis van en ervaring met de specifieke bodemtoestand op een bepaalde plaats cruciaal om een gepast 
aansprakelijkheidsregime te ontwerpen voor bodemverontreiniging. Dit betekent echter niet dat, in 
bepaalde omstandigheden, een samenwerking tussen verschillende overheidsniveaus niet voordelig zou 
kunnen zijn. De beslissingsbevoegdheid zou in principe bij de decentrale overheid kunnen liggen, terwijl de 
centrale overheid een ondersteunende taak zou kunnen hebben wat betreft informatieverstrekking en 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek of het uitwerken van oplossingen voor grensoverschrijdende schade of voor 
speciale beschermingsgebieden. 
Schijnbaar in tegenstelling met bovenstaande economische analyse, bestond, op Europees niveau, de 
wens om milieuaansprakelijkheid in Europa te harmoniseren al zo’n 20 jaar. Op 21 april 2004, werd 
Richtlijn 2004/35/CE betreffende milieuaansprakelijkheid met betrekking tot het voorkomen en herstellen 
van milieuschade (eindelijk) aangenomen. Zijn er specifieke omstandigheden in de Europese Unie die 
pleiten voor centralisatie of zelfs harmonisatie van milieuaansprakelijkheidsregels, waaronder 
aansprakelijkheid voor bodemverontreiniging, of zijn de redenen voor centralisatie niet noodzakelijk 
gebaseerd op public interest beschouwingen? 
Een derde subvraag daarom is: om welke redenen werd, op Europees niveau, de harmonisatie van 
milieuaansprakelijkheid noodzakelijk geacht, wat is het toepassingsgebied van de richtlijn en wat voorziet 
de richtlijn, bijvoorbeeld voor bodemverontreiniging? 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt eerst de bevoegdheid van de Europese Unie om milieuaansprakelijkheidsregels 
te harmoniseren verduidelijkt. Vervolgens worden de verschillende fases in de ontwikkeling van de 
richtlijn besproken en worden de redenen die de Europese Commissie opgaf in deze verschillende fases 
voor de harmonisering van milieuaansprakelijkheid aangegeven. Tot slot worden het toepassingsgebied en 
de voorzieningen in de richtlijn voor bodemverontreiniging bestudeerd. 
Met Richtlijn 2004/35/CE betreffende milieuaansprakelijkheid met betrekking tot het voorkomen en 
herstellen van milieuschade, wil de Europese Unie een gemeenschappelijk kader van 
aansprakelijkheidsregels tot stand brengen voor het voorkomen en herstellen van milieuschade, gebaseerd 
op het ‘vervuiler betaalt’ principe. De ontwikkeling van de richtlijn en de richtlijn zelf, deden heel wat stof 
opwaaien, zowel in academische kringen als op politiek niveau. Het voornaamste punt van discussie betrof 
de vraag of en hoe ver de Europese Unie kan gaan in het opstellen van een Europees 
aansprakelijkheidsregime. Daarom is het opmerkelijk dat, in de uiteindelijke tekst van de richtlijn, de 
Commissie geen afdoende verklaring geeft waarom een Europees milieuaansprakelijkheidsregime nodig is 
en waarom de Lidstaten dit niet zelf kunnen doen, zoals de Commissie behoort te doen op basis van het 
subsidiariteitbeginsel. De redenen waarom harmonisatie noodzakelijkheid werd geacht, situeren zich 
veeleer in de documenten, die de richtlijn voorafgingen. De drie documenten waarnaar verwezen kan 
worden om de redenen na te gaan voor de overdracht van bevoegdheid voor 
milieuaansprakelijkheidsregels van de Lidstaten naar het Europees niveau zijn: het Groenboek betreffende 
het Herstellen van Milieuschade, het Witboek betreffende Milieuaansprakelijkheid en het Commissie 
voorstel voor een richtlijn betreffende milieuaansprakelijkheid met betrekking tot het voorkomen en 
herstellen van milieuschade (in het bijzonder het Explanatory Memorandum). Uit deze drie documenten 
blijkt dat de Commissie zes hoofdredenen aanhaalt voor Europese actie op het gebied van 
milieuaansprakelijkheid: het grensoverschrijdende karakter van milieuschade, het race-to-the-bottom 
argument, het gelijke marktvoorwaarden argument (ook het ‘level-playing field’ argument genoemd), de 
realisatie van het ‘vervuiler-betaalt’-principe, het nakomen van het preventie- en het voorzorgsbeginsel, 
sanering en herstel van het milieu, en de garantie op een minimum beschermingsniveau. 
Vervolgens wordt het toepassingsgebied van de richtlijn bestudeerd. Het blijkt dat het 
toepassingsgebied van de richtlijn beperkt is, zodat verschillende aansprakelijkheidsregimes van toepassing 
kunnen zijn op verschillende vormen van schade bij eenzelfde ongeval. Bovendien verduidelijkt de richtlijn 
de verhouding met andere aansprakelijkheidsregimes niet. Ook zijn verschillende cruciale aspecten van een 
aansprakelijkheidsregime, zoals het al dan niet toekennen van verweren, verzekeringsaspecten maar ook 
precieze definities van schade en herstelcriteria overgelaten aan de Lidstaten. Lidstaten mogen eveneens 
strengere regels behouden of opnemen in hun nationaal recht om milieuschade te voorkomen en te 
herstellen. Bijgevolg voorziet de richtlijn een onzeker kader en creëert de richtlijn minder harmonisatie dan 
de voorstanders van de richtlijn misschien hadden gehoopt. 
Met betrekking tot bodemverontreiniging blijkt dat de toepassing van de richtlijn eveneens beperkt 
zal zijn. De richtlijn is alleen van toepassing bij schade die na de inwerkingtreding van de richtlijn (30 april 
2007) is veroorzaakt, en er moet een duidelijk verband zijn tussen de vervuiler en de schade. Bovendien 
moet de schade aan de gezondheid ‘significant’ zijn, en moet deze veroorzaakt zijn door een activiteit, zoals 
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gespecificeerd in Annex III van de richtlijn. Dit betekent dat veel vervuilde sites in Europa gesaneerd zullen 
moeten worden onder de desbetreffende wetgeving van de Lidstaten zelf. 
Bovendien, ook voor de vervuilde sites die binnen het toepassingsgebied van de richtlijn vallen, zijn 
verschillende aspecten aan de Lidstaten overgelaten, zoals het toekennen van een vergunningsverweer of 
een state-of-the-art verweer, zodat de vervuiler vrijgesteld kan worden van aansprakelijkheid. De 
implementatie van de richtlijn kan dus behoorlijk verschillen in de verschillende Lidstaten. Ook geeft de 
richtlijn een grote vrijheid wat betreft de sanering van de vervuilde sites. Samen met de talrijke sites die 
onder nationale wetgeving dienen te worden gesaneerd, maakt dit dat de richtlijn weinig harmonisatie zal 
creëren. Integendeel, de richtlijn zou zelfs onzekerheid kunnen veroorzaken omdat verschillende 
aansprakelijkheidsregimes van toepassing kunnen zijn. 
De analyse in Hoofdstuk 4 en het antwoord op de derde subvraag geven vanzelf aanleiding tot de 
laatste subvraag: komt de richtlijn overeen met het theoretisch kader, zowel wat betreft economische 
efficiëntie als wat betreft het beslissingsniveau voor aansprakelijkheid voor milieuverontreiniging, en 
indien niet, waarom werd harmonisatie van milieuaansprakelijkheid, waaronder aansprakelijkheid voor 
bodemverontreiniging, noodzakelijk geacht in de Europese Unie? 
Analoog aan de theoretische analyse, is het aangewezen om eerst te onderzoeken of het 
aansprakelijkheidsregime zoals voorzien in de richtlijn efficiënt is, en overeenkomt met de economische 
theorie. Dit is onafhankelijk van het optimale beslissingsniveau voor aansprakelijkheidsregels voor 
milieuverontreiniging. Vervolgens kan het optimale beslissingsniveau voor aansprakelijkheidsregels voor 
mlieuverontreiniging onderzocht worden voor Europa, op basis van het theoretische kader dat in 
Hoofdstuk 3 werd opgesteld. Ook hier worden de argumenten van de Europese Commissie ter 
rechtvaardiging van de richtlijn onderzocht vanuit een ‘public interest’-benadering en een ‘private interest’ 
benadering. Op deze manier kan de studie van de richtlijn het theoretisch kader aanvullen en een beter 
inzicht geven in alle factoren die meespelen in een concreet harmonisatiedebat. 
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de economische efficiëntie van de richtlijn. Er wordt geconcludeerd dat, wat 
betreft de keuze van het type aansprakelijkheid, de richtlijn overeenkomt met de economische analyse van 
aansprakelijkheidsrecht. Deze analyse voorspelt immers dat risicoaansprakelijkheid efficiënter is voor 
gevaarlijke activiteiten, omdat men zo ook het activiteitenniveau van de vervuiler kan beïnvloeden. Voor 
niet-gevaarlijk activiteiten volstaat schuldaansprakelijkheid, hetgeen precies is wat de richtlijn voorziet. 
Echter, sommige voorzieningen in de richtlijn kunnen het preventieve effect van de richtlijn 
ondermijnen als ook de mogelijkheid om herstel te verzekeren. Immers, in theorie kan 
risicoaansprakelijkheid een goede stimulans zijn voor bedrijven om alle mogelijke risico-minimaliserende 
maatregelen te nemen, en om het voorzorgsbeginsel te implementeren. Echter, het beperkte 
toepassingsgebied van de richtlijn, het feit dat de bewijslast rust op de autoriteiten, de mogelijkheid om een 
vergunningsverweer of een state-of-the-art verweer toe te kennen en de afwezigheid van verplichte 
verzekering zou er toe kunnen leiden dat de richtlijn geen overtuigende stimulans is voor bedrijven om in 
risico-minimaliserende maatregelen te investeren. Bovendien bestaat het risico dat bedrijven niet 
aansprakelijk gehouden kunnen worden en dat herstel van de schade niet verzekerd kan worden omdat de 
Lidstaten zelf geen directe verplichting hebben om de schade te herstellen. Bovendien, omdat de 
uiteindelijke beslissing voor een aantal van deze cruciale factoren doorgeschoven is naar de Lidstaten, kan 
de invloed van de richtlijn en de kost voor de industrie verschillen tussen de verschillende Lidstaten. 
Er kan dus geconcludeerd worden dat het regime van de richtlijn enkele inefficiënties vertoond. Het 
moet echter duidelijk zijn dat deze inefficiënties niet noodzakelijk te wijten zijn aan het feit dat de richtlijn 
op Europees niveau tot stand is gekomen. Inderdaad, ook op het niveau van de Lidstaten kunnen dergelijke 
inefficiënties voorkomen. Toch is de richtlijn duidelijk het resultaat van een politiek 
onderhandelingsproces, hetgeen de inhoud van de richtlijn heeft beïnvloed. Met de moeizame 
onderhandelingen tijdens het ontwikkelingsproces van de richtlijn in het achterhoofd, krijgt men zelfs het 
idee dat op een gegeven moment het aannemen van de richtlijn belangrijker geacht werd, dan de inhoud 
van de richtlijn. Die inhoud kon op een later moment nog wel bijgeschaafd worden. 
Maar waarom werd het nodig geacht om de bevoegdheid voor milieuaansprakelijkheid te 
verschuiven van de Lidstaten naar het Europees niveau? 
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt of de richtlijn overeenkomt met de voorspellingen van het theoretische kader 
voor het optimale beslissingsniveau van aansprakelijkheid voor milieuverontreiniging, en indien niet, hoe 
de harmonisatie van milieuaansprakelijkheid, waaronder aansprakelijkheid voor bodemverontreiniging, in 
Europa verklaard kan worden. Hiervoor worden de argumenten van de Europese Commissie om de 
richtlijn te rechtvaardigen, zoals vereist op basis van het subsidiariteitsbeginsel en het 
proportionaliteitsbeginsel, vergeleken met de argumenten voor harmonisatie uit de economische theorie. 
Het blijkt dat, vanuit economisch standpunt, de redenen van de Commissie voor de richtlijn eerder 
zwak zijn, en dat deze geen verschuiving van de bevoegdheid voor milieuaansprakelijkheid, waaronder 
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ook aansprakelijkheid voor bodemverontreiniging, van de Lidstaten naar het Europees niveau zou 
rechtvaardigen. 
Inderdaad, vanuit economisch perspectief is de enige valabele reden voor centralisatie de 
internalisering van grensoverschrijdende schade. Echter, ook in dit geval zou een ‘transboundary-only’ 
regime volstaan, en zou geen volledige harmonisatie nodig zijn. Analyse van de richtlijn toont bovendien 
aan dat de richtlijn niet noodzakelijk het probleem van grensoverschrijdende schade zou oplossen. 
Anderzijds was al eerder aangehaald dat, omwille van schaalvoordelen in wetenschappelijk onderzoek of 
informatieverzameling, samenwerking tussen verschillende overheidsniveaus voordelig zou kunnen zijn. 
Echter, ook de mogelijkheid tot schaalvoordelen is geen reden voor vergaande centralisatie of harmonisatie. 
Vervolgens wordt aangetoond dat het risico op een race-to-the-bottom of op oneerlijke concurrentie, 
te wijten aan verschillen in aansprakelijkheidsregels in de Lidstaten, niet erg waarschijnlijk is, en dat deze 
argumenten daarom de harmonisatie van milieuaansprakelijkheid in Europa niet kunnen rechtvaardigen. 
Bovendien toont het doctoraatsonderzoek aan, dat de richtlijn geen ‘level playing field’ kan garanderen, of 
een vermindering in de transactiekosten kan realiseren, noch voor milieuaansprakelijkheid in het algemeen, 
noch specifiek voor aansprakelijkheid voor bodemverontreiniging. 
Met betrekking tot de twee volgende argumenten van de Commissie, wordt geargumenteerd dat de 
realisatie van het ‘vervuiler betaalt’ beginsel, het preventie- en het voorzorgsbeginsel, en de sanering en het 
herstel van het milieu op zich niet verklaren waarom milieuaansprakelijkheid op Europees niveau geregeld 
moest worden en waarom de Lidstaten dit niet zelf kunnen realiseren. Bovendien is het twijfelachtig dat de 
richtlijn het ‘vervuiler betaalt’ beginsel, het preventie- en het voorzorgsbeginsel, en de sanering en het 
herstel van het milieu zal kunnen realiseren. 
Tot slot, als het minimum beschermingsniveau argument geaccepteerd wordt als een valabele reden 
voor harmonisatie van milieuaansprakelijkheid op Europees niveau, dan moet er op gewezen worden dat 
deze reden voor harmonisatie niet gebaseerd is op economische efficiëntie, maar op de wens om de 
Europese burger een minimum milieukwaliteit te garanderen en te beschermen tegen milieuschade. Indien 
men hierbij echter de preferenties van de burgers in de verschillende Lidstaten ignoreert, is harmonisatie 
van milieuaansprakelijkheid op basis van dit argument, vanuit economisch perspectief, paternalistisch. 
Het besluit van deze analyse is niet dat er helemaal geen Europese actie zou mogen zijn op het gebied 
van bodemverontreiniging. Meer nog dan op theoretisch niveau moet en kan de vraag of 
milieuaansprakelijkheid in Europa gedecentraliseerd of gecentraliseerd moet worden niet in zwart-wit 
bewoordingen beantwoord worden. Bovendien is subsidiariteit geen kwestie van decentralisatie of 
centralisatie, maar laat het principe samenwerking tussen verschillende overheidsniveaus toe. Voor 
bodemverontreiniging bijvoorbeeld zou een Europees register van vervuilde sites een overzicht kunnen 
geven, duidelijkheid voor industrie kunnen scheppen en mogelijk de sanering van deze sites kunnen 
stimuleren. Niettemin vereist de diversiteit van de bodem in Europa en de verschillende problemen in de 
Lidstaten een lokaal bodembeleid. Daarom, zeker in het geval van bodemverontreiniging lijken de 
argumenten voor harmonisatie van aansprakelijkheid voor bodemverontreiniging, vanuit economisch 
perspectief, zwak. 
Samenvattend kan gesteld worden dat het regime van de richtlijn enkele inefficiënties vertoont. 
Bovendien blijkt uit de vergelijking van het theoretisch kader met ‘de praktijk’ in Europa dat er ‘meer 
Europa’ is en dat de richtlijn verder gaat dan wat het theoretische model zou suggereren. Anders gezegd, 
vanuit economisch perspectief is er een inefficiënte verschuiving van bevoegdheden van de Lidstaten naar 
het Europees niveau wat betreft milieuaansprakelijkheidsregels, waaronder aansprakelijkheid voor 
bodemverontreiniging. 
Daarom worden aanvullende redenen gezocht voor het bestaan van de richtlijn 
milieuaansprakelijkheid en voor bepaalde voorzieningen in de richtlijn zelf, op basis van de ‘private 
interest’ benadering. Inderdaad, om te begrijpen waarom de verschuiving van bevoegdheden voor 
milieuaansprakelijkheid van de Lidstaten naar het Europees niveau plaatsvond, en waarom de inhoud van 
de richtlijn is zoals ze is, mogen lobby-activiteiten van de verschillende belangengroepen in het 
wetgevingsproces van de richtlijn niet vergeten worden. Private interest theorieën kunnen hierbij helpen 
om de redenen te achterhalen voor de harmonisatie van milieuaansprakelijkheid in Europa, die niet 
gevonden konden worden op basis van de public interest benadering. 
In het bijzonder wordt onderzocht of, enerzijds, de inefficiënte verschuiving van bevoegdheden voor 
milieuaansprakelijkheid van de Lidstaten naar Europa veroorzaakt is door lobby-activiteiten van 
belangengroepen, en anderzijds, of de inefficiënties in de richtlijn zelf verklaard kunnen worden door deze 
lobby-activiteiten. 
Eerst wordt het wetgevingsproces van de richtlijn geanalyseerd op lobby-activiteiten. In een eerste 
stap wordt uitgelegd welke actoren betrokken waren bij het wetgevingsproces van de richtlijn, en wat hun 
belangen waren. Het wetgevingsproces van de richtlijn wordt in detail bestudeerd en er wordt aangegeven 
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in welke stadia en waar lobbying plaatsvond. In het bijzonder wordt gekeken naar lobby-activiteiten die 
betrekking hadden op vergunningsverweer en state-of-the-art verweer, additionele aansprakelijkheid van 
de Lidstaten en verplichte financiële verzekering. 
Het blijkt dat het bestaan en de inhoud van de richtlijn duidelijk beïnvloed zijn door lobby-
activiteiten, zowel van industrie als van milieuorganisaties, en door de invloed van de Lidstaten en de 
Commissie zelf. Dus, lobby-activiteiten van alle actoren die betrokken waren in het beslissingsproces van 
de richtlijn dragen bij tot de verklaring van het bestaan en de inhoud van de richtlijn. 
Vervolgens wordt onderzocht of de lobby-activiteiten, die waargenomen werden in het 
beslissingsproces van de richtlijn, en het resultaat van deze lobbying overeenkomen met de voorspellingen 
van de private interest theorieën die in het theoretisch deel besproken werden. Het lijkt dat het lobby-
gedrag wat betreft het overheidsniveau, waarop aansprakelijkheidsregels bepaald zouden kunnen worden, 
overeenkomsten vertoont met zowel de Becker als de Buchanon theorie over lobbying. Bovendien lijkt het 
dat milieugroeperingen, industrie, en de Lidstaten zelf, elk met hun eigen redenen, niet tegen het idee van 
een Europees aansprakelijkheidsregime waren of dit zelfs verwelkomden. De Commissie van haar kant zou 
(eveneens) het Europees aansprakelijkheidsregime verwelkomd kunnen hebben uit andere motieven dan 
het belang van de Europese burger en de bescherming van het milieu, zoals bijvoorbeeld de mogelijkheid 
om haar bevoegdheden uit te breiden op domeinen waar de Commissie tot op heden geen bevoegdheid 
had, zoals bijvoorbeeld bodembeleid. Kortom, de aanwezigheid van private belangen kunnen verklaren 
waarom de verschuiving van bevoegdheden voor milieuaansprakelijkheid plaatvond van de Lidstaten naar 
het Europees niveau, in tegenstelling tot wat de economische theorie suggereert. Bijgevolg, het antwoord 
op de vraag of de inefficiënte verschuiving van bevoegdheden voor milieuaansprakelijkheid van de 
Lidstaten naar Europa kan verklaard worden door lobby-activiteiten van belangengroepen kan positief 
beantwoord worden. 
Wat betreft de inhoud van de richtlijn zelf, wordt aangetoond dat de industrie, in vergelijking met 
milieugroeperingen, het meest succesvol was om zijn belangen te verdedigen en om bepaalde eisen 
ingewilligd te krijgen. Bijgevolg past het lobby-gedrag van de belangrijkste actoren in het beslissingsproces 
van de richtlijn wat betreft de inhoud van de richtlijn beter in Olson’s theorie van succesvolle, goed 
georganiseerde lobby-groepen, dan in Becker’s competitietheorie. Het lijkt dat ook de inefficiënties in de 
richtlijn zelf verklaard kunnen worden door lobby-activiteiten, en in het bijzonder door industrie-lobbying. 
Het antwoord op de vraag of de inefficiënties in de richtlijn zelf ook kunnen verklaard worden door 
lobbying, is daarom ook positief. 
Tot slot wordt onderzocht of lobbying meer inefficiënties veroorzaakt op het niveau van de lidstaten 
dan op Europees niveau en of daarom Europese actie gerechtvaardigd zou zijn, zoals ook onderzocht werd 
in het theoretisch deel. 
Er wordt aangetoond dat, in het geval van de Europese Unie, het voorbarig zou zijn te stellen dat 
milieugroeperingen altijd ondervertegenwoordigd zijn op Lidstaatniveau, in vergelijking met de industrie 
en dat daarom de bevoegdheid voor milieuregulering toegewezen moet worden aan het Europese niveau. 
In Europa kan het zijn dat industrie zowel op Europees niveau als Lidstaatniveau meer invloed heeft in 
vergelijking met milieugroeperingen. Redenen hiervoor zijn meer middelen en eenzelfde doel zodat 
industrie zich makkelijker over de landsgrenzen kan groeperen dan milieugroeperingen, die in sommige 
lidstaten meer invloed kunnen hebben dan in andere lidstaten. Het beslissingsproces van de richtlijn 
reflecteert inderdaad deze ongelijkheid en toont dat de industrie-lobby belangrijke toegevingen verkreeg, 
met name wat betreft het vergunningsverweer en het state-of-the-art verweer en verplichte verzekering. 
Niettemin lijkt het onrealistisch dat de industrie streefde naar een race-to-the-bottom in 
milieuaansprakelijkheid, en zijn hier geen indicaties voor. Het is realistischer dat de industrie een enigszins 
coherente (minimum) aanpak verkoos boven verschillende nationale aansprakelijkheidsregimes. In die zin 
kan de harmonisatie van milieuaansprakelijkheid in Europa gebruikt worden door de industrie om 
concurrentieverstoringen te vermijden. Echter, harmonisatie van marktvoorwaarden, om private belangen 
te dienen, is zeker geen valabel argument voor de verschuiving van bevoegdheden voor 
milieuaansprakelijkheid van de Lidstaten naar het Europese niveau. 
Dus, de redenering dat lobby-activiteiten meer verstoringen zouden veroorzaken op nationaal niveau 
dan op Europees niveau en dat daarom een Europees milieuaansprakelijkheidsregime gerechtvaardigd zou 
zijn, is voorbarig. Deze negatieve conclusie betekent niet dat de Lidstaten een efficiënt 
milieuaansprakelijkheidsregime zouden ontwerpen of dat lobbying minder ernstig is in de Lidstaten dan 
op Europees niveau. Het lobby-gedrag is zo complex dat iedere algemene conclusie vrijwel zeker fout zou 
zijn. 
Samenvattend, vanuit economisch perspectief, zijn de redenen die de Commissie aanhaalt ter 
verantwoording van de richtlijn eerder zwak, en rechtvaardigen ze geen verschuiving van bevoegdheden 
voor milieuaansprakelijkheid van de Lidstaten naar Europa. De private interest benadering levert echter 
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een waardevol inzicht in het lobby-gedrag tijdens het beslissingsproces van de richtlijn en draagt in 
belangrijke mate bij tot de verklaring waarom de richtlijn aangenomen werd op Europees niveau, in 
tegenstelling tot wat de economische theorie suggereert, en waarom bepaalde voorzieningen opgenomen 
zijn in de richtlijn, opnieuw in tegenstelling tot wat efficiënt zou zijn volgens de economische theorie. 
Concluderend leert dit onderzoek ons het volgende: De verschuiving van bevoegdheid voor 
milieuaansprakelijkheid van de Lidstaten naar het Europees niveau was inefficiënt en komt niet overeen 
met de economische criteria voor centralisatie. Tegelijkertijd maakt dit onderzoek duidelijk dat een 
milieuaansprakelijkheidsregime op Europees niveau onvermijdbaar was gezien de private belangen die 
speelden. Inderdaad, het is opmerkelijk dat alle belanghebbenden in het beslissingproces van de richtlijn 
eensgezind een aansprakelijkheidsregime op Europees niveau verwelkomden, zij het ieder om hun eigen 
redenen. De belangrijkste institutionele speler — de Europese Commissie — was voorstander van de 
richtlijn omdat deze de mogelijkheid bood om haar bevoegdheden uit te breiden op domeinen waar de 
Commissie tot dan toe geen bevoegdheid had, zoals bodembeleid. Ook de industrie en de 
milieugroeperingen waren voorstander van een aansprakelijkheidsregime op Europees niveau. 
Milieugroeperingen hoopten dat de verschuiving van bevoegdheid naar Europa zou leiden tot een strenger 
milieuaansprakelijkheidsregime en dat dit dan zou leiden tot een betere milieukwaliteit in Europa. De 
industrie prefereerde een Europees milieuaansprakelijkheidsregime dan weer voornamelijk voor het 
creëren van een ‘level playing field’ en gelijke marktvoorwaarden voor de industrie in alle Lidstaten. 
Indien men echter naar de inhoud van de richtlijn kijkt, dan blijkt, zoals in Hoofdstuk 5 wordt 
aangetoond, dat het regime van de richtlijn enkele inefficiënties vertoont. Deze zijn het resultaat van het feit 
dat alle belanghebbenden weliswaar een aansprakelijkheidsregime op Europees niveau wilden, maar 
uiteraard van mening verschilden over de inhoud van een dergelijk Europees 
milieuaansprakelijkheidsregime. Milieugroeperingen waren bijvoorbeeld hevig gekant tegen het 
vergunningsverweer en het state-of-the-art verweer, terwijl deze verweren voor de industrie een absolute 
must waren. Het gevolg is dat Europa nu inderdaad een Richtlijn Milieuaansprakelijkheid heeft, maar dat 
de invloed — precies omdat het een compromis tussen de verschillende belangengroepen betreft — eerder 
beperkt is. Het is bovendien ook moeilijk om een eenduidige winnaar van het lobbying proces aan te 
duiden. De reden hiervoor is dat cruciale voorzieningen ofwel doorgeschoven zijn naar de Lidstaten 
(bijvoorbeeld het al dan niet toekennen van het vergunningsverweer of het state-of-the-art verweer), ofwel 
op de lange baan geschoven zijn (zoals de beslissing om al dan niet verplichte financiële zekerheden te 
voorzien). De industrie, de milieugroeperingen en de Europese Commissie hebben dus nu wel een 
Europees milieuaansprakelijkheidsregime, maar de uiteindelijke invloed van de richtlijn zal afhangen van 
de implementatie van de richtlijn in de verschillende Lidstaten. De richtlijn zal bijgevolg geen gelijke 
marktvoorwaarden garanderen en het is al even twijfelachtig of de richtlijn zal zorgen voor een algehele 
verbetering van de milieukwaliteit in Europa. De echte winnaar is misschien nog eerder de Europese 
Commissie, die terrein heeft gewonnen op een belangrijk gebied van het milieurecht, namelijk 
bodemverontreiniging. Dat de richtlijn een inefficiënt compromis geworden is, deerde de Commissie 
blijkbaar niet, evenmin als de politici in de Raad, die de richtlijn aangenomen hebben. 
Verder toont het beslissingsproces van de richtlijn mooi aan dat de centralisatie/decentralisatie 
beslissing in Europa niet alleen gebaseerd is op economische overwegingen. De Commissie geeft weliswaar 
economische redenen voor centralisatie, maar in praktijk rechtvaardigen deze criteria geen centralisatie. 
Andere redenen spelen duidelijk een belangrijkere rol in de beslissing om de bevoegdheid van de Lidstaten 
naar het Europees niveau te verschuiven. Een andere reden die de Commissie aanhaalt heeft met 
rechtvaardigheid te maken. Het ‘transboundary only’-regime (waarbij een Europees regime alleen zou 
gelden voor grensoverschrijdende milieuschade) werd bijvoorbeeld door de Commissie verworpen omdat 
dit het gelijkheidsbeginsel in Europa zou schenden. Echter, het is waarschijnlijker dat macht en de 
uitbreiding van bevoegdheden voor de Europese instellingen de belangrijkste drijfveren waren achter de 
richtlijn. 
Alhoewel men op basis van bovenstaande analyse pessimistisch zou kunnen stellen dat in Europa 
geen rekening gehouden wordt met economische analyse en economische argumenten bij 
(de)centralisatiebeslissingen, geloven we dat het gebruik van economische argumenten op de manier zoals 
in dit onderzoek gebeurd is, toch nuttig is. 
Ten eerste kan door een positieve economische analyse een beter inzicht verkregen worden waarom 
bepaalde verschuivingen van bevoegdheid van het nationaal niveau naar het Europees niveau hebben 
plaatsgevonden. Als de public interest benadering geen afdoende verklaring kan geven voor bepaalde 
inefficiënte centralisatiepogingen, kan de private interest benadering een aanvullende verklaring bieden 
voor deze centralisatiepogingen. 
Ten tweede kunnen economische argumenten ook gebruikt worden op beleidsniveau. Inderdaad, 
voor beleidsmakers die geïnteresseerd zijn in het publiek belang, zijn economische criteria nuttig omdat ze 
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weergeven onder welke omstandigheden centralisatie kan bijdragen tot sociale welvaart en in welke 
omstandigheden niet. Ook kan economische theorie ook gebruikt worden om aan te tonen dat een 
inefficiënte verschuiving van bevoegdheden naar het Europees niveau soms plaatsvindt louter omwille van 
een machtsstrijd tussen de Europese Commissie en de Lidstaten.economische argumenten in het bied van 
milieurecht, centralisatie gewenst is door de industie om of kan public choice analyse aantonen dat, speciaal 
op het gebied van milieurecht, centralisatie soms gewenst is door de industrie, puur en alleen om 
handelsbarrières te creëren. 
Bijgevolg, de economische analyse, zoals toegepast in dit onderzoek, laat toe om de gevolgen aan te 
tonen van een centralisatie die niet gebaseerd is op economische criteria, en kan zowel op positief als 
normatief niveau gebruikt worden. Bovendien kan de economische analyse een bijdrage leveren in de strijd 
tegen de lobbying van belangengroepen en de Europese Commissie voor een inefficiëntie verschuiving van 
bevoegdheden naar Europa. 
Nu, hoe het ook zij, de richtlijn is in werking getreden. Een interpretatie van de richtlijn conform zijn 
doel en de algemene beginselen van het Europese milieubeleid lijkt de beste optie om de richtlijn de kans te 
geven om uit te groeien tot een bruikbaar instrument om milieuverontreiniging in de Europese Unie te 
voorkomen en te herstellen. 
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